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Reflections on the Middle East *Charles Burton Marshall*

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Reviews *Edward Teller, Vladimir Petrov, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Harry J. Psomiades, Bernard F. Donahue, Young W. Kihl*

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Reflections on the Quarter

The Arab-Israeli Military Confrontation

AS long-standing disputes erupted into general conflict in the spring of 1967, the Middle East once again became the center of world attention. In the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities in June, tension between the Arab states and Israel rose dramatically. Border clashes and violations of frontiers, particularly between Israel and Syria, contributed to the deteriorating situation. By calling for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line, President Nasser set in motion a series of events that resulted in the six-day war between Israel and her Arab neighbors. On May 16 Egyptian troops, replacing the UN force established after the Suez crisis of 1956, occupied positions along the armistice line; two days later Nasser called for the removal of remaining UN troops from Egyptian territory.

The decision of UN Secretary-General Thant to comply immediately with the Egyptian request met with adverse reaction in Western countries. Israeli officials called it "disastrously hasty." U Thant replied that he lacked the legal or political basis for leaving the force in Egypt without Egyptian consent. Moreover, in his estimation it was doubtful that the presence of the force under such circumstances could have prevented the outbreak of conflict. In reply to Nasser's demand, India and Yugoslavia pulled out their contingents. Other UN members who had contributed to the force objected to U Thant's decision but offered no alternative plan.

With the removal of the UN force, Egyptian troops occupied the Straits of Tiran commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and threatened to close this waterway to Israeli shipping. The failure of the Great Powers, especially the United States, to react to these moves—in particular to the closing of the Straits of Tiran—compelled Israel to insist on an international guarantee of free access to the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1957 Israel had relinquished control over the Straits and removed its troops from Sharm el Sheikh only after receiving a guarantee of freedom of passage for Israeli shipping. She considered Nasser's closing of the Straits an act of war. Since the 1956 Suez crisis, the importance of the Israeli port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba had increased, and Israeli officials claimed that free passage through the Straits and Gulf was vital to Israel's economy. The unwillingness of other powers to guarantee free access heightened tensions already near the breaking point.

When the armed conflict erupted

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in June, Egypt had deployed approximately 100,000 soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula, Syria about 40,000 in the Golan Heights which overlook Israel's border, and Jordan more than 20,000 in the West Bank. In addition, Iraq and other states sent troops to bolster the forces of their Arab allies. The Soviet Union and other communist states had provided billions of dollars worth of military assistance that enabled the Arab states to threaten Israel. However, the superior training, morale and mobility of the Israeli military forces more than compensated for the Arab advantage in modern equipment. Within twelve hours after the outbreak of hostilities, the Arab air forces had been destroyed, largely on the ground, affording the Israelis unchallenged control of the air. The poorly coordinated Arab land effort was no match for Israeli forces, which quickly seized control of the Sinai Peninsula, Sharm el Sheikh, Gaza, the Golan Heights inside Syria, and the West Bank of Jordan.

These military victories were followed by diplomatic success in the United Nations, where Soviet-led efforts to force an immediate, unconditional Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory failed. Only resolutions opposing Israel's annexation of the old city of Jerusalem received unanimous support in the UN sessions. In the confrontation, the Soviet Union and other communist states, with the exception of Rumania, broke diplomatic relations with Israel and pledged full support to the Arab states. Even after Nasser's massive defeat, Soviet arms and technicians continued to pour into Egypt. In response, the United States and Britain announced in late August that arms sales to Israel and Jordan would be resumed.

Various efforts have been made since June to reach a Middle East settlement. This time, however, the Israelis are determined to remain in regions captured during the six-day war until they have reached a permanent settlement with the Arab states. Apparently Israel has as its principal objectives to achieve diplomatic and legal acceptance by the Arab states, to secure safeguards against the border violence that has erupted sporadically since the founding of Israel, and to gain access to the Suez Canal for Israeli shipping.

In contrast, Arab leaders seem not to have reached full agreement on a common policy. At the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in August in Khartoum, no substantive issues were settled. Syria and Algeria announced their opposition to any compromise plan; the Algerian representative boycotted the conference and left Khartoum in protest. Differences developed among Arab governments on the issues of Yemen and the continuation of an embargo on shipments of petroleum to Western states which allegedly had assisted Israel. No agreement was reached on either issue.

Serious problems face the nations of the Middle East. The loss of revenue from the closing of the Suez Canal, the sharp reduction in the number of tourists, the partial destruction of the cotton

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crop by insects, and the capture of Egyptian oil wells in the Sinai Peninsula has inflicted grave damage upon the Egyptian economy. Economically, Jordan was heavily dependent on the West Bank, which served as the "bread basket" for the country as well as the principal attraction for tourists visiting Jordan. In the aftermath of the Israeli-Arab military confrontation, political problems abound as well. Although saved by a shrewdly inspired popular display in his behalf immediately following the war, Nasser's political fortunes are uncertain. The arrest of fifty top Egyptian military officers points up the unrest in Cairo. In Jordan, King Hussein's throne, like President Al-Natassi's position in Syria, is in danger.

Israel as well faces numerous problems that are likely to increase with the passage of time. Principal among them is the pacification and integration of the population in occupied areas, especially Gaza and the West Bank. The threat of insurrection remains present, even though for the moment the populations of occupied areas are largely quiescent. The Israelis have taken it upon themselves to revitalize the economies of captured areas. Wherever possible, they have attempted to reorganize Arab administrative units. The return of refugees to the West Bank, begun on August 18, may add to Israel's problems. Moreover, the question of the future of Jerusalem remains, despite the apparent resolve of Israel not to relinquish control of the old city. Within Israel, feelings run high for the retention of the old city, even though there are strong foreign pressures for its internationalization, if not for its return to Jordan. The war and the occupation of territory several times larger than Israel have imposed some strain on the Israeli economy. However, the temporary retention of occupied territory is essential if Israel is to bargain from a position of strength for a Middle East settlement.

Continued Soviet support for Arab belligerence as a means to further Moscow's own objectives in the Middle East could contribute to prolonged instability in this troubled region. For the Soviets, the defeat of the Arab states, upon which they have lavished vast amounts of military assistance, was surely a disappointment. It was even a setback. Yet, in a sense the Soviets could hardly lose. Had the Arabs been victorious, the Soviets could have claimed much of the credit and would have wielded considerable influence. When the Soviet-supported Arab venture misfired, the Soviets suffered a loss of prestige—but the Arab leaders had nowhere else to turn for continued support and, hence, have become, at least for the near future, more dependent on the Soviet Union. In addition, Arab relations with the West are severely strained and in some cases diplomatic ties are broken; the restoration of friendly relations will require months and perhaps years of patient diplomacy.

The Soviets today are more firmly entrenched in the Middle East than they were in May 1967. Soviet influence is not likely to be diminished until Israel and her

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Arab neighbors achieve a permanent settlement satisfactory to both sides. This, in turn, depends on the willingness of the Arab states, after a generation of conflict, to accept Israel as a neighboring state.

Britain's Second Common Market Bid

ON May 2 Prime Minister Wilson announced in the House of Commons that the British government had "decided to make an application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome for membership of the European Economic Community and . . . the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom." The second British attempt to join the Common Market followed a series of discussions between Britain and her prospective EEC partners, as well as a detailed examination, within the British government, of the potential implications of entry. According to Wilson, his government had chosen this moment for application because "our discussions in the capitals of the Six have confirmed the validity of this approach in terms of the practical working of the Community and its institutions."

At the time of Britain's first Common Market application, in July 1961, British officials had outlined a series of major problems which had to be resolved before Britain joined the European Community. Although prepared in principle to accept the Rome Treaty, Britain had sought changes in, and in some cases exceptions to, the EEC's common external tariff, in order to safeguard Commonwealth trade. Moreover, the British government had sought concessions from the Six in order to enable Britain to adapt her agricultural policy to that of the EEC. Finally, Britain had pledged not to join the Common Market until all other EFTA countries had worked out satisfactory arrangements with the Six for their essential trading interests. Given these British commitments and interests, the Brussels negotiations, which lasted from the autumn of 1961 to January 1963, were necessarily tedious and protracted.

Since the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations the problems surrounding Britain's application have changed considerably. Although certain issues remain, others have diminished in importance. According to Wilson, the two major issues are: (1) the operation of the Common Market agricultural policy and its potential effect on the cost of living, the structure of British agriculture, and the balance of payments; and (2) the future of New Zealand's trade and the exports of sugar-producing Commonwealth countries.

After conducting detailed studies of these problems, the British government concluded that they could be resolved without another series of long negotiations with the Six or substantial changes in the Rome Treaty, to which Common Market governments are opposed.

By the spring of 1967, Prime Minister Wilson, even as the Conservative Government which preceded him, had become convinced that British entry into the Com-

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mon Market was vital to the future expansion of the British economy. Once noted for his reservations about the European Community, Wilson now argued that Common Market membership would provide a stimulus to businessmen to increase production, sales and plant capacity. Moreover, entry into the EEC would make it possible for Britain to exploit advantages in advanced technologies. Like other European leaders, Wilson has become apprehensive of the development of an Atlantic technological imbalance in which Western Europe may fall farther behind the United States in such fields as electronics, computers, aircraft, rocketry, space satellites and nuclear energy. Without the enlargement of the European Community to include Britain, there would be little prospect of maintaining the existing British technological position vis-à-vis the United States, not to speak of strengthening the competitive position of European industries in fields where the Atlantic technological imbalance is greatest.

To a far greater extent than was the case when Britain first applied for Common Market membership, the British government has expressed interest in European political integration. According to Wilson, however important the economic rationale, the political arguments for Common Market membership were "decisive" in leading Britain to apply a second time. Politically united, Western Europe can play in international affairs a role which is no longer open to the individual nation-state.

In contrast to the situation prevailing in 1961 when the British electorate became deeply divided, the Wilson Cabinet enjoys the support of a broadly based consensus in favor of Common Market membership. This time the Opposition has committed itself to European integration to an even greater extent than the Prime Minister's party. Having accepted for the most part the economic arguments in favor of Common Market membership, Conservative spokesmen, including Edward Heath, have advocated creating a European political community that would provide for an Anglo-French nuclear force as the core of a more broadly based European deterrent.

The principal obstacle to British Common Market membership remains France. In the official French view, it is necessary for Britain to solve her own major economic problems, including domestic inflation and balance of payments deficits. Moreover, the position of sterling as a reserve currency, unique among European countries, is a stumbling block. According to a statement by President de Gaulle at his press conference of May 17: "In fact, parity and monetary solidarity are essential rules, essential conditions of the Common Market. They cannot be extended to our neighbors across the Channel unless some day the pound sterling appears in a completely new position so that its future value appears assured, it is freed from its character as a reserve currency, and the mortgage of Britain's sterling balance within the sterling area disappears." So long as Britain retains for sterling

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the role of a reserve currency, she will face periodic economic crises that will make it impossible for her to fulfill her obligations as a Common Market member. De Gaulle is not prepared to have France, or the EEC, assume the economic burdens of preserving sterling as a reserve currency, should Britain face another major economic crisis after joining the Common Market.

In addition to domestic economic reforms, Gaullist criteria for British Common Market membership include the development of a "European" outlook on issues of major international importance. In his May 17 press conference, de Gaulle declared: "The idea, the hope which, from the beginning, led the Six continental countries to unite tended without any doubt toward the formation of a unit which would be European in all respects, and, because of this would become capable not only of carrying its own weight in production and trade but also of acting one day politically by itself and for itself toward anyone." According to de Gaulle, the British do not yet place primary emphasis upon "European" interests, even though admittedly the "European" orientation of Britain has increased since the first Common Market application. The British retain a "special relationship" with the United States, as well as a "special commitment" in various parts of the world which "distinguishes them from the continentals." Undoubtedly, British disagreement with the EEC at the time of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations in Geneva, British support for U.S. policy in Viet Nam, and the conflict between British and French policy toward a nonproliferation treaty and the Arab-Israeli conflict, contribute to de Gaulle's assessment that Britain is not yet sufficiently "European" in outlook.

So long as Britain has not transformed herself from a power with worldwide interests to an exclusively European country, British entry into the Common Market, in de Gaulle's estimation, would have a major effect upon the institutions of the European Community. Britain's delegates would "represent the very substantial and very special mass of interests and of economic and political authorities of their own country," and would be "joined there immediately by the delegations of several of the states which now constitute with them the Free Trade Area (EFTA); it is obvious that the inspirations, dimensions and decisions of what is today the organization of the Six would give way to an inspiration, dimensions, and decisions that would be entirely different."

Apparently de Gaulle fears the transformation of a tightly-knit European Community into a much less cohesive organization. According to the French President, the admission of Britain would reduce the level of consensus among EEC members. But French spokesmen have used yet another argument against British entry. According to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, British Common Market membership would so strengthen the West European bloc as to force the East European communist states to revert to closer ties with

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the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would dampen the prospects for the attainment of another Gaullist objective: a European association of states embracing Eastern and Western Europe. Whatever the likely impact of British Common Market entry upon relations between East European communist states and the Soviet Union, this argument is inconsistent with the Gaullist contention that British admission would reduce the cohesiveness of the EEC, and thus weaken the European Community.

Apparently, the strategy of the Wilson Cabinet is to refuse to accept a negative French response. In a statement to the House of Commons on May 17, Wilson declared that Britain would "not take 'no' for an answer." British policy, it seems, is designed to respond to each French argument against Common Market membership in the hope eventually of attracting support from the other EEC countries and isolating France from her European neighbors. Britain appears determined not only to make a success of whatever negotiations are conducted, but as Wilson suggested, "to carry them forward as quickly as lies within our power."

Whether or not Britain can satisfy Gaullist criteria for sufficient "Europeanness" is not certain. No other European country, not even among the existing members of the Common Market, has fully met the criteria set for Britain. There is no "European policy" on major international political issues. On economic policy, a "European" position has emerged only after extensive negotiations, together with trade-offs, among the Six. As part of the Common Market, Britain would participate in the so-called Community method of evolving a European position on economic issues. Outside the EEC, it is doubtful whether France's Common Market partners, any more than Britain, would have developed such a position.

In its second bid for EEC membership, the British government enjoys greater flexibility than on the occasion of the first application. To a far greater extent than previously, Britain is prepared, politically and psychologically, to meet French objections to her Common Market candidacy. If France is to exclude Britain, de Gaulle may be compelled to lengthen his list of criteria. In this event an unavowed motive in vetoing Britain's bid may become clear: de Gaulle's opposition rests on his unwillingness to acquiesce in a British bid for the leadership of Western Europe, or even to go shares with Britain. As in the case of his Quebec policy and his withdrawal from the NATO command structure, de Gaulle rejects French subordination to "Anglo-Saxon" hegemony. If such fears condition his opposition to the new British bid for Common Market membership, Britain will face a long period of uncertainty about her application.

The Havana Conference

AS a result of the initiative of Premier Fidel Castro, the first conference of the Organization of

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Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) convened in Havana from August 1 to 8. For the most part, the participants included revolutionaries whose objective was to press Latin American communist parties toward a more militant strategy and to achieve greater coordination for the pursuit of "national liberation wars." Among those in attendance were representatives of splinter groups who shared at least one conviction: that the older communist movements in their respective countries have become too soft, divided and subservient to Soviet policy. In addition, several East European countries, together with North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam (Viet Cong), sent observers. The self-styled representative of the American Negro community, Stokely Carmichael, attended as an observer but was given the title of honorary delegate by Castro.

Although the conference was designed, as its title suggests, to achieve "solidarity" among Western Hemisphere communist movements, some Latin American communist parties—for example, those of Argentina and Venezuela—sent no participants. The conference was the object of denunciation by other communist movements, including an attack upon Castro published on July 30 in *Pravda* by Luís Corvalán, Secretary General of the Chilean Communist Party. Criticizing Castro's strategy, Corvalán recalled that Lenin had "warned against the danger of adventurism, which as a rule results in the loss of precious lives of revolutionaries and the retreat of the movement." He accused Castro of seeking to destroy other communist parties and thereby providing "a gift to imperialism" and took issue with Castro's contention that some Latin American communist parties are weak because of their reliance upon "bourgeois elements."

The principal theme of Havana was: "The first duty of all revolutionaries is to make revolution." Dissenting communists, especially the leaders of the older Latin American parties, advocated a "popular front" strategy in which communists would work with "bourgeois" elements in the attainment of revolutionary objectives. In sum, the dispute which this conference pointed up revolves around the appropriate strategy to "unite, coordinate, and set up the struggle against United States imperialism on the part of all the exploited peoples of Latin America."

The deliberations and resolutions of the conference reflected the dominance of Castro's followers. The conferees called for the "seizure of power through armed struggle" throughout the Western Hemisphere. According to the resolution, the people of Latin America have but two choices: to succumb to the pressures of U.S. "imperialism," or to resist and fight. A second resolution condemned the Organization of American States, and urged Latin Americans to reject "servile Pan-Americanism" and instead to join the "struggle for the liquidation of the imperialists' exploitations."

Another resolution, which re-

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ceived approval by a vote of 15 to 3 with 9 abstentions, condemned Soviet policies on economic and technical assistance. The resolution denounced the policies of "certain Socialist countries" whose governments extend credits and technical aid to "dictatorships" and "oligarchies" in the hemisphere. In particular, this resolution was critical of Poland and the Soviet Union for having signed economic and technical assistance agreements with Brazil, Chile and Colombia.

Stokely Carmichael attempted to link the riots in U.S. cities to a broader hemispheric strategy designed to overthrow existing governments. Wars of national liberation would be fought not only in the rural areas of Latin America, but in the urban centers of the United States. Quoting Che Guevara, Carmichael declared that: "Hatred is an element of the struggle, transforming [war] into an effective, violent, selective and cold killing machine." He called for a "second or a third Vietnam" in this hemisphere.

The OLAS Conference differed in several respects from the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January 1966. At the earlier conference the Soviet Union appeared to play a more active role, not only in the deliberations but behind the scenes as well. At the OLAS Conference the Soviet Union was the object of criticism, and pro-Soviet Latin American communist parties were conspicuous by their absence. Although it was not totally absent from the Tri-Continental Conference, the theme of the "Negro Revolution" in the United States was given a far more prominent place in the deliberations of the OLAS meeting.

To a greater extent than the Tri-Continental Conference, the OLAS meeting provided evidence of the split within, and weakness of, the communist movement of the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, it has been estimated that, from a total population of 170 million, there are less than 1,000 guerrilla fighters engaged in "national liberation wars" throughout Latin America—too small a band to have a great impact upon an area more than twice the size of the United States. Yet in several Latin American countries communist insurrectionary forces have resisted efforts to dislodge them.

Although the Havana Conference revealed differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Soviets continue to provide massive economic and military assistance to Castro. While thus supporting Castro's militant policy, the Soviets pursue a strategy designed to expand communist influence in Latin America through economic agreements, cultural exchanges and other forms of "peaceful coexistence." Such a two-pronged strategy provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity to pose as a non-militant power, while backing, by deeds more than by words, Castro's call for "national liberation wars." It could lead to various outcomes. Were Castro successful in overthrowing one or more Latin American governments, Cuba, not the Soviet Union, would become the undisputed leader of the Latin American communist movement.

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But the United States would have suffered a grave political and psychological reverse, thus serving the objectives of both Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The Nigerian Civil War

BOTH because of its size and its population Nigeria stands out among African states like a giant among pygmies. Until 1966 Western statesmen were hopeful that Nigeria would be a stabilizing force in Africa, influencing other young states to choose the path toward representative government and showing how unity can be created from diversity. But the civil war that erupted in May between the federal government under Major General Yakuba Gowon and the Eastern, Ibo state of Biafra has sundered Nigerian national unity. Although British rule had brought more than fifty peoples under one political system, tribal antagonisms among the three largest ethnic groups—the Yoruba, the Hausa and the Ibo—began to harden soon after independence in 1960. The British bequeathed to Nigeria a federal system of government which, as of 1967, consisted of four regions: the coastal Western, Mid-Western and Eastern regions, and the interior Northern region.

Dissatisfaction with the domination of the federal government by the Northern Moslem Hausa tribe led to a coup d'état in January 1966 in which a group of non-Northern army officers, mostly Ibo, attempted to install a Yoruba (Western) as Prime Minister. Northern resentment led to a counter-coup in July 1966 by Northern officers who installed Major General Gowon as Prime Minister. In this coup, more than 200 Ibo officers were killed. Two months later, the Hausas instigated a mass pogrom of the Ibo minority living in the North. Few Ibo villages were unaffected by the slaughter. Since September 1966 almost two million Ibo refugees have poured into Biafra, where most members of the Ibo tribe live.

For several months, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of Eastern Nigeria, resisted Ibo secessionist pressures in the hope that the break from the federal government could be made peacefully. In the early months of 1967 Major General Gowon attempted to discipline the Eastern region with economic measures but these proved largely ineffectual and unenforceable. By May pressures had mounted both within the federal government and the Eastern (Ibo) region. The threatened secession of the East, the mobilization of federal troops, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the campaign to strangle the East economically, masked a deteriorating political situation in Western Nigeria. Yoruba pressure to remove Northern troops from the Western region, which includes the capital, Lagos, had increased to the point where federal authorities could no longer ignore it. In fact many of the government's economic countermeasures against the East may have been equally directed at the Western (Yoruba) region, where

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opposition to federal authorities was mounting.

After months of threats, conferences, offers and counteroffers, the Eastern region seceded on May 30 and created the state of Biafra with Colonel Ojukwu as head of government. The federal government tightened its blockade around Biafra. While the northern border of Biafra, as well as the western border (the Niger River), could be closed, the eastern frontier with the Cameroon could not be sealed. Moreover, Gowon was hampered in his attempts to blockade the Biafra coast by the small size of the Nigerian Navy (one frigate and three small vessels) and by the loss of the Navy's Ibo personnel. It was not until July that the Navy was able to take effective action against Biafra.

On July 7 fighting broke out on the northern frontier of Biafra. The military forces of both sides were too small for either to win a quick, decisive victory. Biafra probably can field little more than the equivalent of four battalions, together with some helicopters, small civilian aircraft and one B-26 bomber. Federal forces were hampered by the poor road system in the North which the rainy season and heavy military traffic soon turned into a series of quagmires. Supply and communications difficulties hindered federal progress on the northern front. By mid-July, however, federal troops had captured the town of Nsukka, fifteen miles inside Biafra's northern border and forty-nine miles north of Enugu, the Biafran capital. While the Biafrans are not as well armed as federal troops, the Northerners have had to deal with a hostile populace and Enugu's "scorched earth" policy. In mid-July the federal and Biafran air forces exchanged a few minor strafing and bombing attacks on each other's capital cities. On July 26 federal troops landed by the Nigerian Navy captured the Bonny oil terminal, from which petroleum is shipped from Biafra.

In spite of consistent pressure on the northern front, Colonel Ojukwu moved his Ibo forces into the Mid-Western region on August 10. One day later, when federal troops mutinied, the Eastern forces captured Benin, the capital of the Mid-Western region. The ease with which Biafra forces advanced can be attributed in part to the fact that about 40 per cent of the Mid-Western population are also Ibos. Moreover, as many as seven of nine colonels in command of federal troops in the region were of Ibo origin (Ojukwu's mother was a Mid-Western Ibo).

After occupying the Mid-Western region, a Biafran force pushed across its northern border on August 14 in what was apparently a flanking maneuver for a major push on August 19 into the Western region toward Ibadan and Lagos. By August 21 Biafra had captured the important crossroads town of Ore, seventeen miles inside the Western region and only 135 miles from Lagos. Apparently Ojukwu was attempting to achieve a breakthrough to Lagos before the federal government's recently ordered Soviet MIG-15's and Czech L-29's could be used against

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him. Meanwhile, federal troops were reported on August 22 to have reached Eha Amufu, only twenty-four miles from the Biafran capital, and further advances by Gowon's forces were reported in early September.

Like many other internal conflicts, the Nigerian civil war was quickly internationalized. Biafra purchased a B-26 bomber from a private arms dealer who had previously bought it from the French Air Force. As early as August 1, a Nigerian mission was in Moscow to attempt to purchase arms. On August 23 the federal government announced "a limited purchase of arms" from the Soviet Union; it has been reported that Lagos acquired fifteen MIG-15's and at least four Czech L-29 jet trainers, as well as a considerable number of Soviet "training technicians" to service the aircraft. Biafra has also received some Czech small arms and ammunition through private channels.

Undoubtedly Biafra has the potential to become a viable nation-state if it survives the war. With a population of fourteen million, it contains more people than other African states such as Ghana, Kenya, Algeria or Morocco. The country has large oil reserves and other resources, but the Ibo people themselves are its greatest resource. The enterprising Ibos have filled a large percentage of the jobs in the modernized sectors of the Nigerian economy. They form a large part of Nigeria's educated upper and middle classes. By 1945 more Ibos were studying abroad than all other Nigerian tribesmen combined. The ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity of Biafra stands in marked contrast to the majority of African states. Loyalty to the Ibo "nation" as a whole is not just a recent phenomenon; for more than a generation it has been nurtured in the Ibo conscience and it is not likely that such a national consciousness can be easily snuffed out.

The civil war has complicated Nigeria's relations with other countries. The federal government has accused the United States of "meddling" in the civil war and of seeking to "Balkanize" the country in order to gain control of the nation's oil. According to Radio Nigeria, run by the federal government, the United States has "meddled" in Nigeria's internal affairs by refusing to sell arms. Although the United States continues to recognize the federal government, the Johnson Administration attempted to maintain a position of neutrality in the civil conflict. In contrast, communist states have offered arms to both protagonists.

The civil war has gravely weakened Nigeria. It is doubtful whether the internal unity of the country can be restored. Even if the federal forces are victorious, it is unlikely that General Gowon would have the military capability needed to pacify and control such a large and hostile population. The prospects for unity will not be bright unless the federal government adopts a policy of conciliation toward the Ibos and restores a viable federal system providing considerable autonomy for the Ibos and other Nigerian peoples.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

by Charles Burton Marshall

A REPORT on the Middle East issued a few years ago by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations summed up in apt words: ". . . the area remains obdurately a most *disorderly* part of the world; geographically, racially, culturally, economically, and above all, politically, there is a profound inconsistency about the area. For every rule there is an exception, for every premise a contradiction." Shortly after arrival at his Cairo post in late May a debutant American Ambassador publicly appraised the Middle East situation at the moment as closer to normal than to crisis. It was a connoisseur's judgment. An amateur would find such a distinction as difficult as detecting the subtleties of different vintages from the same vineyard. In international affairs the overworked but indispensable word *crisis* denotes a problem loaded with immediate potential for war or threatening one or more regimes' hold on authority—most probably both, because war and the tenure of regimes are almost invariably connected. In a measure distinctive among the world's regions, the Middle East is marked by crisis protracted to normality. Accordingly it offers considerable opportunities for contemplation of crisis-management, which, in our over elaborative age, is a term of art for the age-old business of trying to stay out of trouble while striving to have one's way.

My thoughts here are merely a distant observer's musings on this topic in connection with the lightning war which followed so soon upon the Ambassador's reassurances. They do not purport to narrate or fully to analyze the happenings referred to. They are glosses on a few aspects, offered with some sense of presumption, because I am surely no expert on the Middle East, where cumulatively I have spent about thirty days, mostly sightseeing in and around the capitals of six of the lands concerned. Except in gross dimensions, moreover, the concatenation preceding the war remains a matter of guesswork. Because the losers' files will probably not be sifted by the winners' analysts, the contributory events may never be comprehended in depth and precision matching what is known of some aspects of the onset of the two World Wars, for example. The Soviet Union will be mum or dissimu-

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lating. The Israelis will probably keep a great many secrets to themselves. It is not, however, a case of nothing being available. The governments concerned have made voluminous public utterances. The verbal processes at the United Nations alone produced huge amounts of relevant wordage, but wringing solid information from all such is like getting gold from sea water. With what information can be gleaned, one must try to comprehend how the flare-up was sparked—how diverse versions of crisis-management maintained in the Arab states concerned, Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States interacted to produce a war.

I

Brevity in discussing relevant attitudes among the Arab societies is not easy. The special potency of Arab rhetoric is a factor. I recall a Jordanian psychiatrist's explanation to me a few years ago. The Arabs, mostly needy, find words the least expensive substitute for alcohol, which is denied to them by religious precept. Like any intoxicant, the hyperbole in which their tongue is rich tends to unleash credulity. Any rousing speech may bring on a jag. The fact of having a common language across the Arab zone is also relevant. Successful political personalities may project by mass media to the other lands, so that the jag may overlap boundaries.

Such reactivity produces an impression of community and nationhood. The Arab states' regional organization is the world's most elaborate and pervasive one. There is much talk of Arab brotherhood based on traditions from a great Arab past of a millennium or so ago, when Arab order and unity prevailed from the Atlantic shores to the Persian Gulf and Arab power dominated the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and extended to Bengal. In practice, the dozen or so Arab states are recurringly at loggerheads. Arab nationhood is an expression rather than a reality. Brotherliness between one regime and another is often in a Cain-and-Abel motif. The League of Arab States, however imposing in concept, is a feeble reality. Its solemn principles are mostly flouted. In concrete considerations as opposed to abstract, the Arab lands reflect a diversity of interests related to differing economic resources and stakes, to divergent historic experiences, and to contrasting relationships to outside powers.

Despite actual divisions, the idea of unification as the only

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rightful frame of political authority for Arabdom persists as a reproach to the legitimacy of existing Arab regimes. The result is a paradox bordering on contradiction. Arab regimes in general feel compelled to pay tribute to ideas tending to discredit their own rightful existence, but Arab regimes go on trying to maintain separate existence counter to the ideal they vaunt. The urge for unity, which none can renounce, engenders an intermittent jostle for dominance and survival. The combinations vary from stage to stage. Only a real expert, if anyone at all, could with assurance describe the pattern of interlocking contentions at any moment. In recent times cleavages have been marked between Arab regimes espousing versions of socialist progressivism and revolution and enjoying the Soviet Union's sponsorship and other Arab regimes of more traditional mold opposed to the Soviet Union's purposes. These opposing groups have themselves been riven by secondary animosities.

The fact of Israel's existence—with a population culturally and religiously differentiated from the Arabs and a position bisecting the Arab range—gallingly epitomizes Arab frustration, because it has been established and aggrandized in face of Arab hostility and despite huge Arab advantage in numbers. The emotion of pride requires attributing this result to factors of outside assistance. Israel's existence is thus seen as artificial, spurious, obtrusive and aggressive, a lingering effect of foreign power exercised within what is rightfully Arab domain. The UN's "good-housekeeping seal" implanted on Israel's origin does not allay but accentuates the affront. Israel's independence must not be acknowledged. War, conceptual if not actual, must be maintained against Israel. Arab regimes' conviction on this score varies from velleity to militance. For many of them, however, the issue involves survival. Any gesture of formal accommodation to Israel's existence would precipitate rebellion. In substantial numbers, in extreme poverty, and in apathy relieved only by hatred for what has overtaken them, Palestinian Arabs who fled or were dispossessed in the violence incident to Israel's emergence two decades ago have lingered on in the environs. With a militant organization and a subsidized force, they dispose a potential for raids and sabotage against Israel and for undercutting Arab governments which might otherwise be inclined to come to terms with it.

In sum, opposition to Israel's existence and the proposition that Israel's presence in the Arab midst is an aggressive one requiring ultimate elimination are the two ideas on which Arab

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unity has been able to manifest itself. Thus Arabdom's most notable failure has provided the basis of Arab unity's one enduring success. Whatever there is of reality in Arab unity has hinged on maintaining the myth of Israel's nonentity. Yet ambivalence has persisted, because of reluctance about coming to grips in the ever vaunted war and because of the double advantage in claiming noncombatant immunities along with belligerent privileges. The activist Arabs' course of contrived ambiguity played out this spring, and war suddenly became unequivocal.

II

Israel's ever imminent difficulty has risen, obviously, from the fact of having control of territory in dispute with all its neighbors adjoining and beyond—not a question merely of legitimate location of boundaries, because any dimension whatever, the basic fact of existence itself, for an independent Israel is repugnant to them in varying degrees. The Israeli response to this circumstance and the attendant dangers has been affected by contrasting views of the country's relationship to the world at large.

One sort of attitude is identified, though not exclusively, with Palestinian-born senior Israelis and with the upcoming generation. It is inward-oriented. It might be described as the Canaanite attitude. The present state is regarded as a re-embodiment of the kingdoms of 933-722 and 168-63 B.C. The two millennia of the dispersion are dismissed as a parenthesis in history. This view accords with Niccolo Machiavelli's precept: "That deliverance is of no avail that does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valor." Any hint of clientage to outside forces is shunned. The notion of Israel as a product of the United Nations—of Israel's national existence as stemming from a General Assembly resolution—is regarded as a formalistic absurdity. As the core fact in Israel's revived existence, a determining number of Jews fought for it and brought force to bear decisively. Their will to persevere has accounted for Israel's subsequent survival amid numerically superior enemies. Israel's future will be contingent on the same factor.

The other attitude looks outward. It regards a balance of exterior forces as the main circumstance essential to Israel's emergence. In view of Israel's statistically precarious situation, it stresses similar considerations for the present and future. The

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attitude is maintained largely among those who have come to Israel as a refuge from abroad. It is especially concerned for the situation of Jewish kinsmen remaining in other lands. It manifests habits acquired in getting along in minority positions amid divergent environments. It puts stress on finesse, temporizing, abatement, deference, the avoidance of confrontation. It emphasizes in particular a need for gingerly conduct of relations with the Soviet Union as abettor of Israel's more activist Arab adversaries.

This latter approach prevailed within the Israeli government until a figurative last minute before the June fighting. Israel was attempting both to deter immediate enemies and to reassure their sponsor. It was seeking to be both intimidatory and placatory. As Plautus long ago observed, "To blow and to swallow at the same time is not easy." No lesson recurs more often in the conduct of high policy, but none is more difficult in application. Policymakers are wont ever to eat their cake and have it. It is external reality which, if I may have indulgence to switch clichés, says to fish or cut bait. If perhaps Israel aggravated the probability of war by too long mitigating defiance with deference, a result was the engendering among its enemies of the climate of overconfidence essential to pervasive tactical surprise and thus to the quick success achieved once Israel had made up its mind.

III

My assumptions about the men running the Soviet Union's policies are entirely conventional. No Kremlinologist, I have no talent for calibrating the ratios between their devotion to national strategic considerations and their ideological commitment. Like a playwright who owns a theater, they work at both pursuits at once as mutually serviceable rather than competing purposes. On the basis of either, they would have reasons for ambitious concern in the Middle East. Parts of the region are loaded with petroleum. Control of the flow thereof would provide great leverage over European economies. Part of the Middle East forms a flank to Southern Europe. The region lies athwart air connections between Western Europe and the Orient. Affecting accesses among the waterways of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean, the area bears on the Soviet Union's maritime connections with the outer world and interposes between Europe and the lands of greater Asia and remoter Africa.

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Presumably the Soviet rulers have had no intention of attempting immediate or overt dominion in the region. Their relevant ambitions are linked to a wider purpose of eliminating United States power as a factor in Europe, and specifically of eroding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An eclipse of NATO would entail riddance of the United States as a maritime factor in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union would fill in behind it. As a corollary, Soviet power would dominate the waterway between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The latter, third greatest of the oceans and the only one whose periphery belongs largely to so-called third-world countries susceptible of revolutionary manipulation, would present huge opportunities.

The role aspired to in the Middle East would be akin to Great Britain's in Queen Victoria's golden age. Lord Palmerston, detailing British policy a century ago, disavowed coveting any part of the area "any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south would have wished to possess the inns on the North Road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops and post horses." In like fashion, the method does not call for the Soviet Union to possess the region. The prerogatives sought would be those of a regional arbiter exercising paramount influence among a diversity of client states which would cultivate Soviet assistance in restraining pushy neighbors.

Such a design does not involve a timetable or master plan. Though not immediate, neither is it apparitional. It has guided Soviet conduct in the area, but the Soviet Union has essayed circumspection in applying it. The Soviet Union must take care to avoid a direct challenge to the paramount naval and nuclear power disposed by the United States. It must work through surrogates, making avail of its communist doctrine regarding "national liberation wars," according to which any developments among the emerging and less developed states tending to serve the Soviet Union's advantage are asserted to have legitimacy under history's laws and any opposing tendency is supposed to be illicit. The Soviet Union has been wont to invoke relevant shibboleths on behalf of its clients in the Middle East and against their adversaries. One is led to question whether the Soviet Union has been party to its clients' often reaffirmed intention to annihilate Israel. Walter Lippmann, for one, professed to see such

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a design behind Soviet policies antecedent to the June war. Without knowing for sure, I should doubt the estimate.

The Soviet Union has endorsed Israel's right to existence and has armed the sworn enemies of that right. It has voiced support of Israel's access to the Suez Canal and abetted the barrier. Soviet delegates at the Havana Tricontinental Conference in early 1966 endorsed proposals for the extinction of Israel. Soviet spokesmen subsequently negated the idea. The record could be lengthened. In my view what the ambiguities and switches demonstrate is an attempt at manipulative policy. While hypothetically the Soviet Union might not grieve over Israel's disappearance, within the limitations of circumstance and for the time being, the presumptive Soviet purpose has been to work Israel into being a suitor for protection, much as Iran has been pressed toward clientage by vicarious means in the form of a buildup of Egyptian naval power in environing waters.

Manipulative policies usually have the defect of being overclever. Sponsors characteristically magnify their control. It is all too easy to take assumptions for facts and to count liabilities as assets. In this instance, Soviet policymakers presumably overestimated their leverage on Arab clients. They certainly must have been misled into equating quality with quantity in appraising military assets accruing from their assistance. It is not hard to imagine how, because such errors recur within our own experience. I recall an illustrative example. A few years ago in an Asian country a visiting Congressman told me of prodigies achieved by our military assistance program there. He dismissed my doubts by citing confidences from the brigadier general who headed our military aid mission. Next time I saw him I kidded the Congressman's misinformant. He conceded that he and I knew better but added that he was loath to jeopardize his chance for a second star through any feedback to the Pentagon and so had reported progress and nothing else. The Kremlin, as well as we, and probably more than we, must have been bemused by progress reports. The spring's events forced a realistic accounting.

IV

What of American attitudes relevant to the Middle East? The United States' material stakes in the area relate to earnings from petroleum properties, a significant source of foreign exchange. They relate to airways and maritime routes. The area has a

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highly important bearing on the security and livelihood of allies in Europe. In these respects, the United States' interests are obverse to the Soviet Union's. The area is inherently vexatious to American preconceptions. American approaches to foreign affairs incline to be rationalistic. Rationalism in relation to Middle Eastern problems is reflected in three current news items at hand as I write—one concerning a proposition to convert the new Jerusalem into another Danzig, one about reconciling Arabs to Israel's existence by subsidizing a huge irrigation scheme so as to enrich the stakes at issue, a third concerning an idea of ending national jurisdiction over all the rest of the world's maritime narrows and canals so as to set a moral example for Egypt to dispossess itself of the Suez.

Rationalism values symmetry and balance in policy. It holds all problems solvable. Rationalism assumes conflict to be aberrant. It banks on inherent harmony of interest among human groups—a harmony not always obvious and dominant, but assumed ever to be latent and susceptible of being brought into play in all situations by patient indulgence. It attributes a transforming efficacy to negotiations. Rationalism correlates community with communication. It disjoins consent and coercion, in the manner of our President, who is wont to quote the 18th verse of the 1st chapter of Isaiah without noting the linkage with the 20th verse. Rationalism puts great store by what is called understanding. Understanding, however, is ambiguous. Such peoples as Pakistanis and Indians, or Poles and Germans, understand each other quite well, but not as sweethearts understand each other. The same is probably true of Israelis and Arabs. Conceptually, however, rationalism merges understanding in the sense of comprehension with understanding as empathy. Rationalistic approaches also involve a high degree of self-projection. An illustrative recollection from some years back concerns advice blurted by a United States representative at the United Nations to contentious Arab and Israeli representatives—that they should settle their differences in a true Christian spirit. Rationalism, as Michael Oakeshott has put it, tries to live every day as if it were the first. It is impatient of history's obduracy. It relegates cultural and ethnic differences to secondary or even tertiary standing in human affairs. It is impatient of the idea that differences rooted in episodes of antiquity told in the 21st chapter of Genesis may not be susceptible of prompt solution. Rationalism goes hand in hand with

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functionalism—the idea of solving differences by shunting them aside and turning instead to concrete common endeavors.

The United States' position regarding the Middle East is basically affected by a decision two decades ago to join with other powers in sponsoring a state of Israel in Palestine in succession to Britain's mandate. To attribute the creation of Israel to that action may be an exaggeration, but the deed was at least a gesture of authentication whereby Israel was brought into the society of states. Within limits imposed by that reality, the United States has sought to exemplify evenhandedness, but that precept is not enough to mollify Arab intransigents, who see in it the impartiality which would mediate between a householder and a housebreaker. The point applies to the United States' part in the 1950 tripartite declaration supporting the territorial status quo within the region. Other powers, including the Soviet Union, acted as midwives for Israel. Other powers were involved also in the 1950 declaration. The United States, however, is the one with a fleet dominant in the Mediterranean, the one whose maritime and nuclear strength casts it as the strategic stabilizer. It is also the principal source of outside contributions to help Israel to a measure of economic success far beyond its Arab neighbors. When unreconciled Arabs look outward to account for Israel's endurance in face of their hostility, the United States inevitably and singularly springs to mind.

One particular United States commitment, involving a curiosity of sorts, is relevant. It relates to the United States' maritime position. It was articulated in the denouement of the 1956 war. Israel had launched that war mainly to ensure itself maritime access to the south and east. Britain and France colluded in it to ensure their stakes in the Suez Canal. The United States took a position insisting upon unconditional withdrawal from foreign territory occupied in consequence of an attack made in face of United Nations disapproval. Among other land parcels, this precept required Israel to give up promontories and islets commanding access to the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's channel to the south and east. A congeries of national forces under United Nations aegis took over, but without any stipulations guaranteeing the access desired by Israel. As a consolation, the U.S. Secretary of State pledged Israel unspecified support of free access to the Gulf of Aqaba—subject to a waiver in event of a ruling by the International Court of Justice denying international status to the waters concerned. Whatever its contractual signifi-

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cance, the pledge probably added nothing to what the United States' interests as a maritime power would entail, but its terms, rather than expressing a motif of evenhandedness, aligned the United States with Israel's interests in the matter. What is curious is that the pledge virtually slipped from official recollection—probably because of the late Secretary of State Dulles' penchant for carrying his office in his brief case. Though it was referred to in former President Eisenhower's last book of White House memoirs, *Waging Peace,* and in Herman Finer's *Dulles Over Suez,* its existence has been overlooked in innumerable diplomatic histories and commentaries and ignored on many occasions of testimony. The Department of State appears, at least figuratively, to have lacked a file copy, but Israel's Foreign Office had a well-preserved original.

V

Last autumn measures got under way for rehabilitating the Soviet Union's main chosen instrument in the Middle East—namely President Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime in Egypt, which was in trouble on the home front related to economic sluggishness, a baffling and wasting stalemate in its Yemen intervention, and general frustration of aims to promote Egyptian ascendancy in fusing Arab unity and socialist revolution. The events thus set in train found the United States deeply involved elsewhere. No part of the horizon gave high promise. America's rationalistic assumptions about general affairs were under serious test at home, where a nation deeply committed to maintaining order over the world was showing no conspicuous talent in the rudiments of keeping order in its streets. A conception of modulated employment of force faced heavy going in Southeast Asia. In the predicament, to use Abraham Lincoln's phrase, of "an ox jumped half way over a fence," U.S. policy confronted a cheerless choice among pulling back, redoubling exertions, or protracting the unsatisfactory level of effort—none of them certain of result or free of risk. It is easy to cite U.S. preoccupation with Viet Nam as the circumstance enabling or tempting the Soviet Union and its Arab clients to attempt what they attempted. Devoted critics of the American venture in Viet Nam have so argued, but not convincingly. The Soviet Union's ambitions and Egypt's activism have long antedated the United States' involvement in Viet Nam. In any event, no one in authority in the U.S. government wished for yet another set of exigencies to crop up.

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Egypt's restorative entailed a heating-up of the old quarrel with Israel. Nasser's apparent purpose—and behind him, the Soviet Union's—was to lay hold of an issue whereby to force even the Arab regimes in opposition either to go under or to switch over, along with their military resources substantially supplied by the Soviet Union's strategic adversaries. Borne by success, Egypt would be in position to regain the initiative in Yemen and to win out in the competition to dominate in South Arabia in the wake of British withdrawal scheduled for early 1968. The initial step was a pact for mutual defense and military collaboration between Egypt and Syria, the latter also a Soviet client whose relationship to Egypt in recent years had flitted among union, hostility, rivalry and collaboration. Simultaneously commando raids from Syria into Israel by units of the Palestine Liberation Army were stepped up. In diplomatic privacy, Israel's Prime Minister Levi Eshkol—who was originally from the Ukraine, where relatives still live, and who personified the cautious, exterior-oriented approach—informed the Soviet Union of mounting domestic pressures against temporizing with the raids and of the necessity of making early reprisal. He was warned not to retaliate against Syria. Meanwhile the raids were being explained away as beyond the Syrian government's restraining power. Israel complained to the United Nations Security Council. There the Soviet Union vetoed a watered-down resolution urging Syria to take more effective measures to prevent raids. Thereafter the Syrian government avowed an indulgent, hands-off attitude toward the raids. In a communiqué issued during a state visit to Paris, the Soviet Prime Minister included a reference to nondiscrimination against the Soviet Union's Jews and to their freedom of movement to Israel—points with tacit implications not likely to be lost on Eshkol. Making do with second best—a case of clobbering Peter to repay Paul—an Israeli force made a retaliatory raid against a Jordanian village. This was coupled with warnings that Syria's turn might be next. The action drew reproof from the Security Council. More important, it added to troubles at home for the Jordanian monarchy, which was under a powerful propaganda assault led by Egypt and Syria for its avowed opposition to Soviet purposes and for its policy toward Israel of formal hostility mitigated with tacit passivity. At the end of 1966 the Jordanian regime was being pressed heavily from within and without.

The new year brought more of the same—mounting infiltration,

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aborted sessions of the Syrian-Israeli mixed armistice commission, various Arab demands for annihilation of Israel, and repeated Israeli warnings of dire consequences for abettors and perpetrators of raids. By turns, these Israeli warnings named Syria or only hinted at its identity—a slight sign of trepidation. In mid-April Syria began openly to twit Egypt for reluctance to implement the joint military pact. In late April the Soviet Union openly demanded Israel's desistance from any hostile acts against Syria. A significant development, little noted, came on April 30. The Egyptian-supported regime in Yemen issued decrees extending from three to twelve miles its claim of jurisdiction over waters marginal to the mainland and appurtenant islands and claiming the continental shelf to soundings of 200 meters. Linked to the prospective British withdrawal from South Arabia and, by corollary, from Perim Island, these decrees prefigured a design to ban Israeli shipping from the Bab el Mandeb, the strait at the southern end of the Red Sea.

The pace and intensity of warnings and preparatory military moves continued to rise to mid-May. According to subsequent Egyptian accounts, the Soviet Union at that juncture passed along purported intelligence indicating an Israeli mobilization against Syria. The two Arab allies thereupon announced the alerting of armed forces to "complete readiness for war." So as to permit deployments to effect its military undertakings with Syria, Egypt demanded retraction of the United Nations Emergency Force, which over a tedious decade had separated Egypt both from its adversary and from the necessity of dealing with that adversary. The United Nations Secretary General, U Thant, explained the impossibility of a piecemeal withdrawal. Egypt responded accordingly. The entire force was withdrawn and disbanded.

The Secretary General's action merits a parenthetical comment. No event of the spring was discussed more vehemently or less cogently. Some critics blamed him for acquiescing at all. Some blamed him for promptness. In my clippings drawn from American, British and Canadian sources, he is variously called irresponsible, supine, culpable, reckless, muddled, and so on through a long invidious list—all for merely doing what he had to do. The condemnatory extravagance was as uncalled-for as the surfeit of encomiums six months before when—in an episode remindful of Byron's lady who "whispering she'd ne'er consent, consented"—he had ended a charade of reluctance about re-election. A memorandum by his predecessor was cited in reproach of U Thant's

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compliant withdrawal of the United Nations force. The memorandum had no official status. Citing it as authoritative was like giving force of law to a diary entry. Ten years before, Dag Hammarskjold had written the memorandum as a personal interpretation to give guidance to a journalist who was undertaking a book about United Nations peacekeeping and who, in Hammarskjold's view, was too much inclined to take relevant juridic documents at face value—which, in the judgment of many, would be the only proper way to handle them. The Hammarskjold memorandum drew mainly on understandings recollected from negotiatory discussions. According to its allegations, the force once interposed with Egypt's consent was removable only upon Egypt's and the General Assembly's concurrent determinations of the completion of its mission. Thus by its premises the sovereignty of both Egypt and of governments contributing force components had been impinged upon—Egypt's by yielding autonomy respecting forces on its territory, and the contributors by yielding control of their own forces. These were large assumptions to rest on a base so fragile as unofficial recollections. In point of fact, three of the original ten contributory governments had meanwhile recalled their forces, two others had cut to merely nominal participation, and at the moment of the Secretary General's action two more of the main contributory governments, sympathetic to Egypt's cause, were opting out.

There was less to the United Nations Emergency Force than met the eye. What was important, however, was not the impaling of a supposition by an event. It was that the withdrawal made way for Egyptian forces to resume the promontories and islets from which to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba—a move logically consistent with formal hostilities maintained against Israel and with a long-standing ban on Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal. After five days bustling with mobilizations, maximum alerts, deployments, and the rallying of more Arab states to the new alliance, President Nasser on May 23, in a speech filled with threats of dire vengeance in event of Israeli resistance, announced a blockade against all Israeli shipping and Israel-bound strategic cargoes under whatever flag. Israel's Prime Minister denounced the move as aggression. In Moscow, Britain's Foreign Minister found Soviet officials "completely satisfied" with the new situation. Reportedly, however, the Soviet authorities, fearful lest the situation should get out of hand, were also cautioning Nasser to restrain his vaunting. On May 26 he spoke again and some-

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what less bellicosely. Spokesmen around him began rationalizing the blockade as a step toward a legal test as prefigured in the late Secretary of State Dulles' memorandum on access to the Gulf of Aqaba and hinted at possible flexibility in application. Gossip focused on the chance of working something out—possibly an easing of restrictions in return for a gift of grain—during the Egyptian Vice President's Washington visit then planned for early June.

On the issues as now emerged the United States was cast unequivocally with Israel. Pressure was mounting for the President to do something. Some of the bitterest critics of executive prerogative as applied in Viet Nam completely reversed constitutional precepts and demanded U.S. confrontation with the Arabs at whatever risk of involvement with their Soviet patron. Many voices invoked plighted national obligations to Israel without defining them. Amateur admirals devised strategies completely inapposite to the waters concerned. Fortunately—and specifically so for Israel, as matters turned out—the President ignored the chatter. On a quick visit, the Israeli Foreign Minister found him sympathetic but in no mood to be hurried into new hostilities. Before testing the blockade the United States would take care to line up diplomatic support among other maritime nations—an endeavor which elicited a few proffers of moral protest but none of material commitment. Israel chartered a ship in the environs and rushed a crew around Africa to man it for an early test of the issue with Egypt—a gesture soon to be foreclosed by other events.

As the month closed Israel was under stress as its mainly civilian forces stood to arms in response to Arab troop concentrations. Its spokesmen had only a promise of abstract support from outside against the blockade. On the night of May 28 the Soviet Ambassador, delivering his government's accusatory protest against Israel's military preparations, found the Israeli Prime Minister deferential to the extent of inviting the Ambassador's inspection of Israeli military dispositions and offering himself to fly to Moscow at once to explain. Next day brought from the Syrian President arriving in Moscow, the Prime Minister at Damascus, and Nasser in Cairo new declarations of dire results in store for a resistant Israel. The Soviet Union again voiced support of Nasser. Jordan's king, swept along by popular pressure, signed on as an ally in Cairo. Soviet policymakers could congratulate themselves for having managed a crisis to the very

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edge of a great success. The Egyptian bandwagon was rolling. Arab governments were climbing aboard. Israel was now boxed in. Official pronouncements there of being on the brink of war and of fighting alone if necessary could be dismissed as the bravado of desperate men. Moscow's Arab clients were also in a self-congratulatory mood and, in presumption of assured success, relaxed a bit.

Egypt's assertion of blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba has been cited as the precipitant of the war which soon took them by surprise. The action provided a respectable excuse but probably was not causative. Only one Israeli-flag ship had entered those waters in two years. Anyway, the loopholes in Nasser's asserted ban on strategic goods might have proved sufficiently commodious. The basis asserted on April 30 for eventually closing the Bab el Mandeb, a thousand miles to the south, was probably even more portentous for Israel's interests. Jordan's adherence to the alliance has also been cited as the triggering event. It is doubtful whether it made a determining difference in Israel's military situation. It is probably erroneous to attribute the decision for war to any one factor.

The Israeli Foreign Minister's return from Washington on May 27 prompted a critical reappraisal within the Israeli cabinet. Israel's whole approach in managing the crisis was called in question. The effort both to mollify the Soviet Union and to deter its clients obviously was not working. Israel could not afford production losses entailed in having its mainly civilian forces stand to arms indefinitely. It dared not suspend the armed vigil in view of the strength mobilized around its borders. What future was there in being impelled to call up forces whenever the now more or less coordinated Arab states should decide to turn military pressure on as a convenience for policy? What future in trying to cope with hostile neighbors and their sponsors in Moscow on a basis of asserted unilateral belligerent rights? Implications of the Soviet Union's augmenting weight in the region were canvassed. The cabinet decided in favor of military action to undercut the military foundations of the designs entertained by the Soviet Union and its clients. In the taking of that decision one Israeli attitude submerged, and the contrasting one became ascendant. The decision was premised on an assumption that Israel must act for itself rather than wait for others. The importance of exterior balances was not, however, discounted. The decision involved an estimate, which would prove correct, that

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the Soviet Union, facing the implications of U.S. concern in the area along with its nuclear and naval resources, would stand aside from the combat. The action decided on was executed with the intrepidity of men who know they cannot afford a defeat. The immediate result is now a well-told story. Perhaps the most extraordinary thing about the decision and the ensuing war was the Arabs' and the Russians' failure to foresee them—a case of governments taken in by their own plans.

VI

Whether the success achieved will prove durable for Israel remains problematic. Israel won more ground than it could wish to hold. It has found no way of relinquishing ground by negotiation, and it has refused this time to yield to the proposition that it must surrender a perimeter not regarded as legitimate by its neighbors in order to resume a perimeter which they also hold illegitimate. The great increase of alienated peoples under its jurisdiction may well make it more vulnerable to unconventional attack. Its neighbors remain unreconciled to its existence. Their pride is more deeply wounded than ever. Perhaps none of the regimes could survive a gesture of accommodation. The Arab intransigents appear even more in clientage to the Soviet Union than before their debacle. Hopes are uttered for moderation or even reform of the Soviet Union's conduct in consequence of lessons learned. I have at hand six articles by authors professing to discern a prospect for the Soviet Union henceforth to behave in world affairs in the manner which the respective authors have been ascribing to it for some time past. Though such an upshot is theoretically conceivable, it should be remembered that views of reality are hugely difficult to cast aside, and any regime must be tenacious of its *raison d'être*. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union, even if it wishes, could afford to renounce sponsorship of a revolutionary future.

There may well, however, be room for at least a show of elasticity on immediate issues. In the opportunities offered in Yemen and magnified by the prospect of British withdrawal from South Arabia, the Soviet Union has an alternative avenue toward securing a purchase on the relevant waterways. Without disadvantage to its interests and purposes, the Soviet Union can probably afford to undertake now a role of fostering Arab accommodation toward Israel. In any case, some gesture of this sort would scarcely result

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in alienating the Arab intransigents, who would have no other place to turn for patronage. Such a gesture, even if failing to change the situation materially, would earn the Soviet Union credits for good intent among those ever watching for hopeful portents. The unlikely event of success, on the other hand, might forward the Soviet aim of cultivating Israel as a client.

A time when Israel can relax into what, by rationalist assumptions, would be a normal environment is not in sight, because the Middle East will probably remain as obdurate as ever. Yet changes will occur. One change in prospect pertains to the Suez Canal. Lord Palmerston had a point, a century ago, in doubting the wisdom of creating the canal, since its existence would focus too much importance and anxiety on an area too much inclined to instability. Ernest Renan, welcoming Ferdinand de Lesseps to the Academy in 1885, cited Jesus' words, "I come not to bring peace but a sword," and went on prophetically:

> This saying must frequently have crossed your mind. Now that you have cut through it, the isthmus has become a defile, that is to say a battlefield. The Bosporus by itself has been enough to keep the whole civilized world embarrassed up to the present, but now you have created a second and much more serious embarrassment. Not merely does the canal connect two inland seas, but it serves as a communicating passage to all the oceans of the globe. In case of a maritime war it will be of supreme importance, and everyone will be striving at top speed to occupy it. You have thus marked out a great battlefield for the future.

The closure enforced by Egypt as a result of the June fighting will force consideration of the question whether so vital a waterway must be left subject to whims of local ambition. The answer probably does not lie in any grandiose scheme for internationalization. It rises from circumstances imposed by the closure itself. The world's commerce is adjusting. It must learn to get along very well without the canal by using the Cape route. With a decline in international concern for the canal, Egypt's leverage will diminish. Also Israel may then be left more and more to fend for itself. The attitude which prevailed in early June is prophetic for Israel.

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THE TREATY AND THE NONNUCLEAR STATES

by James E. Dougherty

THE United States and the Soviet Union, after two years of negotiation, have presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva separate but identical texts of a draft nonproliferation treaty.[1] The first point to draw comment was the fact that Article III of the texts, which is supposed to deal with international control and inspection, was left blank because of differences over the roles to be assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The second noteworthy item was that the two superpowers were willing, so soon after the bitter United Nations debate over the Middle East war and amid continued escalation of the Viet Nam war, to agree on the wording of a significant arms control agreement. It seemed almost as if they wished to cooperate diplomatically in the West as an indication of their desire to keep the conflict in Asia from getting out of control.

The third interesting aspect of the transaction was the fact that the Soviets stopped short of submitting a joint draft. When asked to explain, Aleksei A. Roshchin, the Soviet delegate, merely replied that this was the "best method" of proceeding. If the Soviet procedure had been selected out of concern for possible reactions from Communist China, as was commonly thought, this seemed to mean that the Soviets were more worried about the Chinese than were the Americans over the attitudes of their European allies. Virtually all the textual compromises that had been struck since mid-1965 had come at the cost of muting pro-NATO and pro-European positions held earlier by the United States. Despite the fact that West Germany had become reconciled to the abandonment of the NATO nuclear-sharing clause and the allies had been persuaded to accept as of no practical consequence the dropping of the "European option" clause, there was still a serious question confronting the superpowers: Even if they can reach a mutually satisfactory *modus vivendi* on inspection, will they be

[1]ENDC/192, August 24, 1967 and ENDC/193 of the same date.

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able to convince the nonnuclear-weapon states of the world that it is to their advantage to sign the proposed treaty?

The United States within recent years has developed a number of arguments as to why nonnuclear states should remain nonnuclear. (1) Expansion in the size of the nuclear club will further complicate the already complex problem of nuclear disarmament. (2) Such expansion would increase the risk of technical accident, unauthorized use, strategic miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation from limited war, and thus make for a less stable world. (3) Small national nuclear forces are costly and detract from development. (4) Such forces are provocative, accident-prone, become obsolescent quickly, and lack both credibility and military utility. (5) They render young nuclear powers vulnerable to pre-emptive attack in the early stages. (6) Finally, these new national *forces de frappe* do not really pay off politically as well as some nationalists expect.

These arguments, taken cumulatively, possess an undeniable strength. Moreover, there is a certain inevitable logic in the effort of the United States as the oldest and leading nuclear power to obtain a nonproliferation treaty. But in all honesty we must admit that what strikes American policymakers as eminently logical may not be sufficient to compel the assent of all the nonnuclear states—nearly six score of them—nor even of all the "threshold" powers for whose adherence the treaty has really been designed. It is the purpose of this article to examine the perspectives through which a few of these pivotal nonnuclear-weapon states represented at Geneva are likely to view the treaty when it comes to making the decision: to sign or not to sign.

The Dilemmas Confronting India

Indian government officials readily concede the force of some of the foregoing U.S. arguments. They seem to realize that the world has arrived at a critical juncture in respect to nuclear weapons. The Gandhian tradition motivates them to refrain from making India the sixth nuclear power, for they know that if "club" membership increases to six it will probably expand to ten or twelve or more within a relatively short time. Right now India, perhaps more than any other country, represents the Nth-power "firebreak." She has no assurance, of course, that her abstention will induce other potential acquirers to abstain. Nevertheless, many Indians are still reluctant to have their country lead the way into the atomic no man's land.

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But there are voices in India that call with mounting intensity for a decision to build nuclear weapons. They belong to politicians, civil servants, scientists, military planners, journalists, industrialists, strategic analysts and others. Whether these still constitute a minority of the politically significant elites is very difficult to say, because in delicate situations members of elite groups seldom publicize frankly their innermost thoughts. These people, sometimes openly but more often privately, make certain military, economic and political arguments in favor of acquisition which indicate that they have not been entirely convinced by the U.S. educational effort. Some of the arguments they hold in common with many other nonnuclear states; some are distinctively Indian.

Militarily, they contend that nuclear weapons provide massive firepower available in no other form. China, whose intentions worry India more than those of Pakistan, possesses nuclear weapons, and only through a similar possession can India underwrite her national security. If deterrence works in the West, why should it not work in the East? India does not have to be concerned about achieving a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union or the United States, but only against China, which ought to be a much easier undertaking. In this respect, India's task is less formidable than that facing France, which must acquire some semblance of credibility against the USSR. As a defensive state, India may not really need expensive long-range delivery systems, at least not in the beginning, when it will be sufficient and highly useful to wield a tactical nuclear capability denying China the mountain approaches through the Himalayas.

Economically, the advocates of acquisition point out that nuclear weapons are no longer prohibitive in cost, especially for a country such as India which has been moving steadily for several years toward the creation of a substantial civil nuclear energy program. Within the last year the government has concluded an agreement with Canada to enlarge the scope of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant from 200 to 400 megawatts. Meanwhile, a 380 MW station is nearing completion at Tarapur in Maharashtra, and a third power station with a capability of 400 MW is scheduled to be built at Kalpakham in Madras by 1971. Moreover, India is one of the very few nonnuclear-weapon states which has already built a plutonium separation plant. Consequently she has come a long way toward paying for a weapons program. In fact, each passing month brings her closer to a position in which a governmental decision to manufacture weapons

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could be implemented in a relatively short time. It is difficult for many people in the West to realize that India could produce nuclear weapons sooner than the more technologically advanced West Germany. Yet this is the consensus of Western arms control analysts.

No doubt a decision to engage in a full-scale weapons program would siphon off scarce scientific and engineering talent from projects that could contribute to the nation's economic development. But this is a problem of lesser magnitude than it would be for a country starting out from "scratch" in the nuclear sector. Furthermore, some Indian scientists and economists argue that even if a weapons program does entail certain sacrifices now, it can contribute to the growth of a sophisticated technological infrastructure which will spin off benefits for the economy in the future. The economic area in which India suffers the most enduring vulnerability pertains, of course, to food. If the U.S. government wanted to "play rough" with India in respect to inducing her to sign the nonproliferation treaty, it could withhold food aid and wait for India to eschew "unnecessary military programs" and to furnish concrete evidence of her intention to assign top priority to agricultural development. Ardent advocates of the treaty have at times expressed a willingness to "play food politics" in this instance, if necessary. It is difficult to say whether a precise linkage has been drawn between food assistance and India's willingness to sign the treaty. But regardless of the actual facts, some Indians undoubtedly suspect that such a linkage *is* being drawn, however subtly.

The political arguments for acquisition, it is safe to say, are the strongest of all, just as they were with Britain, France and China. In today's world nuclear weapons alone seem to provide the ultimate guarantee of a country's independence and territorial integrity, in the absence of effective international peacekeeping machinery or a reliable alliance bond. Under the pressure of Chinese expansionism, Indian nationalism has begun to stir within recent years. Nehru has been criticized for neglecting India's defense and ignoring the realities of international politics. The nationalists insist that India must now choose between two unpleasant alternatives—either abandon the policy of nonalignment and secure credible defense pledges from abroad (thereby in the bargain creating a Soviet-American coalition against China in Asia), or else acquire a national nuclear capability. National-

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ists being what they are, they are more inclined toward the latter course, for they implicitly agree with de Gaulle that it is intolerable for a nation to rely permanently upon outside powers for its defense.

Indian nationalists divide along realistic and idealistic lines. The realists, who are somewhat resentful of the fact that the campaign against proliferation did not roll into high gear until after China had obtained nuclear weapons, fear that if India signs the treaty she will be relegating herself to what may become a permanently inferior political-strategic position vis-à-vis China within the international system. They also argue that an Indian hand on the nuclear lever might serve to foreclose both strong-armed tactics by more powerful states and "crisis deals" by the superpowers, which may be tempted to make future concessions to China at India's expense rather than risk a military encounter. The more idealistic nationalists who cannot fully divest themselves of the Gandhi-Nehru tradition have begun to rationalize the case for acquisition by pointing out that it could strengthen India's position at the international conference table where disarmament negotiations take place.[2] Moreover, along with the Swedes and other nonnuclear neutrals, many Indians are of the opinion that signing the kind of nonproliferation treaty tabled at Geneva would be tantamount to forfeiture of whatever modest leverage the neutrals now enjoy over the nuclear powers in the disarmament talks, without commensurate concessions by the latter.

It is not surprising, then, that the Indians have made several major demands of the nuclear-weapon powers at Geneva and elsewhere. First, the powers must demonstrate that China's acquisition of nuclear weapons will not lead to a permanent enhancement of her international political status. India has always been sensitive concerning the granting of the veto power to China at the 1945 San Francisco Conference at which the United Nations Charter was drafted, and she does not wish to see the veto merged with the possession of the nuclear bomb. In this connection, Ambassador Trivedi has written:

> There are some who even think of equating possession of these evil weapons with permanent membership of the Security Council of the United Nations, as if the nuclear bomb were a special symbol of the right to enforce the veto. No wonder, therefore, that the world society in

[2]For an account of the arguments over this issue, see Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," in Alastair Buchan, editor, *A World of Nuclear Powers* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, for the American Assembly, 1966), pp. 57-58.

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general has come to the conclusion that the possession of nuclear weapons does bestow prestige and that consequently the road to sanity lies in taking away these dread instruments from the hands of the five powers rather than placing them in the hands of more countries.[3]

Second, the nuclear-weapon powers must give assurances that the nonproliferation treaty will not affect adversely the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for development purposes. For several years, India has been pointing out that the peaceful applications of atomic energy will loom large in future development plans of the less privileged countries of the world, and that efforts to control the spread of weapons must not be prejudicial to peaceful uses. Since late 1966, India has acquired eloquent and strong allies on this score in Brazil, Sweden and several other countries including, for a different set of economic reasons, West Germany.

Third, India demands adequate security guarantees in return for signing a nonproliferation treaty. In order to preserve her nonalignment posture as much as possible, India would prefer the guarantees to come from powers "in different camps," as Madame Gandhi put it in mid-1967.[4] This would mean in effect a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee. Britain might possibly be asked to come along as the third responsible nuclear power, but her readiness to do so is somewhat doubtful in view of the recent trend toward cutting defense commitments "east of Suez," as reflected in the defense policy White Paper of July 18, 1967.[5] At the present time, a Soviet-U.S. pledge for the protection of India against China seems to be a remote contingency. If the Soviets are unwilling to submit a joint text of a draft treaty for fear of furnishing grist to Peking's propaganda mills, it hardly seems likely that they would formally cooperate with the United States in extending a pointedly anti-Chinese promise to India. There is no chance whatever that a guarantee can be embodied in the language of the nonproliferation treaty. But even if a joint Soviet-U.S. guarantee were to be feasible, it would necessarily involve reciprocal obligations—i. e., if one party refused to render aid to an India under attack, the other would be absolved of its obligation. Hence the reliability of the pledge would be a function of the continuation

[3]V. C. Trivedi, "Vertical Versus Horizontal Proliferation: An Indian View," in James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., editors, *Arms Control for the Late Sixties* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 199-200.

[4]Statement by the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 17, 1967, as quoted in *Weekly India News*, July 28, 1967, p. 6.

[5]See David Fairhall, "Smaller Forces East and West of Suez," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 20, 1967, p. 3.

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of the Soviet-American détente. This is not something upon which India can confidently depend for an indefinitely long time.[6]

Up to now, the United States has been reluctant to offer a formal guarantee, and for good reasons. If extended to the Indians, can it be withheld from all other signatories? Although the Indian leaders are now speaking only of outside support in the event of a nuclear threat, might they later invoke the guarantee in the event of a massive conventional attack by a nuclear power? Furthermore, would such a guarantee, whether given specifically to India alone or on a wider basis to all weak and exposed states requesting it, increase the probability of U.S. involvement in nuclear war in geographic regions of less vital interest to the United States than Europe, where the credibility of the U.S. commitment has often been questioned? Our European allies may not be anxious to see the United States undertake new commitments to Asia that might some day require us to make a nuclear response to China. All of these are questions which must give serious pause to the President and the Senate; and our present inability to answer them satisfactorily must give Indian statesmen pause also.

Finally, India, along with several other neutral states, has insisted that any nonproliferation treaty must involve "a balance of obligations" as between nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states. The treaty, to be acceptable, must be designed to stop "vertical proliferation" (within the existing nuclear-weapon states) as well as "horizontal proliferation" (i. e., the spread of weapons to other states). It must be more than a mere effort on the part of the armed to disarm the unarmed, as Ambassador Trivedi frequently has reiterated at Geneva. In one of his most recent and trenchant interventions before the ENDC, Trivedi said:

> By all means let us talk of regulation of armaments—universally; by all means let us talk of non-armament—universally; by all means let us talk of arms restraint and arms control—universally. But any attempt to im-

[6]Prime Minister Gandhi, in the statement to the Lok Sabha referred to above, hinted at an official awareness of this when she said: "We must realize in the final analysis, the effectiveness of any such nuclear shield in the field of security would depend not on the spirit in which the nuclear powers accept the shield, but on the national and vital interests of the giver." *Weekly India News, loc. cit.* M. R. Desai, Deputy Prime Minister of India, during a visit to the United States in September 1967, acknowledged that an adequate system of guarantees probably could not be worked out in conjunction with the present treaty and indicated that his country might accept the treaty without guarantees provided it does not discriminate against nonnuclear powers in the field of peaceful technology.

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pose non-armament particularly on unarmed countries, and any tendency to talk only in terms of imposing non-armament on some countries—weak countries, countries which have faced, are facing and will face threats to their security and loss or occupation of their territory, countries which face threats to their independence and territorial integrity, countries whose security is in danger—is, to use an American phrase, "counter-productive."[7]

Indian officials have long had a fairly accurate idea of the kind of nonproliferation treaty toward which the superpowers were moving, and they have not been happy with its general principles. It seems to them to institutionalize a sort of "atomic apartheid" in both the peaceful and the military fields. In the peaceful field, the major issue pertains to inspection and control of nuclear reactors. For two years prior to the latest draft text of the treaty, the United States called for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, or their equivalent (meaning Euratom safeguards) to insure that fissile materials would not be diverted from peaceful to military purposes. The Soviets, as usual, have been less interested in control systems. At times in the past they have contended that inspection is not necessary for a non-proliferation treaty, but that if an inspection system is to be written into the treaty it must be under the exclusive auspices of the IAEA. India has often asked why she should accept an infringement upon her national sovereignty by submitting her peaceful nuclear industry to control by the Vienna Agency when other countries, both nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states (i. e., the USSR and the members of Euratom) are unwilling to do this.

In an effort to set a "good example," the United States has opened some of its power reactors to IAEA inspection. Poland and Czechoslovakia have expressed a willingness to submit to IAEA controls if West Germany should do likewise. But up to now the Soviets have refused to accept any international inspection on their own territory. Consequently the Indians have a point when they assert that they are being discriminated against even in respect to peaceful technology. American government officials, in their desire to obtain a nonproliferation treaty, are sometimes willing to rationalize the Soviet refusal to accept IAEA controls on the grounds that Soviet submission would be meaningless in any event; since the Soviet Union already possesses a massive nuclear weapon capability, there can be no question of trying to prevent

[7]ENDC/PV. 314, July 18, 1967, p. 5.

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diversion from peaceful to military applications. But this argument has not greatly impressed the Indians, for it implies that nuclear-weapon status brings special privileges in the realm of peaceful nuclear technology as well. It is interesting to note that India's agreements with Canada for the construction of nuclear installations do not require the New Delhi government to submit to IAEA controls.

Beyond appealing for the universalization of IAEA controls over the peaceful nuclear industries of all nations, Indian spokesmen have often contended that the nonnuclear-weapon states cannot fairly be expected to renounce nuclear weapons indefinitely (much less forever) while the five existing nuclear powers fail to make any progress toward nuclear disarmament and while two of the five still refuse even to adhere to the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Indeed the Indians have often supported the demands of other neutrals, such as Sweden and the UAR, that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty subscribed to by all five nuclear powers constitutes a logical prerequisite to a nonproliferation treaty.

For several years, India has taken the lead, both in the United Nations General Assembly and at Geneva, in insisting that the nonproliferation treaty must embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear-weapon powers and nonnuclear-weapon powers. It should prevent all further proliferation by all states, and constitute a tangible step toward nuclear disarmament even though the latter process cannot be achieved in a short time. Up to now, complain the Indians, the nuclear powers have offered no effective solution to the security needs of the nonnuclear-weapon states except to advise the latter that the best way to safeguard their security is by renouncing the option to "go nuclear" in their military establishment. But, the Indians hasten to add, this is not the course the nuclear states themselves have pursued. The Great Powers have consistently rejected plans for nuclear armaments reduction on the grounds that they would adversely affect their security, and then they turn to the nonnuclear countries and try to persuade them that nuclear weapons furnish no security and should be forsworn. Ambassador Trivedi declared on May 23, 1967 that

> a nonproliferation treaty must accordingly embody an article of solemn obligation under which the States possessing nuclear weapons would negotiate a meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their delivery systems. This provision cannot be merely a

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pious preambular platitude like the unfulfilled "determination" in the four-year-old partial test ban treaty.[8]

The present draft treaty tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union in late August 1967 does not place a legal obligation upon the existing nuclear powers to proceed toward nuclear disarmament. It is still nothing more than what Trivedi calls a "pious preambular platitude." One of the gravest dilemmas confronting Indian statesmen is that, on the one hand, they wish to see a demonstration of intent on the part of the nuclear powers to move toward reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in their future defense policies; yet, on the other hand, they are not anxious to see the two superpowers on which they depend for security step on the "down" escalator in respect to nuclear armaments while China is on the "up" escalator. Indeed, within the last eighteen months many arms control analysts in the West have reached the conclusion that if the United States is to provide India with any kind of security guarantee which is to retain its credibility through the 1970's, Washington must maintain a "high posture" rather than a "low posture" in respect to nuclear armaments, and should begin to set up a ballistic missile defense at least against the growing Chinese capability. Yet even the announcement by Secretary McNamara on September 18, 1967 that the United States intends to deploy a "thin" ABM system is not likely to resolve all of India's doubts on the score of guarantees.

Whether India's political leadership will be able to arrive at a satisfactory solution of all the complex problems confronting it no one can prudently predict. But these various dilemmas add measurably to the confusion, misgivings and fear for the future that pervade the Indian political scene today. In the end, the Indian government may feel compelled to reject the nonproliferation treaty for domestic political reasons, in order to prevent the nation's internal cohesion from disintegrating as a result of ethnic-linguistic factionalism, the decline of Congress Party hegemony, and the challenge of foreign threats. At the very least, India's leaders may feel impelled to accept the treaty only with substantial reservations that would keep open India's option to obtain her own nuclear weapons in the near future should she become convinced that the two superpowers are unable, for whatever reason, to provide an adequate guarantee of her defense

[8]ENDC/PV. 298, May 23, 1967, p. 15. Trivedi repeated his warning about the inadequacy of a "pious preambular platitude" in ENDC/PV. 303, June 8, 1967 and ENDC/PV. 308, June 27, 1967.

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and her political status in Asia against the growing power of China.

Under Article VII of the present draft treaty, India could, of course, withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." But otherwise the treaty is of unlimited duration, and the wording of this clause places a considerable political onus upon the withdrawing party. India as well as other countries might very well prefer to see a treaty of limited duration—say, three to five years—worded in such a way as to place the onus on the existing nuclear-weapon powers to make progress toward transforming the international environment and improving the security position of all states.

The Issue of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The United States, the Soviet Union and Britain have all subscribed to the view that a peaceful explosive device and a military weapon are so similar as to be for all practical purposes indistinguishable from each other, and several other delegations at Geneva have acknowledged this as an indisputable fact. Not all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, however, have drawn exactly the same conclusions from it. The three nuclear-weapon powers have insisted that the nonproliferation treaty must preclude peaceful nuclear explosions carried out by nonnuclear-weapon states. In mid-1966 the United States offered to make available to signatory nations nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a nondiscriminatory basis and under appropriate international safeguards. President Johnson reiterated this offer when the ENDC resumed its talks in February 1967. Articles I and II of the treaty prohibit the transfer to and receipt or manufacture by nonnuclear-weapon states of "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Article IV guarantees that nothing in the treaty "shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties . . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" and subject to the limits specified in Articles I and II.

The U.S., Soviet, British and occasionally the Swedish and Canadian delegations at the Geneva ENDC meetings have attempted to persuade the underdeveloped nonnuclear-weapon states that they should not allow their concern over peaceful uses

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to prevent them from subscribing to a nonproliferation treaty. At various times they have pointed out that the prospects of technological "spin-off" from military programs to peaceful uses have probably been exaggerated; that if any "spin-off" does become evident, it can be shared with the nonweapon states; that peaceful detonations are never likely to constitute an everyday industrial technique for development purposes—i. e., they will always be extraordinary means; that the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty could increase rather than decrease the free flow of nuclear information, materials and equipment for peaceful application by raising the international confidence level, thus making it possible to remove restrictions calculated to inhibit the spread of weapons; and that the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty would enable the nonnuclear-weapon states to concentrate their resources on the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology. Moreover, if controlled fusion should ever be achieved, this would not involve an explosion, and hence would not be prohibited by the present treaty.[9]

But the three nuclear-weapon powers have insisted that if any additional states were to carry out their own "peaceful explosions," other states—particularly suspicious or hostile neighbors—would have no choice but to conclude that the former had acquired a military capability which must now be duplicated by themselves. Consequently the nuclear-weapon powers have held out for a total ban on peaceful explosions by nonweapon states. Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union have not deemed it credible that the "have-nots" should refuse to sign a nonproliferation treaty merely to keep open the option to conduct peaceful explosions. The two superpowers have taken the position that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is an issue requiring a separate international agreement—i.e., the creation of appropriate international machinery for guaranteeing access to peaceful explosions to nonweapon states on an impartial basis cannot be handled in the present nonproliferation treaty, but must await later negotiation.

Among the nonweapon states, Brazil has become the principal champion of the right to conduct peaceful explosions on a na-

[9]For a representative sample of these arguments, see the statements by Lord Chalfont, ENDC/PV. 288, February 23, 1967, pp. 6-11; Aleksei Roshchin, ENDC/PV. 293, March 14, 1967, pp. 23-24; William C. Foster, ENDC/295, March 21, 1967, pp. 23-25; E. L. M. Burns, ENDC/PV. 299, May 25, 1967, pp. 14-15; Mrs. Alva Myrdal, ENDC/PV. 300, May 30, 1967, p. 6; Fred W. Mulley, ENDC/PV. 307, June 22, 1967, pp. 6-8.

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tional basis. Brazilian spokesmen no less firmly than those of India have insisted upon "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations" between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers in respect to progress toward disarmament, neutralizing the effects of the failure of two nuclear powers to adhere to the treaty, and furnishing to the nonweapon countries both security guarantees and assurances on the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. On this last point, A. F. Azaredo da Silveira said in March 1967:

> We are told . . . that a growing number of European politicians, scientists and businessmen already begin to view with apprehension the opening up of a "technological gap" between their countries and the countries outside the area. . . . [I]f responsible personalities in some of the highly-industrialized States of Europe seem to fear that, owing to a gap in technology, their economies risk falling behind—thereby condemning them to a future role which one newspaper defined as being that of "an atomic proletariat"—what of the genuine alarm with which the truly poor nations of the developing world look at the possibility of being permanently barred from the advantages of nuclear progress in the economic and industrial fields?[10]

Da Silveira then took exception to an interpretation which had earlier been placed upon the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty by U.S. Delegate William C. Foster. As the United States reads the treaty, Foster declared, it prohibits any nuclear explosive which can also be used as a weapon.[11] Da Silveira pointed out that Article 17 of the LANFZT guarantees that nothing in the treaty would prejudice the right of the contracting parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and contended that Article 18 "permits the contracting parties . . . to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or to collaborate with third parties for the same purpose."[12] All that is required, he said, is that the contracting party carrying out such an explosion must give advance notice and information to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, and arrange for observation by both agencies.

Da Silveira asserted that to bar access to nuclear explosions would amount to hindering the development of peaceful uses, because peaceful explosions might some day be important in dig-

[10]ENDC/PV. 293, March 14, 1967, p. 13.
[11]ENDC/PV. 291, March 7, 1967, p. 16.
[12]ENDC/PV. 293, March 14, 1967, p. 15.

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ging canals, connecting hydrographic basins, recovering oil fields and releasing natural gas. He offered two additional arguments: First, banning all explosions would not be an absolutely foolproof method of preventing the spread of weapons, since the latter can now be manufactured without resort to explosions. Second, even after it had achieved a capability to carry out a peaceful explosion, a nonnuclear-weapon state would still have to take several additional steps before embarking upon the manufacture of nuclear weapons.[13] Several weeks later, following the recess of the ENDC talks, Correa da Costa of Brazil reiterated his country's position in even more unequivocal terms:

> Brazil does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons either by receiving or manufacturing them; but we shall not waive the right to conduct research without limitation and eventually to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives that will enable us to perform great engineering works. . . . We do not exclude but rather look forward to the cooperation of the nuclear Powers—military or not—in technical assistance, in contracts for actual detonation services, or in the manufacture of explosive devices.[14]

Mexico, the only other Latin American state at Geneva, did not pursue the same approach as Brazil on the question of peaceful explosions. Ambassador Castañeda did not deem Geneva the proper forum for authoritative interpretations of the Latin American treaty, but gave his government's opinion that the treaty permits only those explosions for peaceful purposes which do not constitute an explosion of a nuclear weapon, defined in the treaty as "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes."[15]

Later, Castañeda argued that developing states are not really confronted with the dilemma described by others (meaning, of course, Brazil). Acknowledging the fact that the developing countries cannot afford to give up the possibility of peaceful explosions for gigantic civil engineering works, he denied that such explosions must always be carried out by the state concerned, using its own technical resources. If states import technology for other purposes, they could import it for this one. (Brazil had suggested importing "explosive" technology on its own national initiative, e.g., from India or France, without submitting the kind of international application the United States seemed to have in

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[14] ENDC/PV. 297, May 18, 1967, p. 17.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

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mind.) Castañeda cited the experience of Canada and Sweden, two states whose abstention from the manufacture of nuclear weapons has not significantly affected their research, development and production in reactor technology and other peaceful fields. But then, noting that the developing states cannot afford to depend completely on the largesse of the West in respect to the export of nuclear technology, the Mexican delegate urged that the international sharing of knowledge and benefits in the nuclear area be established as a matter of juridical obligation and rights. He concluded with the observation that an imperfect nonproliferation treaty would be preferable to no treaty at all.[16]

Brazil, however, was not persuaded to alter her position. Azaredo da Silveira considered it unacceptable to curtail freedom of scientific research in one sector of human knowledge, especially one so potentially crucial for development. To offset the efforts of some delegations to deprecate the importance of peaceful explosions, he called attention to the growing interest of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and U.S. private enterprise in Project Plowshare. Brazil, he intimated, could only renounce the right to conduct its own peaceful explosions if *all* nations would at the same time renounce the manufacture of nuclear explosives for both peaceful and weapons purposes. In his view, a nonproliferation treaty does not have to prohibit nonweapon countries from manufacturing peaceful explosive devices. In contrast to the Mexican delegate, he said that Brazil was "a long way from those who insist that it is preferable to have a bad treaty than to have no treaty at all."[17]

Sweden agreed with the superpowers that all nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes should be under international regulation. But Mrs. Alva Myrdal, speaking on behalf of Sweden, expressed sympathy for the position of the less developed countries. Since peaceful explosives are among *des futuribles,* if their manufacture is to be denied to nonweapon states then the latter must be given assurances of rights of equitable use. Sweden linked the issue of controlling peaceful explosions with the working out of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In the Swedish view, all nuclear testing should cease and all peaceful explosions, including those of the superpowers, should be carried out under in-

[16]ENDC/PV. 304, June 13, 1967, pp. 7-10.
[17]ENDC/PV. 310, July 4, 1967, pp. 4-8. Da Silveira was a bit unfair to the Mexican delegate, who had spoken on behalf of an "imperfect" treaty, not a "bad" treaty.

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ternational auspices on a nondiscriminating basis, perhaps by the IAEA. Otherwise, every peaceful explosion conducted under purely national auspices would be suspect as a violation of a comprehensive test ban. The controls for peaceful explosions should be set up in conjunction with a test ban, not a nonproliferation treaty, because the surveillance needed for explosions is different from the surveillance needed to insure against weapons production.[18]

Thus Sweden shifted much of the onus on the question of peaceful explosions back to the superpowers. Mrs. Myrdal argued that the differences between the two superpowers on the technical verification of a comprehensive test ban had been reduced to negligible proportions, and that these differences could no longer be used as a pretext for delaying agreement in this field—a position to which the United States took strong exception.[19]

Despite the fact that a paragraph was added to the preamble pledging the two superpowers to furnish peaceful explosions to the nonnuclear-weapon states on an impartial basis and without charging them for the cost of research and development, India and Brazil remained dissatisfied. They appeared to feel that the treaty as presented invested the weapon powers with a privileged position in respect to peaceful nuclear technology. Although Italy, Canada, Rumania and Sweden requested the nuclear-weapon powers to submit their peaceful nuclear activities to the same kind of international control that would be imposed upon the nonweapon signatories, the Soviet Union and the United States refused.[20]

Conclusions

Nothing has been said here about the attitudes of such countries as Japan and West Germany, simply because this article was addressed primarily to the views of certain states represented on the ENDC. Japan and West Germany have, of course, made their positions on the treaty known through various channels. Italy, which is a Euratom partner of the Federal Republic, is a member of the ENDC. All three countries have been keenly interested in safeguarding their future stake in the realm of peaceful nuclear technology. West Germany, which has invested heavily in fast

[18]ENDC/PV. 302, June 6, 1967, pp. 4-8 and ENDC/PV. 309, June 29, 1967, pp. 4-12.
[19]ENDC/PV. 312, July 11, 1967, pp. 4-9.
[20]*New York Times,* September 3, 1967.

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breeder reactors, has especially expressed misgivings about the danger of industrial espionage, not only from East Europe but from other competitors outside the Euratom area, should IAEA inspectors be allowed to visit West German plants. The Italians for their part are extremely reluctant to approve any provision of a nonproliferation agreement that would have an adverse effect upon the European unity movement, however remote the political goals of the Community might seem at present.

The West Germans no longer stress the argument that they are the only nation in the world which has given a treaty promise not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Still less do they say ominously that they cannot give the Soviets a formal pledge of nuclear renunciation until reunification has been achieved. During 1967, they have generally preferred to rely upon highly technical arguments concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the relations between Euratom and IAEA. To most of their technical objections to the treaty, the United States has managed to come up with relatively satisfactory answers. The United States, for example, has been trying to assure the Germans and the Italians that the wording of Article III on inspection will finally be worked out in a manner satisfactory both to Euratom and IAEA. Yet beneath the technical language in which the West German arguments are couched, one cannot avoid the impression that there are more deep-seated political misapprehensions which may be difficult to articulate. There is still probably some reluctance to sign a nonproliferation treaty until evidence is obtained that such a move will contribute to, rather than detract from, the achievement of national political objectives. Unless there is such evidence, Bonn's adherence to the treaty might subsequently provoke a dangerous reaction from national extremists.

It ought to be said in fairness to the delegates at Geneva that anyone who carefully reads the Verbatim Proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee sessions cannot but be struck by the seriousness of tone and the relative absence of ideological polemics which have marked the discussions in 1967. These exchanges might well go down in history as constituting the most thoughtful and rational international debate yet conducted on an intercultural basis over questions fraught with the profoundest political significance for the future of nation-states. The nuclear-weapon "have-nots" convey an unmistakable impression that they are conscious of possessing formidable leverage at the present time over the nuclear-weapon "haves." They wish to press

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their opportune advantage as far as they prudently can, but on the whole they seem aware also that if they transgress the political and strategic limitations inhering in the contemporary world situation, they may suddenly plunge the international system into a condition of uncontrollable instability with consequences which, although they cannot be predicted accurately, are not entirely pleasant to contemplate.

The leaders of several states can undoubtedly recite motives for acquiring nuclear weapons for their own countries. But most of them are apparently determined to refrain from launching upon the nuclear course hastily, without a thorough probing of both the pros and cons of such a decision, as well as the available alternatives to it. The nonnuclear-weapon states—or most of them—might ideally prefer to move toward an international environment in which nuclear weapons would count decreasingly as indices of power, prestige and security. Yet they realize that this is not the direction the Great Powers are taking as they approach the 1970's—with their eyes fixed upon new military-technological developments.

The nonweapon states are deeply concerned over the future relationships between the civil atom and the military atom, between the guaranteed and the unguaranteed, between the nuclear-armed and the nuclear-naked. They do not seem ready to sign any treaty which, in their eyes if not in ours, involves obnoxious discrimination. They assert over and over again that no treaty which perpetuates the division of the world into independent possessors and dependent beggars can prove effective in the long run. It gives them small comfort, in the wake of the Middle East war, which demonstrated the weakness of the United Nations, to hear the United States calling upon the General Assembly to study the problem of security guarantees for the nuclear-abstaining states. Small wonder, then, that they wish to buy time in order to get their bearings, and that they are now arranging to convene a conference of all the nonnuclear-weapon states in the United Nations during the summer of 1968. The future could be a long one. Before they close out options that may at first be only temporary but which may soon come to assume a prescriptive permanence, they want to know where the world is heading. One can scarcely blame them for that.

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THE IMPACT OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY ON THE SOVIET OFFICER CORPS*

by Roman Kolkowicz

"IN every profession there is a strain between traditional thinking and technical proficiency; but in the military profession conservative influences in the past have been particularly pervasive . . . military professionals have a long record of resistance to technological change. . . ."[1] Janowitz's observation, while made in the context of U.S. military problems, is pertinent to a major problem prevalent in all large military establishments: the far-reaching effect of modern technology on traditional organization, structure of authority, internal processes and professional standards.

Thermonuclear weapons have caused a radical transformation in the dynamics and technology of warfare. In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, the rapid introduction of nuclear warheads and long-range ballistic missiles has brought about a qualitative change in the nature and conduct of war, and caused extensive disturbances in the traditional processes, attitudes, organization and institutional values of various military communities. New strategic views have been advanced that frequently minimize traditional military authority for war planning. New military experts have assumed broad authority within their realm. Younger, well-trained technical officers, experts on the new equipment and weapons, have entered the officer-community in large numbers, and enjoy certain prerogatives denied others. These are the officers, here referred to as "technocrats," who maintain and operate the complex military equipment and weapons of thermonuclear war, who understand and speak the language of industrial managers, and whose functions and processes yield themselves to quantification and hence to statistical and mathematical manipulation and computerization. To these professional advan-

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[1]Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 22.

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tages one must add the fact that Soviet political leaders tend to associate technical expertise with modernization and progress, and to reject conservatism as a liability.

These revolutionary changes have caused far-reaching effects in the Soviet armed forces and have substantially affected the interests of various groups in the military. For purposes of clarity, we shall summarily describe these groups, their objectives, their opponents and the issues under contention.

Conflicting Schools of Thought on Strategic Doctrine. The emergence of new views on strategic doctrine in the Soviet Union has challenged many traditional concepts of warfare and strategy and has thus divided the military community. Roughly speaking, we may say that there are two schools of thought on strategic doctrine. The first group, the "progressives," stresses the role of massive and rapid employment of strategic nuclear missiles in determining the outcome of war. This school tends to depreciate the utility of the conventional forces, where the bulk of the traditional commanders is located, and to allocate to them a rather marginal role in war. The second group, the "conservatives," accepts the dominant role of the strategic nuclear-missile forces, but defends the active and vital role of the conventional forces.

Conflicts Between the Traditional Commanders and the Technocrats. The influx of large numbers of technical officers has greatly affected the values, processes and status structure of the military establishment. These officers view traditional command and disciplinary practices as rather marginal in modern armies and stress technical expertise and efficiency as the most desirable and important criteria. The traditional commanders, in turn, regard their opponents' narrow technical expertise as detrimental to the combat effectiveness and readiness of the armed forces, since it derogates tradition and the human element necessary in the military.

Conflicts Between the Technocrats and the Organs of Political Control. The emergence of large numbers of technical experts in the officer corps has created new problems for the officers who exercise political control in the military. Their task is made more difficult by the fact that in seeking to indoctrinate and control they must avoid interfering with the technical officers' vital professional functions. The privileged position of the technical officers, who tend to view themselves as a professional elite with

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no time to waste on political activities, helps to curb attempts to control them.

The Technical Expert in the Officer Corps: A Conflict Between Traditionalism and Modernity

In recent years, Soviet military leaders have publicly stressed the growing technical and scientific requirements of military life, echoing Vauban's ancient prescription on the importance of the officer's acquiring a knowledge of the sciences: "I know hardly a profession in which it is more necessary. For the soldier who only knows his sword cannot achieve great things."[2] The late Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovskii, told his officers that "without high levels of technical training, without knowing the basics of physics and mathematics, it is impossible to conduct modern military operations expertly."[3] More recently Marshal Zakharov, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff, in a lecture to the officer corps, said that such important problems as "correlation of the types of armed forces . . . the determination of their place and role in the military potential of the country, and their role and place in a thermonuclear war [could] only be solved correctly on a scientific basis."[4] What impact has the massive influx of modern weapons, equipment and techniques had on the Soviet military community? What changes have these developments brought about in the military power structure and in the military's relations with the Communist Party apparatus?

In the armed forces of the Soviet Union, as in those of many other countries, the elite, the Establishment, has traditionally come from the military academies. The graduates of the academies who assume commands enter an officer community dedicated to camaraderie, mutual support, and the other traditional military virtues.[5] The ideal Soviet officer combines bravery, manliness and leadership skills with staff and command abilities. He is more likely to earn the respect of his men by courage and personally inspired authority than by clever staff work or technical expertise. In the past, technical expertise, though acknowledged as desirable

[2]Sebastian le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban, cited in Werner Hahlweg, editor, *Klassiker der Kreigskunst* (*Classics of Military Art*) (Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1960), p. 161.

[3]*Krasnaia zvezda,* October 25, 1962.

[4]*Ibid.,* February 4, 1965.

[5]As one Soviet officer has expressed it, "In an institution where each man is a brother to his fellow-man, even an unknown soldier is best friend to each of us." *Ibid.,* October 13, 1962.

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in an officer, did not rate very highly among his qualities.[6] Since World War II, however, and particularly since the launching of Sputnik and the modernization of the Soviet armed forces, large numbers of engineers and technicians have entered the officer ranks. They are to be found predominantly in such elite bodies as the air defense forces, the strategic missile forces and the submarine navy. This influx of well-trained technical officers into the military community is changing the image of the military commander and is threatening the traditional officers' dominant positions and careers. Furthermore, the technical officers' resistance to becoming involved in party activities makes for strained relations with the political control functionaries in the military. Thus, the rise of the technocrats has introduced new and potentially far-reaching problems into the party-military relationship.

The French military writer, F. O. Miksche, observed that "Soldier-technicians are regarded less as comrades than as 'colleagues,' not constituting a unit, but a kind of community effort."[7] Miksche belittles the importance of the new *homo technicus* in modern military establishments and accuses him of "complex primitivism."[8] His views are not isolated; they reflect the turbulence in some military establishments that is caused by the massive influx of modern weapons systems and the accompanying growth in the number and influence of technicians in uniform.

The Soviet military establishment has been undergoing such an internal upheaval as a result of the need for modernization. While the traditionalists are fighting a rear-guard battle, the modernizers are pressing ahead; presumably with the support of the highest party leaders, they are weeding out the technically backward and inept, and replacing them with younger and better-trained technicians. The extent and the ruthlessness of this purge campaign among the Soviet officer corps in the past few years were such that Marshal Malinovskii felt impelled to rebuke the cadre organs:

> Cadre organs are trying to get rid of experienced commanders only

[6]For an authoritative and trenchant view of various images of the Soviet officer see the following statement by Marshal Konev, cited by Milovan Djilas in his *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1962), p. 82: "Voroshilov is a man of inexhaustible courage. But—he was incapable of understanding modern warfare. . . . Budennyi never knew much and he never studied anything. He showed himself to be completely incompetent and permitted awful mistakes to be made. Shaposhnikov was and remains a technical staff officer." Konev is implying that courage, while admirable, is not sufficient, but that technical expertise alone is also a narrow virtue.

[7]*Military Review,* August 1962, p. 76.

[8]He criticizes him for not seeming "to grasp the fact that the technical means and methods are not an end in themselves, but a means to an end." (*Ibid.*)

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because they are 35 years old, and supposedly have sat around too long in their positions and therefore have no prospect of advancement, etc. . . . Not even regimental commanders are assured of remaining in their position. If they do not have an academic education, then the cadre personnel do not even want to talk to them.[9]

Malinovskii then tried to counter the argument that older, less useful officers are blocking the way for the younger and more capable officers by stressing that "one could not block the way to advancement of capable, diligent young commanders, even if one wanted to." He stated that even when these younger commanders lack a higher professional military education they still "appoint themselves to higher positions."[10]

The growing emphasis on the role and importance of the technocrat in uniform is reflected in statements of ranking military leaders. Marshal Biriuzov, the former Chief of the General Staff, who was killed in an airplane crash in October 1964, stressed the changed relationship between the professional and the technical officer. Warning the professional military officers not to discriminate against the "technical" officers, Biriuzov went on to say that "such 'classification' was inherited by us from those distant times when one could count the engineers in the military on the fingers of one hand."[11] He stated that in the present period, however, 72 per cent of officers in the Soviet missile forces are engineers or technicians, and that in the air defense forces the "number of engineers and technicians exceeds the number of officers who have graduated from officer schools and [higher military] academies."[12] Moreover, "it can be said without exaggeration that to such officer-specialists belongs the future of our armed forces."[13]

Biriuzov's predecessor and successor, Marshal Zakharov, pointed out that, while "in past wars the gaps in a commander's military and technical knowledge were sometimes filled in by his native intuition . . . it is very risky to rely on intuition in nuclear warfare under conditions of rapid and highly mobile military operations."[14]

[9]Cited in *K novomu pod'emu partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote* (*To a New Intensification of Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy*), edited by Major General Z. S. Osipov (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), p. 12.
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 13.
[11]Cited in *Voennyi inzhener—aktivnyi vospitatel'* (*The Military Engineer—An Active Educator*) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), p. 5.
[12]*Ibid.*, p. 17.
[13]*Ibid.*, p. 5.
[14]*Krasnaia zvezda*, October 12, 1962.

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The Political Neutrality of the Military Technocrat

One of the most remarkable aspects of the technocrats' position in the Soviet armed forces is their consistent and vehement refusal to become involved in the normal political-educational activities in their units. The Soviet press frequently quotes technical officers as expressing such views as: "I am a specialist. My job is to ensure good conditions and combat readiness of the equipment; the education of soldiers and sergeants—that is the job of commanders and political workers."[15] Or: "That's not our job. Education—that's the political worker's job. We are engineers. Our element is technology."[16] This reluctance, especially of the younger technical officers, to participate in party work has generated ill-feeling among the political officers and also some of the professional officers. The latter resent the fact that they themselves must submit to large doses of indoctrination and political work, while the *tekhnary,* who enjoy greater career security and preferential treatment, are allowed to remain aloof from such time-wasting activities.

The technical officers' "crawling into their technical shell"[17] has been strongly criticized by a number of leading military and political personnel, who oppose the notion that a "military engineer is a 'pure' specialist who has little time left, after attending to complex systems of contemporary weapons, to carry out other duties."[18] Marshal Biriuzov was among those who commented on this problem, pointing out that "it is not a secret that among our military engineers, especially among the young, one finds a desire to be appointed to such positions where their duties would be concentrated on servicing military equipment." However, having obtained such a position "they feel themselves 'free' of any involvement of education of personnel."[19]

Yet, despite the criticism leveled at them in public, the military technocrats are still resisting the various attempts to engage them more fully in political work, and the issue continues to be debated. Political functionaries such as General Epishev, the head of the Main Political Administration, may state categorically that a Soviet officer "cannot be a narrow military specialist, but [must be] an organizer and expert in the teaching and upbringing of

[15] *Ibid.,* March 14, 1960.
[16] Cited by Colonel-General N. Antonov in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* January 1961, p. 34.
[17] General of the Army I. Pliev, in *ibid.,* October 1962, p. 27.
[18] *Ibid.,* January 1962, p. 72.
[19] *Krasnaia zvezda,* May 21, 1961.

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subordinates,"[20] but other military leaders stress the importance of not burdening the technical officers with too much political-indoctrinational work. Early in 1963, for example, the First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General V. Tolubko, criticized certain practices by which officers are overtaxed with political duties at the expense of their professional training and activity.[21]

Malinovskii made the point that, while political involvement is necessary for officers, it is no more important than that political officers should have technical expertise and up-to-date technical training: "[Thorough familiarization with science and technology] . . . applies equally to political workers. If they are not sufficiently familiar with modern military equipment, they will not be able expertly to conduct political-educational work among the personnel."[22] In the same vein, *Krasnaia zvezda* has on several occasions attacked the preferential treatment accorded to political indoctrination and political instructors and has criticized the fact that specialized education and training are being slighted.[23] Marshal Biriuzov, while asserting the need for some political participation by technical officers, wondered whether it "is advisable to burden a specialist who has higher training with such tasks as belong to the sphere of duties of sergeant personnel."[24]

Whatever may be the reluctance of professional officers to accept technical innovation and the elevation of the technical officers, the demands of modern warfare have made the technocrats in uniform indispensable to the viability of the Soviet armed forces. Since the political leadership and many of the military leaders favor a strategic doctrine that assigns a crucial role to the strategic forces, which are based heavily on modern technology and must be kept at a high level of readiness, the men in charge of such weapons and equipment inevitably have become the new elite among the military.[25] The technical officers are well aware of the

[20]A. Epishev, "Na strazhe mirovogo truda sovetskogo naroda" ("Guarding the Peaceful Work of the Soviet People"), *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie,* January 1963, p. 21.

[21]"Officers sometimes complain that they never have the opportunity to prepare adequately for their duties. In the units where such difficulties occur, it is necessary in the coming year to unburden the officer of excessive loads and do away with the unnecessary waste of time." *Krasnaia zvezda,* January 8, 1963.

[22]*Ibid.,* October 25, 1962.

[23]*Ibid.,* October 13, 1962; January 13, 1963; February 3, 1963; March 20, 1963.

[24]*Ibid.,* May 21, 1961.

[25]See R. Kolkowicz, *The Impact of Technology on the Soviet Military: A Challenge to Traditional Military Professionalism* (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, RM-4198-PR, August 1964).

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importance of their role, and expressions of their self-assurance range from simple self-congratulatory observations to dire forecasts of the consequences of not heeding the technocrat:

> The time is coming when the technician and engineer will assume one of the central places in war. . . . If military leaders fail to understand the changes that have taken place in military technology and continue to adhere to obsolete methods, [they will bring about] disasters and grave losses on the battlefield.[26]

Military engineers, as one officer pointed out, perform functions that require remarkable expertise and have a high economic value, despite the fact that "the engineer has until recently often been looked upon as a narrow specialist, some sort of highly qualified 'technocrat'."[27] A naval captain pointedly asked why seven hours a week of the officer's time are allotted for political education and only one hour and a half for professional-technical training, and why military personnel who are studying political education are given two to three days to prepare for classes while those taking professional training are permitted only one day.[28]

The technical officers' open challenge of such fundamental party practices in the military appears the more remarkable when it occurs in the face of an intimidation campaign by the political organs.[29] Their relative freedom to assert themselves arises from the important advantage they have over professional officers with lower skills in being able to command lucrative and prestigious civilian positions in the event of their dismissal from military

[26]Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Baranov, *Voennaia tekhnika i moral 'no-boevye kachestva voina (Military Technology and the Combat Morale of the Soldier*) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), pp. 5-7.

[27]Engineer-Captain D. Kovalerchuk, in *Krasnaia zvezda,* February 3, 1963.

[28]Naval Captain 3rd class V. Sherel, in *ibid.* Among the technical officers who have publicly criticized restrictive party practices in the military are the following: Colonel-General A. Podol'skii, deputy commander of the Soviet Union's Air Defense Forces (PVO), who strongly urged that all the time necessary be given to personnel desiring to improve their technical expertise (*ibid.,* January 4, 1963); Major General D. Smilevetz of the Engineering-Technical Services, who took issue with the excessive use of the military's time for subjects not geared to technical specialization (i.e., for political indoctrination), and asked: "Is it not strange that, despite the fact that military technology is developing very rapidly, military institutes cannot increase the number of hours needed for the teaching of the specialized and technical subjects?" (*ibid.,* October 13, 1962); and Lieutenant Colonel Rybkin, who criticized the political organs for making allowances to officers studying political subjects ("they gave them three full days a month and three evenings a week during which they were freed from any service duties"), while officers who tried to improve their technical-professional standards through correspondence courses "have not been given a single day for doing the home work assigned by the academy" (*ibid.,* October 4, 1962).

[29]See R. Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962-1963* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-3760-PR, August 1963).

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service.[30] Moreover, because their skills are urgently needed, they enjoy some preferential treatment in the matter of participating in drab political-educational activities. The leverage of the technical officers vis-à-vis the political organs inevitably leads to friction between them.

The Controversy over the Role of the Technical Officer

"As long as there are dangerous and irksome tasks to be done, an engineering philosophy cannot suffice as the organizational basis of the armed forces. . . . Heroism is an essential part of the calculations of even the most rational and self-critical military thinkers."[31] This perceptive statement by Janowitz underscores an important question that is disturbing many well-ordered military communities: how to preserve a military ethos, with the ideals of heroism, bravery, dedication to duty and personal sacrifice, and protect the authority of the commander in the age of computerized war techniques, cybernetics and managerial procedures.[32]

The conflicts and tensions between traditionally-oriented professional officers and the more progressive and pragmatic technical officers have deeply disturbed the Soviet military,[33] and there are innumerable instances of the continuing battle between the tradi-

[30]See Kolkowicz, *The Impact of Technology,* also *Red Star,* November 10, 1963. The unhappy lot of the professional officer who possesses no special technical skills is reflected in the bitter words of a major who was released from active service: "I am 46—that's the trouble. . . . What pleasures are ahead of me? Am I to eat up my pension and wait till I die? Too soon for that. . . . I need a place in life, do you understand? I need active service." When someone tried to assure him that he could get a job, the major shouted: "What do you mean, work? I am an old platoon officer. Where does a company officer belong in a civilian job?" *Literaturnaia Gazeta* (*Literary Gazette*), May 24, 1960.

[31]Janowitz, *op. cit.,* p. 35.

[32]Khrushchev was also sensitive to this problem. During his last reception in the Kremlin for the graduates of the military academies, he stressed that "even with automation, the individual plays the decisive role" and rejected the distorted image of the modern officer as an impersonal technician: "Today in our country an officer is frequently conceived of as a man in a white coat who sits at a control panel and pushes buttons. . . . But you military men well know what modern military operations will be like." *Pravda,* July 9, 1964.

[33]In 1961 the military press carried a running discussion, initiated by Engineer-Colonel Beloborodov in January, which focused on the subject of similar, standardized service insignia for all officers, technical as well as professional. In many letters to the editor and other responses, the engineer-officers overwhelmingly expressed the desire to be treated as full-fledged officers and left no doubt that they wished to be placed in commanding positions. Marshal Biriuzov entered the discussion on May 19, and stressed the growing role of the technical officers in the Soviet Army. The new emphasis on the technical officers' role was underlined in the customary reception of graduates of military academies in the Kremlin, where Engineer-Colonel Samusenko was elected to speak in the name of all graduates. See *Krasnaia zvezda,* January 27, March 3, April 19, May 19 and July 9, 1961.

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tionalists and the innovators. Thus, a spokesman of the latter, Lieutenant-General V. Petukhov, in an article entitled "Overcoming 'Traditional' One-Sidedness,"[34] criticizes the practice of singling out only a soldier's heroic deeds and military virtues when citing his achievements: "Frequently, on hearing stories of such heroics, a soldier thinks to himself 'I would surely like to be such a brave and courageous man, but to study technology—that's very dull." Petukhov complains that these accounts will tell you that the hero "did not retreat even one step before the enemy" but usually fail to mention his professional or technical skill. And he reminds his readers that "it is not only bravery that counts but also the mastering of the equipment and skill of combat."

The gauntlet has been taken up for the military professionals by Major General Makeev,[35] the authoritative editor-in-chief of *Krasnaia zvezda*. In a rather striking departure from communist orthodoxy Makeev stresses the historical continuity of military virtues: "The concept of military honor has existed since time immemorial; it is as old as armies. . . . Even in the old Russian army there were good traditions—bravery, selfless dedication, and military skill were revered." He goes on to distinguish between the hard lot of the officer, that is to say, of the military professional, and that of the ordinary soldier. He also argues with those who hold that the career of the officer has little social utility. The officer's contribution, he says, is "no less necessary to the fatherland than that of the *kolkhoznik, agronom,* engineer, teacher, or doctor." And he criticizes the unconcerned citizen (*obyvatel'*) for not caring that "while he sleeps, thousands of officers carry on their difficult duties."

Other traditionalists, pleading their cause, stress the unfortunate lot of the commander and the dangers of bookishness (*shkoliarstvo*) in the technocrats. A Colonel of the Guards, G. Iashkin, gives an impassioned description of the hardships and the virtues of commanders "who spend sleepless, frightening nights in the extreme heat of summer, during the rain and frost of autumn, [and] who work in a dedicated manner with every single soldier and sergeant. . . ." Iashkin expresses the bitterness of the traditional commanders toward the political officers who tend to view the former as more expendable than the technocrats: "At times it may become necessary to enter the battle alongside those who feel that, since such is the lot of the officer, there is

[34] *Ibid.*, March 23, 1964.
[35] *Izvestiia*, February 12, 1963.

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no need to be especially concerned about his welfare, and essential needs, and about the conditions of his work."[36] Chief Marshal of Armor, P. A. Rotmistrov, warns that "disproportionate stress on theoretical training may lead to the separation of officers from life." He maintains that such an overemphasis on technical and theoretical training may transform officers into "scholastics (*shkoliastov*) who do not understand life at all but are merely capable of citing the book." He is concerned that "such officers may become dogmatic and superficial."[37]

Relations between the traditionalists and the technocrats have been exacerbated by a development which is also causing concern in the party and in the High Command: the growing anti-militarism of Soviet society, in particular among Soviet youth. *Krasnaia zvezda* reflected the increasing concern over this attitude when it initiated a debate in its pages on the merits and demerits of military service as a career. The discussion revealed some of the younger generation's deep disenchantment with the military, as expressed, for example, in this withering remark to a young man who was contemplating a military career: "Don't be a fool, Igor; only failures put on a gray overcoat voluntarily, and you are a bright boy."[38]

In a letter to the old war-horse, Marshal Budennyi, several students of military academies broached the delicate subject of the nobility of the military profession:

> There can be no beauty [of profession] where, they say, people are training to kill others. . . . They say that there have been and are bourgeois philosophers and generals who talk of the beauty of war. . . . They say that while the officer profession is necessary at present, it is uninteresting and unromantic, and that any civilian profession is better than the military.[39]

The extent of, and concern with, anti-military and pacifist trends in Soviet society was reflected in many other public statements

[36] *Krasnaia zvezda*, November 10, 1963.
[37] *Ibid.*, January 30, 1963.
[38] *Ibid.*, August 26, 1962.
[39] *Ibid.*, January 13, 1963. On the issue of the conditions of military service as a profession *Krasnaia zvezda* also carried some opinions which contradicted the official line. Among them was the following, published on December 26, 1962: "I do not believe that comrade Matukhin [an advocate of the beauty of the military profession] experiences happiness from his service. It seems to me that, if you gave him suitable conditions and a good income, he would have thrown over this 'beautiful' life and would have taken off his 'beautiful' uniform. . . . Where can there be beauty? In the daily routine where everything is figured out to the last minute? Or in the days which all seem alike? To see in them the beauty of life means to be a limited person."

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by prominent military and party leaders. Marshal Malinovskii rebuked Soviet writers and artists for "mistaken tendencies in representing the last war." He criticized them for introducing "motifs of pacifism" and "abstract rejection of war"[40] into Soviet literature, the arts and the movies.

General Epishev similarly condemned artists and writers for "a note of pacifism" which had appeared in their works and which "belittled the heroic spirit of military events." He expressed his "great concern with the ideological and artistic imperfection of certain works dealing with military life" and urged writers to produce works that would "teach youth to be brave and courageous, steadfast and firm, in the struggle with the enemies."[41]

The pacifist sentiments in society, the denigration of traditional military professionalism and the growing economic and professional opportunities in civilian life have had such a detrimental effect on the quality and quantity of officers entering the armed forces that a reappraisal of policies in the party and in the military was called for. One result of this reappraisal was a public de-emphasis of the technical expertise of officers at the expense of traditional "general military skills." In keeping with the usual practices of the communist society, this change of official attitude and policy was broadcast widely by means of a public "debate" in the military press. The "debate" was eventually closed by the then Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Biriuzov:

> The problems [of the debate] concern the relationship between the commander's technical abilities and his general military skills. The opinions on these are divided. Some comrades maintain that the commander must possess such a level of knowledge as will enable him to be thoroughly familiar with all types of equipment. Others maintain that the officer must primarily concern himself with general military training. . . .

Biriuzov then stated as his own view that the traditional functions of the commander are as vital today as ever, and that "sheer technicianship, separated from practical affairs, inevitably leads to narrow-mindedness."[42]

Although the technical officers are growing in numbers and authority, and although they are critical of the old-fashioned ways of the traditionalists among the professional officers, they do not, by and large, attempt to impose a new set of values on the latter

[40] *Ibid.*, February 9, 1964.
[41] *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1964, p. 73, and *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 9, 1964.
[42] *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 28, 1964.

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beyond their insistence on up-to-date, functional principles and methods. On the contrary, the technocrats would like to be accepted by the traditionalists in the officer corps; they want to be viewed as commanders, and they, too, seek rapport with their men.[43] In other words, the conflicts in the officer community are caused not so much by the technocrats' violation or rejection of the old military virtues as by the traditionalists' resentment at having to share authority with the intruders and realization that they themselves may have become expendable. If the technocrats' pragmatism were to be reconciled with the older commanders' military ethos, this could greatly strengthen the corporate autonomy of the officer corps.

Trends and Outlook

The initial impact of a changing technology and the modernization of the Soviet armed forces was such as to divide and debilitate the officer corps. Large numbers of traditional commanders were replaced by technical officers,[44] traditional military values came to count for less than technical expertise, and established strategic views yielded to the overriding emphasis of the "progressives" on strategic missile-nuclear weapons and forces[45] (a development that caused political controls in these forces to be relaxed, at the same time that they were tightened in the conventional forces).[46]

Gradually, however, the shock effect of these reforms on the military has been subsiding, and countertrends are discernible that are likely to have a unifying effect. These new and long-range developments are (a) the growing acceptance by both party and military leaders of a war strategy that places renewed emphasis on traditional methods of warfare and the need for conventional forces; (b) the humbler attitude of technical officers toward the traditional commanders, whose values and virtues they have come

[43] *Izvestiia,* February 12, 1963.

[44] Lieutenant General Kalashnik, deputy head of the MPA, stated that "since 1945 the number of engineer technicians in the armed forces has grown three times." *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* November 1962, p. 15. It should be noted that, while the absolute increase of technicians was indeed threefold, the relative increase was between ten and fifteen times, because in 1962, when Kalashnik was writing, the Red Army was only about one-quarter the size it had been in 1945.

[45] See Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations.*

[46] See R. Kolkowicz, *The Use of Soviet Military Labor in the Civilian Economy: A Study of Military "Shefstvo"* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-3360-PR, November 1962).

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to respect and emulate; (c) the bond of common opposition of all officers to the excessive control functions exercised by the political organs. Furthermore: (d) The party *apparat* may find it difficult to continue to manipulate the officer corps as in the past through frequent intensification of political controls. The technocrats' self-assertiveness, professional indispensability, and possession of options to leave the military for lucrative jobs in the civilian economy, places them in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the political control organs. (e) Ranking technical officers were not, as a rule, co-opted in the past into the highest party councils, or given political roles. However, most of the present members of the High Command are nearing retirement age and becoming too old for dealing with the complexities of thermonuclear war. It is very likely that some of their replacements will include ranking technical officers. (f) The general erosion of the attractiveness of professional officer careers is causing major concern in the military and party and may lead to concessions to the military in order to enhance its status in the eyes of the younger generation.

The influence of the technocrats in the Soviet officer corps will continue to rise—though the tension between them and the traditionalists will lessen—partly because of the technical and scientific needs of the armed forces and partly because the party elite increasingly favors the pragmatic approach, as shown in its use of managerial and administrative techniques. In the final analysis, the changes wrought by modern technology and the influx of technocrats in the officer corps enhance the position and influence of the whole military establishment in Soviet society. The military stands to gain also from the waning ideological commitment noticeable throughout the Soviet Union and from the ascendance of manager-bureaucrats in the place of charismatic leaders.[47] As a result of these various developments, the ideological constraints on the officer corps are likely to diminish. Thus, by combining

[47]To quote Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Zakharov: "A revolution has occurred in military affairs which is unheard of both in extent and consequences, a revolution which has produced a truly profound change in the organization, training, and education of the armed forces and in the views, manners, and forms of armed struggle. . . . With the emerging of rocket-nuclear arms, cybernetics, electronics, and computer equipment, any subjective approach to military problems, hare-brained plans, and superficiality can be very expensive and can cause irreparable damage. Only the thorough scientific foundation of decisions and actions . . . will guarantee the successful fulfillment of the tasks. . . ." Similar views have been expressed by A. N. Shelepin and L. I. Brezhnev, the most powerful members of the Secretariat of the Communist Party's Central Committee. *Krasnaia zvezda,* February 4, 1965, July 25, 1965, and July 4, 1965, respectively.

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the technocrats' functional indispensability with the traditional, cohesive ethos of the commanders, the Soviet military may become a more professional, less-indoctrinated, self-assertive group, with greater institutional autonomy and professional independence than ever in the past.

A Postscript

This paper was originally presented at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology held at Evian, France, in September 1966. Of the rather large Soviet delegation at the Congress, about six to eight delegates participated in the proceedings of the Working Session on "Military Professionals and Militarism." The spokesman for the Soviet group was General P. Zhilin, presently head of the Institute for Military History.

Several of the Soviet delegates brought with them copies of papers intended for the Working Session. These papers must be described, in all forthrightness, as a mélange of tiresome propaganda against "warmongering imperialist capitalism," *cum* pious assertions of the benevolent and altruistic objectives of Soviet policy, *cum* fervent disavowals of the non-Marxist brand of sociology and bland assertions regarding the true and scientific nature of Marxist sociology.[48] While their formal papers had the usual imprimatur of "communist correctness," the Soviet delegates' behavior during the proceedings of the session was reasonable, sober and relatively "objective." Only after they returned home did they find it necessary, once again, to resort to the usual tedious harangues ex post facto.

Typical of such harangues is the following excerpt from S. Semonov's monograph *Sotsiologia i problemy sovermennosti (Sociology and Contemporary Problems)* in the series *Report on the Sixth World Congress of Sociology:*

> In the "military" section, in distinction to other sections, there were most of all presentations containing open anti-Soviet characteristics. That was the reason why the head of the Soviet delegation P. N. Fedoseev stated in his address to the plenary session during the first day of the Congress, that some people at the Congress attempt to substitute apologias for sociology. One gets the impression that some presentations, especially, those presented to the section "Military Professionals and Militarism" have been prepared not in sociological but propagandistic centers and are in the spirit of the "cold war". . . .[49]

[48] See, for example, G. Karpov's paper, "De Quelque Aspects Sociaux du Problème du Désarmement."

[49] (Moscow: Iznane, 1967), pp. 62-63.

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Among papers singled out in that category were Raymond Garthoff's and mine:

> The paper by Roman Kolkowicz (a representative of the Rand Corporation of California which finances anti-communist research) was entitled, "The Influence of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officers Corps." The paper enumerated a number of alleged conflicts and crises in the Soviet Army. Among them are two major "crises." First, between older military cadres, with World War II experience, who as it were, maintain that a future war will be conducted with traditional methods, and younger military cadres who prefer nuclear weapons. Secondly, [conflicts] between technocrats and political organs. In the Soviet Army, according to Kolkowicz, there are at present many technical specialists among the officers who resist political influence [politicization]. As these contradictions continue to grow, the army will continue to escape political influence.

Had Semonov looked into my paper, he would have noticed the heavy documentation from authoritative Soviet sources which indicates beyond a doubt the existence of disagreements among these military groups in the Soviet Army. Moreover, a number of authoritative Western works have also discovered the existence of disagreements in the Soviet military on such issues as strategic doctrine and political controls. However, one must not be too harsh with one's Soviet colleagues. One must learn the simple truth that their public statements and their private views are not necessarily similar, and that strong constraints of a complex nature operate on them, forcing them into the banalities of agitprop verbiage. Consequently, in the spirit of better international understanding across the ideological and political chasm, I shall tolerantly dismiss their statement about having helped me to mend my ways and to see the light of truth: "In their subsequent talks R. Garthoff and R. Kolkowicz sharply changed the tone and substance of their statements as compared with their written papers."

It goes without saying that hardly anything which transpired during the few days of the conference would motivate me to change my general views contained in this paper. What occurred was a change in the Soviet delegates' understanding about both the substance and purpose of my paper, which was neither "anti-communist" nor in the "spirit of the cold war." Perhaps conferences are not a complete waste of time, after all.

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U.S. POLICY, THE UN AND THE CONGO*

by Ernest W. Lefever

DURING its first four years of independence, the Congo was a major concern of the White House and the Department of State, sharing with Berlin, Cuba and Viet Nam the distinction of having a special task force devoted to its problems. The role of the United Nations Force (UNF) in that turbulent arena was a matter of considerable controversy within the State Department. Congress joined intermittently in the debate. Senator Thomas Dodd's advocacy of Moise Tshombe's secessionist cause earned him the sobriquet "Ambassador to Katanga," to the discomfort of the U.S. Ambassador, Edmund A. Gullion, in Leopoldville. Portions of the press and public were passionately partisan, although no American blood was being spilled. Walter Lippmann called the UN peacekeeping effort "the most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international cooperation ever attempted,"[1] and Arthur Krock referred to UNF action as "the bloody war to suppress the establishment of Katanga as a separate state."[2]

This inquiry is concerned, not with the Congo debate within the U.S. government or the impact of the Congo question on the American public, but rather with U.S. policy toward the UN operation in light of the depth and sustained character of Washington's commitment to a crisis in a part of the world hitherto regarded as on the periphery of American interest.[3]

Interests and Objectives

The Congo crisis erupted in July 1960, six months before the end of the Eisenhower Administration, but there was no significant difference between Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy in the assessment of the crisis or the nature of American interests in central Africa. From the first, Washington sought a united

*This article is adapted from Chapter 4 of Dr. Lefever's forthcoming book, *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation,* which will be published later in 1967 by The Johns Hopkins Press.

[1] *Washington Post and Times Herald,* July 21, 1960.

[2] *New York Times,* December 4, 1964.

[3] The debate in Washington is summarized briefly in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 574-579, and Theodore S. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 635-639.

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Congo with a stable and moderate government in Leopoldville, which would represent all major factions and be capable of sustaining mutually beneficial relations with Western states. Both administrations wanted the new state to succeed politically and economically, and sought to ensure Western access to its vast economic resources. The United States wished to frustrate Soviet subversion, to head off a civil war, and to bring about the peaceful integration of Katanga into the Congo. These specific objectives were compatible with the larger goal of stability and peaceful change in Africa.

More attention was devoted to the Congo than to the rest of Africa combined because the immediate dangers and opportunities there characterized the continent as a whole. Wayne Fredericks, of the State Department's African Bureau, said: "If we don't have a Congo policy, we don't have an African policy."[4] The European Bureau, however, kept insisting that U.S. African policy had to be orchestrated with America's far-flung commitments elsewhere, particularly in Europe. The government had to take seriously the interests of Belgium, Britain, France and other NATO countries that were unenthusiastic about UN intervention, as well as the views of the Afro-Asian leaders calling for more militant UN action against Katanga.

Washington was deeply concerned with the lawlessness and disorder that followed the July 1960 mutiny of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba's dismissal of its Belgian officer corps, and the exodus of Belgian administrative and technical personnel from the Congo. The Department of State feared that the Soviet Union would exploit the chaos for purposes inimical to stability and the best interests of the Congolese, and regarded Moscow, not Brussels, as the chief threat to the Congo's independence. Although the United States was the only government to receive a formal invitation from Leopoldville to provide military assistance to restore law and order, Washington from the outset and for a variety of reasons chose to channel its aid through the United Nations.

Direct U.S. military aid was quickly ruled out lest it be used as a pretext for more substantial Soviet intervention in behalf of Lumumba which could lead to an unsought confrontation of the two great powers. U.S. leaders did not fear a political contest with the communist bloc in the Congo, but they wanted the contest to be conducted by acceptable rules and at minimum risk.

[4]Cited in Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 575.

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Uneasiness regarding Soviet-bloc involvement persisted throughout the UN period, and not without reason. But the real danger from the communists was their subversive exploitation of civil strife and chaos, and not a direct military confrontation as implied in some American statements.

The United Nations option was also supported by Washington's disposition to share the responsibility for security in Africa with other states, particularly with the former metropolitan powers. Recognizing that the new states would continue to rely heavily on their European ties, American leaders saw themselves as allies of London, Paris and Brussels (and other Western governments, for that matter) in a common effort to strengthen and protect the fledgling regimes.

With its commitment to decolonization and its increasing interest in the Third World, Washington was anxious not to alienate the leaders of the emerging states by political, military or economic policies which carried overtones of control or excessive influence. Regardless of what the United States did, there would be communist charges of "neo-colonialism," but it was believed that the United Nations, functioning as a lightning rod, to use the metaphor of Ambassador Gullion, would help to absorb these charges.

The United States had long advocated UN peacekeeping in principle and had been the most consistent supporter of UNEF (in the Middle East) and other United Nations missions involving military personnel. This largely favorable experience with multilateral peacekeeping reinforced its general disposition to turn to the United Nations in certain types of crises where bilateral or alliance action was held to involve unacceptable political costs.

A final and significant factor that weighed on the side of the UN option was the sheer confusion of the situation. The reports from the Congo in those frantic early days were distorted and exaggerated by rumor, panic and sensational headlines. No one knew how much or what kind of external assistance was needed.

Given these considerations, U.S. Ambassador-designate Clare H. Timberlake advised President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba to appeal for UN aid. This was on July 10, 1960. On July 12 a group of Congolese cabinet members asked Timberlake to request 3,000 American troops to restore order.[5]

[5]Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 114.

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At his insistence they formalized the request in writing. Since the matter was already before the UN Secretary-General, President Eisenhower declined to act unilaterally on the invitation. Two and a half years later Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland summed up the initial U.S. response: "Should the Congo's chaos be attacked by a hastily assembled international peace force; or should we send in a division of United States Marines; or should we just sit on our hands and wait for our adversaries to exploit the situation?" We wisely decided, he continued, "not to risk a confrontation of nuclear powers in the center of Africa." We believed, he added, that a UN force would serve "the national interest" of the United States.[6]

Danger of Communist Penetration

The U.S. emphasis on the restoration of internal order was based on the premise that chaos would be exploited by communist states and their allies. In the Security Council debate that preceded the first three United Nations resolutions, Washington succeeded in stopping the communist-neutralist effort to brand Belgium as an aggressor. U.S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge quickly denied charges of Belgian aggression and insisted that the withdrawal of Belgian troops be contingent upon the capacity of the UN forces to restore order.[7]

America's repeated warnings that the introduction into the Congo of military assistance not under the UN Command—or any other unilateral aid—would be "in defiance of the United Nations" and would "seriously jeopardize any effort to bring stability and order to the Congo," reflected the deep concern over Soviet penetration.[8] When Lumumba asked for technical and financial help during his visit to Washington on July 27, 1960, he was told that all U.S. assistance would be given through UN channels.[9]

Lumumba's strident attacks against Belgium, his unwillingness to cooperate with the UN mission, his willingness to accept Soviet aid, and his increasingly evident emotional instability made Washington apprehensive about his capacity to govern responsibly. When Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba on September 5,

[6]U.S. Department of State Press Release 34, January 17, 1963, p. 34.
[7]United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records* (hereafter referred to as UN, *SCOR*), S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 15 and 42-43.
[8]UN, *SCOR*, S/PV 877, July 20, 1960, p. 38.
[9]*New York Times*, July 28, 1960.

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Washington made no announcement but its private reaction was, according to the *New York Times,* "It's about time."[10]

On September 14, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, ANC chief, seized control of the central government and installed a Council of Commissioners. Francis Monheim, a Belgian journalist and close friend of Mobutu, suggests that Mobutu acted on his own initiative.[11] Other reliable sources claim, however, that he was encouraged and even "discovered" by the CIA, and imply that the ANC chief had the Agency's full support.[12] The exact role of the United States is less important than the fact that the Council of Commissioners enjoyed U.S. support from the beginning. UN officials, on the other hand, were reluctant to work with the *de facto* Mobutu regime. Ambassador Timberlake urged Secretary-General Hammarskjold to back the Council Government.[13] Certain UN officials apparently continued to regard Lumumba as the legal Prime Minister, even though they no longer dealt with him as such. On this point American views conflicted sharply with those of Hammarskjold and his Special Representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal of India.

On November 2, 1960, Dayal strongly attacked the Belgian advisers in Leopoldville and Elisabethville and denounced the ANC for its lack of discipline and inability to maintain order. He all but ignored the Council of Commissioners and asserted that the only institutions "whose foundations still stand" were the Chief of State and the Parliament, the latter having already been suspended by Kasavubu. Only through them could a peaceful settlement of the constitutional crisis be found.[14]

Washington rejected Dayal's criticism of Belgium and pointed out that the Congolese Parliament was unable to act normally "because of existing conditions," implying that Lumumba's reinstatement was unacceptable.[15] This view reflected the widely-held suspicion that the UN operation might be used to re-establish Lumumba. Washington's misgivings about the impartiality of Dayal strained its relations with the UN Secretariat. In Leopoldville there was frequent friction between Dayal on the one

[10]September 6, 1960.
[11]Francis Monheim, *Mobutu, l'homme seul* (Brussels: Editions Actuelles, 1962), pp. 132 ff.
[12]Hoskyns, *op. cit.,* p. 201. See also Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story* (New York: W. Morrow, 1962), pp. 220-222.
[13]Hoskyns, *op. cit.,* p. 242.
[14]UN, *SCOR,* Supplement for October, November, December 1962, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), pp. 7-34 *passim.*
[15]*New York Times,* November 5, 1960.

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hand and Ambassador Timberlake and other Western diplomats on the other. Eventually it became evident that Dayal's continued presence in the Congo prevented effective cooperation between the UNF and the Leopoldville authorities. The latter repeatedly insisted that Dayal be replaced. On March 10, 1961, Hammarskjold recalled Dayal to New York for consultations. Two months later Dayal's resignation was announced. Evidence suggests that this withdrawal had been obtained in a deal that also called for the transfer of the U.S. and British ambassadors.[16] Timberlake left the Congo in June 1961.

The "American Plan"

One of President Kennedy's first decisions in African affairs was to order a reassessment of the government's Congo policy. Under Dayal the situation had deteriorated. Congolese troops continued their lawlessness. The intense dissatisfaction among the militant African states over the ouster of Lumumba led to the Casablanca Conference in early January 1961, which demanded the disarmament of Mobutu's troops, the release of political opponents arrested by Leopoldville, the reconvening of Parliament, and the expulsion of all European advisers from the Congo. Pressured on all sides, Hammarskjold on February 1 requested the Security Council to strengthen the mandate of the UNF so that it could more effectively protect the Congo from outside interference and remove ANC factions from political life.[17]

Against this background the Department of State developed a series of tentative proposals which the European allies called the "American Plan." The plan included four major elements:[18] (1) All Congolese troops should be neutralized by the UNF. This disarmament—or limitation of arms—should be accomplished by negotiation if possible, but by force if necessary. (2) All foreign interference in the Congo outside the UN framework should cease. (3) If the neutralization of the ANC proved to be effective, all political prisoners, including Lumumba, would be released and allowed to participate in domestic politics. (4) Sub-

[16]See Hoskyns, *op. cit.*, p. 365. The U.S. efforts to oust Dayal are also discussed in Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 63-64.

[17]UN, *SCOR*, S/PV 928, February 1, 1961, pp. 11-18 *passim.*

[18]See London *Times*, February 4, 1961; *New York Times*, February 4, 1961; *Washington Post and Times Herald*, February 3 and 8, 1961; *CRISP, Congo: 1961* (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 320. See also Adlai E. Stevenson's statement, UN, *SCOR*, S/PV 934, February 15, 1961, pp. 12-13.

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sequently a broadly based government would be established under the authority of Kasavubu and representing all major factions.

The "American Plan" was designed to safeguard the U.S. interest in security and moderation by making the formation of an all-Congo government contingent upon the neutralization of the ANC and the restoration of internal stability. This new approach reflected Washington's effort to strengthen the moral stature of the Secretary-General and to increase his authority in the Congo. Hammarskjold was under severe and constant Soviet attack at that time. The incoming Kennedy Administration also sought to demonstrate its desire to improve relations with the Afro-Asian bloc.

The announcement of Lumumba's death on February 13 produced an atmosphere in which Washington felt it had to lean closer to the more militant Afro-Asian leaders who insisted on "energetic measures" to expel the Belgians and to reconvene the Congo Parliament. It was generally believed that Parliament would support the Stanleyville (Lumumba) forces against Leopoldville. On February 17 the Afro-Asians introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council. This draft neither referred to President Kasavubu nor associated Hammarskjold with its implementation. It emphasized withdrawal of foreign advisers rather than disarmament of the contending ANC groups as the best way to restore order. The neutralization of army units and the achievement of internal order were no longer made a condition for national reconciliation. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson argued for the consolidation of the moderate Ileo-Kasavubu Government that had replaced the Council of Commissioners on February 9, and objected to the draft because it seemed to exclude a prohibition against Soviet-bloc arms which Stanleyville continued to receive. Although the language differed from the original American proposal, under pressure from the Afro-Asian states the U.S. delegate finally endorsed the resolution.[19] At the same time Washington accepted the paragraph authorizing the UNF to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war.

The Katanga Problem

In the beginning the United States insisted that the UNF should not become involved in the Congo's domestic affairs. In a Security Council debate Ambassador Lodge warned that the

[19]UN, *SCOR*, S/PV 941, February 20, 1961, pp. 16-17.

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UN mission should not be drawn into the political struggle between Lumumba and Tshombe, which he held was essentially an internal dispute.[20]

After Lumumba's ouster, Washington began to fear that UN policy in the Congo tended to favor the Lumumba cause. This was one reason for U.S. criticism of Dayal. But as far as the secession of Katanga was concerned, Eisenhower was on the whole satisfied with Hammarskjold's policy of moving cautiously. The Kennedy Administration supported more vigorous UN measures to create an environment in which the Congolese factions, particularly Leopoldville and Katanga, could reach an accord.

Six factors figured strongly in the American opposition to an independent Katanga: (1) Under Belgian rule Katanga had always been an integral part of the Congo, a position accepted by the Brussels Round Table Conference in 1960. (2) Were Katanga allowed to secede, other regions might follow suit. The result would inevitably be fragmentation and chaos which would invite communist penetration. (3) If the problem of Katanga secession could be solved, it would, as Under Secretary of State George W. Ball maintained, "contribute decisively to the ability of the Leopoldville Government to cope with the diversionary activities of Antoine Gizenga," who had become the leader of the Lumumba forces.[21] (4) Secession would disrupt the Congo's economic fabric and destroy its potential for economic viability. (5) Though Tshombe was anti-communist, a number of moderate leaders in Leopoldville, especially Interior Minister Cyrille Adoula and Foreign Minister Justin Bombok, met this description equally well. (6) To enhance America's stature in the eyes of the emerging nations, Washington had to oppose Tshombe's secession effort which most Afro-Asian states mistakenly believed to be a simple expression of Western "neo-colonialism."[22]

For all these reasons, President Kennedy sought to encourage the development of a moderate regime in Leopoldville. The installation of Adoula as Prime Minister on August 2, 1961 seemed to vindicate U.S. policy. "Adoula had been the Ameri-

[20]UN, *SCOR*, S/PV 885, August 8, 1960, p. 8.

[21]George W. Ball, *The Elements in Our Congo Policy* (U.S. Department of State Publication 7326, December 1961), p. 19. This statement by Mr. Ball was the most complete and authoritative pronouncement of U.S. Congo policy during the first thirty months of the crisis.

[22]These factors were recalled by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, April 25, 1965 (U.S. Department of State Press Release 84, pp. 1 and 6).

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cans' choice for this job from the start," Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams reportedly admitted.[23] Secretary of State Dean Rusk publicly praised Adoula's "intelligence, moderation, and nationwide stature."[24]

Washington's objectives for the Congo now called for ending the secessionist movements in Elisabethville and in Stanleyville. When Williams met Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in August 1961, he apparently told Welensky that the United States sought to end Katangan secession by peaceful means if possible, but by force if necessary:

> He [Williams] told me that if the Katanga did not come to an accommodation with the Central Government soon, it was to be expected that that Government would seek to impose its will by force of arms and that the U.N. forces would be justified in intervening on the side of the Central Government on the grounds that it was the only legal government.[25]

After Round One, the first of three clashes between the UNF and Katanga forces, was launched by Conor Cruise O'Brien on September 13, 1961, Washington refrained from making any public comment. But according to the *New York Times* of the following day, State Department spokesmen regarded the action as falling within the UN mandate. While not implying approval for everything UN troops may have done in the controversial September action, Washington clearly supported a firmer approach by the UNF. As an earnest of its commitment to a strong United Nations presence in Katanga, the United States provided four transport planes to the UNF for use inside the Congo.[26]

Washington's desire to back a UN effort to end the secessionist threats of both Tshombe and Gizenga was evident in the debates on the November 24, 1961 resolution which authorized the use of force to apprehend prohibited foreigners. Although Stevenson tried unsuccessfully to amend the draft to authorize action against *all* secessionist movements, and not only Katanga's, he voted for the more limited resolution. Another American draft amendment, requesting the new Secretary-General, U Thant, to use negotia-

[23]Sir Roy Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days* (London: Collins, 1964), p. 220.
[24]*New York Times,* December 9, 1961.
[25]Welensky, *op. cit.,* p. 222.
[26]A Globemaster C-124 and a Hercules C-130 arrived on September 21, a few hours after the cease-fire went into effect. Two more C-130's followed. Heretofore the United States had provided airlift facilities for the UNF only to and from the Congo. (*New York Times,* September 22, 1961.)

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tion and conciliation to settle the Congo problems, was withdrawn under the threat of a Soviet veto. This amendment was aimed partly at allaying the fears of the Western allies. Since the November 24 resolution affirmed all previous ones, including those providing for UN conciliation efforts, Stevenson said: "This new resolution can in no way be a diminution of, but only an addition to, authority previously granted."[27]

The United States apparently supported Round Two from the outset. This operation began on December 5, 1961, in response to Katanga's harassment of UN troops in Elisabethville. The next day Washington disclosed that, in compliance with a UN request, it would provide some twenty additional transport planes to fly troops and equipment to Katanga. According to the State Department, "It was this internal airlift that permitted the rapid U.N. buildup in Katanga."[28]

London, Paris and Brussels reacted strongly against the December UNF action. At the Western Foreign Ministers Conference then meeting in Paris, and at the subsequent NATO Council session, several European allies tried to persuade Washington to join them in a call for an immediate cease-fire. The State Department said it opposed a cease-fire until the UNF had attained its "minimum objectives"—the need and right of the UNF "to protect itself, to maintain its freedom of movement and communications."[29] This unequivocal demonstration of American approval of the UN action helped U Thant to resist the European demands for a halt to the fighting. As a result the UNF continued its military operation in Katanga until December 19 and achieved most of its immediate "minimum objectives."

Faced with the threat of a military defeat and with the strong advice of the American and several European consuls to come to terms with Leopoldville, Tshombe agreed to meet with Adoula. On December 14, Tshombe requested the intervention of President Kennedy, who designated U.S. Ambassador Gullion as his personal representative to arrange the meeting. After preliminary discussions in Leopoldville, Gullion met Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. He then escorted the Katanga leader in the President's plane, *Columbine,* to Kitona to meet Adoula. Only then did Thant order the UNF to cease firing. At Kitona, Gullion

[27] *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: 1961* (U.S. Department of State Publication 7413, August 1962), p. 83.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[29] *New York Times,* December 14, 1961.

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and UN Under Secretary Ralph Bunche tried to convince the two parties of the need for reconciliation. An eight-point agreement was reached.

Back in the United States there was considerable debate within the government on the proper role of the UNF in Katanga. During the December fighting an "American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters" had been organized, listing some eighty well-known persons as members.[30] Known as the "Katanga Lobby" and designed to put pressure on the Administration, the Committee declared that UN "action against Katanga," as well as U.S. "logistical support," was "illegal." Among the Senators opposing Kennedy's support of Round Two were Thomas J. Dodd, Everett McKinley Dirksen, Thruston B. Morton, Richard B. Russell, Strom Thurmond, and James O. Eastland.[31] Richard M. Nixon devoted a full syndicated column to a strong attack, declaring that the Administration's policy in the Congo was "the worst foreign policy blunder since its handling of the Cuban invasion."[32]

On December 27, 1961, Assistant Secretary Williams and Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, denounced Katanga's "propaganda" campaign. Williams accused the "propaganda machine" of fabricating "horrendous tales of indiscriminate mayhem" committed by the UNF. Rowan said: "There has been a clever big-money campaign to convince Americans that they ought to support Katanga's secession" and accused Michel Struelens, former director of the tourist office of the Belgian Congo, of running the campaign from "plush quarters in New York." Four days later George C. McGhee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that the Williams and Rowan speeches "were not cleared at the highest levels of the Department." The controversial Mr. Struelens provoked a drawn-out dispute between the State Department and several members of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Finally, in December 1962, he was ordered to leave the country or face deportation. "After a series of legal battles, he left voluntarily in August 1963."[33] He returned to the United States in 1964, after Tshombe became Prime Minister of the Congo, as a special representative of Leopoldville.

[30]In January 1962, full-page advertisements of the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters appeared in leading U.S. newspapers. Max Yergen, of New York City, was listed as chairman.

[31]*New York Times,* December 15, 1961.

[32]*Washington Post and Times Herald,* December 19, 1961.

[33]The activities of Mr. Struelens are summarized in a news analysis, "Tshombe's Spokesman," *New York Times,* August 3, 1964.

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The Kitona Accord signed by Tshombe and Adoula led to long and fruitless negotiations between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. By mid-1962 the United States decided that more effective methods were called for. After discussions with Brussels and London, Washington drafted a plan for Katanga's integration. Unlike its allies, the United States was prepared to recommend the imposition of economic sanctions against Katanga if Tshombe refused to accept peaceful integration and recognize Leopoldville's authority. In early August, Washington submitted its proposals to the Secretary-General. On August 20 Thant officially presented his UN Plan for National Reconciliation, which was in fact a slightly modified version of the American draft. Five days later the United States pledged its full support of this plan.

Although both Adoula and Tshombe endorsed the Thant Plan, as it was called, they still could not come to terms. Adoula's failure to solve the Katanga problem had made his position highly precarious, and the fall of his government, which would open the door for a left-wing regime, was a distinct possibility.[34] These developments moved Washington to further action. In October Under Secretary McGhee went on a three-week mission to the Congo to encourage a *rapprochement* between Leopoldville and Elisabethville and to convince Tshombe that the United States did not seek his downfall as the leader of the richest province in the Congo. By the end of November Washington obtained Belgian acquiescence to institute more coercive measures under the Thant Plan. At the conclusion of the talks between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in Washington on November 27, the Belgian leader agreed that unless "substantial progress within a very short period" were made, it would be necessary "to execute further phases under the United Nations Plan, which include severe economic measures."[35] After some persuasion Washington also managed to obtain a promise from London that it would not prevent the imposition of sanctions against Katanga if these were considered necessary.

The situation continued to deteriorate. Tshombe was building up his forces. Observers predicted Adoula's early collapse. Ambassador Gullion was afraid that Adoula would yield to alleged offers of communist-bloc aid. Some voices in the State Department, which Theodore Sorensen identified as those of "doves," came up

[34]See speech by G. Mennen Williams, November 2, 1962 (U.S. Department of State Press Release 670), p. 5.
[35]*New York Times*, November 28, 1962.

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with the hawk-like proposal to send to the Congo "a squadron of U.S. fighter air-craft" manned by U.S. Air Force pilots to end "Katanga's resistance in a hurry."[36] President Kennedy was skeptical of the proposal and on December 9, 1962 ordered a thoroughgoing reappraisal of alternatives for dealing with the situation, ranging from direct U.S. military intervention to the withdrawal of American support for the UN's effort to end secession. The appraisal did not support the use of the air squadron directly by the United States or under UN auspices, but proponents of the expedition continued to press for it in one form or another. Both Adoula and Thant had reservations about the proposal, and on December 17 Kennedy postponed action pending the findings of a U.S. military mission, which he dispatched to the Congo three days later. Headed by Lt. General Louis W. Truman, the eight-man team was to "determine what additional forms of assistance the United States could provide to ensure the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace in the Congo."[37]

The Indian commanders of the UNF in Katanga rightly interpreted the Truman mission, which arrived in the Congo on December 21, as a clear sign of Washington's determination to support UN military action to end secession. After recurrent provocations, the UNF launched Round Three on December 28, several weeks ahead of a scheduled plan which had been developed and updated over a period of months. As a direct outgrowth of the Truman mission thirty trucks, six armed personnel carriers, mine-clearing equipment, transport aircraft, and other U.S. military matériel began arriving early in January, though this did not affect the outcome of Round Three. With the entry of United Nations troops in Kolwezi on January 21, 1963, Katanga's secession was finally ended.

The initial U.S. position that the Leopoldville-Elisabethville conflict was a domestic dispute which the UNF should not attempt to solve by force had undergone a substantial change. The problem was seen increasingly as a threat to peace, and when negotiation and other diplomatic means proved ineffective, Washington justified the use of force by the UNF under its right of "self-defense" and "freedom of movement" to oust the secessionist regime in Elisabethville. On January 17, 1963, Harlan Cleveland said the UN military action in Katanga was justified, even though it was opposed "in varying degrees by several of the larger

[36]Sorensen, *op. cit.*, p. 638. See also Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 578.
[37]*New York Times,* November 28, 1962.

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nations." Because of the Congo operation, he said: "There are no uninvited foreign troops, no Communist enclaves, no 'army of liberation,' no reason for a single American soldier to die there, no excuse for a Soviet soldier to live there."[38]

After heading a U.S. fact-finding mission to the Congo, Cleveland declared in Leopoldville on February 12 that the two major problems confronting the Congo were "catastrophic inflation" and the retraining and streamlining of the Congolese army.

Bilateral Military Assistance

In 1960 the United States expected the UN mission to make a serious effort to discipline and retrain the ANC. The fundamental problem then and since has been to provide a competent officer corps, which under the circumstances meant the use of European officers, mainly Belgians who were strongly preferred by the Congolese. In its so-called American Plan, Washington explored the possibility of having all Congolese troops disarmed. In November 1961 Adlai Stevenson argued in vain for explicit UN authority to train and reorganize the ANC. He also recommended that the Security Council assist the Congo by providing a small air force.[39]

Confronted by the failure of the UN mission to make any headway in streamlining, training or officering the ANC, Washington developed the Greene Plan which called for a series of bilateral aid programs to be channeled through and coordinated by the United Nations.[40] After intensive discussion within the U.S. government, negotiations with Leopoldville, and consultation with UN officials, Washington approached Belgium, Canada, Italy, Norway and Israel, each of which agreed to participate. The plan was rejected by Thant in April 1963 because of objections from the more militant Afro-Asian states, and because it may have stretched the UN mandate too far. As a result, Belgium, Italy and Israel eventually entered into conventional bilateral military aid agreements with Leopoldville, in literal violation of the Security Council prohibition against direct assistance.

Even before the failure of the Greene Plan, the United States had informally and quietly started its own bilateral aid effort in October 1962, and in July 1963 it concluded a military aid agree-

[38]Address, January 17, 1963 (U.S. Department of State Press Release 34), p. 2.
[39]UN, *SCOR*, S/PV 975, November 16, 1961, p. 10.
[40]The Greene Plan was named after Colonel Michael J. L. Greene, USA, who led a U.S. military advisory group to the Congo in July 1962. The object of the plan was to modernize and train the ANC by several bilateral military aid programs under a UN umbrella so as to conform to the Security Council prohibition against direct military assistance from an external government.

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ment with the Adoula Government. In the following month a U.S. military aid mission was established in Leopoldville.

The U.S. aid program received a boost at the end of March 1964, when Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman recommended, after a six-day mission in the Congo, that more ground vehicles, transport aircraft and communications equipment be sent.[41] By June 1964, the United States had contributed $6.1 million in bilateral assistance, compared with $168.2 million in military assistance through the United Nations.[42] By that date Washington had sent almost 100 military technicians to the Congo to train ANC personnel in the use and maintenance of the equipment furnished.[43] The bilateral American effort, initiated long before the UNF withdrew, was motivated by the same objective of internal stability for the Congo that underlay U.S. support of the UN mission. It also indicated Washington's belief that the UNF had failed in one of its most important assignments—making the Congolese army a responsible instrument of internal security.

Financial and Logistical Support

America's political endorsement of the UNF was consistently underwritten by financial and logistical support. The total cost of the military operation from July 1960 through June 1964 was some $411 million, of which the United States provided or will provide 41.5 per cent, or about $170 million. American support included both assessments and voluntary contributions. Washington also became the largest purchaser of UN bonds, issued to meet the peacekeeping debts. It bought $100 million in bonds on a matching basis with other states, on the condition that annual payments of the interest and principal for the following fifteen years would be included in the regular UN budget.

The United States continued its logistical support of the UNF to the end of the operation on June 30, 1964. By that date the Defense Department had transported 118,091 troops and 18,569 tons of cargo into or out of the Congo, and airlifted 1,991 troops and 3,642 tons of cargo within the Congo. The breakdown of external logistical support follows:[44]

[41] *New York Times*, April 1, 1964.
[42] *Ibid.*, June 22, 1964.
[43] *Washington Post and Times Herald*, June 17, 1964.
[44] These figures were provided by Captain William Alexander, USN, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, September 16, 1964.

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U.S. Airlift: 1960-1964	
Troops into the Congo	43,303
Troops out of the Congo	31,093
Cargo into the Congo (tons)	8,542
Cargo out of the Congo (tons)	1,904

U.S. Sealift: 1960-1964	
Troops into the Congo	20,352
Troops out of the Congo	23,343
Cargo into the Congo (tons)	5,322
Cargo out of the Congo (tons)	2,801

Impact on the Peacekeeping Mission

By virtue of its power and active involvement, the United States had a greater impact on the character, effectiveness and duration of the UN Congo operation than any other government. Though it sent no troops and was not a member of the Secretary-General's Congo Advisory Committee, the operation could not have been authorized without Washington's assurance of political, financial and logistical support. Had American support been withdrawn at any point, the effort would have collapsed or been greatly reduced in size. The widespread assumption of consistent U.S. support made possible the political, financial and manpower support from many other states. Especially important were the troop contributions of India and Ethiopia, each of which made available more than 100,000 man-months, and the Canadian communications unit.

Washington became the informal leader of a relatively stable coalition of states that supported, each for its own reasons, the UN resolutions and their interpretation and implementation by Hammarskjold and Thant. As the only great power and the only permanent member of the Security Council that steadfastly backed the operation, the United States was inevitably thrust into a position of influence and responsibility. This leadership role was further strengthened because there was substantial concurrence between the U.S. goals of stability in central Africa and the prevention of communist penetration, and the Security Council resolutions calling for the restoration of law and order and prohibiting states from unilateral intervention.

Washington served both as a generator and a balance wheel. It generated ideas and plans and constantly sought to achieve a working consensus among the associated states. The Secretary-General, the senior members of his staff in the "Congo Club,"[45] and UN officials in Leopoldville and Elisabethville frequently sought American counsel. U.S. officials also offered technical, military and political advice, as did the officials of other interested

[45]The "Congo Club" was an informal UN staff group which met frequently with the Secretary-General. It included three Americans, one Briton, two Indians and several others. See *New York Times*, October 19, 1961.

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states. The United States acted as a balance wheel between the sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant Afro-Asian leaders and the more conservative European spokesmen. It was precisely this mediating role that drew criticism from both sides, and at the same time assured Washington's leadership of the coalition. The Department of State and the White House both led and reflected the changing interpretations of what the UNF should do.

This does not mean that the UN Secretariat was an appendage to the State Department or that the Secretary-General failed to exercise initiative in his own right. It means rather that, in spite of occasional differences in tactics and timing, the Secretary-General and the President saw the situation in substantially the same terms. Nor does this concurrence of objectives mean that UN officials were unresponsive to advice from other governments. Both the Secretary-General and the President took into account the same range of internal and external forces bearing on the Congo drama and came to similar conclusions.

There is no evidence that the U.S. government ever exerted improper influence on UN officials or advocated measures contrary to the UN resolutions. The presence of three Americans among the Secretary-General's close staff advisers was used by Soviet spokesmen and others as proof that Hammarskjold in particular was taking orders from Washington. In connection with the Kitona conference in December 1961, for example, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Valerian A. Zorin, accused Washington of "direct interference" in the Congo to "save" Tshombe and asserted that Ambassador Gullion "gave instructions" to Ralph Bunche, a U.S. citizen.[46] Bunche replied: "Gullion and I worked together amiably. I in no way affected him and he in no way affected me. I neither took nor gave instructions to Gullion. . . . I am proud that in sixteen years of U.N. service my Government has never attempted to give me advice or instructions on my U.N. duties."[47]

The United Nations as an Instrument of U.S. Interests

On balance the United Nations peacekeeping mission served American interests and objectives in the Congo, but this does not necessarily mean that U.S. policy might not have been served

[46] *Washington Post and Times Herald,* December 23, 1961.
[47] Hearst Headline Service dispatch by Pierre J. Huss, December 22, 1961.

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equally well or better by other options.[48] In retrospect there were only two plausible alernatives to UN intervention. One was an assertion of Belgian authority to nip the army mutiny in the bud, and the other was to dispatch a small U.S. military force in response to the July 12 invitation from the Congolese ministers. Forthright Belgian action at an early stage, with or without the invitation of Lumumba, could have arrested the mutiny. Even later, after the situation had deteriorated, Brussels could have restored order if it had had the support of Britain, France and the United States, as President Charles de Gaulle had suggested. The judicious exercise of Belgian authority (which may not have cost a single Congolese life) either unilaterally and without an invitation from the Lumumba Government, with such an invitation, or backed up by one or more NATO allies, would doubtless have been effective in restoring order, but it would have evoked outraged cries of "neo-imperialism" from predictable quarters. No one can say, of course, what the long-range consequences would have been.

U.S. military assistance, even though in response to a formal invitation from Leopoldville, would likewise have evoked charges of "neo-colonialism." But in either case order could have been restored and probably at less financial, political and human cost than the four-year UN operation. This speculative and retrospective judgment takes into account three largely successful and relatively low-cost exercises of Western military authority in tropical Africa in 1964—the dispatch, upon invitation, of British troops to three new East African states (Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda) to put down army mutinies in January, the not-so-clearly-invited use of French military power in Gabon the following month, and the invited Belgian-American paratroop mission to rescue hostages in the Stanleyville area of the Congo in November. The British and French military actions accomplished their immediate goal of restoring order at low political and human cost. Only one person was killed in the British action. The five-day Stanleyville operation successfully achieved its objective of rescuing some 2,000 civilians of eighteen different nationalities (American, European, Asian and African) with little loss of life. Despite the barrage of criticism against the essentially humanitarian Stanleyville rescue mission from communist and militant neutralist

[48]See Ernest W. Lefever, "The U.N. as a Foreign Policy Instrument: the Congo Crisis," in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good, editors, *Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and Instruments* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 141-157.

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leaders, including organized attacks against U.S. embassies and legations in half a dozen capitals, its gains far outweighed the temporary political cost.

Turning from these hypothetical options for dealing with the Congo crisis to the actual operation pressed by Washington, it can be said that the UN peacekeeping mission, despite its inefficiency and long duration, contributed to American goals at an acceptable financial, political and human cost. Along with other elements, including U.S. diplomacy, the UNF contributed to the central U.S. objective of a stable Congo united under a moderate government capable of sustaining mutually beneficial diplomatic and economic relations with the West. This was also a Western objective generally, and was not incompatible with legitimate African interests or the larger interests of international peace.

The more extravagant expectations for the UNF entertained by some U.S. officials were not fulfilled. The United Nations mission, along with parallel diplomatic efforts, did not achieve peace in the Congo. After four years of UN "peacekeeping," the Congo was rent by tribal conflict and rebellion. Without a competent officer corps the ANC remained a source of disorder and lawlessness. The UNF helped to impose ground rules that made it difficult for the Soviet Union to capture the Lumumba-Gizenga movement and thus establish a base for subversion in Africa, but by 1963 the Chinese communists had succeeded in penetrating the Congo and were giving material support and direction to rebel groups committed to overthrowing the central government. In the latter half of 1964 the lives of Americans in the Congo were in greater danger than at any time since that country was granted independence. UN officials, unable to make headway in building a competent ANC officer corps, actually blocked effective aid in this vital area by as much as three years by opposing the use of Belgian training officers and advisers.

Those State Department officials who believed that U.S. aid through the UN channel, as opposed to direct military assistance, would protect the American diplomatic "image" among the new African political elites, were destined to be disappointed. Before long UN troops were being called "American mercenaries" and worse. Ironically, in late 1962 some of these image-conscious officials were among the strongest advocates of direct U.S. military action to destroy Tshombe's regime in Katanga, going so far as to urge President Kennedy to dispatch a squadron of fighter aircraft for that purpose. This apparent contradiction on the question of

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direct U.S. military action in the Congo can be attributed in part to the belief that in 1960 military assistance to restore law and order would have been resented by the African nationalists, while direct and forceful military action against Tshombe in 1962 would have been welcomed by them. This interpretation is supported by Assistant Secretary Williams: "Our generally good image in Africa reached a remarkable apogee when we fully supported the U.N. in ending the secessionist movement in Katanga. That effort at secession was regarded by other Africans as counter-revolutionary and a return to colonialism."[49]

These shifting positions among American officials on the use of force in Africa can be explained largely by the proponent's views of the relative justice or injustice of a particular cause for which coercion is being considered. In some policymakers there is also a persistent and unsubstantiated assumption that a "just" but "unpopular" course of action, especially if it involves military force, can be made more palatable by a sugar-coating of UN legitimacy. It was this assumption that permitted many Americans outside of government to give moral support to the exercise of U.S. military power in Korea. The formal endorsement by the Security Council of President Truman's initiative in Korea enabled them to sanction a use of force that they would have condemned had it been carried out under a normal bilateral arrangement between Seoul and Washington.

The UN endorsement of a military operation, whatever moral and political assets such an endorsement may have, is hardly an effective device for warding off hostile propaganda attacks from those governments that oppose the effort. It is doubtful that a UN-authorized and -executed Stanleyville rescue mission in 1964, with the inevitable side effect of strengthening the central Congolese government, would have been any more popular in Moscow, Peking or Cairo than the actual mission authorized by Leopoldville and carried out by the Belgians and the Americans. This is not to say that the channel for implementing a policy is unimportant, because the instrument is a part of the policy, even if only a small part. But the intent of the policy initiator and the effect of the policy on the interests of other parties are more important morally and politically than the formal legal or quasi-legal arguments or instruments employed to justify or implement that policy.

[49]Speech by G. Mennen Williams, April 25, 1965 (U.S. Department of State Press Release 84), p. 1.

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BELGIUM'S ROLE IN THE UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN THE CONGO*

by Wynfred Joshua

AT times the Congo's history since independence reads like a Victorian melodrama in which a Belgian villain dominates the scene. In the original 1960 version a Congolese Premier, Patrice Lumumba, attempted to chase the Belgians out of the country because, as he charged, there was a Belgian conspiracy to regain control of the young state. In later versions the Congolese actors changed, but they, too, found it necessary to claim a Belgian knave and raise the specter of a neocolonial plot. As recently as May 1966, when the Mobutu regime sent four former Congolese ministers to the gallows, Congolese officials were hinting at Belgian intrigue.

These periodical outbursts against the old imperial overlords have not been confined to Congolese leaders alone. During the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Congo from 1960 to 1964, UN representatives also accused the Belgians of trying to regain control of Congolese society, obstructing a return to order, and violating UN resolutions. The late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold pursued for a while a policy of what he called "eliminating the Belgian factor" in the Congo. In this emotionally charged atmosphere neither side accorded the other its due. Hammarskjold and his representatives, Rajeshwar Dayal and Conor Cruise O'Brien, could not rid themselves of the image of Belgium as the evil spirit, and the Belgians could not understand how a polyglot UN force, ignorant of the Congo and the existing Belgian administrative structure, could hope to effect any form of order. Paradoxically, the United Nations and Brussels had the same end in view: to bring peace and security to the turbulent new state. Was it necessary to eliminate the Belgian factor? Why, in spite of the sinister role ascribed to Brussels, are there still

*This article is based on research undertaken by the author for The Brookings Institution study, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-1964*. The material presented was in large measure derived from personal interviews with Belgian government officials, scholars, and other leading citizens in 1965. The author is grateful to The Brookings Institution for permission to make further use of this material. The views expressed, however, are hers alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of other members of the Brookings staff.

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some 2,200 Belgian military advisers and civilian technicians working in the Congo today?

Belgian policies toward the multinational operation in the Congo were complex and at times contradictory. Scant attention has been paid to the Belgian point of view. This article is an attempt to look at the Congo and the UN mission through the eyes of the Belgians and their political leadership.

Belgian Interests in the Congo

Belgium's policies toward the Congo and the UN effort were conditioned by eighty years of imperial past and the heritage of colonial administration. In line with liberal Western tradition, Brussels felt politically and morally committed to help its former ward make an effective transition to modern statehood. The Belgian government wanted to justify its decision to grant independence overnight, albeit this had virtually been forced upon it. During the colonial era Belgian doctrine had called for gradual preparation for nationhood. Unlike France, Belgium had first emphasized mass elementary education rather than the creation of a highly educated elite. Secondary and university training was to be stressed at a later stage of development. Economically, the administration had provided the Congo with a standard of living which compared favorably with that of most black African countries. But in terms of political trends elsewhere in Africa, the pace in the Congo was too slow.

Government and private investments in the Congo were substantial. A considerable part of Belgium's economic livelihood was tied up in its colony. The official colonial policy had encouraged the development of the country's rich resources by granting exclusive concessions to private, primarily Belgian, corporations. The largest financial grouping was the Société Générale de Belgique, which controlled, either directly or indirectly, about 70 per cent of the Congolese economy. The Société Générale's mining activities were concentrated in Katanga and Kasai. Through an intricate system of interlocking directorates and shareholdings, it had a controlling interest in the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, practically the sole extracting company in Katanga, in which British, French and German interests were also represented.

In contrast to Great Britain and France, however, Belgium lacked a tradition of empire. Only rarely did colonial policy enter the

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public debate. Public opinion was completely unprepared for the nationalist riots of January 1959 in Leopoldville. The general attitude in private and governmental circles was to avoid another Algeria at any price. Belgian colonial theory, already somewhat torpid in the early fifties, became defunct with the swift-moving events of 1959 and 1960. During 1959 the Socialist opposition, in particular, conducted an intensive campaign against the use of force in the Congo and the dispatch of metropolitan troops, which presumably would have been necessary to avoid further bloodshed. Moreover, the international climate was greatly conditioned by the aftermath of Suez and by the American view that the colonial era should come to an end. Under these circumstances, and concerned lest international—especially American—opinion should turn against Belgium, the Liberal-Christian Democrat coalition government offered to negotiate with Congolese leaders at a Round Table Conference in January 1960. At this meeting agreement was reached to grant full sovereignty to the Congo on June 30, 1960.

In accepting the principle of independence for the Congo, in providing it with a transitional *Loi fondamentale* which embraced the goals of national unity and parliamentary democracy, Belgium had painted an ideal picture of an emergent nation that would accede peacefully to independence without a serious rupture with the metropole. The infant state would have all the attributes of sovereignty, but because of the lack of trained Congolese its civil administration and its army—the instruments of its unity—would necessarily depend for a long time on Belgian cadres serving as technical advisers.

The mutiny of the *Force publique* within a week after independence cruelly shattered this vision. The Congo's governmental structure disintegrated. Belgium had an immediate vital interest in protecting the lives of some 87,000 of its citizens who were living in the Congo. It felt forced to intervene, and on July 10 the first Belgian paratroopers attempted to quell the uprisings. At the same time Belgium saw its prestige fall in the international arena, where it was accused by some of aggression and by others of abandoning its colonial responsibility and inadequately preparing the Congo for statehood.

Belgium's Initial Position

Belgium's fundamental objective was to maintain a sufficient presence in the Congo to protect its citizens and its economic

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interests. Its actions and policy there and in the international realm were directed at its nationals in the Congo. Its goal was to ensure the continued administrative and economic functioning of the new state. This was only possible if Belgian citizens, encouraged by a sense of security, would remain at their posts. This overriding concern, both in Belgian and Congolese interests, was reflected in Brussels' initial position with respect to the UN mission.

The Belgian government saw immediate military intervention as the only means of maintaining law and order in view of the incapability of Congolese authorities to guarantee the safety of its citizens and other Europeans. Intervention from this standpoint was considered an emergency measure, and not interference in the internal affairs of the new republic. In no way did Brussels regard its military action as illegal or as an act of aggression. No Belgian official seriously suggested the reimposition of Belgian authority in the Congo.

Brussels considered its own forces adequate to meet the situation. Once the Congo crisis was brought before the United Nations, however, it realized that UN interference was inevitable—but believed that a UN military presence would have the same objective of restoring order and saw this merely as a force which would collaborate with the metropolitan troops. Since UN intervention was not a reflection against Belgium's own conduct, Brussels was prepared to endorse Leopoldville's original request of July 10, 1960 for UN military aid. The first Security Council resolution on the Congo on July 14, which did not condemn Belgium but called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops, seemed to confirm Brussels' view. Encouraged, the Belgian Representative at the United Nations, Walter Loridan, pledged that his government would recall its forces as soon as UN troops were able to take over.[1]

Belgium's interpretation of the July 14 resolution was, however, that it was incumbent on the Belgian government to decide in each specific situation whether the UN units could meet their obligations to enforce law and order. The government felt it still had the right to intervene if its citizens were in danger, but promised that in such instances it would notify the UN command immediately.[2] Thus, it was not until July 23 that the withdrawal

[1]United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records* (hereafter referred to as UN, *SCOR*), S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 36-37.
[2]UN, *SCOR*, Supplement for July, August, September 1960, S/4398 (July 18, 1960), p. 24.

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of Belgian units from Leopoldville was completed. This policy of a gradual troop withdrawal and replacement by ONUC (Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo) forces appeared to be accepted. Hammarskjold did not at that time ask Brussels to expedite its troop recall, nor did he formally object to Belgium's unilateral intervention after July 14.

Faced with no immediate opposition, Brussels showed that it was quite prepared to cooperate with the UN mission. It even suggested that the United Nations should employ Belgian troops, particularly for the pacification of Stanleyville. This proposal was rejected, but UN officials did agree on the use of Belgian aircraft for the transportation of UN troops within Equateur province.

The situation in Katanga, where Belgian mining interests were involved, caused Brussels particular concern. When insurrection broke out there, the provincial president, Moise Tshombe, asked Brussels for help. With the aid of Belgian troops under the command of Major Guy Weber, the mutinies were quickly suppressed. While elsewhere in the Congo Belgian actions engendered resentment, in Elisabethville the local government and press hailed Major Weber as a hero.

Tshombe himself did not feel that his interests lay with Leopoldville. Encouraged by the Union Minière, which saw him as a more cooperative force than Lumumba, he declared the secession of Katanga on July 11. The Belgian government was under great pressure from its nationals in Katanga, where the overwhelming majority supported Tshombe's secession effort. At Brussels' urging they had stayed, but they insisted on the retention of Belgian troops to protect them. Europeans in Katanga warned that the entire economy and administration would collapse if UN forces were to replace the metropolitan troops, and many threatened to leave if ONUC moved in.[3] Katangan politicians were equally opposed to a UN presence. They appealed to the outside world for recognition of an independent Katanga. In spite of the favorable reaction of the Belgian public at home, the majority of the authorities in Brussels and Elisabethville accepted the arguments of Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny against recognition:

At that time the majority of the Belgians scattered all over the country were trying to escape, and half the Belgian investments there were not in Katanga at all—so how could I support Katanga when the result

[3]Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, *Congo: 1960,* Vol. II, prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen (Brussels: les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), pp. 746-747.

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would be just to set it at war with Leopoldville and to cause our compatriots to be put in concentration camps and have their property confiscated under the laws of war? How could I jeopardize the future collaboration with the legal Government in Leopoldville by taking sides between the Katanga and Leopoldville?[4]

Count Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden, the Prime Minister's chef de cabinet, who had been sent to Elisabethville to explore the matter of Belgian aid, was able to dissuade Tshombe from going to Brussels to argue his case. But the Belgians did want to isolate Katanga from the political influence of Lumumba and to rebuild Katanga's administrative structure and security forces. Starting with pro-Belgian Katanga, Brussels hoped to reconstruct the Congo on a federal or confederal basis. D'Aspremont-Lynden's visit resulted in the establishment of the Belgian Technical Mission, which in the months ahead became the *de facto* administrative organ in Katanga.

With this in mind Brussels wanted to create a Katangan *gendarmerie* strong enough to neutralize anti-Tshombe Congolese troops and tribal groups before withdrawing the forces that had been responsible for Katanga's security. The Belgian government saw nothing to be gained from a precipitous arrival of UN contingents as long as Katanga could not assume responsibility for its own administration or resist any invasion by Lumumba troops. It feared that UN entrance into Katanga would amount to interference in the Congo's internal conflict in favor of the Lumumba regime. Morover, since peace had been restored in Katanga, the Belgians saw no need for a UN presence there. They were unwilling, nevertheless, to go so far as to threaten to oppose ONUC's move into Katanga with armed force. Belgian troops were under strict orders not to resist UN forces. Hammarskjold himself admitted in his August 6, 1960 report:

> The difficulty . . . in the case of Katanga does not have its roots in the Belgian attitude. . . . The Belgian Government acquiesces in the Security Council decisions and therefore undoubtedly will instruct its military elements in the province to act in accordance with the resolutions.[5]

Yet the continued presence of an active metropolitan force in Katanga undoubtedly encouraged the opposition of the Tshombe regime to the United Nations. Concerned lest the *gendarmerie*

[4]Pierre Wigny, "Belgium and the Congo," *International Affairs*, July 1961, p. 282.

[5]UN, *SCOR*, Supplement for July, August, September 1960, S/4417 (August 6, 1960), p. 53.

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and the European population in Katanga resist the *casques bleus,* Hammarskjold asked the Security Council for a clarification and broadening of his mandate. At the same time, he hoped to reassure the Belgians. The Council's resolution of August 8, 1960 was an attempt to meet both these objectives. It stated that the entry of UN troops into Katanga was necessary and that ONUC would not be used to influence the outcome of any domestic conflict in the Congo. Four days later a token UN presence was established in Katanga, and on August 14, in consultation with the UN commander, the evacuation of metropolitan troops began.

Belgium's actions during these early months deepened Lumumba's resistance to efforts to disarm ANC (Armée Nationale Congolaise) troops in Leopoldville and elsewhere.[6] They also strengthened Tshombe in his obstruction of UN intervention and his secessionist illusions. As a corollary, the relations between ONUC and the Lumumba regime deteriorated.

Conflicting Belgian Policies

Brussels believed that a Belgian presence in the Congo could be re-established under a moderate regime. Therefore, after Lumumba broke diplomatic relations with Belgium in July, and as long as he dominated the scene, Belgian policy supported the more moderate groups in Leopoldville that opposed Lumumba. Brussels worked either through the Belgians who remained in Leopoldville or through President Fulbert Youlou's French advisers in Brazzaville. At the same time it continued to support Katanga. The parallel policies came increasingly into conflict.

Early in September d'Aspremont-Lynden became Minister of African Affairs and Robert Rothschild head of the Belgian Mission in Katanga. This reinforced considerably the sympathy for Katanga within the Belgian government, where the Minister of Defense, Arthur Gilson, was one of Tshombe's staunch advocates. The government was in any case in no position to adopt a hard line against Katanga. The liberal and conservative press and groups with financial interests in Katanga clamored for the strengthening of Tshombe's position. The pro-Katanga members of the Belgian cabinet, including Rothschild in Katanga, endorsed support of the Leopoldville moderates, but they wanted to move

[6]Recognizing that the mutinous ANC troops were the major obstacle in the restoration of order, Major General H. T. Alexander of the Ghanaian contingent, Belgian General Gheysen, and acting ANC Chief of Staff Maurice Mpolo agreed to disarm them. On July 18 Mpolo appealed to Congolese troops to lay down their arms. Lumumba, however, strenuously objected to any disarmament.

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cautiously and to give priority to the Tshombe regime as the keystone of the future Congolese confederation.[7]

Although by early September Belgium had complied with the UN request to withdraw its metropolitan troops from Katanga, a number of Belgian officers and n.c.o.'s were placed at the disposal of the Katangan regime to rebuild a new *gendarmerie* loyal to Tshombe. Belgium also furnished military equipment to the Katangan forces. On September 7, 1960 a Sabena plane flew light arms to Elisabethville. Although Brussels tried to wave aside Hammarskjold's protest, it was evident that this shipment occurred at the very time the *gendarmerie* faced an attack by ANC troops from the north, just as the last metropolitan troops were about to depart from Katanga. Belgium's unilateral military assistance to Katanga continued even after the General Assembly passed the September 20, 1960 resolution which called upon all states to refrain from providing direct or indirect military aid to the Congo.

In Leopoldville, the September 1960 events augured well for Belgian hopes to return a moderate regime to power. The Mobutu coup of September 14 had effectively removed Lumumba from the premiership. The young colonel, Joseph Mobutu, had established a College of Commissioners, a group of Congolese graduates and students, to run the country under the continued presidency of Joseph Kasavubu. The Commissioners had promptly enlisted the help of Belgians, mostly academicians, to advise them. Brussels now tried to effect a reconciliation with the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. But the policy of ONUC was to foster a rapprochement between Kasavubu and his former Prime Minister. Unofficial Belgian advisers to the Commissioners viewed with consternation ONUC's efforts to protect Lumumba, particularly since the latter appeared to be supported by the Soviet Union. They attempted to persuade Mobutu and his Commissioners to oppose such a reconciliation. These actions created an atmosphere of mutual hostility between Belgians and UN officials and contributed to growing distrust of the UN representatives by the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime as well.

The Bukavu incident in late December 1960 provided another irritant in relations between ONUC on the one hand and Brussels and Leopoldville on the other. The Kasavubu-Mobutu regime had asked Belgium for transit permission for Congolese troops through the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi; thence they would proceed to Bukavu which had been taken over by

[7] *Congo: 1960,* Vol. II, *op. cit.,* p. 963.

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Lumumba forces. Leopoldville also intimated that diplomatic ties would be re-established if Belgium would help with the operation against Bukavu and clarify its position regarding Katanga. Brussels decided to cooperate: this was an opportunity to identify itself more closely with the Leopoldville authorities at a time when they resented Belgian aid to Katanga. The government hoped, furthermore, to resume diplomatic relations with the Congo before the Belgian elections would take place in 1961.

When Hammarskjold accused Belgium of violating the prohibition of the September 20 resolution against direct military aid, Brussels replied that it had not learned of the Congolese request until the landing of Mobutu's troops in Ruanda-Urundi. Faced with a *fait accompli,* the ANC units had been transported to the Congolese border. Moreover, since this matter involved a request of the legitimate Congolese Head of State for what was in principle a relief operation, Brussels did not consider that the September 20 resolution had been violated. Hammarskjold's demand that Belgian authorities disarm and arrest the ANC troops would have been contrary to the Security Council's request "to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority."[8]

The military operation itself, organized with the assistance of a Belgian military adviser to Mobutu, failed. But it helped to cement relations between Brussels and the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. On January 12, 1961 Belgium was permitted to establish a mission in Leopoldville.

The simultaneous collaboration with the Leopoldville regime and the Tshombe Government aroused bitter opposition in various Belgian milieux: Extremists in Katanga resented Brussels' aid to Leopoldville; advisers to the College of Commissioners condemned the assistance to Katanga; and the government itself was divided over whether the primary emphasis of Belgian support should be on Elisabethville or Leopoldville.

The Elimination of the Belgian Factor

Belgian assistance to both the moderates of Leopoldville and the secessionists of Elisabethville was regarded by Hammarskjold and Dayal, his Indian representative in the Congo, as a disrupting factor likely to accentuate the factional struggles and as contrary

[8]UN, *SCOR,* Supplement for January, February, March 1961, S/4621 (January 11, 1961), p. 2.

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to the intention of the UN resolutions. Moreover, Belgium had started in early September 1960 to provide military aid and cadres to the regime in Bakwanga, where the local leader had formed the independent state of South Kasai.

In this context Hammarskjold wrote in October 1960 to Loridan and Tshombe insisting that all aid to the Congo should go through UN channels. The continued presence of "Belgian nationals—soldiers, paramilitary personnel and civilians," he said, was a factor of "crucial importance" in the crisis. He requested Brussels to withdraw "all military, paramilitary or civilian personnel" placed at the disposal of the authorities in the Congo.[9]

Hammarskjold's letters, going beyond previous UN statements, mentioned for the first time *civilian* personnel. This term embraced a wider group, ranging from a political adviser to a Congolese minister, to a technician in the radio station. The new demand confirmed the existing suspicion among Belgians that UN officials in the Congo discriminated against their civilian compatriots.

Brussels claimed that UN resolutions could not compel member states to channel all technical aid through the United Nations, especially not if the Secretary-General refused to make use of available Belgian technicians. Hammarskjold's demands violated the rights of a sovereign state to call upon foreign civilian aid as it deemed necessary. To recall Belgian technicians would be to deprive the Congo of "the services of officials who are under the direct authority of the Congolese Government in order to replace them with international experts independent of that Government." The withdrawal of the approximately 2,000 Belgians "would irreparably compromise the work being done in the country to re-establish order and restore prosperity."[10] Belgium could not understand how Hammarskjold expected to run the economy and administration of a country as vast as the Congo with a small group of civilian UN experts who did not know the native languages and who lacked the Belgians' experience and intimate knowledge of the Congo.

Nevertheless, the UN attack against Belgium intensified. Both Andrew Cordier and Ralph J. Bunche, two leading UN officials, severely criticized Belgium in public.[11] Dayal's second report of

[9]UN, *SCOR,* Supplement for October, November, December 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), pp. 44 and 48.
[10]*Ibid.,* pp. 46-47.
[11]Institut royal des relations internationales, "Evolution de la crise congolaise," *Chronique de politique étrangère,* September-November 1961, p. 579.

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November 2, 1960, in which he condemned the return of Belgian administrators and advisers to the Congo and accused them of sabotaging UN actions, inflamed Belgian feelings even more. Belgian officials believed that Dayal and Hammarskjold, who supported his representative, tried to blame the Belgians for their own lack of success in the Congo and, therefore, insisted upon eviction of the Europeans with whom the Congolese desired to collaborate. In an official communiqué to Hammarskjold, Brussels said that it had been "shocked by tendentious judgments based upon a series of purely subjective allegations and interpretations, ambiguous innuendoes, unfounded insinuations," and flatly rejected Dayal's accusations.[12]

Belgian opinion at home and in the Congo reacted vehemently against Hammarskjold's and Dayal's Congo policies and intensely resented the Secretary-General's determination to run the Congo operation his own way. Leading Brussels papers accused Hammarskjold of appeasing Moscow, catering to the Afro-Asians, and trying to make Belgium a "scapegoat" for his own failures.[13] Realizing that Hammarskjold's notes and Dayal's report had aroused a feeling of national solidarity, the Socialist opposition even refrained from attacking the government on its Congo policies.

While there were incidents of Belgian obstruction, there is no evidence that this was widespread or officially condoned. In fact, the Belgians who stayed or returned to the Congo were an indispensable element in the three-way cooperation (UN, Congolese and Belgian) among authorities at the lower level which maintained the administrative and related services. The United Nations' insistence on the expulsion of Belgian technicians and advisers magnified the problems of premature independence that had brought the United Nations to the Congo in the first place.

In spite of the bitter indignation, Foreign Minister Wigny concluded that the only reasonable course for ONUC and Belgium was to try to reach an understanding. Hence, he proposed that Brussels, Leopoldville and New York conduct tripartite negotiations on the question of Belgian aid. He warned at the same time that Belgium would be forced to withdraw from the United Nations if its chief officials continued to discriminate against

[12]UN, *SCOR*, Supplement for October, November, December 1960, S/4585 (December 7, 1960), pp. 84-92.
[13]*Le Soir*, October 21, 1960; *La Libre Belgique*, October 20, 1960.

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Belgians in an "insulting and stupid fashion."[14] The climate in New York, however, precluded such a conference.

In protest against UN policies, Belgium refused to pay its assessed portion of the costs of the UN mission. When the question of contributing to the operation was raised in the Belgian Senate, Wigny argued that "a firm attitude is necessary at a time when the Secretary-General tells us that we must evidently pay our contribution, but that he will eliminate us from the Congo."[15] As long as UN officials discriminated against Belgians and repeated their unjustified accusations against Belgium, Wigny felt that his government should not make any payments for the UN expedition.

The official Belgian thesis, reiterated during the entire period of controversy with the Secretary-General, was that the presence of the United Nations in the Congo was of recent date. It would remain there only temporarily. Its major preoccupation was the maintenance of international peace and security. Belgium, on the other hand, in spite of its disillusion, was committed to act because of responsibilities in the Congo inherited from eighty years of imperial rule; because it still had substantial interests there; and because it felt that the West should retain whatever influence it had as a counterweight to communist infiltration. This view acknowledged that Hammarskjold had to consider the future of his organization and his own position, but his implacable attitude on the role of the Belgians benefited no one, except perhaps Lumumba and his advocates. Hammarskjold probably adopted what amounted to an anti-Belgian posture partly because of his intense commitment to decolonization and partly because of pressures from communist and more militant African states; but, in Belgian opinion, he neglected thereby the welfare of the Congo.[16]

The Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga Axis

Contrary to UN policy, which gave priority to a reconciliation between the Lumumbists and other factions, the Belgians sought a rapprochement among the moderates in the various provinces who were opposed to Lumumba. Aware that the leaders in Leopoldville, Elisabethville and Bakwanga had certain hostilities and

[14]"Evolution de la crise congolaise," *op. cit.*, p. 842.
[15]Compte-rendu analytique, Proceedings of the Belgian Senate, January 26, 1961.
[16]See, for example, "Evolution de la crise congolaise," *op. cit.*, pp. 821-822 and 981-999 *passim.*

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fears in common, Belgian thinking inclined toward the concept of a tripartite axis.

The Kasavubu-Mobutu regime and the ruling circles in Katanga and Kasai shared Belgium's resentment over UN demands to recall all Belgian personnel. They felt that UN authorities had no right to prohibit them from recruiting Belgian administrative officers. UN efforts to eliminate the Belgian factor intensified their opposition to ONUC. The three regimes were also bitter enemies of the Lumumba movement. In sympathy with these fiercely anti-UN and anti-Lumumba sentiments, certain Belgians close to the leaders of the three regimes explored the possibility of creating a common front which would prevent the establishment of a UN "trusteeship" or a Lumumba-controlled Congo and which would be prepared to cooperate with Belgium.

To be sure, no coherent and carefully planned Belgian policy existed on this issue. Brussels never officially sanctioned a Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga axis, but certain members in the government, particularly the Minister of African Affairs, realized the value of such an alliance in the reconstruction of a federal and moderate administration in the Congo.

Developments in January and February 1961 made the creation of the tripartite coalition a necessity for the Congolese as well as the Belgians. First of all, after Lumumba's death, his heirs had established the Stanleyville regime and were expanding their power; their forces occupied key strategic areas, including Luluabourg, which opened the way to Katanga, South Kasai and Leopoldville.

Secondly, relations between ONUC and both the Congolese and Belgians had progressively worsened. Brussels was convinced that Dayal's policy favored the Lumumba faction to the detriment of the pro-Western moderates. Outside the United Nations it appealed to its Atlantic allies for concerted Western action to try to change the UN course in the Congo. In early February, however, vague reports began to spread of a new "American Plan," from which Belgians and Congolese gathered little more than that this was a proposal to disarm all Congolese troops, including those loyal to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime.[17]

[17]The incoming Kennedy Administration, early in 1961, developed a series of tentative proposals that the European allies called the "American Plan." According to most reports, the Plan called for: the neutralization of all Congolese troops by ONUC; an embargo on all external aid to the Congo outside the United Nations; and, if neutralization proved to be effective, the release of all political prisoners, the reopening of Parliament, and the formation of a national

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Brussels felt that the common Western line of action which it had urged had not materialized. At a NATO meeting in February, called at Belgium's request, its spokesman sharply reproached the United States for discussing the Plan with the Soviet Union and certain Afro-Asian states without adequately consulting its European allies. Furthermore, even for the tottering Leopoldville government, control over its military forces was the most sensitive nerve of national sovereignty. Brussels understood that if the troops of the Kasavubu regime were disarmed along with those of other factions, Kasavubu would be placed on the same footing as his adversaries and his national authority would be destroyed. In turn, the chances that the Stanleyville faction would come to power would be greatly enhanced. There was no guarantee that the neutralization of Kasavubu's opponents would be effected. The "American Plan," according to Belgium, would force ONUC to interfere drastically in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and could not help but favor the militant elements.

Had the "American Plan" been implemented, it would have contravened Belgium's policy of providing direct aid to pro-Western factions in the Congo and strengthening the moderate Leopoldville regime. The Ministry of African Affairs instructed Belgian representatives in the Congo to oppose the "American Plan" and to encourage formation of the Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga axis.[18] By this time, even without formal agreements, a unity of purpose was present among the Belgian advisers and the indigenous leaders in the three areas. Preliminary discussions among the Congolese had already occurred in January, When the Security Council adopted a further resolution on February 21, 1961, this precipitated a military accord among them.

The February 21 resolution broadened the UN mandate to include the use of force to prevent civil war and urged the reorganization of Congolese armed units in order to withdraw them from political life. The Congolese assumed, however, that it gave ONUC the authority to disarm their troops. The agreement among the three moderate centers provided for the pooling of military forces and the establishment of a common military organization. This was followed in March by their accord at the

government in which all major Congolese groups, including the Lumumba forces, would be represented. See *London Times,* February 4, 1961; *New York Times,* February 4, 1961; and CRISP, *Congo: 1961,* prepared by Benoit Verhaegen (Brussels: les Dossiers du CRISP, 1962), p. 320.

[18]J. Gérard-Libois, *Sécession au Katanga* (Brussels: CRISP, 1963), p. 185.

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Tananarive Conference accepting the creation of a confederate structure under Kasavubu's presidency.

The tripartite military accord and the Tananarive formula corresponded with Belgian political thinking; they had been dictated not by Brussels but rather by circumstances in the Congo. By the same token, the Belgian government could not prevent the erosion of understanding between Leopoldville and Katanga that followed shortly thereafter. When Kasavubu came to terms with ONUC in April 1961, this spelled the end of the tripartite axis.

The Implementation of the February 21, 1961 Resolution

The February 21 resolution had been passed in the aftermath of Lumumba's death. The Afro-Asians, whose support Hammarskjold needed in the face of violent Soviet attacks on his policies, had insisted upon instant action against Katanga. The resolution met their demands by urging the immediate evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military personnel and political advisers not under UN command and by calling upon all states to prevent the further departure of such personnel for the Congo. Belgium responded by pledging to Hammarskjold that it would loyally collaborate in the implementation of the resolution.[19]

But Brussels wanted to avoid a precipitous withdrawal of its cadres, which, it feared, would endanger public order and trigger the exodus of Belgian technicians whose presence ensured continuation of the Congo's economic life. This would impair Belgian economic interests and adversely affect the employment of thousands of Congolese as well. It would also jeopardize the understanding between Kasavubu and Tshombe which still existed at that time. Moveover, with general elections soon to be held in Belgium, the government did not wish to upset the electorate by acquiescing in the expulsion of Belgians from the Congo, and from Katanga in particular.

The promise to Hammarskjold was qualified, therefore, by pointing out that the "political advisers" had been selected and employed by the Congolese themselves; hence, their withdrawal should be negotiated between Hammarskjold and the Congolese. Belgium would, however, ask Congolese authorities to release the former *Force publique* officers placed at their disposal as soon as ONUC could take over the task of reorganizing the security forces. Former members of the Belgian Army who had been made

[19]UN, *SCOR*, Supplement for January, February, March 1961, S/4752, Annex 2, (February 27, 1961), p. 180.

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available to officers and train Congolese forces would also be recalled. But the Belgian government carried no responsibility for the Belgian mercenaries, although it would take steps to prevent further recruitment. Finally, Brussels promised to reinforce "the control it already exercises" over the export of military matériel from Belgium.[20]

The Leopoldville regime, on its part, protested strongly against the "oversimplified and completely utopian form of simply ejecting the Belgian military personnel."[21] Its insistence on retaining the fourteen Belgian officers under General Mobutu's command strengthened the Belgian position.

Katanga presented greater complications. Belgium feared that an immediate recall of cadres would not only endanger the lives of its citizens, but would also seriously affect the campaign against the anti-Tshombe Baluba tribes in the north. Belgian leaders realized, moreover, that Tshombe would not surrender his independent position and would replace the Belgians with right-wing French officers. Indeed, in January the Katanga regime had offered the French colonel, Roger Trinquier, the command of the *gendarmerie,* even though it had subsequently withdrawn the invitation at Brussels' insistence.

All these considerations explained to a great extent the contradiction between Belgium's promise to implement the February 21 resolution and the revived recruitment of mercenaries by the Marissal mission to replace the cadres expelled from Katanga. This private mission worked closely with the Belgian military *Sureté* and succeeded in keeping some 250 Belgian cadres in Katanga during the first half of 1961.

Brussels' claim that members of the former *Force publique* and Belgian Army were under Congolese authority was refuted by Major Guy Weber, Tshombe's adviser, who declared that the officers serving in Katanga between July 1960 and September 1961 were under special orders of the Ministry of African Affairs and "were all paid by the Belgian Government. Like military men everywhere, they took orders from their government."[22]

In May a certain flexibility developed in the Belgian and UN positions. In Brussels, the Lefèvre Government had come to power with Paul-Henri Spaak as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new administration was inclined to favor the Leopoldville regime in its

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181; *ibid.*, S/4752, Addendum 2 (March 6, 1961), pp. 197-198.
[21] *Ibid.*, Addendum 3 (March 6, 1961), pp. 199-201.
[22] *La dernière heure,* April 20, 1963.

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conflict with Katanga. In New York, Hammarskjold had finally recalled Dayal, much to the relief of the Belgians. UN officials had concluded an agreement with Kasavubu, which, by permitting Kasavubu to decide whether or not he wished to retain his Belgian advisers, represented a retreat from the rigid UN position. Finally, the rapprochement between Leopoldville and Elisabethville had broken down and anti-Katangan sentiments in Leopoldville had become much more pronounced.

For all these reasons Brussels concluded that a gradual disengagement from Katanga was appropriate. By July 1961 several military and political advisers, including Major Weber, had been recalled. That same month, at Geneva, Hammarskjold and Spaak attempted to resolve their differences.

Spaak agreed to compile an all-inclusive list of political advisers who were to be expelled from Leopoldville; Hammarskjold accepted this and promised to negotiate their release with Kasavubu. A similar list was to be prepared for Katanga. Spaak hoped that the publication of these lists would reassure those who were not involved, including the 10,000 Europeans in Elisabethville. The Belgian military advisers to Mobutu would be permitted to remain. Most of the military advisers in Bakwanga had already been withdrawn. According to Spaak, Hammarskjold agreed in principle to a gradual and planned recall of the military cadres from Katanga.[23] Like his predecessor Wigny, Spaak wanted to avoid a profound disturbance in Katanga which would invite chaos and extremism. The Belgian Minister was under the impression that his demands in this respect had been met.

The events in the next two months belied Spaak's expectations. On August 28, the UN representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O'Brien, ordered the immediate arrest of all Belgian officers and mercenaries, but subsequently halted the operation when the Belgian consul in Elisabethville promised to take over this task. When the deadline for the roundup arrived, only ten of the 187 Belgian regulars were missing. But since the consul, on Brussels' orders, could not accept responsibility for the mercenaries, only 121 of the 175 Belgian mercenaries and 41 of the 81 other volunteers had been apprehended.[24] A number of mercenaries and settlers who had joined the *gendarmerie* continued to assist the Katangan forces.

[23]Institut royal des relations internationales, "L'ONU et le Congo," *Chronique de politique étrangère*, July-November 1962, pp. 356-357.
[24]UN, *SCOR*, Supplement for July, August, September 1961, S/4940 (September 14, 1961), p. 106.

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The first armed clash between ONUC and the *gendarmerie* broke out on September 13, 1961. According to O'Brien, the Belgians were to blame for the eruption of the fighting.[25] UN actions aroused violent protest in official and private milieux in Belgium and Katanga. Belgium regarded the operations of August 28 and September 13 as a breach of the Geneva understanding. Because of Hammarskjold's death, which occurred on September 18, Spaak urged the Belgian press and public to temper recriminations against Hammarskjold,[26] but he joined the press in Elisabethville and Brussels in singling out the local UN representative for criticism. O'Brien, in Spaak's opinion, tried to blame the Belgians for his own errors.[27] The Belgian Senate reflected the sentiments of the people when it unanimously voted to express "its profound emotion at the painful events which had afflicted Katanga and for which the Belgians had fallen victim."[28]

Nevertheless, Brussels fulfilled its obligations under the February 21 resolution. The government announced at the end of October that the passports of all nationals who continued to serve in the Katangan forces would be withdrawn. Shortly thereafter Spaak was able to state that all Belgian regular forces had been evacuated from Katanga.[29]

Taking into account public opinion at home, Spaak continued the established policy of refusing to contribute to ONUC's expenses, although he resisted pressures from right-wing factions to defer payment of the regular Belgian quota for general UN activities. Belgium's refusal to pay its part of the Congo undertaking aggravated the financial strains under which the United Nations labored.

Reconciliation Efforts between Leopoldville and Elisabethville

The Lefèvre-Spaak Government pursued a policy similar to that of its predecessor in seeking the unification of the Congo through a settlement between Leopoldville and Katanga. The two governments were equally opposed to the use of force to impose a political solution. When the Security Council considered the November 24, 1961 resolution, which permitted ONUC to employ force

[25]O'Brien claimed that the first shots were fired from the building in which the Belgian Consulate was located.
[26]"L'ONU et le Congo," *op. cit.*, p. 649.
[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 721-722.
[28]*Ibid.*, p. 723.
[29]*Ibid.*, p. 720.

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in eliminating the mercenaries, Spaak counseled against evicting some 250 mercenaries who had the backing of virtually the entire white and black population of south Katanga.[30]

In the wake of the September clash, the Katangans were imbued with a sense of victory and the new Adoula regime in Leopoldville was on the defense. Brussels doubted, therefore, that any initiative toward a settlement would come from one of the contending parties. Concerned lest a new armed conflict should occur in Katanga, Spaak met at the end of November with Lord Home, his British counterpart, to try to find an answer to the Congolese problem. They hoped to invite an influential African president to accept the role of mediator between Cyrille Adoula and Tshombe. Spaak and Home came to a solution, but the possibility of support from the UN side was remote. Moreover Washington, strongly in favor of Adoula, was in no mood to make concessions to Tshombe. Belgium was faced with the hostility of both UN and U.S. officials toward Tshombe.

Before anything was accomplished the second military action in Katanga began in December 1961. The European population furiously accused ONUC of bombing civilian targets and hospitals. Spaak charged ONUC with violating the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. In turn, Secretary-General U Thant objected to the assistance Belgian civilians and the Union Minière afforded the secession movement. Expressing his government's "total disapproval" of the "operations of war," Spaak asserted that ONUC had gone beyond its mandate.[31]

Once more Belgium turned to its Western allies. Spaak asked his British, French and U.S. counterparts to persuade Thant to halt the fighting immediately. But Washington had no intention of taking any action that would weaken Thant's position. Only London and Paris were prepared to issue a call for a cease-fire. Brussels and London also tried to convince Tshombe of the necessity to negotiate with Adoula. Faced with the possibility of a military defeat, Tshombe agreed, but no lasting solution was found.

As a result of the September and December 1961 operations in Katanga, Brussels felt that ONUC had discredited itself by resorting to "war" instead of conciliation. But by this time the UN's view of Belgium's position had been considerably modified. Since

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 745.

[31] For the exchanges between Thant and Spaak, see UN, *SCOR*, Supplement for October, November, December 1961, S/5025 (December 15, 1961), pp. 190-199.

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the Belgian advisers and cadres had been evacuated, the Security Council no longer singled out Belgium in its decisions and the Secretary-General's report no longer underscored the Belgian presence as an obstacle to the UN mission.

To be sure, a number of Belgian mercenaries remained active in Katanga; the Union Minière continued paying revenue to the Tshombe regime; some private Belgian citizens continued to be involved in the delivery of arms or exercised an important influence over Katangan officials; and certain private companies still protected mercenaries and supplied them with matériel. Belgian officials could perhaps be censured for not more effectively preventing these actions, but they could no longer be accused of violating UN resolutions.

This change suited the Belgian government because it had to be concerned about its position vis-à-vis Leopoldville, with which it had resumed formal diplomatic ties at the end of 1961. The new situation permitted Brussels to support UN policy. Thus, it approved of UN efforts to organize a conference between Adoula and Tshombe and subsequent UN attempts to find a compromise whenever the dialogue threatened to break down.

In cooperation with the Secretary-General, the Western allies conferred occasionally on the Congo problem during the spring and summer of 1962. Thant was convinced that Katanga would be unable to sustain its secession effort if the Union Minière ceased paying revenue—estimated at some $30 million a year—to Elisabethville. Brussels and London wanted to exert pressure on both sides, but they were skeptical about economic sanctions which Washington favored. They also had grave reservations about dictating a specific policy to the Union Minière without being able to guarantee protection of its installations and its future juridical status. In August 1962, Thant endorsed an American proposal based on sanctions. Presented as the UN Plan for National Reconciliation, it became more popularly known as the Thant Plan.

The initial reaction in the Congo suggested acceptance of the Thant Plan by both Adoula and Tshombe, but by the end of November the protracted Adoula-Tshombe negotiations had once more come to a stalemate. While Spaak agreed with UN and U.S. officials that more coercive action was necessary, he persuaded them to make one last endeavor to negotiate a solution. Accordingly, Loridan proposed a conference in New York among Thant, Adoula, Tshombe and respresentatives of the states that had

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supported the Thant Plan. Adoula, suspecting that Spaak wanted to prove to his Katanga lobby that he had made every effort for a peaceful settlement, declined to come to New York. As a last resort Brussels sent to Katanga Rector Dubuisson of the University of Liège, who was on close terms with Tshombe's advisers at the University of Elisabethville. In vain Dubuisson tried to argue Tshombe into cooperating with the Thant Plan.

Spaak kept his commitment to the Secretary-General and advised the Union Minière to discuss the question of payment of revenue and other obligations with Leopoldville. The Union Minière's refusal, on the ground that Tshombe would not permit the company to negotiate on its own with the Adoula Government, meant the end of Spaak's hopes to implement the Thant Plan without recourse to an economic boycott and other sanctions.

When the third military operation took place at the end of 1962, Belgium's official response was limited to restrained comments on ONUC's action and to a recommendation for a ceasefire. Behind the scenes, Brussels tried to pressure Tshombe into renouncing his threat to pursue a scorched earth policy. Bribes to foreign mercenaries by Belgian companies, and the efforts of the European consuls and certain Belgian advisers close to Tshombe, helped to avoid serious destruction to Katanga's industrial infrastructure. The Belgian consul did everything possible to ensure that Tshombe retained his personal freedom so that he would be available when negotiations could be resumed.

The secession of Katanga ended in January 1963. Although Belgian authorities regretted that this had to be achieved by military force, the major remaining obstacle to a further improvement in Belgian-UN relations was removed.

The Rehabilitation of Belgium

In retrospect, the Thant Plan associated Belgium again with UN actions. This was the first actual cooperation between Brussels and ONUC since Hammarskjold's and Dayal's policy to eliminate "the Belgian factor." The switch from conflict to collaboration created an entirely different environment in which Belgian policies could accommodate and adjust to ONUC as well as the Kasavubu-Adoula regime. As a result, Belgium regained stature in the eyes of UN officials.

This changed climate influenced Belgium to re-examine its policy of withholding its share of the expenses of the UN operation. Brussels' request for an extension of the UN military

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mission beyond December 1963 implied not only that Belgium would contribute to the cost of the extension, but also that a settlement of the dispute over Belgium's share of earlier expenses and over all Belgian claims against the United Nations was possible. In the eyes of Brussels and the Secretary-General, the agreement on Belgium's contribution was regarded as a sign of renewed mutual goodwill.[32]

Further, the improved political situation—and particularly the end of Katangan secession—relieved Belgium of the necessity to pursue its conflicting policies of support for both Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Freed from the stigma of "double play," it found Leopoldville more receptive to its efforts; the Secretary-General was also more inclined to endorse the increasing cooperation between metropole and former colony. These trends permitted Brussels to institute an official military aid program in Leopoldville.

From the inception of the Congo crisis, Belgium had been deeply concerned with the need for an effective indigenous security force. Because it furnished military aid to Katanga, what could be offered to and accepted by the Leopoldville regime was extremely limited. A small group of Belgian officers remained in Leopoldville, and Mobutu recalled some additional military advisers after Lumumba's ouster, but as long as Katanga persisted in its independence effort the political and military climate precluded a reorganization of the ANC. The issue came to the fore again in late 1962 when it was obvious that ONUC would not succeed in retraining the Congolese forces.

Brussels went along with an American proposal which entrusted the United Nations with coordinating a series of bilateral military aid programs. Belgium would provide advisers for the organization of ANC headquarters, bases, *gendarmerie* and service schools. In February 1963, Spaak promised Adoula that he would send a hundred officers to the Congo on condition that the request for them would come from the Secretary-General himself[33]—Brussels wanted to be officially released from the obligation of the September 20, 1960 resolution to refrain from providing direct military aid. But Thant, although he had endorsed the general tenor of the plans, was confronted with the hostility of certain

[32]The final settlement came in May 1966: the Belgian government promised to honor its full share of the four-year expedition and the Organization paid Brussels $1.5 million to cover all Belgian claims against the United Nations.

[33]CRISP, *Congo: 1963,* prepared by Benoit Verhaegen *et al.* (Brussels: les Dossiers du CRISP, 1964), p. 116.

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Afro-Asian members to bilateral aid under the aegis of the United Nations. He reported to Adoula, therefore, that he could not offer his cooperation.

Against this background Brussels agreed to launch a bilateral military assistance program for the Congo. Spaak told Adoula that he had informed Thant of the decision, but recommended that the Congolese Premier continue to search for a formula that would allow UN participation. At no time did the Secretary-General object to Belgium's bilateral arms aid. In fact, in private conversations he indicated his approval. These developments highlighted the substantial difference between Thant's attitude and Hammarskjold's insistence on eliminating the Belgian factor.

Neither Belgian military assistance efforts nor the relatively good collaboration among Belgian, Congolese and UN officials could prevent the emergence of new disorder and rebellions. In the course of 1963 Brussels relied increasingly on the *casques bleus* for the security of its citizens in the Congo. When Kasavubu requested the United Nations to maintain a military presence in the Congo during the first six months of 1964, Belgium was among those which endorsed the appeal.

The Role of Belgium in the UN Operation

Belgium had a major impact on the course of the UN operation. During the four years its policy oscillated from passive cooperation to opposition, and subsequently to collaboration with the UN mission.

Initially, in July and August 1960, Brussels did not legally violate the UN resolutions, although there was a decided lack of zeal in executing the Security Council's decisions. Little could be done at that time to avoid delay between the Council's demands for withdrawal and the actual recall of metropolitan troops from the Congo. Belgian actions in Leopoldville and aid to Katanga did not impede the exercise of Leopoldville's sovereignty, nor did this undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, which the Security Council requested all states to respect.

Belgium's policies, however, were contrary to the intention of the July and August 1960 resolutions. Its assistance to Katanga nurtured Tshombe's secessionist ambitions and his resistance to ONUC. The presence of Belgian troops in the Congo outside Katanga strengthened the Leopoldville government in its determination to oppose any disarmament of ANC troops by ONUC.

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These two developments also had a corrosive effect on the relations between ONUC and the Lumumba regime.

The adoption of the September 20, 1960 resolution brought Belgian policies in direct conflict with the UN mandate and Hammarskjold's position. Belgian efforts to cover all options in the Congo—to keep Katanga a going concern and to support the moderates in Leopoldville and South Kasai—constituted a legal violation of the resolution. The promotion of a rapprochement among the moderate sectors against Lumumba contradicted UN advocacy of a reconciliation between the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime and the Lumumba faction. By abetting the contrived anti-UN, anti-Lumumba alliance among Leopoldville, Elisabethville and Bakwanga, Brussels reinforced the existing hostility of these three factions against the UN mission. In consequence, ONUC's effectiveness was undermined.

It is important to remember that these actions occurred in an atmosphere created by what Brussels called Hammarskjold's and Dayal's obsession with the Belgian factor. As long as UN officials tried to eliminate the Belgian presence and as long as UN actions challenged the pro-Western regime at Elisabethville and, to a lesser extent, at Leopoldville, Belgian-UN relations clashed at every turn. In theory, Brussels was to collaborate in implementing the February 21, 1961 resolution. But the Belgian government was also faced with the need to protect its citizens and economic interests. In reality, therefore, Brussels persisted in its procrastination: it asked for UN guarantees to avoid a precipitous withdrawal of its political and military cadres, and even encouraged the recruitment of mercenaries for Katanga. The effect was to intensify ONUC's problems in carrying out its mandate and to impair the stature of UN officials in Congolese estimation. Belgium's unwillingness to contribute to the Congo budget added to the UN's financial difficulties.

The removal of Belgian advisers and cadres from Katanga and growing cooperation between the United Nations and the Adoula Government paved the way for an upswing in Belgian-UN relations. Equally important, UN policy toward the Belgian presence in the Congo gradually changed. UN endeavors in 1962 to find a negotiated solution to the Leopoldville-Elisabethville dispute led Brussels to cooperate once again with ONUC. The maintenance of a pro-European leadership in Katanga had always been the minimum requirement for Brussels to protect its interests there. Belgium also acutely realized that without at least a modi-

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cum of economic prosperity in Katanga—which continued Belgian investments ensured—the possibility of rebuilding the Congo would be remote.

The nadir in Belgian-UN relations was reached when UN officials least recognized the need for continued Belgian influence in the Congo. Brussels could not understand why the world organization wanted—in a state as frail and dependent as the Congo—to control all civilian and military assistance to the exclusion of those who had the experience, the means and the true interest to provide it. Belgium saw a fragile and obviously temporary UN force, composed of units that could not communicate with each other, let alone with the local tribes. It could not comprehend how this hastily assembled force could assume the task of managing the huge Congo without Belgian help. The Congo's disparate regions were held together only by the Belgian administrative network. Hammarskjold's unrelenting attitude toward Belgium in this respect deprived the Congo of glaringly needed help in every sector of civil, military and economic life.

Admittedly, some Belgian-UN friction could have been avoided if Belgian authorities had shown more understanding for the difficulties ONUC encountered. Much more important, however, was a need for UN—and U.S.—officials to appreciate how difficult it was to run the Congo and how vital the Belgian cadres were to this effort. The presence of Belgian administrators and military advisers in the Congo today indicates the tacit acceptance of the Belgian, instead of the UN, position by the United Nations as well as by the United States.

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CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE GROWING ACCOMMODATION, 1964-1965*

by Daniel Tretiak

WHILE many of the present communist party-states became members of the communist system as a result of external coercion after World War II, some have joined that system because of ideological affinity, coupled with the expectation that national interests would be adequately met by this move. For some of these, entry has brought net gains; for others, membership has not automatically led to the satisfaction of material expectations. The experiences of the latter group have modified their relations with either the leader of the system, the USSR, or its rival, China. Thus far none of the states in the system has completely severed ties with Moscow.

The loose bipolarity in international affairs over the past twenty years has helped those nation-states that are not aligned politically with either the Soviet Union or the United States to maintain a relatively neutral position between the two major power blocs. Moreover, the national interests of individual member-states within each of the blocs have generally operated to erode the control of the bloc leader. This trend has prevailed in spite of frequent setbacks to national aspirations and temporary restorations of bloc-leader authority.

Cuba's role in the postwar international environment has been exceptional. Interaction with the United States, its political mentor for over fifty years, has virtually ceased; Cuba has pledged its allegiance—reluctantly, in some respects, at first—to the USSR, and over a period of several years has become increasingly integrated into the communist system.

Cuba's role as a Soviet-sponsored communist state has not been achieved without tension. But there has been a gradual expansion and consolidation of mutually beneficial relations between the two countries. Because the Cuban Revolution represented a sharp

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break with Cuba's past pattern of internal policies and external relations, its leaders struggled for several years before they could attain the stability and institutionalization necessary in order to alter the relations entered into by previous regimes.

Cuba's Chinese and Soviet Options

The severance of Cuban-U.S. relations in 1961 left it to the USSR to meet Cuba's excessively ambitious economic and political demands. Difficulties developed at an early date for Cuban-USSR diplomacy when Castro persisted in his plan to "make the Andes the Sierra Maestras of Latin America," for this implicitly contradicted Moscow's policy of seeking a détente with the United States.[1] Especially after the missile crisis of 1962, Latin American communist parties were on the whole unresponsive to Cuba's call for revolution. Their attitude aggravated Castro's doubts of Soviet support for Cuba's national interests.

Throughout the period 1961-1964, when Cuba was attempting to play a dynamic international role in the Caribbean and in Latin America, the Cuban government had to deal with serious internal divisions over political and economic policy. Political disputes that had disturbed relations between the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, the Cuban Communist Party) and the virtually unorganized 26th of July Movement from 1956 to 1958 continued to prevent a genuine fusion between the two groups. In spite of this, a single political organization, the Organización Revolucionaria Integrada (ORI), was proclaimed in 1961. The lack of genuine cohesion slowed down membership recruitment, formulation of a party constitution and establishment of a party hierarchy. It also resulted, beginning in 1962, in the expulsion from the ORI of certain PSP leaders.

At this time Cuba's economic goals, like those of other underdeveloped countries, were based on the belief that Cuban political independence could best be safeguarded by increasing economic independence through industrialization. They reflected orthodox Marxist doctrine, as well as the emotional reaction of many Cubans against excessive emphasis on sugar production. But these goals were impractical, as the Cubans have been forced to admit,

[1]Interest in seeking a détente was not shared by all elements in the Soviet Union. Some, perhaps including Khrushchev at times, wanted détente to follow only after U.S. concessions. Not until the October 1962 missile crisis did Soviet leaders seek détente on the basis of the status quo, and even then only after an internal struggle.

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because Cuba lacked the political and economic experience necessary to attain them in a brief period of time. In 1960 Havana had asked the leading communist states to pledge support for its industrialization program. The Soviet Union was unwilling to provide economic aid without assurances as to its proper use. As for the Chinese, they simply lacked the economic resources to meet their commitment, even though they realized that the Chinese emphasis on armed struggle in Latin America was appealing to some, if not all, Cuban elites. Moscow's response, particularly, caused resentment in Cuba.

Not fully satisfied with either Moscow or Peking, the Cuban leadership was unwilling to support either government in the momentous dispute that began to unfold publicly between them as Cuba entered the communist orbit. On some issues the Cubans seemed to side with the Chinese, thus further inhibiting the development of smooth relations between Havana and Moscow. But, on the whole, in 1963 and 1964 they remained neutral in their response to the Sino-Soviet dispute.[2]

Economically, the Cubans were heavily dependent on the USSR. Soviet trade (much of it really aid) accounted for about 45 per cent of Cuba's total trade turnover from 1961 through 1964; China's share amounted to 10 per cent in the same period, making China Cuba's second best trading partner. Given the fragile basis of Cuba's economy, the Cubans had good reason to avoid antagonizing the Chinese, especially after the Soviets turned out to be less reliable supporters of the Revolution than they had hoped. But interest in Chinese friendship should not be interpreted to mean that Cuba, at any time during 1961-1964, was growing closer to China than to the Soviet Union. During this period its dealings with the Soviet bloc were consistently more intensive than its intercourse with the Chinese and their adherents. Only on certain key issues such as the nuclear test ban treaty and the spread of armed revolution did Havana tend to side with Peking against Moscow.

The discussion that follows shows how various areas of Soviet-

[2]In accordance with Cuba's policy of maintaining as much neutrality as possible in the dispute, the Cubans refused to take sides at meetings of communist "front" organizations where they were faced with an immediate choice. Where possible, they avoided taking a position; when forced, they sided with the Soviets far more often than with the Chinese. Especially at meetings held in the USSR and East Europe, Soviet pressure forced their acquiescence. At meetings in Latin America, Cuban delegations seemed less pro-Soviet. Votes at various meetings in 1963 and 1964—though not reported by the Cubans themselves—indicated that in the end they would side with the Soviets, not the Chinese.

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Cuban conflict began to be resolved by the end of 1964. Cuban resentments subsided appreciably after the 1962 missile crisis and with the easing of Cuba's economic dilemma; the Soviets, particularly after Khrushchev's ouster, took steps to increase Cuba's organizational prestige with the Latin American communist parties, and the Cubans, especially after January 1965, responded in kind to Soviet overtures. Even at times of relatively high tension between the two governments, the benefits accruing to the Cubans from adherence to the communist sphere provided an effective basis for Soviet-Cuban accommodation.

Partial Resolution of Soviet-Cuban Difficulties

During 1965, the main irritants that had marked Soviet-Cuban relations since 1961, such as the debate over the correct means for communist parties to take power and the direction of Cuba's economic development, were at least partially removed. The Cubans had consistently maintained that if communists or other leftists were to replace noncommunist governments in Latin America, it would be necessary to resort to armed struggle. The Soviets disapproved this policy, but even more to the point, Latin American communist parties were unwilling to follow Cuban advice because they felt it was inappropriate in various countries.

By the end of 1963, earlier Soviet attempts to settle their policy differences with the Cubans having proved fruitless, new initiatives were required. Premier Castro visited Moscow in January 1964 at Khrushchev's request. He accepted Soviet guarantees of price-supports for sugar as a partial *quid pro quo* for postponing industrialization. Although not entirely satisfied with this arrangement, he was willing to acquiesce in it, meanwhile denying publicly that industrialization was being sacrificed. Nevertheless, Cuba continued through the autumn of 1964 to refrain from noticeably supporting the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute, refusing, for example, to sign the nuclear test ban treaty.[3]

Meanwhile, Soviet Latin American policy—the "peaceful way"—failed conspicuously to bring communists to power in Brazil and Chile in 1964. Such setbacks implied that Chinese and Cuban criticism might not have been baseless; they may well have played some part in Khrushchev's downfall. The fact that for a month after his ouster the Cubans were as silent about it as

[3]A Castro statement of refusal appeared in *Noticias de Hoy* (Havana; hereafter cited as *Hoy*), July 28, 1964.

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the Chinese, no doubt reflected their underlying resentment at Khrushchev's demands concerning Cuban foreign and domestic policy. They may have felt that their abstention from public criticism of the new Soviet leadership deserved to be rewarded by some concessions, especially in the area of foreign policy. In late November, when the Chinese began to attack the new leadership in the Kremlin, the Cubans sought to strengthen their relations with the Soviet Union.

Amelioration of Ideological Tensions. Havana's hopes were rewarded in part. A Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America was held in Havana at the end of 1964. The meeting was secret, the final communiqué was unsigned, but all Latin American parties apparently were represented. Soviet observers were present, but the Chinese were neither present nor invited. Where a party was split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet groups (e.g., Brazil, Peru, Chile), only the pro-Soviet faction was represented.[4]

On the issue of support for the Cuban Revolution and armed struggle, the communiqué tended to mollify Cuban sensitivities:

> With regard to supporting the struggle of the other people in Latin America against imperialism, the Conference formulated the following recommendations: [it called on the communist parties] to support actively those who are actually suffering repression such as Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan, and Haitian combatants.[5]

The communiqué also called on the communist parties to associate themselves publicly with Cuba by demanding that their governments officially recognize the Castro regime and oppose the U.S.-sponsored blockade of Cuba. It advocated "a publicity campaign about all the successes of the Cuban Revolution—economic, social, and cultural." Although the document did not specifically support armed struggle as the only correct road to power, it paid particular attention to the Venezuelan, Colombian and Guatemalan paramilitary campaigns.

According to the communiqué, the participants at the meeting took neither side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although the views of the Chinese on several points at issue in the communist movement were tacitly criticized. First, the communiqué called for "multilateral meetings (*encuentros*) and a conference (*reunión*) or conferences of all Marxist-Leninist parties, which may be

[4]According to the Albanians, the meeting took place "without the participation of Marxist-Leninist groups and Parties from Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and so forth." Tirana, Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA), February 16, 1965.
[5]*Hoy*, January 19, 1965, p. 1.

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necessary." Second, it declared that "all factional activity [within the various parties] ought to be categorically repudiated." Third, it recommended "immediate cessation of public polemics" in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

These three positions of the conference represented agreement with Soviet policy at the expense of the Chinese. Cuba was willing to concur with the Soviet stand because of the communiqué's praise and support of the Cuban Revolution and of the armed struggles proceeding on the Latin American continent. The Cubans felt that enough was offered to them, both in the communiqué itself and in the fact that the meeting was held in Havana, to justify measures to ease their political relations with the Soviet Union. The communist parties attending the conference did not promise to follow the Cubans on all issues. Nevertheless, the meeting gave a new standing and legitimacy within the communist movement to the Cuban leadership and the Cuban party organization.

Castro used the communiqué of the Latin American communist meeting as the basis of his remarks in a speech of March 13, 1965. After recalling Soviet-Cuban discord during the missile crisis, he turned to the Sino-Soviet dispute, stating that it only benefited "our enemies" and Cubans had "a perfect right to abolish, to banish that discord and those Byzantine battles from [their] country. . . ." According to Castro, Cubans "do not understand the language of division."[6] His charges were directed against China, which had maintained a polemical tone in its communications with the Soviets.

Castro further implied that the Chinese had accused the Cubans of not supporting the Viet Cong strongly enough against the Americans. In response, he sternly proclaimed: ". . . let no one imagine he can lecture to us on revolutionary behavior." It was the duty of "the socialist camp" to accept whatever risks might be necessary in Viet Nam.

Cuba's attendance at the Moscow meeting of communist parties in March 1965 was another important manifestation of the new attitude of accommodation toward the Soviet Union. The Cuban delegation was led by Raúl Castro. Cuban press attention to the conference was consistently high, while the Chinese boycotted it and later criticized its participants.

The Economic Debate Partially Settled. The Soviets agreed to

[6] *Hoy,* March 16, 1965, p. 4.

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provide some degree of support for Castro's revolutionary goals in return for which the Cuban leader redefined earlier economic goals to match Soviet support levels and exhorted Cubans to proceed apace with the development first of sugar production, and second of cattle raising. Castro's reshuffling of the Instituto Nacional para Reforma Agraria (INRA) and his speeches on Cuba's economy made it clear that agriculture would be the basis for that economy, at least for several years to come.

In early February 1965, Castro removed Carlos Rafael Rodríguez from the presidency of INRA, assuming that position himself. This change and the designation of 1965 as the "Año de la Agricultura" (The Year of Agriculture) set the stage for several pronouncements by the Cuban Premier on future agricultural development. He de-emphasized plans for Cuba's industrialization, noting that in the past three years the "development of our economy and the role agriculture plays in this development have expanded. Agriculture has been changed so that today it is the basis for the economic development of our country."

He also described how the entire party-state apparatus would have to be used in support of agriculture if the country's economic goals were to be met:

> Agriculture requires not only the effort of the Party but . . . of all other organizations, because neither agriculture nor . . . [the party] alone can effect these tasks. They can be realized by putting all the forces of the Party to work with the full support of other administrative organs, on which agriculture greatly depends.[7]

The Ministry of Industry would have to subordinate itself to the goals of the INRA: "The Ministry of Industry can play a very important role . . . and we will depend on [it] to a great extent for fulfilling [our agricultural plans]."[8]

While Castro was advocating continued emphasis on the Cuban sugar industry and giving some support to the Soviet leaders in their dispute with the Chinese, Che Guevara was taking positions abroad that clearly ran counter to Castro's efforts to improve Soviet-Cuban relations.

The Guevara Disappearance

The formation of a Cuban party apparatus was a slow and tortuous process culminating in the establishment of an official

[7] *Hoy*, February 16, 1965, p. 5.
[8] *Ibid.*

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Cuban Communist Party early in October 1965. This organization superseded the ORI and the Partido Único de la Revolución Socialista (PURS); its leadership, like that of its predecessors, was increasingly drawn not from the old PSP, the pre-revolutionary communist party, but from the ranks of Castro's 26th of July Movement. The near-totality of the PSP eclipse was manifested sharply at this time. Of 104 new members on the party's Central Committee less than 20 per cent were from the old PSP.[9] Former PSP members Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez are among the six members of the Secretariat, but all eight members of the Politburo come from the old July 26th Movement.[10]

The naming of the new party executive coincided with the announced departure from the upper echelons of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, an Argentinian who had joined Castro's movement in 1956, was long Castro's alter ego, and enjoyed second place in the Cuban ruling elite after 1959. Guevara's disappearance from the Cuban political scene—announced on October 3, 1965—far outshadowed the removal or eclipse of any previous revolutionary figures. It was, in fact, a contribution to the resolution of the controversial issues that kept Cuba and the Soviet Union apart. Although Castro's earlier attitudes toward these questions had delayed Cuba's integration into the communist community, he had come to recognize more clearly than Guevara the need to strengthen ties with the USSR, despite costs to Cuban internal and international goals. It was therefore necessary to dissociate Guevara's opposite views from Cuba's official policy.

As this realignment in policy was being put into effect—between November 1964 and March 1965—Guevara was out of

[9]Both the Chinese and the Soviets reported their estimates of the new Cuban party organization; the Soviets were far more thorough. Compare *Pravda,* October 3, 1965, p. 5 (reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [*CDSP*], October 27, 1965) with *People's Daily* (*Jenmin Jihpao* [*JMJP*]), October 8, 1965, p. 3.

[10]Excluding members of the Politburo and the Secretariat, of the 84 members on the Central Committee nearly 68 per cent (57) have military titles (e.g., *comandante, capitán, teniente*); the 32 per cent (27) who lack military titles are called *compañeros,* a term here connoting civilian status. Little appears to be known about many of the military officials. They may not have real power now, but they are clearly a potential source of power and may come to form an interest group within the Cuban political system. If so, the military could become insistent about having its views considered, if not totally accepted.

As post-revolutionary institutions become stable, Castro's charisma may become less effective and perhaps less necessary. Because of their probable cohesion on military issues, the middle levels of the military group in the party could emerge as a source of power. This view does not imply that the military would necessarily impose its views on Castro, but rather that it might wield sufficient power to bargain effectively with the First Secretary-Premier.

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Cuba. Nevertheless, on various occasions he indicated his dissatisfaction with the decline of interest in rapid industrialization. He also noted that Soviet aid left something to be desired, and called for a reaffirmation of the Cuban commitment to revolution overseas. Guevara's statements in other countries were his last published remarks on outstanding issues involving Cuba and the communist part of the world.

From mid-December to mid-March, Guevara was on an African tour similar to the 1964 trip of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. He visited Algeria, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey and Ghana, then went to China for approximately a week. In Africa again, he stopped briefly in Tanzania and the UAR, revisited Algiers, and returned to the UAR.[11] After a stop in Prague, he arrived back in Cuba on March 15, and soon thereafter disappeared from public view.

Hoy's March 21 issue carried a picture of Guevara reporting to personnel in the Ministry of Industry about his trip; his remarks have not been published. By the time he returned from his travels, the Cuban leadership's decision to speed up the accommodation with the Soviets not only required the Revolution to sacrifice more of its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but also made it necessary to remove Guevara from power so as to silence his influential but now impolitic views. His African trip revealed the limited international appeal of his policies precisely when a little foreign support might have strengthened his position at home.

In Africa Guevara had hoped to gain support for his charge that "U.S. imperialism" was "the first common problem" facing both Cuba and Africa.[12] Moreover, he maintained that broader economic ties could be used to strengthen Cuban-African relations, which presently were slight. He noted that "Cuba has sugar, cattle, and nickel; Ghana, cacao; Algeria, oil. If we were all to unite, [we could obtain] the most sophisticated derivatives of each product, and large industrial combines could be formed that would serve a substantial group of countries."[13] He also restated his views stressing industrialization over the intensification of agricultural production—in direct conflict with his country's new policy of developing the sugar industry. He stressed

[11]It was reported that he would also visit the Sudan; inexplicably, no such visit occurred.
[12]*Hoy*, January 23, 1965, p. 7.
[13]*Ibid.*

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industrial and mining goals for Cuba, and virtually excluded mention of the then-current drive to re-emphasize sugar:

> Cuba proposed to develop to the maximum its capacity for utilizing its raw materials in order to take advantage of its [present] installed capacity and to develop its consumer-goods industries to the maximum, and also to make a geological survey and a most thorough investigation of natural resources.[14]

Guevara reiterated his belief in the primacy of armed struggle among the ways to power. On one occasion he said that "with very few exceptions, the taking of power in Latin America will be through armed struggle," although conceding that other strategies might be successful in Latin America and Africa.[15]

The Africans refused to accept his main tenets. Of the seven countries he visited—Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Dahomey, Congo (Brazzaville), the UAR and Tanzania—only the governments of Ghana and Mali signed joint communiqués. These revealed that Guevara's failure to influence the Africans was nearly total. For example, neither Ghana nor Mali specifically denounced "U.S. imperialism";[16] neither endorsed Guevara's call for wider Cuban-African trade—or, in Ghana's case, even some minimal form of economic cooperation. While all parties pledged support to rebels in the Portuguese colonies, no sanction of Guevara's guerrilla warfare theories appeared in either communiqué.

When nearing the end of his trip, Guevara remarked in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania's capital, that "before embarking on this (African) trip, I feared that Africa was unaware of the danger posed by U.S. imperialism, which has bound up its politics with so-called aid programs. Nevertheless, after meeting with African statesmen, I can say that these African countries are clear on this question."[17] He was correct; they were clear enough on this question and other questions to refuse to embroil themselves in Cuba's problems. They also seemed unwilling to enter into meaningful political and economic cooperation with Cuba. Communiqués were the only face-saving gestures two of the more radical African countries—Ghana and Mali—could provide Guevara. He returned home, his views rejected by the Africans who did not want to endanger their relations with the USSR and China by becoming allies of Cuba.

[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.;* also see *Hoy,* January 2, 1965, p. 3.
[16] *Hoy* published the Cuba-Mali Joint Communiqué on January 27, 1965, p. 8; the Cuba-Ghana Joint Communiqué on the next day, January 28, p. 5.
[17] *Hoy,* February 19, 1965, p. 1.

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Guevara's dealings with the Africans were more delicate than were his remarks about the Soviets and certain issues relevant to internal Cuban politics. In Algiers, he implicitly criticized the Soviet Union for price discrimination in foreign trade with the underdeveloped nations. Speaking as a special guest at the Second Economic Seminar of Afro-Asian Solidarity, Guevara said:

> The development of the countries which are now embarking upon the road of liberation must be borne by the Socialist countries. . . . We believe that this responsibility for aid to the dependent countries must be met in [a fraternal] spirit, and that there should be no talk of mutually beneficial trade based on the prices which the law of value and the international relations of unequal exchange, a product of the law of value, impose upon the underdeveloped countries.
>
> How can "mutual benefit" mean the sale at world market prices of the raw materials which cost the backward countries sweat and boundless suffering, and the purchase of the machines produced in today's large automated factories at world market prices? If we establish this type of relation between the two groups of nations, then we must agree that the socialist countries are, to a certain extent, accomplices in the imperialist exploitation. . . . Socialist countries have a moral duty to remove all tacit complicity with the exploiting countries of the West.

Guevara was also critical of the communist states' unwillingness to supply arms to "liberation movements" free of charge. He remarked:

> If it is absurd to think of a director of an enterprise in a Socialist country at war hesitating to send tanks to the front which cannot guarantee payment, no less absurd is it to think of a man who sees the possibility of payment from a nation which is fighting for its freedom or which needs these weapons to defend its freedom. Weapons cannot be considered salable goods in our world. They must be given without charge and in the necessary quantities to the extent possible, to the nations requesting them, to fire at the common enemy.

As if to minimize the sharpness of his criticism, he added:

> This is the spirit in which the USSR and the CPR gave us their military aid. We are socialists; we constitute a guarantee for the use of these weapons. However, we are not the only ones. U.S. imperialism's ominous attack upon Vietnam or the Congo must be answered by supplying these sister nations with all the instruments necessary to their defense and by giving them our complete and unconditional solidarity.[18]

Guevara was clearly directing his criticisms against the USSR: it was the Soviets at that time, far more than the Chinese, who were insisting that Cuban trade be on a more businesslike basis;

[18] *Hoy*, February 26, 1965, p. 4; see also Algiers correspondent's dispatch in Spanish to Prensa Latina, Havana, February 25, 1965.

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it was the Soviets, especially in relation to Viet Nam and the Congo, who were doing less militarily to aid "national liberation movements" than they were capable of doing. The Chinese had provided both advisers and funds for the rebels in the Congo; only in response to the Belgian-American airlift did Moscow indirectly release arms to aid the rebellion.

After his Algiers visit, Guevara traveled back to Egypt. In an interview reported in the Arabic-language journal, *Al Tali-'ah,* he not only resurrected early PSP/July 26th Movement differences within the Cuban Communist Party, but also attacked the Yugoslavs for various revisionist economic schemes (a favorite device of the Chinese for criticism of the Soviets). He claimed that during the 1957-1958 period the PSP

> committed grave mistakes. Perhaps this basic error was due to its failure to strike a deep understanding of the magnitude of the spread of the revolutionary movement and the possibilities which lay in struggle; thus it always lagged behind the movement which rose under the leadership of Fidel Castro.[19]

He also reviewed a 1962 Cuban purge directed against pro-Soviet PSP leaders.

Guevara associated himself by implication with the Chinese against the Soviets in his criticism of Yugoslav economic innovations, expressing concern that "where production law dominates [the economy], it surrenders the economy to capitalism. That is to say that in Yugoslavia, there is danger of walking toward capitalism, and it is imminent that this economic principle [capitalism] shall reflect on its political position." While his criticisms of the Yugoslavs may have been directed only at Tito's regime, they had anti-Soviet undertones. In Algiers, Guevara had unmistakably questioned Moscow's economic motives; in Cairo, he broadened the scope of his public disagreement with the Soviets.

Like the Africans, the Chinese were apparently unimpressed by Guevara's policy statements; they paid very little heed to his presence in Africa.[20] *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* did not report it at all. Moreover, upon visiting China in February 1965, Guevara met with a curious reception: he talked to high party functionaries, yet did not meet Chairman Mao. No substantial account of his

[19] *Al-Tali-'ah* (Cairo), April 1965. To this writer's knowledge this interview never appeared in any Cuban publication. I am grateful to Michel Nabti of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace for translating it for me for inclusion as Appendix A in the original RAND Memorandum.

[20] The only Chinese report about Guevara's African trip seems to have been that in *JMJP,* December 28, 1964, p. 3.

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visit appeared in the Chinese press. At home, *Hoy* simply mentioned Guevara's arrival in Canton, but carried no further news of his whereabouts until he reached Tanzania.[21] According to some reports, the Chinese were desirous that Cuba stay away from the Moscow Conference to be held the next month. Guevara could not commit Cuba to this deviation, not only because he was far from Havana, but also because he knew that the Cubans were going to attend the meeting, regardless of his own position. Indeed, the Chinese may have known that the Cubans would go to the meeting and they may simply have used this opportunity to express to Guevara their disenchantment with Castro and his followers.

Further Indicators of Soviet-Cuban Accommodation

Cuban Behavior at "Front" Meetings. Cuba's increasingly open support of the Soviets rather than the Chinese was manifested during July 1965 at the meetings of the World Peace Council (WPC) in Helsinki, Finland; the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb meeting in Nagasaki, Japan; the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Prague; and in its reaction to the aborting of the Ninth World Youth Festival, scheduled for Algiers at the end of that month.

The World Congress on Peace, National Independence and Disarmament was held in Helsinki July 10-15. Previously, Cuban delegates to such meetings had been low-level personages; this time Juan Marinello, one-time president of the PSP, headed the delegation. Unlike Cuban press treatment of similar "front" meetings in earlier years, reportage of this meeting was thorough.[22]

On the other hand, Cuba made its position known by its absence from the Eleventh World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, held in Nagasaki from July 1-8. At the previous year's meeting, the Soviet delegation, in response to an open Sino-Soviet difference of opinion, had walked out. The Cubans

[21]February 3-12, 1965, especially the issues of February 3, p. 1, and February 12, p. 1.

[22]See *Hoy,* July 10-15, 1965. A careful comparison of Soviet, Chinese and Cuban reports of the congress demonstrates that the Cubans were more active than they had been at meetings in 1963 and 1964; that they made proposals which met with a favorable Soviet response but received no response from the Chinese or their supporters; and that the Chinese did not claim Cuban support for their positions against the Soviets on issues dividing the two main party-states. (Havana Radio, Domestic, Spanish, July 14, 1965; Tirana, ATA, International Service in French, July 28, 1965; *Nepszabadsag,* July 13, 1965; Moscow, TASS, International Service in English, July 13, 1965; Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, July 14, 1965.)

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had stayed, playing a minor role in the proceedings. In 1965, fully aware that the meeting would be Chinese-dominated, they followed the Soviet example and sent no representatives to Nagasaki.

The Ninth World Youth and Student Festival was to have been held in Algiers at the end of July. But when the Ben Bella government was overthrown by a military coup, the Soviet Union, the East European party-states (Albania excepted) and Cuba reacted harshly to the new Boumedienne government. In contrast, the Chinese supported the new regime and hoped that the Youth Festival, as well as the earlier scheduled Afro-Asian meeting, would still be held.

The Cuban leadership—Fidel Castro especially—was vociferous in its denunciation of the anti-Ben Bella coup.[23] Disagreeing with the Chinese, Cuba joined the Soviets in urging that the festival not be held in Algiers in 1965. In order to preserve a semblance of Sino-Cuban amity, the Chinese criticism of those who advocated postponement omitted an attack on the Cubans.[24]

The Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) met in Prague July 13-17. Although Cuban participation in the WFTU had previously been sporadic, Lázaro Peña, head of the Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos (Revolucionaria) [CTC (R)], had held a prominent position in the world organization since the days of Batista. At the July Executive Committee meeting, the Cubans not only were represented by Peña, but also voiced approval of Soviet policy. They made no criticism of Moscow's policy toward Viet Nam, while the Chinese claimed that the Soviets "talked a lot about unity and anti-imperialism, but [that] their actions did not suit their words."[25] In opposition to the Chinese view that the Executive Committee meeting would lead to greater disunity within the WFTU, the Cuban assertion, as expressed by Peña, was that the sessions had "strengthened the classical and anti-imperialist stand of the organization."[26]

Cuba and CMEA. Despite the large number of bilateral treaties, protocols, conventions and contracts between Cuba and individual communist states, relations between Cuba and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON) have

[23]See Castro's speech in *Hoy*, June 29, 1965, pp. 4-5.
[24]Peking, NCNA, July 20, 1965.
[25]*Ibid.*, August 1, 1965.
[26]*Hoy*, July 21, 1965, p. 1.

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been slow to develop. Because of general doubts among its members about the wisdom of dispensing foreign aid to the Cubans, CMEA has been reluctant to formalize relations with Havana. On their side, the Cubans, while willing to take as much aid as possible from the party-states, have been hesitant to join such organizations as CMEA lest broad-scale economic plans inimical to their national interests be imposed on them. The Cubans have not wanted to subject their economic goals to overall bloc planning, fearing that their hopes for industrialization might be sacrificed. Cuban press reports of attendance and observation at CMEA meetings have been very rare until recently.

During 1965, the change in Cuba's relations with CMEA was not as perceptible as that in connection with the "front" organizations. Nevertheless, a few interesting developments occurred. In January the Cubans attended the Nineteenth Executive Committee Meeting of CMEA—the first time a Cuban observer is reported to have attended such a meeting.[27] A functionary of the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry, Cristóbal Victorero, subsequently attended another CMEA meeting in mid-March of 1965.[28]

These might have been signs that the Cuban leadership was considering an intensification of relations with CMEA. However, of twelve CMEA meetings held during June and July 1965, a Cuban observer attended only one, that for Ferrous Metallurgy.[29] Even China and Yugoslavia participated in more of the sessions. Moreover, the Cuban press did not report any of the twelve meetings considered.[30]

In October 1965, a Cuban scientific delegation headed by the vice-president of the Cuban Academy of Sciences visited the Dubna nuclear research institute outside Moscow.[31] Later the Cubans, but not the Chinese, North Vietnamese, North Koreans or Albanians, were invited to participate with seven other party-states in a space-research project under Soviet auspices.[32] Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces Raúl Castro attended the joint maneuvers of four Warsaw Pact nations in October, the first time a leading Cuban military figure was

[27] *Hoy*, January 29, 1965, p. 10.
[28] *Hoy*, March 21, 1965, p. 3.
[29] Moscow, TASS, International, English, June 29, 1965.
[30] Besides maintaining minimal contacts with CMEA, Cuba became a member of the Posts and Telecommunications Cooperative Organization of Socialist Countries at its Sixth Conference held in Peking, June 21-July 15, 1965. (Peking, NCNA, July 4 and 15, 1965.)
[31] Havana broadcast in Spanish to the Americas, October 12, 1965.
[32] *New York Times*, December 12, 1965, p. 141.

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reported present at such a gathering.[33] Quite clearly, Cuban relations with functional organizations of the communist system are expanding.

Cuban Attention to Other Communist Parties. From 1962 through most of 1964, the Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista (PURS) was a more feeble organization than its successor, the Cuban Communist Party, and its external associations were limited. In order to maintain their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Cubans had kept relations with all other communist parties to a minimum, and there were few reports of developments in other parties in the Cuban press.

However, as Cuba's relations with the Soviets and their followers improved, attention to the activities and statements of the pro-Soviet parties increased markedly. During the period July-December 1964, of 18 stories appearing in *Hoy* about various communist parties (or far-left political groups), 14 (78 per cent) dealt with pro-Soviet organizations and 4 (22 per cent) with pro-Chinese groups or individuals (e.g., the Brazilian Francisco Julião and the Guatemalan guerrilla, Marco Antonio Yong Sosa). None of the items had to do with pro-Chinese communist parties per se, or splinter groups of pro-Soviet parties. During the shorter five-month period, January-May 1965, of 39 stories in *Hoy* dealing with communist parties, 37 (95 per cent) were about pro-Soviet parties and only two (5 per cent) about pro-Chinese organizations. These figures suggest a change in Cuban policy away from neutrality, or occasionally implied support of the Chinese, toward a consolidation with the Soviets.

Chinese Disenchantment with the Cubans. During the post-1959 period the Chinese were convinced that the Cuban Revolution would herald the spread of other revolutions in Latin America. The Cubans shared this hope, frequently encouraging Latin Americans to carry on protracted armed struggles against existing governments. The Soviets were less enthusiastic about such activity, although some pro-Soviet Latin American communist parties (Venezuelan, Guatemalan) associated themselves with guerrilla fighters. But the Cuban Revolution was not duplicated elsewhere, and Cuba became politically, if not spiritually, isolated from Latin America; in 1962 the Organization of American States excluded her from membership. The Chinese continued to maintain a keen interest in Cuban political and

[33] *Granma* (Havana), October 21, 1965, p. 10.

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economic life, hoping to turn Sino-Cuban ideological affinity into support for Chinese positions against those of the Soviets.

Then, concurrent with the sharp increase in Soviet-Cuban interaction, there was a striking decline in Chinese approval of the Castro regime and its external policies. By the end of 1964, Sino-Cuban relations had already reached their apogee; in early 1965 a waning of mutual attraction began, and this continued during 1966. The 1965 shift in positions is revealed by comparing Chinese and Soviet reports of Castro's speeches, Cuba's response to major international crises, and economic developments in Cuba.

In 1963 and 1964 the Chinese regularly reprinted speeches by Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, and Che Guevara; they reprinted no speeches of these three Cuban leaders from January to May 1965. In contrast, the Soviets, who had reprinted Cuban speeches less regularly than had the Chinese in selected periods in 1964, increased their coverage of Castro speeches not only in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia,* but also in external publications and those of pro-Soviet communist parties.[34]

In 1965—as compared to 1964—the Chinese also showed their disapproval of Cuban foreign policy responses by scarcely mentioning those responses in the Chinese papers. For example, after the August 5, 1964 Tonkin Bay incident in Viet Nam, *Jenmin Jihpao* reprinted Cuban statements about the American involvement on August 7 and 10 as well as Castro's discussion of the bombing. Cuban comments about the United States setting up an airlift in the Congo in December 1964 were also well reported.[35] In contrast, after the first U.S. air-strike against North Viet Nam (February 7, 1965) and the U.S. dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic, Chinese reports of Cuban responses

[34]During selected periods in 1964, Soviet and Chinese reprints of excerpts from Castro speeches totaled 5,824 Russian words and 5,164 Chinese characters. In the 1965 period, Soviet reprints of Castro speeches totaled 12,875 words, but there were no reprints in the Chinese press. The data for Chinese reprints are from *JMJP,* June-August 1964, December 1964, and January-July 1965; those for Soviet reprints are derived from the Daily Index to *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* for the same time periods. For Soviet external-source reprints of Castro speeches, see *Information Bulletin of the World Marxist Review,* April 23, 1965, pp. 39-46; June 21, 1965, pp. 68-82; July 16, 1965, pp. 51-60; and November 25, 1965, pp. 18-24. No attempt is made to equate words and characters, or column-inches; these totals merely indicate that both Chinese and Soviet sources paid attention to Castro and employed the reprint method to register their approval of his speeches.

[35]*JMJP,* December 1, 3, 4, 1964.

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were virtually nonexistent, even though strong protests were registered against these U.S. actions within Cuba.[36]

Finally, while in previous years the Chinese had consistently reported Cuban economic developments, only one article about the Cuban economy appeared in *JMJP* (on February 8) during the January-June 1965 period. The Chinese perceived by early 1965 that the Cubans were no longer neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Although the Chinese themselves have refrained from publicly criticizing Cuban behavior, some of their ideological allies have been less restrained. During 1965, the Albanians, the pro-Chinese Belgian communists, and certain Latin Americans in accord with Chinese ideological views grew critical of Cuba's more pro-Soviet posture.[37]

Cuban Disinterest in China. The increasing disinterest in Cuban affairs shown by the Chinese press was matched to a certain extent by a similar inattention to Chinese affairs in Cuban papers. While the number of articles in *Hoy* in 1965 about miscellaneous developments involving China did not decrease significantly in comparison with 1964, attention given to the activities of the Chinese leadership fell off markedly. Cuban coverage of Chou En-lai's visit to several African countries in January 1964 was far more complete than it was with respect to Chou's 1965 travels. Mao Tse-tung's statement on the U.S.-Belgian airlift from the Congo was reported in *Hoy* at the end of 1964,[38] but there were no reprints of Mao's statements on key international problems in 1965.

Conclusion

Cuba's developing affinity with the Soviet Union led to a near-break in Sino-Cuban relations in early 1966. A bitter Sino-Cuban debate was carried on within the framework of foreign trade, although in fact the Chinese were criticizing Cuban behav-

[36]The first article from Cuba about Viet Nam was the statement of Robert Williams, U.S. Negro then living in Cuba, in *JMJP,* February 13, 1965, p. 4; brief articles also appeared in *JMJP* on February 14 and 15. But while Castro condemned the U.S. entry into the Dominican Republic in his May Day speech, the speech was not summarized in *JMJP* and Cuban demonstrations against the United States early in the crisis were reported only in *JMJP* of May 6 and 7. In various roundups of Latin American demonstrations against the U.S. action, no later reports of Cuban demonstrations appeared. (*JMJP,* May 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 21, 1965.)

[37]*Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), February 16, 1965, as cited in ATA in French, February 16, 1965; *La Voix du Peuple* (Brussels), July 2, 1965.

[38]November 29, 1964.

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ior in the Sino-Soviet dispute and alleged Cuban compromise on the issue of aid to armed revolutions. By attacking Castro, the Chinese were joining with advocates of guerrilla warfare, especially in Latin America, as well as with certain Cuban elites (probably in the Cuban armed forces) who were critical of Castro's accommodation with the Soviet Union and the Guevara ouster.

As if to re-establish Cuba's revolutionary credentials, Havana played host in January 1966 to the Tri-Continental Conference of communist delegations meeting to promote the coordination of "national liberation wars." Cuba subsequently became the site of the Secretariat of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL) established by the conference. Nevertheless, the Chinese and those who shared their views remained dissatisfied with Cuban behavior. Consequently, since mid-1966, the Cubans have begun to strengthen their ties with noncommunist revolutionary organizations in various Latin American countries, at the expense of good relations with orthodox communist parties. Cuban criticism of those unwilling to pursue violence against incumbent regimes in Latin America is reminiscent of the early 1960's. While the Soviets have not been overly enthusiastic in support of this Cuban attitude, they have preserved a position of importance in Cuba, continuing, for example, to lend extensive assistance in the development of the sugar industry.

Apart from having to tolerate policy disagreements with its new junior partner, the USSR's monetary costs for economic support of the Cuban Revolution have remained quite high. Because of this, however, the Soviets could successfully exert pressure on Cuba to modify its economic development goals. Once the Cubans agreed to Moscow's insistence that agriculture, especially sugar-growing, should be emphasized and industrialization decelerated in line with Cuban capabilities, they embarked on an ambitious program to grow large amounts of sugar cane. In 1965 the sugar crop exceeded six million tons. The Cubans expect that production will increase to ten million tons by 1970, although the 1966 total of 4,452,718 tons represented a 1.6 million ton drop from the 1965 level. They also hope that Soviet aid will be invested primarily in mechanization of harvesting, improvement of mill operating capacity, and training of technicians capable of handling machinery. If goals for production are consistently met over the coming five years, Cuba may find

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herself with an efficient, mechanized sugar industry, profits from which could underwrite the coveted industrialization.[39]

Although the Cubans have in effect pushed the problem of industrialization under the rug, one issue remains to be faced. Cuba is an urban, not a rural country. The Havana government knows full well that while investment in sugar production may represent a wise allotment of Soviet resources, the Cuban urbanite is simply unwilling to "volunteer" for work in the *Zafra* (sugar cane harvest). The combination of forced labor and minimal mechanization has been successful to date, but the government would prefer to provide jobs in the city for urban dwellers, not force them to work in the countryside because there are too few city jobs available. It is possible that the Cubans agreed to emphasize sugar production on condition that some funds would be diverted to industrialization and technician training for factories in the cities. Even so, the cost to Cuba from even temporary concentration on stepped-up agriculture may be great. The huge exodus of Cuban refugees to the United States is partly the result of sacrificing the urbanization goal, for there simply were not enough jobs to employ urban workers. Rather than risk an uprising from the urban areas, Castro was able to convince the United States, in effect, to alleviate potential stress on his regime by accepting the influx of refugees.

If, by 1970, sugar production has been significantly increased and a serious, well-prepared foundation for industrialization laid, Cuba will have overcome its initial economic failures and will be a relatively stable member of the communist system. It may also have the strength to re-establish its neutral, yet potentially dynamic, position within that system. Meantime its experience is an example of how the system—and the Soviet Union in particular—has the capability to attract other states to it despite not inconsequential differences, and to provide for most, if not all, a new system-member's needs when that member is willing to accommodate, even subordinate, itself to system goals.

[39]For a recent description of economic relations between the USSR and Cuba, see Alexander Kaspin, "Soviet-Cuban Trade," *New Times,* March 1, 1967, p. 31.

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DECISION THEORIES AND CRISIS BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CRISES*

by David C. Schwartz

IT is now common to represent political acts, and much human behavior generally, as the resultants of processes of choice —as decisions. To study politics, this perspective suggests, is to investigate the bases and characteristics of decision-making. In the analysis of international politics, especially in the study of foreign policy and the research and development of national security policy, various "decision-making" approaches have recently been employed with some impressive, if not yet theoretically integrated, results.[1]

There is considerable diversity in purpose, approach, focus and method among the still largely separate strands of inquiry that are often lumped together under the rubric "international decision-making." Maximizing models and game theoretic notions exist side by side with psychological theories of personality, motivation and learning. Every level of analysis, from that of the individual to that of the national and even international culture, is represented in recent research. This variety derives, in part, from the operation of divergent, fundamental conceptions of the character of human decision-making.

The world of social science has been divided between users of two different models of man. In most of psychology and sociology . . . men are seen as subjects of influence. They are the objects of action by causal

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[1]The burgeoning literature, and the need for integration, can be seen in a recent publication by Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson, *National and International Decision-Making* (New York: Institute for International Order, undated). This study lists twenty-one other bibliographies on related topics and some 800 separate books and articles on decision-making.

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factors. Conditioning stimuli, punishments, and rewards, and persuasive devices produce predictable attitudes and behaviors in them. Economics has proceeded by a different model. Men are seen as rational, maximizing animals. . . . *These two alternatives are not opposed. In fairly complex ways, they are interrelated.* The influence model and the maximizing model are simultaneously true.[2]

It seems likely that a greater theoretical integration of decision theories, a specification of some of the fairly complex ways in which the influence model and maximizing-satisficing models are interrelated in international decision-making, would facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of international political behavior. The achievement of some greater integration of these theories is one of the principal goals of this article.

One way to study the interaction of alternative models of decision-making is to investigate aspects of human choice that are common to, and important in, each of the models—and to investigate these areas of common concern in such a way as to allow rather direct comparison of the explanatory and predictive power of the two (or more) approaches. This, essentially, is the overall method used below.

Prediction, Strategic Doctrine, and Deterrence

A prominent element in almost all of the decision-making approaches now current in the study of international politics is "prediction or expectation concerning the consequences of one's behavior" (often, more narrowly, "prediction of the responses of others").[3] In the ordinary circumstances of life, we may feel reasonably confident about these predictions and hence allow them to

[2]Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 472. (Emphasis added.)

[3]"Clearly there can be no choice among alternative actions . . . except in terms of a set of expectations or assumptions concerning their possible *consequences*. . . . Inherent in the assumptions or expectations which affect the choice of action are the elements of *prediction* of the behavior of states which might be affected. . . .

"However much the policymaker may believe he is practicing the fine art of plucking decisions out of the azure, the entire study of foreign policy is based on the proposition that he goes through a series of operations which can be separated and described . . . and that those series of operations constitute patterns which are analytically stable and tend to be operationally stable as well." Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. and Richard C. Snyder, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1959), pp. 10 ff., 209 ff. (Emphasis added.)

"While policy-makers may be loath to admit it, prediction or conjecture play a very real part in the policy process. As each policy-maker weighs alternatives, he must of necessity ask himself the probable responses of other states to the proposed policy. Those policies which fail to take adequate account of the probable reactions of other states may not only be ineffective but also dangerous." Lloyd Jensen, "Foreign Policy Elites and the Prediction of International Events," paper read at the 1965 meeting of the Peace Research Society, p. 1.

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remain more or less implicit. This is likely to be true in familiar situations (i.e., where we have learned appropriate behavior) or where the risks appear low (perhaps because the involvement and resources of others appear limited). When we encounter new situations, or where the engagement, options and resources of others are important or even dangerous to us and the risks seem great, it is not enough to leave implicit the assumptions on which our action is based; we generally seek to understand, and if possible to influence or control, the behavior of all actors in the situation.

These latter properties—novelty, ambiguity, interdependence and danger—characterize precisely the present international environment. Accordingly, recent years have witnessed an increasing effort to make the bases of U.S. foreign policymaking more explicit. Empirical and normative discussions of national goals have proliferated.[4] Studies of the particular factors affecting the adoption of specific policy programs have been carried out.[5] Yet the fundamental cultural factors that influence policy planning and program decisions often seem vague, inconsistent with each other, and difficult of application. Then too, the specifics of contemporary decision-making generally remain inaccessible to public, scientific inquiry.[6]

Perhaps the most promising vantage point would be one intermediate between basic goals (which are, presumptively, the wellsprings of public policy) and the operational "decision-rules" of diplomatists. These intermediate intellectual perspectives which link goals to policy and constitute predictions about the consequences of policy may be referred to as "strategic doctrines." In more familiar terms, a strategic doctrine is a coherent set of

[4]"Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy," Council on Foreign Relations, in Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, editors, *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1960); Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Strategic Doctrine and National Interest," in *The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960); *Goals for Americans,* Report of President's Commission on National Goals (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Book, 1960), pp. 15-23, 299-399; *The National Purpose* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), chapters by Jessup, MacLeish, Rossiter and Lippmann; *Prospect for America,* The Rockefeller Panel Reports (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 17-26; "U.S. Objectives and Strategy" (from U.S. Army FM 100-5), *Survival,* July-August 1962.

[5]The prototypical study, and one that has profound implications for broader theory, is Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea," in Richard C. Snyder, H. S. Bruck and B. Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962).

[6]Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti and Richard A. Brody, *Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis* (Stanford: Stanford University Studies in International Conflict and Integration, 1964), p. 12.

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fundamental principles for the employment of resources (including military forces) in support of national objectives.[7] In this article, we will examine some social scientific assumptions underlying one such doctrine—deterrence. As other strategic doctrines are examined in this light, additional studies similar to this one may contribute to a widening discussion concerning the relationships between military factors and political events.

Deterrence is a natural starting point. Eugene Rabinowitch has asserted that "The last ten years have left us with little to rely upon, as safeguards of peace, except deterrence."[8] Whether this is precisely so or not, it is clear that "the vast majority—indeed, practically all—of the strategic thinking in and out of the military has centered upon deterrence and deterrents."[9]

This being so, especially in an era in which the bases of foreign policy have become more explicit, deterrence has been a dynamic, not a static, doctrine. "It is a dozen years since deterrence was articulated as the keystone of our national strategy," Thomas Schelling wrote in 1963, "and during those years the concept has been refined and improved."[10] More recently, encouraged in part by the Navy's large-scale research on deterrence—Project Michelson—still more refinement has taken place.

Yet a great deal remains to be done, particularly in the clarification and operationalization of concept and in the integration of deterrence notions within broader theoretical frameworks in international relations. In Schelling's words:

> What is impressive is not how complicated the idea of deterrence has become, and how carefully it has been refined and developed, but how slow the process has been, how vague the concepts still are, and how inelegant the current theory of deterrence is. . . .
>
> Furthermore, those who have grappled with ideas like deterrence, being motivated largely by immediate problems, have not primarily been concerned with the cumulative process of developing a theoretical structure.[11]

Snyder and Robinson, attempting to integrate and advance decision theory in international relations, agree:

> Until recently, research and writing on the subject of deterrence has been largely dominated by experts in military strategy. . . . By and large, the specialized literature on deterrence appears to have grown up

[7]This definition is my extension of that provided in *Basic Doctrine Manual*, USAF (draft), p. 1.
[8]Eugene Rabinowitch, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1956, cited in George E. Lowe, *The Age of Deterrence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 132.
[9]Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
[10]Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 6.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 7.

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in vacuo, somewhat unrelated to existing theories of international relations employed by those whose main concern is not with weapons systems and strategy. . . . This is somewhat strange when one realizes that the parameters of any deterrence system seem to point directly to the traditional concerns of students of international relations.[12]

In attempting to facilitate the integration of decision theories, in the research reported on below, a partial model of crisis decision-making is elaborated which draws upon and synthesizes some major theoretical approaches in international relations.

Deterrence, Decision-Making, Escalation and Crisis: Consensus and Controversy on the Study and Application of Strategic Doctrine

The strategic doctrine of deterrence appears to facilitate assessment of the likely consequences of some contemporary foreign policies for two primary reasons: (1) Basically, deterrence is a theory of human decision-making under conditions of interdependency of action. (2) In the present interdependent and still largely bipolar international system, much of the consequences of action depends upon the reactions of others (most notably, the United States and the Soviet Union).

Deterrence is a social psychological theory—a theory or "special case" of influence.[13] To deter is to influence opposing decision-makers. On this point there is general agreement. Thus, deterrence "is concerned with *influencing* the *choices* that another party will make, and doing it by *influencing his expectations* of how we will behave."[14] Similarly, deterrence "is *an ever-changing estimate* of what one of the protagonists will or will not do in any given situation."[15]

These notions of interdependence and influence suggest that what is involved in deterrence are relationships, and that central to the behavior of each actor are his perceptions of the other actors—and especially perceptions of the decision-making of other actors. If to study deterrence is to study decision-making, then to study decision-making is, *inter alia,* to study perceptions. "The perceptions of nations-to-be-deterred are an important factor in

[12]Snyder and Robinson, *op. cit.,* pp. 13 ff., 129. The authors also suggest the need for the application of "more general economic, psychological and sociological theories and techniques. . . ."

[13]Ithiel de Sola Pool with Barton Whaley, *Deterrence as an Influence Process* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1963), p. 1.

[14]Schelling, *op. cit.,* p. 13. (Emphasis added.)

[15]Lowe, *op. cit.,* p. 51. (Emphasis added.)

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estimating the effectiveness of deterrence and components of a deterrence system."[16] As one study put it,

> "Objective reality" has no influence upon the decision-maker—no matter how "hard headed" he is—except as it is filtered through his particular set of lenses. One thing we must do then in trying to influence the choices and actions of the Soviets and Chinese is to try to discover what their perceptions of their environment are.[17]

To this point, there is consensus. When one inquires further, "What perceptions shall we study?," or really, "What are the essential characteristics of, and influences upon, foreign policy decision-making?," and "How shall we study these?," consensus fails—or, at least, strong differences of opinion exist regarding the weights or emphases to be placed on various factors. In other words, we seem to be agreed on what some of the central questions are ("Who makes the decisions and how are they made?"),[18] but appear to be somewhat divided on the answers to those questions. We shall see that these disagreements over the character of foreign policymaking and its proper study also relate to a set of controversies about the application of decision theories to international relations (especially concerning the role of nuclear weapons in crisis).

As indicated, there is a considerable variety of statements or "forms" of those formulations, but the maximizing conceptions of decision-making are now usually stated in game theoretic formulations. These approaches generally posit that decision-makers choose among perceived alternative actions that behavior which has the greatest expected utility. Further, the decision-makers are supposed to arrive at the expected utility by multiplying the subjective value of each possible outcome of an action by the perceived probability that the outcome will occur and summing these products of outcomes.[19]

According to these conceptions, deterrence can be effected

> by decreasing the probability of a successful outcome or by increasing the cost of an action and thereby lowering its utility. . . . [In this manner] one can increase the risk and cost of an action to such an extent that the

[16]Robert C. Angell, "A Comparison of Soviet and American Values," in Thomas W. Milburn and William C. Parker, Jr., *Project Michelson Status Report II* (China Lake, Calif.: U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, 1965), pp. 11 ff. Perceptions, of course, are only one part of a decisional dynamic. Motivations, personality variables and the like are properly recognized to be important here. This study, however, concentrates on the perceptual aspects of decision.

[17]Robert North and Jan Triska, "U.S.S.R.-Chinese Relations: Cohesive and Conflictual Aspects," in *ibid.*, pp. 47 ff.

[18]Snyder and Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[19]Dean Pruitt, "Risk-Taking and Decision-Making," in Milburn and Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 104 ff. See also Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Chapter 1.

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probability of its initiation is quite low, providing that the actor who is being deterred is "rational."[20]

Proponents of the many influence-type models do not usually deny the potential explanatory power of maximizing theories in the analysis of some deterrence situations, though they do hold that the maximizer's assumptions about information and rationality limit the applicability of the theory. More often, those who advance psychological or sociological conceptions suggest that a comprehensive and detailed understanding of decision-making requires a "broader" perspective. And there is justification for this viewpoint. The application of insights derived from psychology and sociology has wrought a revolution in our understanding of politics. These insights suggest the following questions: What is to be maximized, under what circumstances, and over what time period? What social and psychological factors define the available (perceived) goals which orient foreign policy choices? How are costs and gains assessed? How do decision-makers handle certainty, risk, and uncertainty? What is the effect of tension on decision-making? How does perceived hostility affect cost assessment? How does the approval or disapproval of salient others (fellow citizens, allies, enemies) affect estimates of probabilities? These important questions bear significantly on the study of decision-making in foreign affairs. To answer them, more information is needed than the theories of maximization alone can provide. In the words of Thomas Milburn,

> Situationally contingent orderings of objectives . . . as weighted in terms of culturally and situationally determined risk preferences provide what is empirically a better-supported base than the expected utility model for predicting choice.
>
> Our new technology and science . . . can be directed and exploited more effectively as we better understand risk-taking; the impacts of threats . . . across culture, ideologies, and situations. Soviet . . . behavior can be understood most effectively when contrasted and compared with our own, and when both are seen as results of multiple rather than single determinants.[21]

But even to ask these questions and to reach these conclusions suggests that maximization and influence theories can be integrated, that the interrelationships between the elements (referents) in the two kinds of models are empirical, researchable matters. A specification of some of the ways in which these two

[20]Pruitt, *loc. cit.*

[21]Thomas Milburn, "Design for the Study of Deterrent Processes," in Milburn and Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 ff.

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types of decision models relate to each other might yield more than theoretical benefits, for

> a stable deterrence relationship demands a sophisticated and continuing exchange of signals and a reliability of expectations. . . . As accurate an image as possible of the other nation's foreign policy operational code can help stabilize or permit us to exploit that relationship. . . . Similar benefits may be expected to flow from a consciousness of one's own assumptions, expectations, and preferences.[22]

The research project described in the next section of this article was designed to facilitate the integration of decision theories by employing alternative models in an evaluation of the influence of strategic factors on decision-making in international crises. It was also designed to investigate certain more practical disagreements concerning strategy (i.e., the application of decision theories to international relations)—especially as regards the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence situations. Accordingly, some discussion of these controversies, and of crises as a setting for the analysis of deterrence and decision-making, may serve as additional background and introduction to the research.

There are many sides to the controversy over the effectiveness of strong, superior strategic forces (deterrence weapons systems) in the management of crises. Nonetheless, two identifiable poles of thought seem to be emerging. One conception views military forces as two relatively independent force complexes, one suited to the waging of general conflict and the other appropriate to lower-level conflict. This view implies that superior strategic capabilities can do little to deter or to affect the outcome of crises below the level of all-out war. Others maintain that national military capabilities compose a more integrated force structure. Superior strategic power can then influence opposing decision-makers even in crises confined to lower conflict levels. This latter view supports the argument that aerospace forces, properly considered, are integral to the balance of power, and therefore, that strategic superiority at the top of the conflict spectrum should permit some effective utilization of tactical or political capabilities at lower levels of crisis. In sum, both groupings agree that thermonuclear weapons help to deter total war. "The argument or debate arises over what else thermonuclear weapons can deter."[23]

Despite its technological and military overtones, this is basically

[22]J. David Singer, "Comparison of Soviet-American International Ideologies," in *ibid.*, pp. 20 ff.
[23]Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

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an argument about decision-making, for it is generally recognized that "deterrence, as has often been commented, is essentially a psychological matter. The vast and destructive weapons which are part of a deterrent system do not themselves deter. . . . The role of weapons is to communicate a message in a bargaining process."[24]

Thus both conceptions about the utility of strategic factors in lower-level crises are derived from alternative theories of deterrence and escalation, and the argument revolves about the application of these theories to various kinds of crisis situations. The aspects of escalation theory at issue in this controversy may be summarized and simplified in the following manner: Escalation, signifying qualitative or quantitative increases in the resources committed to influence opposing decision-makers in crises (i.e., in deterrence-salient situations), are supposed to be able to serve as a means of communication in crisis. Do such increases (or, When do such increases) credibly demonstrate national military and political capability, mobility and resolve—and thus influence opposing decision-makers in desirable ways (i.e., effect deterrence)? Do different kinds of crises call for different kinds of aerospace capabilities?

To answer these questions necessarily emphasizes and involves an examination of the influence of military factors on psychopolitical processes in the international politics of the Cold War. One may, of course, be reasonably certain that strategic factors influence the thinking of decision-makers in some manner, but this kind of understanding is manifestly inadequate to the analysis and making of national policy regarding deterrence. To explain and plan for deterrence situations, answers to the following questions are needed: Exactly who is influenced, in what directions, by which military factors, and under what circumstances? What psychological processes are at work in the minds of decision-makers who are presumed to be influenced? How is strategic superiority communicated to opposing decision-makers? What mix of strategic factors and strategic-tactical operations credibly communicates intended messages? In short, what is the dynamic of deterrence?

To investigate the dynamic of deterrence in a manner that will facilitate the integration of decision theories, we need to examine situations in which deterrence has presumably been operative and

[24]Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Social Science Research and National Security* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1963), p. 7.

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to pursue that examination in terms suggested by both maximizing and influence models (or to include elements of the two models in a synthesized model of decision-making). The situations in which the dynamics of deterrence may be most clear are international crises.

It has been said over and over again that the post World War II period has been one of almost uninterrupted crisis. The past fifteen years have been punctuated by one crisis after another, some of which are alleged to have brought the world perilously close to armed conflict. These recurrent crises are not only an important feature of the contemporary international environment but each represented . . . an important choice point for the participants involved. . . . It would seem necessary to examine the nature of contemporary international crises.[25]

Despite the obvious importance of the phenomenon of crisis, few operational definitions are available. Indeed, there has been little explicit recognition of crisis as a separate and researchable phenomenon. Few studies (and none of the major textbooks) in international affairs list "crisis" as an item in their indexes, and there has been a dearth of systematic empirical studies on the causes, character and consequences of international political crises.

As a result, contradictory operating theories have been constructed. . . . For example, it has been asserted that crisis is a deliberate, calculated policy mechanism of the Soviet Union and that the U.S.S.R. and China prefer to operate in only one crisis at a time; on the other hand, it has been argued that crisis is a nonrational phenomenon which cannot be predicted by policymakers.[26]

Recently some efforts have been made to define, or to identify more clearly, the essential elements of crisis and crisis decision-making. Snyder and Robinson, for example, regard crisis decision-making as "a special case of crash decisions [where rapid response is required], presumably differentiated on the basis of significance of the stakes involved."[27] In a later study by Robinson and Charles and Margaret Hermann, "The independent variable, crisis, was defined in terms of three dimensions: (1) a threat to major goals; (2) a short decision-time available for response; and (3) a lack of anticipation by decision-makers that the threatening situation would occur."[28] To this, Snyder and Robinson would add that most crises involved challenges to a limited number of goals as perceived and handled by an *ad hoc* decisional unit.[29]

[25]Snyder and Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[26]James A. Robinson and Charles F. and Margaret Hermann, "Crisis Decision-Making," in Milburn and Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.
[27]Snyder and Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[28]Robinson and the Hermanns, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
[29]Snyder and Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 50 ff.

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It would appear, then, that crises constitute a uniquely interesting setting for the study of deterrence and decision-making. In crisis, the importance and interdependence of decision are clear, as is the relevance of military factors (if not their precise effects). The pressures of threat, time and surprise, in combination with the *ad hoc* character of the decision structures, may serve to reduce in importance the effects on decision-makers of noncrisis roles, of inter-bureaucratic interest conflicts, and of generalized "noise" in the decision process. Further, these peak periods of international tension seem to be the real setting, the "natural experiments," of deterrence.

In studying international decision-making, one does well to consider prediction, strategic doctrine, and deterrence; and an investigation of these matters seems to lead to the study of crisis.

Crisis Management: The Influence of Strategic Factors

The research reported on here is, essentially, a comparative analysis of Soviet and American decision-making in eight major crises of the nuclear age. To this end, a partial model of top-level crisis decision-making was elaborated which includes some variables suggested by certain maximizing and satisficing theories and other variables drawn from a variety of influence-relevant theories. Holding that the referents of all deterrence doctrines centrally include strategic and other military factors (or perceptions thereof), we attempted to identify some typical, recurrent effects of deterrence policies by observing covariation of decision-makers' perceptions, attitudes, assessments and deliberations with their perceptions of strategic force-structures and operations (i.e., by observing regular associations of variables in the model). In addition, some "crisis descriptive" variables were studied in order to identify and consider some relationships between situational and decisional (or perceptual) factors.

Toward a Model of Crisis Decision-Making

A study of decision-making under crisis conditions requires at least two preliminary analytic constructs. Initially, it requires a model of high-level foreign policy decision processes. Secondly, some specifications of the properties of crises must be made (i.e., crisis must be explicitly differentiated from its relevant environment—noncrisis international politics). When these preconditions are met, one can speak of a "crisis decisional system" in

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which strategic perceptions are elements, i.e., system components. Change in one part of such a system should lead to change in at least some other system components. Changes in the perception of another actor's strategic capabilities and intentions may correlate with changes in other perceptions, attitudes, decisions and actions of foreign policy decision-makers. Where the correlation appears to represent a causal relationship, strategic perceptions may usefully be treated as "independent variables," and the items that vary with changes in strategic perceptions may be termed "dependent variables." Thus one may seek to observe the influence of strategic and other aerospace factors on crisis decision-making by noting the other perceptions and decisions that occur after changes take place in decision-makers' perceptions of strategic capabilities and intent or resolve. Since it is often especially difficult to demonstrate that in crises the operation of one variable precedes that of another, one may have to speak more of correlation than of causality. In some instances below, however, a significant covariance of variables exists and there is also logical or theoretical reason to believe that A causes B but not that B causes A. In such cases the tentative imputation of causality appears appropriate.

In attempting to study these important relationships, the following definitions, variables and hypotheses have seemed useful:

A *crisis* may be regarded as a hostile confrontation of two or more nations arising from conflicting policies toward a geographic or problem area, which, by virtue of the use or suggested use of force, engenders a substantial increase in, and high level of, tension. While many of the present international conflicts to which we have grown inured would probably have been classified as crises in previous periods of history, it does not do to regard the whole of the Cold War as one crisis. It is both possible and necessary to identify some of the more significant tension-laden confrontations and treat these as basic settings for study. Some such limitation of scope seems a basic precondition of manageable scientific inquiry.

A crisis may be classified in any number of ways. Two classifications have seemed most useful: (1) level of crisis as defined by the quality or quantity of committed capability (military and political); and (2) directness of crisis confrontation, as, for example, a clash between the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than between allies or "proxies." In order to facilitate more

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detailed evaluation of strategically-relevant influence, *crisis periods* were divided into three phases: initiation of crisis, peak of crisis, and resolution of crisis.

Strategic forces are defined as those designed to carry the main burden of battle in general nuclear war directly against military targets and other vital installations located in the enemy's homeland. These forces include long-range bombers, air-to-ground and decoy missiles, refueling tankers, land- and sea-based strategic missiles, and systems for command and control of these weapons systems. Unless a crisis escalates into a nuclear war, strategic forces play a covert or indirect rather than an overt role. Deployed tactical air units and carrier-based attack aircraft intended to perform other functions are not deemed strategic in character—despite the fact that U.S. forces of this character have the capability to deliver nuclear blows at targets well inside the communist bloc.

If strategic factors enter into deterrence situations as perceptions, it is necessary to specify: (1) the significant strategically-relevant perceptions decision-makers are likely to have; and (2) the other major perceptual components of the crisis decision-making set. Perhaps the two most important strategic perceptions of the nuclear era have been: (1) the strategic capabilities of the superpowers (i.e., force structures), and (2) the intentions, resolve, plans and strategic implementation doctrines according to which the capabilities are employed. For research purposes these items were subconceptualized so that the following independent, strategic or aerospace variables were included in the study:

(1) *Perception of overall East-West strategic balance* (e.g., demonstrable U.S. superiority, marginal U.S. superiority, stalemate, marginal Soviet superiority, and the like.

(2) *Perception of relevant aerospace resources* (and/or resource balance) *available for crisis utilization.*

(3) *Perception of resolve, intentions and likely responses of other parties to the crisis.* Two situational (i.e., "objective") variables of a military character were included in the study in order to relate real military operations to the strategic perceptions which, *ex hypothese,* they in part engender. These were:

(a) *Use of strategic forces.* This variable describes the level of alert, deployment or dispersal of strategic forces during a crisis.

(b) *Use of tactical forces.* This variable describes the use of general purpose forces during a crisis and includes alerts, maneuvers and deployments as well as overt hostilities.

An intensive review of decision-related variables, informed both by our efforts to study the interrelationships between maximizing and influence models and the limits of our resources, resulted in

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the inclusion in our study of the following dependent variables:

(1) *Perception of the tide of history.* A generalized feeling on the part of foreign policy decision-makers that things are going their way, that time is on their side. As with most of the other variables in this study, this perception was researched within the guidelines of a multi-item index. These index scores were based on a loose kind of content analysis of major available domestic, international and diplomatic communications for crisis and inter-crisis periods. The *tide of history* variable was scored on a 1-5 scale from strongly favorable to strongly unfavorable. (It may be well, at this point, to stress the essentially qualitative aspect of this research. We do not argue that our indexes are sophisticated scales or that a score of 1 is precisely two-fifths more favorable a perception of the tide of history than a score of 3. Yet, the scores do seem to reflect some basic properties of the perceptual variables and provide a reasonable basis for determining some patterns which the variables assume in crisis decision-making.)

(2) *Level of threat.* "Threat" is more direct and specific than "tension" and perhaps more observable than "stress." Our index for threat was based on the semantics of crisis communication (e.g., "serious," "grave," "awesome,") and situational fears (immediate nuclear attack on homeland, loss of bloc partner, loss of strategic base, loss of prestige).

(3) *Perceived opposing hostility.* The factors that would affect a decision-maker's perception of hostility were delineated as:

(a) *Expectation or surprise as to crisis;*
(b) *Perception of the scope or totality of the other's motives;*
(c) *"Negotiability" or "reasonableness" of others.*

(4) *Costs of present and projected crisis policies* (comparative units). Costs were conceived of as expenditures and allocations. These were compared in terms of Gross National Product, fiscal budget, military budget, manpower by sector, and the like.

(5) *Risks attendant on present and projected crisis policies* (comparative units). Risks were linked with:

(a) *Probability of general war;*
(b) *Probability of limited war;*
(c) *Probability of failure of other policies;*
(d) *Probabilities of loss of prestige,* and the like.

(6) *Utility values of present and projected policies* (comparative units). Gains were assessed on the basis of the achievement of both specific, crisis-relevant objectives and other national objectives. The former were generally weighted more heavily than the latter, if only because the probabilities seemed skewed that way. Also, political objectives were weighted more heavily than economic gains; specific policy goals more heavily than general prestige goals.

(7) *Number of perceived, available, seemingly appropriate responses.*

(8) *Perceived likely reaction of citizens to crisis policy* (favorable versus unfavorable, directionality through crisis).

(9) *Perceived likely responses of allies to crisis policy* (favorable dimension, integrative dimension, resource commitment dimension).

(10) *Perceived likely response of neutrals to crisis policy* (favorable or supportive dimension).

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In addition to these essentially perceptual matters, several situational (crisis-descriptive or decision-descriptive) variables were incorporated in the study. These included:

(1) *Receptivity of decision-makers to communication* (high, medium, low). This includes information-seeking behavior at different stages of crisis.

(2) *Centralization of decision-making* (high, medium, low). An assessment of the range or scope of autonomy of field personnel.

(3) *Established doctrine as decisional rationale* (degree of change versus stability). The degree to which crisis behavior is consonant with, and justified in terms of, previously stated doctrines.

(4) *Intelligence.* This index encompassed the quantity, quality, number of sources, and evaluation of informational inputs.

(5) *Number of powers involved.* This variable required an assessment of the number of powers involved in a crisis. It was restricted to active participants; otherwise, every nation that had an official position in the crisis could conceivably have been treated as an "involved" power.

(6) *Directness of confrontation.* This variable was used to assess the closeness of a given crisis to a direct nuclear confrontation between the United States and the USSR.

Crisis management is the conception and direction of national foreign policy in crisis. It is typically a coordinated attempt to effect modifications in the crisis policies of other nations by influencing the attitudes of opposing foreign policymakers. Such attitude change is partly a function of changes in perceptions, especially strategically-relevant perceptions.[30] As concretized, then, crisis management is influence, sought and accomplished to a considerable degree through processes of communication which include military operations.[31] From these general considerations, especially from the notion of influence, a set of concrete, interrelated hypotheses was derived.

[30]There are, of course, other problems in attitude change which, for reasons of data limitations, we have not confronted in this study. It seems advisable to make these explicit. Basic attitudes reinforced by long-standing perceptions are obviously less amenable to influence than are less elemental or newer matters. We do not know, nor can we really determine, the strength of Soviet perceptions. We have made the assumption, borne out in our studies, that most perceptions relevant to short-term policies are changeable and amenable to influence in crisis situations. We also know that attitude change depends on communications and that many biases concerning the source, content and consistency of communications affect attitude change. It has not been possible, for example, to examine extensively Soviet reactions to different Western communications sources and to study whether and to what extent these crisis communications have been consistent with previous Soviet perceptions.

[31]Perceptions of the external setting are a basic unit in decision. (See Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, *loc. cit.*) Men may misconstrue reality, but only the psychotic will be wholly out of touch with it. Changing reality is obviously one way to change perceptions of it. Increasing or changing force structures are means of affecting the opponent's calculations. Thus, one elementary but important hypothesis is that "changes in strategic balance, crisis resources, national intent and policy will be

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One summary of the basic modes of influence suggests nine categories: (1) changing the objective environment; (2) providing information; (3) generating fear; (4) modifying certainty; (5) modifying what comes to the influencee's attention; (6) modifying the salience of different things to him; (7) changing the influencee's resources; (8) generating trust and affect; (9) providing a behavioral model to the influencee.[32]

Briefly, we have hypothesized that strategic and aerospace actions in crisis, e.g., mobilization, threats, attacks, constitute changes in the objective environment which, when perceived (a modification of what comes to the influencee's attention), generate fear—partly by providing information of a threatening character to him and partly by effecting modifications in his certainty. More specifically, we hypothesize initially that strategic and general aerospace actions communicate (1) the overall strategic balance of power; (2) the balance of military power available at the geographic point in contention, if any; (3) the intentions and/or resolve of the nations to use that power, to exploit some strategic or local superiority. For example, U.S. mobilizations and directed threats communicate our strategic superiority, our available crisis resources, our intentions and/or resolve in the crises.

In still more concrete terms, the following hypotheses are offered:

Hypothesis 1: Despite their perception of American strategic superiority, the Soviet Union's foreign policy decision-makers have adopted or supported crisis-initiating policies. Such probes by the Soviet Union or its allies produce increased felt-threat to those decision-makers below the level of deterrence.

perceived, in some fashion, by opponents." Indeed, the Soviet elite are alert to foreign information of this kind, especially in crisis situations. Yet facts do not necessarily speak for themselves. They must be placed in an appropriate context lest a particular diplomatic or military action fail to communicate at all, or communicate an unintended message.

On this point, Ithiel Pool has written: "Social science research on persuasion by information suggests rather forcefully that facts do not speak for themselves. A fact is capable of many interpretations. A fact plus an explanation of its significance is more likely to communicate than either the fact alone or the interpretative generalization alone.

"Deterrent information may fail if it does not conform to that principle. If it consists only of a warning statement or only of a particular weapons action each unlinked to the other, it may not communicate as intended. . . . But the problem of deterrence is only partly that of teaching. It is also one of maintaining certain motivational states. It is important in planning deterrent strategy to be clear which objective is being served. Raising certainty may help if the objective is to teach a conclusion, lowering it may help if the objective is to compel caution and indecision." (See Pool with Whaley, *loc. cit.*)

[32]Pool with Whaley, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 ff.

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Hypothesis 2: As the United States' overall strategic superiority becomes increasingly perceptible to opposing decision-makers, Soviet perceived threat rises.

Hypothesis 3: When the balance of available crisis resources is perceived by opponents increasingly to favor the United States, the Soviet decision-makers feel increased threat.

Hypothesis 4: As U.S. strategic and tactical readiness is perceived by the Soviets to increase, Soviet perceptions of the resolve of American decision-makers is increased.

Hypothesis 5: As the Soviets sense increased U.S. resolve, they perceive increased threat and U.S. hostility.

Hypothesis 6: As the Soviets become conscious of increased American resolve and hostility, and hence increased threat to themselves, the number of perceived feasible Soviet policy alternatives decreases from the initiation to the peak of the crisis.

These first six hypotheses suggest that American mobilizations and threats produce Soviet perceptions of heightened U.S. resolve and a balance of power, both overall and in the crisis area, increasingly favorable to the United States. These perceptions raise the level of Soviet felt-threat as well as Soviet perception of U.S. hostility, and often tend to be associated with a constraint on the number of Soviet policy options.

These influences, i.e., changes in Soviet perceptions, occasioned by U.S. military operations were hypothesized to affect the Soviet crisis decision-making process (whether of a maximizing character or otherwise), in the following manner:

Hypothesis 7: As the Soviets perceive increased U.S. resolve and hostility and hence increased threat to themselves, their assessments of the relative merits, consequences, costs, gains and utilities of various crisis policies will undergo significant modification.

As to the adoption of national security policies during crises, we further hypothesize that the following considerations operate to condition the choices made by top-level foreign policymakers:

Hypothesis 8: The more direct the crisis confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (and the fewer or less significant the proxies), the more credible is U.S. strategic action.

Hypothesis 9: Conditions of high or increasing threat affect the receptivity of decision-makers to messages from the opponent in crisis.

Hypothesis 10: As threat increases, decision-makers tend to narrow the scope of autonomy allowed to field commanders.

In addition, the following are included as factors that will affect the calculations of decision-makers. They relate to recent work in the field of international politics and related areas which was considered in this study, although a direct mathematical substantiation from our data is not possible.

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Hypothesis 11: A perception of favorable allied response will reinforce decision-makers in the adoption of a given policy, and conversely, strong actions may be the way to achieve such support.

Hypothesis 12: A perception of low or decreased allied support will generally argue for weaker policies on issues deemed basic to national interests.

Hypothesis 13: To a lesser extent, a perception of favorable neutral support will reinforce decision-makers in the adoption of a given policy.

Hypothesis 14: A perception of favorable response from the citizens of their own country will reinforce decision-makers, at least in democratic nations, in the adoption of a given policy, notwithstanding the fact that in the nuclear age decision-makers enjoy considerable latitude.

Hypothesis 15: A perception of a favorable tide of history will affect the adoption of a given crisis policy.

Hypothesis 16: Changes in policy (especially backdowns) will be accomplished more easily if these changes can plausibly be rationalized within statements of long-term foreign policy objectives.

Most of the hypotheses here have been stated in terms of American crisis management. We also investigated the relationship between variables as reflected in U.S. decision-making (i.e., the effect of Soviet behavior), and some of these are discussed below in the section on findings. Also briefly noted in that section are some patterns of interrelationships between the variables which we did not necessarily expect and which, therefore, were not stated as hypotheses.

A Note on Methods and Settings

This study of crisis decision-making in the nuclear age confronted certain problems of method common to studies in international politics. The major factor limiting research on contemporary political-military phenomena is the problem of access to decision-makers, exacerbated by problems of security restrictions. "Clearly, the standard methods of attitude measurement—the personal interview, the questionnaire, or direct observation of decision-makers in action—can rarely be used by the social scientist who seeks to study human behavior at the international level."[33] If we could not secure access to top-level U.S. decision-makers in order to inquire pointedly about their perceptions and attitudes (or do basic personality studies on them),[34] we had a still more difficult time acquiring indirect data about Soviet crisis decision-making. McGeorge Bundy's comments on the Cuban Missile Crisis are instructive:

[33]North, Holsti and Brody, *op. cit.*

[34]"Clearly, in view of security restrictions, it is impossible to obtain materials of this quality in a . . . contemporary situation." *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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Although vast amounts have been written about the crisis, we still have no solid account of one-half of it—the Soviet side. What is not known of one side limits our ability to assess action on the other, and this limitation should warn us against judgments that this act more than that, or one advantage more than another, was decisive. It does not prevent a more general judgment of the main element contributing to success.[35]

There are, at present, essentially three ways around these difficulties of access to contemporary situations: (1) analysis of available data (content analysis, statistical analysis) and some indication about the representative qualities of the data; (2) indirect means of inferring what actually happened, including the use of objective indicators and indexes for subjective phenomena; and (3) techniques for simulating the phenomena in question. In this study, we made use of a combined form of the first two methods; simulation is recommended in the concluding section of this paper.

Thus, the general hypotheses concerning the relationship between aerospace factors and crisis decision-making were tested in the following manner: First, a "score" or assessment of the level of each variable, as perceived by Soviet and American leaders, was obtained for the initiation, peak and resolution of the crises. Each variable was operationalized as a guideline index; the indicators making up the index were researched in such open sources as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and foreign press reports, as well as domestic sources. The indexes were developed by the author, in conjunction with the professional staff of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In obtaining a score for each variable, in each crisis (and crisis period), two to six coders reviewed the published material. There was generally high inter-coder agreement. Second, the direction of changes in perceptions between the initiation and peak of crises and between peak and resolution was observed and recorded. Third, correlations or covariations between intensity levels and directional changes in any given time period were computed for every pair of variables. Fourth, the frequency of correlation (i.e., the number of crises or crisis time periods in which the relationship holds) was computed.

The major hypotheses set out above concern covariance in directional change between two or more perceptions. They are of the form "as x changes, y changes." Generally, we were concerned with that crisis time period in which aerospace power might be most influential—from the initiation to the peak of the crisis. Most of the data presented below relate to this period. Unless otherwise

[35] "The Presidency and the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, p. 359.

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noted, data refer to directional changes in perceptions between initiation and peak.

For this exploratory study we selected eight major crises of the nuclear age as examples of crisis decision-making, as settings for research. No doubt ample data on prenuclear or hypothetical crises can be made available. Yet the relevance of such data to presently prevailing conditions is necessarily limited.[36] Hence, we must quarry our materials from the recent past. This material, which is often difficult to obtain because of severe security restrictions, is less easily accumulated by orderly scientific methods than the more open record of the prenuclear age. In order to accumulate our data by orderly and controlled means, we chose to conduct an indirect analysis of actual situations and events.

These analyses were conducted with reference to the following crises: Korea, Suez, Quemoy, Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba, Cyprus and Viet Nam (Tonkin Gulf). The selection of these eight crises reflects our goal of incorporating a range of crisis-types and our assessments regarding the researchability of the different crises.

The Sample of Crises Studied by Historical-Analytic Methods

Crisis	*Year*	*Initiation*	*Peak*	*Resolution*
Korea	1950	June 24-25	June 26-29	June 30-July 1
Suez	1956	Oct. 29-Nov. 3	Nov. 4-6	Nov. 7
Lebanon	1958	July 14-15	July 16-19	July 20-Aug. 3
Quemoy	1958	Aug. 29-31	Sept. 1-7	Sept. 8-Oct. 15
Berlin	1961	Feb.-June	July-Sept.	Oct.-Dec.
Cuba	1962	Oct. 22-24	Oct. 25-27	Oct. 28
Tonkin	1964	Aug. 2-3	Aug. 4	Aug. 5
Cyprus	1964	Aug. 8-9	Aug. 10-11	Aug. 12-15

Findings

The variable magnitudes identified in our research are shown in Tables 1 and 2. A variety of simple statistical tests, including the Fisher exact probability test and the chi square with correction for small numbers, were performed on these data but—owing to the extremely small number of n's—results are inconclusive. Accordingly, the major hypotheses specified above seem to be best analyzed by simple inspection of the data, and the discussion of

[36]We recognize that "Social science approaches to historical situations are based upon the fundamental assumption that there are patterns, repetitions and close analogies throughout the history of human affairs. The circumstances and paraphernalia will differ . . . but the patterns of human fears and anxieties and perceptions of threat and injury may not be dissimilar." North, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 12. Comparison of our findings with those of studies on prenuclear age crises may reveal interesting similarities and differences in the patterns of psycho-dynamic factors in crisis decision-making.

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findings which follows treats the hypotheses individually and discursively, on an inspection basis. For ease of inspection, variable magnitudes are represented in the tables as follows: the vertical of each cell is to be construed as a ten-point scale, and the three bars in each cell represent the assessed variable magnitude at the initiation, peak, and resolution of crisis, respectively.

The generalizations regarding crisis behavior and the integration of decision theories drawn from the data are, of course, advanced within the limitations of the approximate character and restricted scope of that data. From this, the need for further research seems clear and, in the concluding section of this paper, suggestions are put forward on improving our understanding of political phenomena through such research.

Hypothesis: Where the Soviet Union's foreign policy decision-makers perceive clear overall U.S. strategic superiority, crisis-initiating actions by the Soviet Union or its allies are associated with increased felt-threat to those decision-makers.

Confirmation involves comparison of the intensity level of Soviet perception of strategic balance with directional change in threat perception. This hypothesis appears to be generally confirmed. Soviet perception of an unfavorable overall strategic balance was associated with an increase in assessed Soviet felt-threat (initiation to peak of crisis) in six of the eight crises investigated. This occurred in Korea (1950), Lebanon (1958), Quemoy (1958), Berlin (1961), Cuba (1962), and Cyprus (1964). It did not seem to be confirmed in the Suez (1956) and Tonkin Gulf (1964) crises where, despite Soviet perception of U.S. strategic superiority, Soviet felt-threat was not assessed to have increased from the initiation to the peak of crisis. As might be expected, felt-threat declines from the peak to the resolution of crises (confirmed in five cases out of eight).

Hypothesis: As the United States' overall strategic superiority is perceived by the opposing decision-makers to increase, Soviet perceived threat rises, too.

This hypothesis suggests that top-level decision-makers may be forced to recognize that they had previously underestimated the overall capabilities of the opponent, and this realization produces threat. Specifically, the hypothesis states that, when Soviet leaders are shown that the United States' superiority is greater than they had theretofore believed, they will feel more threatened. This hypothesis is linked to the first hypothesis: The first hypothesis suggests that the communists may not be deterred from initiating

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TABLE I. ASSESSMENTS OF AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

VARIABLES	KOREA	SUEZ	LEBANON	QUEMOY	BERLIN	CUBA	TONKIN	CYPRUS
US 1 Overall East-West Strategic Balance								
US 2 Crisis Resources								
US 3 Opposing Resolve and Intent								
US 4 Use of Strategic Forces								
US 5 Use of Tactical Forces								
US 6 Tide of History								
US 7 Level of Threat								
US 8 Level of Opposing Hostility								
US 9 Allied Response								
US 10 Neutral Response								
US 11 Internal Response								
US 12 Number of Alternatives								
US 13 Receptivity to Communication								
US 14 Centralization of Decision-Making								
US 15 Degree of "Fit" Between Policy and Doctrine								
US 16 Quantity of Intelligence Information								
US 17 Number of Powers Involved								
US 18 Directness of Confrontation								

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TABLE 2. ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS

VARIABLES	KOREA	SUEZ	LEBANON	QUEMOY	BERLIN	CUBA	TONKIN	CYPRUS
SU 1 Overall East-West Strategic Balance								
SU 2 Crisis Resources								
SU 3 Opposing Resolve and Intent								
SU 4 Use of Strategic Forces								
SU 5 Use of Tactical Forces								
SU 6 Tide of History								
SU 7 Level of Threat								
SU 8 Level of Opposing Hostility								
SU 9 Allied Response								
SU 10 Neutral Response								
SU 11 Internal Response								
SU 12 Number of Alternatives								
SU 13 Receptivity to Communication								
SU 14 Centralization of Decision-Making								
SU 15 Degree of Change in Policy and Doctrine								
SU 16 Quantity of Intelligence Information								
SU 17 Number of Powers Involved								
SU 18 Directness of Confrontation								

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international crises by their perception of U.S. strategic superiority, but that this perception induces threat once the confrontation has begun. The second hypothesis suggests that threat will be reinforced and/or increased if Soviet decision-makers become aware that the strategic balance is even more favorable to the United States than they had thought.

This suggestion seems intuitively plausible. It is not wholly obvious, however, because threat does not always vary with the capability of opponents. At very high levels of tension, for example, increased perception of disadvantage may be disregarded or relatively de-emphasized. Also, some decision-making "styles" may consistently underemphasize opposing capability in crisis.

In six of the eight crises reviewed the second hypothesis could not be tested, since Soviet perception of strategic balance seemed stable (favoring the United States). In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where Soviet decision-makers felt that the strategic balance, already favorable to the United States, shifted even further in that direction, this hypothesis was confirmed. In Suez, we believe that the Soviets perceived a change in strategic balance favorable to themselves with no increase in felt-threat.

If this is so, then the two other strategically-relevant, independent variables—(1) perception of other available crisis resources, and (2) perception of opposing resolve, intent and policy regarding the utilization of strategic factors—assume increased importance as techniques of crisis management.

Hypothesis: Where the available strategic crisis resources of the United States are perceived by opponents to be increased (or, through a decrease in available Soviet resources, the military crisis resource balance increasingly favors the United States), the Soviet decision-makers feel increased threat.

There appears to be a regular association between the perceived U.S. crisis resource level and Soviet felt-threat. In those crises in which the Soviets perceived rising U.S. crisis resource capability during the initiation-to-peak period, their felt-threat rose in every case—Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba and Cyprus. Where U.S. crisis resources were stable during the initiation-to-peak period—in Korea, Quemoy and Tonkin—felt-threat failed to rise only in the Tonkin crisis. Where, as in Suez, we estimated a Soviet perception of decreased U.S. crisis resources at some points in the crisis, a stable, low Soviet felt-threat obtained.

This regular association apparently confirms the hypothesis that

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Soviet felt-threat, already seen to be induced and reinforced by perceptions of U.S. strategic superiority, is further reinforced and/or increased as Soviet decision-makers perceive that U.S. capabilities can be brought to bear in crisis regions.

The United States has often attempted to communicate this power by mobilizing resources in a manner obvious to Soviet leaders, sometimes by deploying certain units to demonstrate combat readiness—for example, near Soviet borders. From this observation we derive the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: As U.S. strategic and/or tactical preparedness is perceived by the Soviets to increase, Soviet perceptions of the resolve of U.S. decision-makers increase.

This hypothesis seems confirmed in every crisis studied.[37] If U.S. strategic superiority and crisis resource superiority are associated with increased Soviet felt-threat and with increased Soviet awareness of U.S. resolve, then logically Soviet perception of increased U.S. resolve should be linked to increased Soviet felt-threat. This suggested relationship between perception of U.S. resolve and Soviet felt-threat occurs in the initiation-to-peak period in our assessments in six of eight cases (Korea, Lebanon, Quemoy, Berlin, Cuba and Cyprus). U.S. resolve and Soviet felt-threat vary independently in Suez and the Tonkin Gulf.

Soviet awareness of increased U.S. resolve and perception of increased U.S. hostility during the initiation-to-peak period are associated in six of the cases reviewed (Korea, Lebanon, Quemoy, Berlin, Cuba and Tonkin). In Suez and Cyprus, Soviet perceptions of U.S. hostility did not rise.

In most of the major crises of the nuclear age, the United States has been successful in communicating its overall capability, its ability to utilize its power, and its resolve to do so if the crisis-initiating policies are carried to undesired conclusions. This has induced and reinforced Soviet felt-threat.

As a crisis develops, the number of alternative policies inevitably narrows. This is inherent in choice-making processes. One starts with a range of possible actions but the range inevitably narrows until only a few options remain. Only rarely can one carry out a large number of action policies—at the same time. A possible objective of crisis management is the narrowing of the opponent's alternatives (or perceived alternatives) so that the desired policy

[37]The assessments of the use of strategic and tactical forces were crisis descriptive, not perceptual. However, we assume that Soviet and U.S. perceptions of the deployment of each other's armed forces are reasonably accurate.

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will be more likely to be adopted. This can be accomplished by inducing such a level of threat and tension that the opponent has neither time nor inclination to keep seeking new policy alternatives.

Hypothesis: As the Soviets perceive increased U.S. resolve and hostility and hence increased threat to themselves, the number of perceived feasible Soviet policy alternatives decreases from the initiation to the peak of crisis.

We emphasize the initiation-to-peak time period here because from peak to resolution the number of alternatives seems likely to fall "naturally."

In our assessments, this hypothesis is confirmed in three of the six cases in which threat rose. Soviet perceived alternatives decreased as threat (and resolve-hostility) rose in the initiation-to-peak periods of the Lebanese, Quemoy and Cuban crises. The suggested relationship was not observed in Korea, Berlin and Cyprus; in Suez and Tonkin Gulf both variables were constant.

Hypothesis: As the number of alternatives the Soviets deem feasible tends to fall, the cost, gain and utility values assigned to different policies tend to undergo some modification.

It is, of course, most difficult to assess the perceived costs and gains decision-makers assign to alternative policies. All that can be claimed for our estimates derived from supplemental analyses is that they seem reasonable and consistent.

Using these estimates, we tested some maximizing hypotheses. We find, as others have, that the risk-taking of both the United States and the Soviet Union is "patterned" and, for each country, "quite consistent" across time in similar circumstances.[38] In almost every case, the crisis policies selected do "make sense" in some "cost versus utility" calculation. On the other hand, there also appear to be some regular changes in decision-rules or risk-preferences during certain crises.

At the initiation of crises, both sides appear to elect policies that promise some balance of utility over costs and risks (if such an alternative exists). Yet at the peak of crises, after felt-threat has generally risen, both the United States and the USSR sometimes prefer alternatives with lower gains but also lower costs and risks to policies promising greater benefits at higher cost and risk levels. Thus, in Korea and Lebanon, the Soviets seemed to shift from moderate-to-high utility and moderate-to-low cost-risk behavior to actions which appear to have had fewer advantages but also fewer costs and risks. This may also be true of the United States in

[38]North and Triska, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 ff.

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Cyprus. This does not mean that U.S. and USSR decision-makers have not chosen strong crisis policies. They have. It suggests only that, at least on occasions, they have chosen "less strong" policies over stronger, but more dangerous and costly, ones.

There are some other commonalities in crises that may be worthy of note. In almost every crisis, for both sides, there is a tendency for perceived costs to rise—suggesting that crises may be an inefficient means of conducting foreign relations. For example, as felt-threat rises, perceived costs and risks seem to rise for both sides and perceived gains to fall; as perceived threat falls, costs fall and gains rise. This last finding suggests some possible interrelationships, or at least some general kinds of relationships, between maximizing models and theories of influence.

One possibility is that we may ultimately be able to show that some influence-related variables (such as threat) typically derive from certain conditions which can be defined in terms of utility or maximizing conceptions. Thus it might be argued that one sometimes feels threat because he is in a situation of high, or increasing, costs and risks, low or declining gain possibilities. If this should prove true, points of correspondence could be established between some quantitative theory of threat perception and a mathematical formulation of maximization. If one then knew the relevant perceptions of costs and risks, one could predict threat levels and associated behaviors (effects). This is to say that, at least sometimes, the operative elements or referents of the two models will have mutually reinforcing effects on the behavior of decision-makers. In these circumstances, prediction of choice will be relatively easier.

On the other hand, it seems more likely that influence-related factors "drive" perceptions, such as those of costs and risks, which are important in maximizing models. To test formulations of this character, it is necessary to establish the two (or more) factors independently, which was not wholly accomplished in this study.

Generally, what this implies is that the operation of each model "fills in some of the blanks"[39] (i.e., establishes and affects some of the necessary elements) for the operation of the other. Systematic empirical research, conducted in a manner that permits the observation of such interrelationships in a wide variety of decisional contexts, should reveal at least some of the basic enduring interactions of the two kinds of models. The identification

[39]I am indebted to Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for this suggestive phrase.

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of these fundamental relationships might be fraught with profound salutary implications for the social sciences.

The concretization and general confirmation of our initial hypotheses suggests that escalation has considerable utility as a technique of crisis management vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Strong, clearly superior strategic forces, the capacity to bring these forces to bear in a crisis, the resolve to do so, and the ability to communicate these matters to Soviet decision-makers have been crucial in the major crises of the nuclear era. Our assessments of the bases of crisis behavior indicate the significance of strategic operations and Soviet perceptions of strategic factors. The importance of tactical operations is also clear.

At this point we should make certain distinctions about escalation and crisis management. First, in influencing Soviet decision-makers, the more direct the crisis confrontation, the more credible escalation becomes. This hypothesis involves comparison of intensity levels. The relative lack of proxies or allies in the Berlin and Cuban crises is reflected in very high observed Soviet perceptions of felt-threat and U.S. resolve. Lesser levels of directness in Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Quemoy, Cyprus and Tonkin are generally associated with less threat and with lower Soviet assessment of U.S. resolve.

Second, strategic actions seem less credible when apparently directed at Soviet proxies or others. We cannot solve all crisis problems by escalation. Nevertheless, a limited goal of crisis management may be to keep the Soviets out of the crisis, to keep the crisis localized. To this end, strategic actions may prove relevant.

Crisis decision-making, of course, involves more than strategic perceptions. The effective utilization of strategic factors depends on our knowledge of other factors in crises. What other factors operate on the processes of decision-making in crisis situations?

Many of the following hypotheses are applications of basic pyscho-political processes. They are employed here as crisis descriptions, involving a comparison of the intensity levels of variables (or a general consideration of these) rather than changes in directionality.

Hypothesis: A perception of favorable allied response would reinforce decision-makers in the adoption of a given policy.

The United States has generally adopted strong crisis policies. We have also generally perceived a high level of support. In Korea, Lebanon and Cuba, U.S. decision-makers seemed to expect a stable, high degree of allied support. In Quemoy and Cyprus, we

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perceived increasing allied support. In Berlin and Tonkin, allied support seemed to us to be at least moderately high throughout.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have lately tended to perceive relatively poor allied support. In only one case, Berlin, did they perceive support to be increasing. In their view, their allies' support during the Cuban, Cyprus and Quemoy crises dropped appreciably. As the Sino-Soviet rift has developed, Soviet top-level foreign policymakers have, in times of crisis, faced a comparatively cohesive Western alliance without the advantage of significant reinforcement from their own allies. In the presence of a significant power disadvantage, this low reinforcement may well have affected Soviet crisis behavior.

On the other hand, the Soviets have tended to perceive a high level of neutral support for their crisis policies while the United States has generally perceived low or only moderate neutral support. The Soviets, in our assessments, viewed the neutrals as highly favorable in Suez, Quemoy and Berlin; moderately favorable increasing toward higher reinforcement in Korea; and highly favorable, stable or only marginally declining in the other cases reviewed. U.S. perception of neutral support was consistently low in Lebanon, Cyprus, Quemoy and Tonkin, and generally moderate in the other crises.

Hypothesis: A perception of favorable citizen response would reinforce decision-makers in the adoption of a given policy.

Soviet internal reinforcement has always been high. The reasons for and the implications of "totalitarian" consensus need no elaboration here. U.S. internal response perceptions have generally been high but *are* subject to fluctuations. In Quemoy, and Berlin, public reaction was low at first but rose quickly to high or moderately high support levels.

Hypothesis: Perception of a favorable "tide of history" would facilitate the adoption of strong crisis policies.

For the Soviets, this hypothesis is very well confirmed. The Soviet Union has perceived a favorable tide of history at the initiation of each crisis. In each case (save Suez and Tonkin), this perception changed downward as the crisis developed.

For the United States, in every case but Suez and Korea, the initial perceptions of the dynamic of world events began low and rose to moderate.

Morever, as crises develop, certain changes occur in decision-making "styles." To use strategic forces effectively and to un-

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derstand crises in general requires some knowledge about these changes.

Hypothesis: Conditions of high or increasing threat affect the receptivity of decision-makers to messages from opponents in crises.

For the Soviets, in five of the eight cases, moderate to high assessed levels of threat are associated with high assessed receptivity to U.S. communications. The hypothesis does not apply in Suez, Tonkin and Cyprus.

For the United States, too, the hypothesis is generally confirmed, but here with reference to perceptual change. In Suez, Berlin and Quemoy, increasing threat and increasing or stable high receptivity were observed. In Cuba, high threat and high receptivity seemed to be manifest. In Lebanon and Korea, decline in felt-threat was associated with decreases in the decision-makers' assessed receptivity. Tonkin and Cyprus are disconfirmatory cases.

Hypothesis: As threat increases, centralization of decision-making increases.

Centralization of decision-making in Washington and Moscow, during international crises, is becoming a fact of political life. It is not, however, a function of threat experienced in crisis. Centralization seems to occur in most of these crises, no matter what changes take place in threat perception. Centralization of decision-making in crises is a ubiquitous finding in our study. This may be important to decision-makers in planning strategic operations for crisis management. The hypothesis as stated, however, is disconfirmed.

Hypothesis: Changes in crisis policy will be more easily accomplished if these changes can be rationalized within extant political-military doctrines.

Perceived or stated stability of operating doctrine has generally characterized both the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations have repeatedly attempted to relate their crisis actions to previously enunciated policy statements. We estimated that for both nations perceived or stated stability of doctrine obtained in at least five of the eight examined crises.

Changes in decisional "style" during crises appear to have some relevance for strategic thinking and planning. If felt-threat is ordinarily associated with an influencee's receptivity to communication, and strategic actions ordinarily induce or reinforce threat—then strategic perceptions (and operations to effect these) may be a useful indicator in timing crisis communications.

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As centralization of crisis decision-making takes place, strategic action must be communicated to central decision-makers. In other words, the targets of influence become decision-makers at the center. Actions and words must be couched in terms most understandable and persuasive to these men.

A Suggestion for Future Research

The major topics touched on in this paper—the interrelationships between alternative models of human decision-making, the decisional subprocess of prediction, the assumptions of deterrence as a predictive doctrine, some characteristics of crisis decision-making—all seem to be of continuing importance in contemporary theory and policymaking. This study, like much current research, treats of these matters in an exploratory fashion. If the importance of these subjects suggests the desirability of further investigation, some brief mention of alternative research techniques for such studies may be appropriate.

This research employed an historical-analytic approach to the study of recent crises, in which a model of crisis decision-making was developed and tested. The model, though crude, did seem to represent some decision processes plausibly and was sensitive enough to permit observation of the effects of some gross variations in policy. Future studies might well seek to test our findings but, hopefully, will utilize a more comprehensive, sensitive, quantitative model. If indexes are used, these too should be improvements on those discussed in this paper—moving in the direction of stricter indexes with more explicit weighting schemes. It is to be expected that more rigorous content analyses will be used in current and future studies.

But there are some important limitations to historical-analytic research on crisis decision-making. First, international political crises are one-time events. Accordingly, because they do not recur in exactly the same way, comparison of alternative strategic postures, actions and communications in identical situations is impossible. Second, the small number of real crises (cases) limits the reliability of the findings drawn from comparing them. Predictability, therefore, is hazardous.

These limitations may be overcome and predictability improved by supplementing historical research with other approaches. Political gaming or experimentation, for example, permits re-experiencing, i.e., re-playing, historical crises and

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facilitates the experiencing of hypothetical crises. *The effectiveness and feasibility of alternative postures, actions and messages can thereby be repeatedly evaluated under controlled conditions.* Then too, the use of the experimental technique allows researchers to elaborate a great number of crisis situations—thus increasing the statistical significance and reliability of findings.

Finally, the operational sophistication of experimental or simulation models can be considerably greater than in the case of models developed for historical analysis, because data-gathering problems of access and security are substantially reduced in the experimental method. Thus, for example, in this study we were able to show that Soviet perceptions of increased U.S. preparedness have been regularly associated with Soviet felt-threat and policy changes. Using gaming methods, one might be able to determine more precisely the optimal "mix" of U.S. force structures, operations and communications for (crisis) influence. Such an increase in precision should be possible for many of the major findings of contemporary research and should permit increments in both theoretical and applied enterprises.

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SUKARNO'S FALL

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ON March 12, 1967 Indonesia's Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (*Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara* - MPRS), the country's highest policymaking body, revoked the chief executive authority given to President Sukarno and appointed General Suharto as Acting President until the appointment of a regular President can be made by a future Assembly. The general elections for the new People's Consultative Assembly are now slated to be held not later than July 5, 1968.

The Provisional Assembly declared that Sukarno had failed both in his "constitutional responsibility" toward the MPRS and in the "execution" of the directions and decisions it had given him. It also noted that Sukarno had not given a "clear account" of his policy with respect to Indonesia's "economy and moral decline," and, more than this, that "there are indications" that Sukarno had carried out a policy which "indirectly benefited" the abortive communist coup of September 30, 1965 in Java, and had "protected its leaders."[1] The same decision barred Sukarno from engaging in "political activities" until after the forthcoming general elections and—perhaps an ominous sign for the fallen President's future—stipulated that "further legal procedures" with regard to "the person of Dr. Ir. Sukarno" be conducted "in accordance with due process of law" but at "the discretion of the Acting President."

In subsequent months, as Indonesians were becoming accustomed to the concept of Sukarno *sadja* ("just Sukarno"), the titles and honorifics bestowed on the former President were dropped or taken away from him: even the Indonesian boy scout association revoked his title *Pramuka Agung* (Great Scout).

Still, uneasiness over Sukarno's remaining powers—and his lingering charisma—continues. Information Minister B. M. Diah

[1]Decision No. 33/MPRS/1967, Information Ministry Release, Djakarta, March 14, 1967. On the September 30, 1965 coup see Uri Ra'anan, "The Coup that Failed," *Problems of Communism,* March 1966, pp. 37-43; Arthur Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *The China Quarterly,* January-March 1966, pp. 144-167; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Gestapu' in Indonesia," ORBIS, Summer 1966, pp. 458-487.

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has declared that while Sukarno "is formally no longer President" it is "up to anyone concerned how to address him," but the Indonesian journalists' association has instructed its members and "all newsmen" that "Dr. Sukarno" is "no longer to be referred to as 'president.' "[2] The failure of the MPRS to use the formal term "dismissed" with reference to Sukarno in its March 12 decision, despite strong pressure by anti-Sukarno student activists to do so, has been widely commented upon as a typical Indonesian resort to subtleties of verbal ambiguity and compromise in the interests of preserving harmony. ("If it is dismissal I will be unable to cope with the security situation," Suharto reportedly told the students.) On the night of March 12, MPRS Chairman General A. H. Nasution, Indonesia's most respected soldier, also refused to clarify for foreign reporters whether Sukarno was still President in name, pleading "You must understand the Indonesian way of thinking."[3]

Indeed, some legal purists may well argue that, technically, only Sukarno's "mandate" or authority given him by the MPRS has been withdrawn and transferred to Suharto as "acting" chief executive, and that there has been neither a formal revocation of his title nor an actual and explicit removal of Sukarno from the Presidential office.[4] In practice, however, there is little doubt that all customarily defined Presidential powers, such as receiving new foreign envoys and appointing top national officials, now are in

[2] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* March 17 and 22, 1967.

[3] Appeals to understand the "psychological" aspects of the MPRS decision to depose Sukarno have been frequent. (See, e.g., the explanation of student leader and MPRS deputy Surjadi, Antara dispatch, Djakarta, March 16, 1967.) Suharto himself, in a radio broadcast from Djakarta on March 13, explaining Sukarno's fall, also referred to the "psychological situation" in the country which made it "very wise" that Sukarno "no longer occupies the post of President." He proceeded, however, to obscure Sukarno's present constitutional position by saying: "In this light allow me to request the understanding and the sincerity of the people that for the safety of the Cabinet's activities we temporarily treat Bung Karno as a *president without powers,* as a president without a state, political and government power." At the end of May, thirty members of the Indonesian Parliament protested Suharto's Presidential Decision No. 62/1967 which was alleged to give Sukarno the continuing right to wear the President's uniform and emblems. Decision No. 62/1967 was described by the deputies as merely signifying the "inactivation" of Sukarno as President. (*Antara Daily News Bulletin,* March 16 and May 31, 1967. Emphasis added.)

[4] In an Explanatory Memorandum attached to some—but not to all—published versions of Decision No. 35/MPRS/1967, it is stated that "based on this provision President Sukarno herewith is replaced by General Soeharto as Acting President of the Republic of Indonesia." But this replacement is referred to in the context of the "state governing authority" granted by the MPRS to Sukarno, and the question remains—particularly since Suharto is but "Acting" President—whether Sukarno legally retains the title of President and, indeed, still holds the office, if in name only.

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Suharto's hands, although Sukarno retains extra-constitutional influence that can hardly be minimized. The process of Sukarno's loss of formal authority over the past two years and some of its implications for Indonesia's political future are the concern of the following pages.

There are three fairly well defined stages in Sukarno's gradual but accelerating slide into ignominy. The first is the period from September 30, 1965 (the date of the abortive communist coup) to March 11, 1966, when Sukarno ordered Suharto "to take all steps" to re-establish domestic security and "safeguard" the President's "personal safety and authority." The second phase begins with Suharto's assumption of this special security mandate and ends with Sukarno's statement of January 10, 1967 to the MPRS—constituting a "supplement" to an earlier Presidential report delivered June 22, 1966—entitled *Nawaksara* (Nine Points). The third phase dates from the issuance of the *Nawaksara* supplement to the MPRS decision of March 12, 1967 revoking Sukarno's Presidential powers.

In reviewing these stages one is tempted to suggest that as late as the beginning of 1967 Sukarno could perhaps have weathered the mounting political storm and need not have suffered the indignity of a fall from power—whatever the truth in rumors of a calculated, long-term strategy developed by Suharto and his associates in October 1965 and designed gradually to bring the President down.[5] That a master politician like Sukarno declined to act differently, thus provoking the conflict between himself and his opponents to an open and, seemingly, most, "un-Indonesian" climax, has been a surprise to many observers. Nevertheless, as will be developed in the conclusion of this paper, his tactics were not out of keeping with his known political style.

I

The chief characteristic of the first phase in Sukarno's fall was his persistent effort to safeguard the important role of the radical Left, and the communist ideology, in Indonesia's domestic

[5]Compare O. G. Roeder, "Bung's Death Wish?," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 23, 1967, p. 536: "Even staunch supporters of Sukarno find his behaviour during the last 18 months difficult to explain. There were plenty of opportunities to reassert himself after *Gestapu*. Even last summer he could have improved his position if he had made a sober and realistic analysis of the situation and evolved a new approach. Certainly the armed forces and many politicians have continuously offered him an easy path back. But with his incredible subbornness, Sukarno is his own worst enemy and enthusiastically engineered his own political suicide."

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development and foreign policy. This attempt was all the more remarkable because it was made in the midst of a violent popular rejection of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* - PKI). The PKI was held to have been closely involved in, if not largely responsible for, the September 30 coup, called *Gestapu* by acrostic-minded Indonesians (from the Indonesian words *Gerakan Tiga Puluh September* or Thirty September Movement). Perhaps as many as a million PKI members, sympathizers and innocents may have fallen victim to the fury of the anti-*Gestapu* pogrom, and it would appear that this terror campaign also saw the settling of many personal scores and private vendettas wholly unconnected with *Gestapu* politics.[6]

Sukarno, in speeches and impromptu exhortations, warned Indonesia not to swerve "to the right," insisted that the nation's revolution was a "left revolution," and reiterated over and over the necessity of preserving *nasakom* (his acrostic referring to the unity of the Indonesian concepts *nasionalisme, agama* [religion], and *komunisme*). While mass hysteria was building up, he accused anti-communist groups of making the Left "victims of false slander." He later chastised Moslems (many of whom had played an important role in the pogrom) for violating Islamic teaching by not burying the bodies of communists in East and Central Java, and ultimately threatened that he would order the Army to "shoot to kill" in order to stop further demonstrations or acts of violence against the communists. He charged that the United States had tried to bribe him to spread "Western ideas" in Indonesia and urged a restoration of friendly relations between Indonesia and Communist China (which, reportedly, had secretly supplied weapons to communist participants in the *Gestapu* affair). As late as February 14, 1966, Sukarno praised the PKI as "the only political party in Indonesia which rendered considerable contribution and sacrifice for the independence of the country." Somewhat earlier Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito Kusumo-

[6]The anti-communist pogrom far exceeded the limits of traditional animosities in Indonesian society, such as those between orthodox Muslims (called *santri*) and communists. To contend that "the perimeters of hatred" in the pogrom "fairly precisely" embraced a *santri*-communist antithesis (B. R. O'G. Anderson in *The China Quarterly,* October-December 1966, p. 142) is to ignore, for example, the events in largely non-Muslim Bali, where some of the bloodiest and most extensive massacres of communists and sympathizers took place. (See Donald Kirk, "Bali Exorcises an Evil Spirit," *The Reporter,* December 15, 1966, pp. 42-43 and Horace Sutton, "Indonesia's Night of Terror," *Saturday Review,* February 4, 1967, pp. 29-30.) The anti-communist reaction included widely divergent ethnic and religious groups and must in large part be explained by a mounting, broad-based popular resentment of the PKI's aggressive drive to power in the two preceding years.

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widagdo had said that the "Djakarta-Pnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis" should be "maintained by all sides."[7]

The President's policy, whatever its intent, infuriated broad segments of society that had long been restive under the PKI's steady ascent to power in the years before *Gestapu*, and heightened suspicions that in attempting to protect the PKI Sukarno was in fact protecting himself because of his own (widely reported) involvement in the coup. Because his alleged role was eventually to become an important factor in mobilizing mass agitation to oust Sukarno from office, it should be touched upon briefly.

By the end of 1965, in such intransigent anti-Sukarno student organizations as the 10,000-member Indonesian Student Action Command (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* - KAMI); in *Ansor*, the militantly anti-communist youth faction of the large Moslem Scholars (*Nahdatul Ulama* - NU) Party; among some military commanders, and in journalistic circles—to name but a few groups—Sukarno's complicity in *Gestapu* had virtually become an article of faith. At first very little hard evidence seemed available. But in the course of alleged confessions by Indonesian Air Force personnel involved in the coup, and as a result of testimony in the trials of former officials, Central Banking Minister Jusuf Muda Dalam, Foreign Minister Subandrio, and Air Force Commander Vice Marshal Omar Dhani, in the fall of 1966, the public became more and more certain that Sukarno not only had known of a planned PKI coup but had dismissed warnings about it and later had sought to protect the participants.

In February 1967 the Indonesian Parliament requested the MPRS to investigate fully Sukarno's involvement. At the same time, the Attorney General's office and the Supreme Court of Indonesia were proceeding with similar investigations. The Supreme Court's report, released on February 13, concluded that the President had had prior knowledge of the plot, had known its purpose was to seize the government by force, and had approved its final implementation. Using chiefly the Attorney General's and the Supreme Court's findings, General Suharto, on March 7, gave the MPRS a full account of the allegations.

Before coming to the substance of Suharto's report it should be noted that General Nasution, at a press conference in Djakarta on

[7] *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, November 2, 10, 29, December 14, 1965; *New York Times*, October 24, 25, November 7, 1965; Reuter's dispatches, Djakarta, December 18, 1965 and February 14, 1966.

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January 27, 1967, had already accused Sukarno of having followed the advice of the PKI and *Gestapu* leaders in appointing the left-leaning Major General Pranoto Reksosamudra as Army Chief of Staff on October 1, 1965, to replace General Ahmad Yani who had been killed by *Gestapu* terrorists the previous night. Sukarno's orders to the armed forces on October 1 to remain at their posts and not to make any movement, Nasution continued, would have halted the operations of anti-*Gestapu* forces under General Suharto, which were even then engaged in quelling the coup. On February 13, 1967, in a statement broadcast over Radio Djakarta, Nasution declared that PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit, shortly before the coup, had confided his coup plans to Army Brigadier General R. H. Sugandhi, whom he had tried to enlist in the plot. Sugandhi had informed Sukarno of the impending coup. But the President, said Nasution, had turned Sugandhi aside with a warning not to give in to "this Communist phobia."[8]

In his full report to the MPRS on March 7 Suharto referred to Sukarno's reaction to Sugandhi's warning. He also noted that on the day of the coup, in response to a report about the killing of top Army generals by *Gestapu* and PKI terrorists, the President had casually remarked that "such things can happen in a revolution." He pointed out that on October 2 the President was still giving orders to one of the leading *Gestapu* figures, Army Brigadier Supardjo, although the day before, with the failure of the coup, Suharto and the "provisional leadership of the Army" had already branded those involved in the September 30 affair as traitors and had dishonorably discharged the military personnel involved. The report dwelt on the curious circumstance that Sukarno, at the height of the coup, went to Halim Air Force Base on the outskirts of Djakarta, where some of the principal plotters, including PKI Chairman Aidit and Commander Dhani, had gathered. But, as Suharto indicated, all this evidence was at best circumstantial."We cannot mark Bung Karno down as a direct instigator or the mastermind or even an important figure of *Gestapu*/PKI," he declared, "unless there are indeed still facts we haven't been able to find until this very day."[9]

[8]*The Straits Times* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), January 28 and February 14, 1967, and Radio Djakarta, Domestic Service, February 13, 1967. That Sukarno knew in advance of the coup plot and approved it, but was not aware of all its ramifications, is also the contention of John Hughes in *Indonesian Upheaval* (New York: David McKay, 1967).

[9]"General Soeharto's Speech before MPRS," *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* undated, special issue, part II, p. 12. (This special issue contains the complete text of Suharto's March 7, 1967 address in two parts.)

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The gravamen of the charge against Sukarno, as Suharto developed it, was the extent to which the President had created the political climate in which the PKI grew so rapidly, and had sought to preserve that climate even after the coup. As the PKI became more and more aggressive "President Sukarno had on one side always taken decisions in favor of the PKI and on the other always discredited the organs of the state and government apparatus."[10] Suharto emphasized in this connection the protection afforded the PKI by such official doctrines as Sukarno's *nasakom* and the President's support for the PKI's concept of an independent "people's volunteer" military force which would in effect be under communist influence and neutralize the power of the Army. Above all he stressed the extent to which Sukarno, after the coup, had tried in speeches and public exhortations to safeguard the role of communism in the nation's development, even though denouncing the coup itself, and how he had failed to take legal steps against known *Gestapu* leaders such as Dhani and Supardjo. Though one may speculate that Suharto's accusation was purposely restrained, for fear of bringing the simmering conflict with Sukarno's supporters to the boiling point, the fact remains that his report, by stressing Sukarno's policy failures and leaving the question of the President's complicity in *Gestapu* essentially unresolved, helped to lay the basis for the revocation of Sukarno's powers.

Aside from creating suspicion that he was trying to protect himself, Sukarno's praise of the PKI and repeated assertions that communism "cannot be crushed" in Indonesia (e.g., in addresses on December 12 and 21, 1965) began to polarize political sentiment and to endanger his status. Among the firebrands of KAMI and its associated "action commands" of high school students, academicians and women; among elements of anti-communist and Army-dominated trade unions; among the provincial, religiously-orthodox Muslim aristocracy of landed wealth and small trade, and among many other groups, hostility to the Sukarno regime was at first focused primarily on the President's ministers and close associates (Subandrio, for example, came to be described as *Durno,* the evil adviser figure in the Javanese *wayang* or shadow play). But increasingly the President himself became the target of this hostility. Street fighting and other minor altercations between hostile student groups alternated with seemingly

[10] *Ibid.*, part II, p. 15.

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ceaseless demonstrations and with a pamphlet and grafitto war, particularly in Djakarta and other towns in Java, in which increasingly vehement accusations were hurled at Subandrio, Dhani and Sukarno. The latter appeared undaunted, however, not least because he succeeded at first in mobilizing his own following in the streets.

Left-wing student groups—the Indonesian Students' Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia* - *Germindo*), the National Indonesian Students' Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia* - GMNI), the student association of the left-wing *Universitas* (University) *Bung Karno* in Djakarta, together numbering about 4,000—soon interlocked with other pro-Sukarno fronts. Many of the latter drew their membership from the left wing of the sprawling National Indonesian Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* - PNI), with which Sukarno has often been identified. This left wing, led by former Premier Ali Sastroamijojo and Surachman, adopted the first letters in the names of its leaders, ASU, as its informal slogan, but made the resulting acrostic stand for *Anak Sukarno* (children of Sukarno). Even before the September 30 coup there had been serious dissension within the PNI over the party's cooperation with the communists; after the coup some party leaders urged that the PNI purge itself. But this only solidified the opposition ASU element, which openly turned to Sukarno for leadership.[11] Student and ASU activists, with the undoubted behind-the-scenes support of the President, took the initiative in forming such federated mass organizations as the Sukarno Front (*Barisan Sukarno*), the "I support Sukarno" organization (*Aku Pendukung Sukarno*), and other "people's action front" groups. Eventually all these groups were proscribed on the grounds that they were being used by the underground PKI remnant. Even so, they initially provided the President with a certain amount of political leverage against his opposition.

Another reason why Sukarno may have felt emboldened to insist on safeguarding the radical Left in the first few months after *Gestapu* was the relative caution evidenced by the Army leadership. To be sure, some Army units, overtly or covertly, had taken

[11]On this internal PNI conflict see the publications by its executive committee *DPP PNI Ali-Surachman tidak dapat meluskan diri; analisa dan kesimpulan mengenai terlibatnja Ali-Surachman dalam Gestapu/PKI* (Djakarta: Departmen Pen-Prop, Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, PNI, 1965) and *Bersihkan tubuh PNI/FM dari oknum kontrev Gestapu/PKI* (Djakarta: P.N.I., 1965).

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part in the frightful anti-PKI pogrom, and a ruthless weeding out of pro-*Gestapu* elements among field and general grade officers had begun even before the last pockets of resistance in Central Java had been wiped out by the middle of October 1965. But the extent to which some commanding officers had apparently been won over to the plot, and the lingering influence of the PKI among lower naval personnel and in the Marine Corps (*Korps Komando Operasi* - KKO), may well have given Suharto and Nasution pause in their purge of the Army. Reportedly, Army sources in November 1965 were still uncertain of "several battalions" in the Central Java area.[12] Clearly Army leaders felt disinclined to drive their differences with Sukarno to a collision at this point. On November 30, 1965, in a ceremony marking the KKO's twentieth anniversary, Nasution almost managed to sound like Sukarno, declaring that the Indonesian Revolution remained "leftist," "anti-feudal" and "anti-*nekolim*."[13] He excoriated the "neo-colonialists" and "neo-imperialists" who, after the Army had crushed the *Gestapu* affair, had made "slanderous and insulting statements" to the effect that the Indonesian armed forces were "planning to deviate the national revolution to the right."

It is evident that Nasution was seeking here to undercut Sukarno's strength and attempting to foil the President's tactic of making himself the embodiment of the "left" and "progressive" direction in the nation at a time when an anti-communist reaction was running strong. But the fact that Nasution felt compelled to make such statements at all suggests uncertainty on the part of the Army leadership. For that matter, the same may be said of the Army's avowed support in this period for Sukarno's (and the PKI's) top priority project of *ganjang Malaysia* (crush Malaysia). Indonesia's "confrontation" of Malaysia had started toward the end of 1963 and the PKI had immediately taken leadership of it. It was supported by the President and, somewhat equivocally, by the Army. Through the confrontation campaign Djakarta had drifted ever closer to Peking's policies and the PKI had steadily gained in domestic political influence.[14]

It was expected that the anti-communist reaction following the *Gestapu* failure would include a repudiation of the confrontation

[12]*The Straits Times*, November 4, 1965.
[13]*Antara Daily News Bulletin*, December 12, 1965. *Nekolim*, an acronym coined by Sukarno, refers to *neo-kolonialisme, kolonialisme* and *imperialisme*, a demonological triad usually ascribed to the West.
[14]For details see Justus M. van der Kroef, *Communism in Malaysia and Singapore. A Contemporary Survey* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), Chapter VI.

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campaign. But this was not to be the case until the middle of 1966, when Sukarno's powers had already been seriously clipped. Meanwhile, during the closing weeks of 1965 and the early months of 1966, top Indonesian officials from Sukarno and Subandrio on down repeatedly emphasized that "confrontation" was continuing. Indeed, Indonesian military and paramilitary marauding ventures in Sarawak and along the southwestern coast of Malaya went on. In April 1966, the chief of the Indonesian Naval Information Section declared that "fierce fighting" in the Sarawak border region was "proof that our confrontation against the *nekolim* project of Malaysia is not an empty slogan." About the same time General Suharto, who by then was emerging as the nation's strong man, reiterated that Indonesia was "compelled" to continue the "confrontation."[15] In October 1965, a "spokesman" for Nasution had asserted that the "confrontation" against the *nekolim,* including Malaysia, was being stepped up and that "there will be no compromise with neo-colonialist Malaysia."

Though hard evidence about the matter is unlikely to be forthcoming, all this may have been part of a carefully thought out "Fabian" tactic by principal Army leaders like Suharto and Nasution, the ultimate objective of which was to break Sukarno's power without plunging the country into civil war. By proclaiming themselves still in alliance with the "leftist" course of the Indonesian Revolution and by backing the anti-Malaysian confrontation (a campaign which also justified the Army's retention of military emergency powers), Army leaders could quietly continue to purge their own ranks while at the same time deluding Sukarno that he had or was about to overcome his political opposition and could shortly revive his particular conception of Indonesia's "permanent revolution" and its *nasakom* dynamic. Army leaders were also shrewd enough to encourage, or at least tolerate, the radical anti-Sukarno and anti-communist reaction. The seemingly endless revelations of communist preparation for and involvement in the coup were widely disseminated by the Army's information services. For good measure the Army periodically even broke up some exuberant anti-Sukarno student demonstrations. Thus, in a sense, Army leaders too fostered the steady polarization of public opinion with respect to Sukarno while making their own political position as safe as possible. These

[15]Radio Djakarta, Domestic Indonesian Service, April 6, 1966; *Armed Forces Daily Mail* (Djakarta), April 10, 1966.

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gradualist tactics to accomplish Sukarno's fall reportedly were referred to as *Operasi Lembing Mas* (Operation Golden Spear) by the top Army commanders and associates of Suharto who were involved.

Whether Sukarno was wholly unaware of the "Golden Spear" being pointed at him may be doubted. But apparently, for various personal and political reasons, he felt compelled to seek a new justification of his policies. After nearly a quarter-century as the one great leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement, he was convinced of the inevitable historical victory of his brand of revolutionary romanticism. Perhaps he had acquired a touch of megalomania or something of that illusion of invulnerability which so often has preceded a dictator's misstep. In any event, in February 1966, he abruptly announced his decision to reshuffle his cabinet, in the apparent belief that his political strength was sufficient still to appeal over the heads of Army leaders and other opponents to the mass of Indonesians, especially in the Central and East Java provinces. As for the fighting mobs of students, he had student mobs of his own. The Army, he calculated rightly, would never oppose him to the extent of tolerating a civil war. The left wing of the PNI, the thousands who owed their jobs to PKI influence and who had acknowledged the considerable patronage powers once held by the PKI, the KKO and much of the Air Force officer corps, the remnant of the radical Left in the trade union and peasants' movements—all these he estimated were and would be with him. The remaining major political party, NU, despite its anti-Sukarno youth movement, would, as so often in the past, opportunistically side with the winning faction, just as before *Gestapu* it had readily cooperated with the PKI.

Finally, Sukarno may have been influenced by a reported new secret agreement concluded between Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, either in December 1965 or January 1966.[16] The document of this agreement, which was discovered by student demonstrators as they were sacking the Foreign Ministry early in March 1966 and turned over to the Army, allegedly disclosed Peking's support for Sukarno's proposed conference of the "New Emerging Forces" (the Djakarta-Peking axis' answer to the UN), in return for the assassination of anti-communist Army generals (among them

[16]*The Straits Times,* March 16, 1966 and *New York Times,* March 16, 1966.

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Nasution) who had not been massacred by *Gestapu* terrorists on the night of September 30. Sukarno may have read into Peking's support for his "New Emerging Forces" concept an expression of confidence and sympathy that might be translated into more tangible assistance in the event his regime was endangered by the Army.

And so, on February 21, 1966—despite the continuing student unrest in Djakarta, Bandung and elsewhere in West Java which the Army seemed only sporadically able or willing to keep in hand—Sukarno suddenly announced a reshuffling of his cabinet. His chief antagonist, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Nasution, was dropped as Minister of Defense. Three major PKI leaders, including Chairman Aidit who had been killed in the aftermath of *Gestapu,* were also dropped *pro forma* from their minor posts. But all the major PKI sympathizers in public life, some of whom were widely regarded as having been involved in the September 30 affair, returned to office. Among these were Foreign Minister Subandrio, Central Bank Affairs Minister Jusuf Muda Dalam, Basic Education Minister Sumardjo, Aircraft Industry Minister Air Vice Marshal Omar Dhani, and Minister of State Oei Tjoe Tat (of Chinese descent and generally regarded as "Peking's man" in the cabinet). Included also were unsavory figures like Lieutenant Colonel Mohamad Sjafei ("Minister for Security Affairs seconded to the President"), who was in grave disrepute in the Army because of his controlling interest in Djakarta's vice rings.

Shortly before announcing the cabinet changes, Sukarno had again warned a delegation of student leaders against "rightist trends" and had chided some student groups for being influenced by *nekolim*. At the cabinet's installation on February 24 the President felt free to use the current communist jargon of phased revolutionary development. The Indonesian Revolution, he said, was in the stage of "national democracy" during which the task was to "exterminate" feudalism and imperialism. The second stage for which the nation was now heading would be that of "socialism." The present task of the cabinet would be to intensify the struggle against imperialism, especially against Malaysia. Anticipating criticism, Sukarno noted that some had already labeled the new cabinet a "*Gestapu* cabinet"; but he revealed that, upon being asked "Are you a Communist?," each new minister had replied "No." "Do not try to push me," he concluded his installation

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speech truculently, "I am not a leader who can be pushed. I know my job and I know what I have to do."[17]

Yet as Sukarno was thus defying his critics, street agitation against him was intensifying. Students and youths even penetrated deep into the security perimeter of the Presidential palace in Djakarta, some hurling rocks at guards, others engaging in fist fights with KKO elements, still others sacking the state secretariat building on the palace grounds. The guards' rifle fire must have been clearly audible in the President's chambers, and on the day before the cabinet's installation Sukarno might have been able to see irate students, holding aloft the bloodstained shirts of comrades wounded by soldiers as they faced the Presidential guard standing with fixed bayonets only a few feet away.

Sukarno added fuel to the flames. On February 26 he banned KAMI, after the student group had led through the capital a mass funeral procession for three students killed in previous demonstrations. At the same time he banned gatherings of more than five students throughout the country. The KAMI ban was simply ignored, but a number of political leaders, particularly in the right wing of the PNI, and in the NU, apparently became fearful that their own organizations might suffer a similar fate if Sukarno proclaimed an "emergency" condition as a result of the continuing student agitation. Moreover, the removal of Nasution, and his replacement by the pliable Major General Sarbini, far down on the seniority list, had served to solidify anti-Sukarno sentiment in the Army leadership and stung even some Sukarno sympathizers into outrage and a readiness to act against him.

Suharto, who had been named Minister and Commander of the Army in the reshuffled cabinet, was largely responsible for the maintenance of security in the capital. But the tactics of the student demonstrators had a way of immobilizing him, for anti-Sukarno agitation now took on the character of a children's crusade. On March 3, for example, thousands of high school teen-agers occupied the entrance hall of the Ministry of Basic Education because it was a "nest of *Gestapu*/PKI." Two days later some 3,000 school children, many not even in their teens, attempted to invade the offices of Foreign Minister Subandrio and screamed insults at him and at Sukarno; on the same day thousands of students barricaded themselves inside the campus of

[17] *Sinar Harapan* (Djakarta), February 25, 1966; *Armed Forces Daily Mail*, February 25, 1966; *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, February 18, 1966.

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the University of Djakarta, in open defiance of Sukarno's ban against student congregations. All over the capital, and in other major West Java cities, the wall scribbling and impromptu student demonstrations and mass meetings against Sukarno were reaching a new crescendo. The Army was ordered to disperse the demonstrations without inflicting casualties. In numerous instances Army commanders in effect looked tolerantly on as KAMI activists continued their marches, protested Nasution's dismissal, burned Subandrio in effigy, or attempted to occupy government offices. Leaders of major parties, pressured by their respective youth groups, began urging the President to rescind the ban on KAMI even as Sukarno was vainly attempting to coordinate his own student followers in a new "progressive" students union.

However, the President's followers, kept under continuous surveillance by local Army and police units, seemed unable to muster an effective tactic against the rampaging youths. On March 10 Sukarno summoned the leaders of the principal parties to the palace for what was described as a "heart to heart talk" but which, according to participants, soon turned into an angry Presidential harangue. Although the party heads were persuaded to issue a short statement expressing formal disapproval of the student demonstrations, within hours most of them (the notable exception being the PNI left-wing leaders) had repudiated the statement.

The next day, as Sukarno was addressing his cabinet, an aide reportedly informed him that "soldiers of an unidentified unit" were approaching the palace. Whether the report was true—if so, the Army apparently had decided on a final confrontation—is not clear, but pleading the pressure of an "important development" Sukarno at once left the cabinet meeting, flying by helicopter to his Bogor hill-resort palace fifty miles away. There, some hours later, three Army commanders closely associated with Suharto (among them the Djakarta garrison commander, General Amir Mahmud), apparently informed him that (1) there seemed to be no way to deflate the ballooning student agitation, and (2) unless the Army was given special security powers the President's constitutional role and personal safety could no longer be guaranteed. Assured that he would keep his titles and head-of-state position, Sukarno agreed to this proposal, consenting also to still another cabinet revision and to a formal ban on the PKI. The latter two demands were probably represented as the minimum for which

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KAMI was prepared to settle—at least for the moment. Sukarno appears to have been under no illusion about the momentum KAMI was trying to build against him in the streets of the capital. To a meeting of territorial commanders and cabinet officials shortly after the generals' visit to Bogor, he is reported to have observed that "there are 400 ways to topple a government, among them the employment of children to block streets and roads—as stated in a CIA handbook" which he said he had been studying.[18]

Late in the afternoon of March 11, probably while still in Bogor Palace, Sukarno signed a decree formalizing his new rapprochement with the Army: General Suharto was given power "to take all steps" to guarantee domestic tranquillity and "safeguard the personal safety and the authority" of the President and "Great Leader of the Revolution." Although on February 17 Sukarno was reported to have "confirmed" a public remark attributed to Subandrio that the PKI had been "dissolved" within the "framework" of an "integral" post-*Gestapu* "solution," no official decree promulgating a PKI ban had ever been issued. Suharto's first act as security head, therefore, was to sign a Presidential decree, dated March 12, 1966, banning and dissolving the PKI throughout the country. The proscription was called necessary because "lately" the country had been experiencing "subversive actions" by the "remnants" of the "counter-revolutionary forces" of the *Gestapu* movement and the PKI.

The March 11 transfer of power to Suharto was a fateful turn in Sukarno's career. Widespread resentment over his February 21 cabinet change and the accumulating effect of the student demonstrations certainly were major causes of this first crucial step in the President's downfall. But there were others. The Army did little to quell the anti-Sukarno outbursts—especially after the discovery of the secret Subandrio-Chen Yi agreement revealed a new plan to assassinate top Army commanders in return for continuing Communist Chinese support. In face of the Army's not too well concealed collusion with KAMI and other anti-Sukarno leaders, the ASU and pro-Sukarno student groups were largely, though not entirely, neutralized. Indeed, the latter groups' very readiness to lead occasional counter-demonstrations, particularly in Surabaya, provoked clashes with KAMI or its allies which the

[18]Cited in O. E. Roeder, "The Ides of March," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 24, 1966, p. 550. For one perceptive analysis of the pressures on Sukarno in this connection see Tarzie Vittachi, *The Fall of Sukarno* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 169-174.

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Army could cite as evidence of a rapidly deteriorating security situation that required the granting to Suharto of new security authority to "safeguard" the President. Outside Djakarta, where KKO members periodically clashed in street fights with Army personnel and students, and where pro-Sukarno papers and publications in Central and East Java attempted with but small success to promote anti-Suharto sentiment, the Army could point to a similar danger to buttress its claim for new security powers. Under these conditions the mass following that Sukarno had counted on never materialized.

Finally, mounting dissatisfaction with food shortages, skyrocketing prices and the chronic inability of the government to improve the average wage earner's lot undoubtedly contributed to the mood supporting a drastic political change. Early in January 1966, KAMI announced a boycott of all university lectures until the government retracted recent price boosts in gasoline, kerosene (widely used as fuel for cooking and for lighting), postal rates and train fares. The campaign bore small fruit; however, it improved the anti-Sukarno students' image. It helped to identify the little man's problems with the student demonstrators at a time when Djakarta's grandiose, costly, Sukarno-inspired monuments were increasingly being seen as symbols not of national greatness but of government waste and incompetence.

II

As Sukarno had anticipated, the transfer of security powers to Suharto only increased the rioting students' political appetites. Failure of the President promptly to name a new cabinet free from communist sympathizers led to a new student "passive disobedience" campaign. Also several government buildings were occupied by youthful mobs, and students "arrested" certain cabinet ministers, including the Lenin Prize-winner, Coordinating Minister of Education Prijono, and Central Banking Minister Jusuf Muda Dalam. The latter soon found himself on trial. Reportedly, Suharto transferred the arrested ministers from the students to the Army's "protective custody," and shortly issued orders for the arrest of a number of other ministers. Among these were Basic Education Minister Sumardjo and Foreign Minister Subandrio, who had been staying (or hiding) in the President's Merdeka Palace in Djakarta. Suharto let it be known that he had acted upon receiving reports that KAMI had threatened to behead

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the ministers and impale their heads on the spiked wall of Merdeka Palace.

In the midst of this confusion Sukarno, on March 16, took to the radio to assert that he was still in full control of the government and had not in fact delegated any authority. The predictable result was that KAMI staged a mass demonstration the next day, storming into and temporarily occupying two government ministries. Mixed with cries for a new cabinet "free from communists," other slogans were now beginning to be heard—demanding the ouster of Sukarno as President.

Agitation reached a new high on March 23 when Djakarta garrison troops reportedly discovered caches of arms and ammunition in the compound of the Indonesian Central Intelligence Office (*Badan Pusat Intellidjèn* - BPI) which, until his arrest, had been headed by Subandrio. An Army announcement alleged that the BPI had been used as a distributing center of arms for underground communists and pro-communist students. Whether the charge had any substance or not, it served to put Subandrio further into disrepute. This, along with the fact that most leading cabinet ministers were now in custody, obliged Sukarno to agree to a cabinet revision. On March 27, reportedly after only cursory consultation with Suharto, the President announced a new and smaller cabinet headed by a six-man Presidium. Suharto was designated Fifth Deputy Premier in charge of defense and security, and Nasution returned as Minister and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Crush Malaysia Command (*Komando Ganjang Malaysia* - KOGAM), a loosely constructed organ of mass mobilization designed to continue the "confrontation." Sukarno retained his dual role as Premier and President, and continued as Supreme Commander of KOGAM.[19] Two of his close confidants, Johannes Leimena and Ruslan Abdulgani, also were retained, as First and Third Deputy Premiers respectively. Their inclusion, combined with the relatively lower-ranking posts for Nasution and Suharto, touched off a new round of student protests. Federations of anti-Sukarno and anti-*Gestapu* organizations such as the Pantjasila Front and the *Ampera* Strategic Command (*Komando Strategi Ampera* - KOSTRAM: *Ampera* is an acronym for Sukarno's "Message of the Suffering of the People") expressed disappointment with the cabinet, asserting that among the lesser ministers there were still "communists."

[19] *Duta Masjarakat* (Bandung), March 28, 1966.

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At least in part to meet these criticisms Suharto, on March 31, ordered all government departments and services to "immediately intensify" "cleansing" their personnel of any remaining members of the PKI and its mass organizations, and to do so, significantly, in coordination with KOGAM.[20] In subsequent months Army commanders took to stressing the continuing vitality and danger of the communist remnant in the country, urging that new steps be taken against the underground PKI/*Gestapu* movement's alleged "political guerrilla war" (abbreviated to *gerpol* by Indonesians from the words *politik gerilja*). Reports of freshly discovered plots against the lives of Nasution and Suharto were mixed with revelations of actively functioning and well-organized PKI terrorist groups with distinctive code names such as "Mount Ice" and "Black Cat."[21] At the same time KAMI began to appeal to the Army for help in clashes with KKO elements and pro-Sukarno student groups, and by July, in parts of Central and West Java, fighting between Muslims and alleged communist sympathizers and pro-Sukarno groups associated with the PNI left wing had become an almost daily occurrence. Waves of arrests of PKI suspects were announced in many cities in Java and some in Sumatra. Tales and rumors of attacks by Army units on PKI strongholds in the mountains of Central Java, and of newly discovered quantities of communist propaganda literature and arms in the capital, also heightened tensions.

This new crisis atmosphere, however, cannot be separated from the pressure of anti-Sukarno groups to bring about still further constitutional changes. Specifically they wished to reduce Sukarno's powers and eventually return to the parliamentary system of government that had disappeared with the progressive imposition of Sukarno's "guided democracy" over the past seven years.[22] In the first instance their efforts focused on the convening of the MPRS, the body which under the Constitution elects the President and Vice-President. Strategy called for the election of a Vice-President (an office that had been vacant since Mohammad Hatta resigned in 1957 after falling out with Sukarno's policies) at

[20]Radio Djakarta, Domestic Service, March 31, 1966.

[21]For details on these reports and the government's reaction see Justus M. van der Kroef, "How Dead is the Indonesian Communist Party?," *Communist Affairs*, January-February 1967, pp. 3-10.

[22]On the emergence of the "guided democracy" system in Indonesia, see Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), and Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy in Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

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the next MPRS session, slated to begin on May 12, 1966, and then to vote Sukarno out of office and have the new Vice-President succeed him.

But even though the slogans "Let us reconstitutionalize Indonesia" and "The President must be constitutionalized" attracted wide support, Sukarno proved adamant in his opposition to the convening of the MPRS, and he clearly retained followers of his own. In Central Java, PNI branches and provincial newspapers, though cowed and cautious, still seemed prepared to rally to the President. In East Java pro-Sukarno trade unions were becoming restive. Under the circumstances the Army's continuing campaign against alleged PKI/*Gestapu* remnants appeared to many to be an attempt to repress the pro-Sukarno opposition as well. Thus, Suharto and the other Army leaders realized that an attempt to dismiss the President might yet lead to disturbances, and that even the formal election of a new Vice-President could touch off open resistance. Moreover, time was needed to replace the purged communist members of the MPRS and the Indonesian Parliament, and parties and other pressure groups were jockeying for as large a share of the vacant seats as possible.

Reluctantly the cabinet agreed to Sukarno's suggestion to postpone the MPRS session, first to the middle of June and then, it would seem, still later to the end of July. But the postponements brought KAMI into action once again. On May 23, 5,000 students marched on Parliament in Djakarta; as soldiers fired warning shots and one demonstrator was bayoneted, they presented a demand calling for the convening of the MPRS not later than June 1. Yet even as demonstrations were building up again, Suharto had been busy pacifying Sukarno supporters, transferring pro-Sukarno Army commanders (e.g., Major General Surjosumpeno of the Central Java Diponegoro Division and Major General Ibrahim Adjie of the West Java Siliwangi Division), and warning students not to create "a rift" between themselves and the Army. Repeatedly the armed forces leadership, including Suharto and Nasution, affirmed that they had no intention of ousting Sukarno and excoriated rumors that the MPRS would be called upon to do so. In the end party leaders, the Army, and probably also Sukarno reached a mutual accommodation. The MPRS would formally convene in Djakarta on June 20. But while it would "examine" the President's constitutional position, it was understood that it

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would not elect a new Vice-President, nor set machinery in motion to depose Sukarno.

When the 546-member MPRS met, among its first decisions (No. 9/MPRS/1966) was one ratifying the Presidential order of March 11 which transferred special security powers to Suharto, and another electing Nasution MPRS chairman. It also invited Sukarno to give it a "progress report." On June 22 the President did so. His speech, called *Nawaksara* (Nine Points), was one of the shortest he ever delivered, and also one of his most truculent. The MPRS had elected him leader, Sukarno declared, and that meant not only an obligation on his part but also on the part of the Indonesian people and the MPRS, which had the responsibility of following his leadership. Moreover, the MPRS had accepted Presidential policy directives laid down in various past speeches as the guidelines of the state, and they had to be implemented. He emphasized that the present MPRS membership was provisional, pending eventual elections, and intimated that the provisional MPRS had better not take steps from which the elected MPRS might have to deviate.[23]

The tone of the *Nawaksara* speech seemed to be that of a disappointed schoolmaster lecturing and, in effect, upbraiding his pupils. MPRS reaction was swift. In a special resolution on July 5, it demanded that Sukarno give a "full and detailed report on national issues" since he became President; and in particular give a complete accounting of the causes of the *Gestapu* coup and its epilogue, and of "the economic and moral deterioration of the country." The resolution noted that the President's *Nawaksara* address had "failed to meet the expectations of the common people" because it did not detail his policies surrounding the *Gestapu* affair.[24]

Though it might not have seemed so at the time, the passage of this MPRS resolution was another fateful turn in the story of Sukarno's fall. Considering the prevailing political atmosphere, the *Nawaksara* speech would appear to have been deliberately provocative. Again, as in the case of his cabinet reshuffle of February 21, Sukarno seemed to have gone out of his way to infuriate his enemies and solidify their ranks. Only an abject *mea culpa* would now satisfy the anti-Sukarno faction, and even that might not be enough to preserve Sukarno's position. Still, despite the rising

[23] *Kompas* (Djakarta), June 23, 1966.
[24] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* July 8, 1966.

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clamor that he present a "supplement" to his *Nawaksara* speech as requested by the MPRS, Sukarno resisted. When at last he was persuaded to do so by the pressure of Suharto and Army leaders, whatever tactical benefit he might have reaped from a public confession had long since vanished. Meanwhile his continuing reluctance to make a clean breast of his past policies and his behavior during the *Gestapu* affair only deepened public suspicion and accelerated the effort to oust him.

Compared to the *Nawaksara* resolution, the other MPRS decisions issued on July 5, 1966 seem almost routine.[25] Decision No. 15 was not to fill "the vacant post of Vice-President," but it also provided that in the event the President was unable to carry out his duties Suharto, as "bearer" of Decision No. 9 which gave him special security powers, would assume the post of Acting President. This provision was to figure prominently in the maneuvering to remove Sukarno from office eight months later. The MPRS also ordered a review of all Presidential decrees not in agreement with the Constitution, and while apologizing to Sukarno and emphasizing that this action did not influence his present position as head of state, it revoked its 1963 decision naming Sukarno "President for Life." Other decisions provided that general elections be held by July 5, 1968, approved the ban on the PKI and outlawed Marxist-Leninist doctrine except for purposes of academic study, and recommended that steps be taken to end the confrontation against Malaysia.

In a radio address on July 6, at the end of the MPRS session, Suharto praised its work and warned that whoever opposed the MPRS decisions was placing himself outside the law. This was as unequivocal a threat to Sukarno supporters as Suharto had made thus far, and it helped to pave the way for acceptance without disturbance of a new *Ampera* cabinet announced by Sukarno on July 25. This cabinet, which Sukarno declared he had formed "together" with Suharto, was almost certainly forced on the President by the Army and in principle may well have been agreed to even before the MPRS met. Greatly reduced in size compared to its predecessors, it featured Suharto as Chief Minister (Sukarno still technically retained the title of Premier), Adam Malik as Foreign Minister, and the Sultan of Djokjakarta, Hamengku Buwono, as Economics Minister. This was the new triumvirate of

[25]For the text of these resolutions, see *Ketetapan-ketetapan M.P.R.S. Hasil-Hasil Sidang Umum ke-IV Tahun 1966* (Djakarta: C. V. Pantjuran Tudjuh, n.d.).

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power, with Nasution (not in the new cabinet but as MPRS chairman) in the Olympian position of being its confidant and arbiter.

The personnel of the new cabinet was little to Sukarno's liking. Few if any of his trusted associates had been included. Even such veteran ministers and "Sukarno stooges" as Johannes Leimena and Ruslan Abdulgani were at first eliminated. Then at the cabinet installation on July 28, following a highly temperamental speech in which he declared "I am still Premier, because I have been appointed President of the Republic of Indonesia," Sukarno proceeded to announce two additional appointments: Leimena as vice-chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, and Abdulgani as chairman of state corporations. Suharto, though taken by surprise, showed no emotion at this display of Presidential willfulness.

While in subsequent months Sukarno repeatedly demonstrated that he was still a force to be reckoned with, the erosion of his powers continued quietly and steadily. For example, he had been adamant in resisting an end to the anti-Malaysia campaign, and Army leaders had at first also emphasized that "confrontation" had to continue. After the transfer of security authority to Suharto, however, Sukarno's opponents felt strong enough to begin bringing this futile effort to an end. Despite continuous remonstrances by the President, secret negotiations began toward the middle of April. At the end of May 1966, Malik and Malaysian Deputy Premier Razak concluded a formal, if preliminary, agreement in Bangkok, looking toward the "beginning of the end" of hostilities. With the MPRS decision on Malaysia to sustain them further, Indonesian negotiators intensified their efforts, so that on August 11, at a conference in Djakarta, both Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to "cease forthwith" all "hostile acts" between them, and to exchange diplomatic representation as soon as possible. Malaysia also agreed as a face-saving gesture to Indonesia to hold "free and democratic" elections in the near future in Sabah and Sarawak, where the population would have an opportunity to "reaffirm" their previous decision about their status in Malaysia. KOGAM, the Indonesian government's chief coordinating body for the confrontation, had already been dissolved. On August 17, during his Independence Day speech, Sukarno claimed it was at his insistence that the Indonesian-Malaysian agreement had included the provision that general elections must be held in Sarawak and Sabah, and that Indonesia would not recognize

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Malaysia until these elections had taken place. But there were few who were not aware that one of the President's major policies—the anti-Malaysia campaign—had now in fact been repudiated. *Ganjang Sukarno* (crush Sukarno) now replaced *ganjang Malaysia* as one of the more popular grafitti of the day.

Meanwhile the Army stepped up its campaign against the *Gestapu gerpol,* and against suspected PKI members and avowed pro-Sukarno supporters, especially in the ASU wing of the PNI. Reports of frequent arrests of suspected communists in major Javanese cities alternated with Army press releases on the discovery of caches of illegal arms and communist propaganda literature, on new plots to massacre religious leaders, and on new outbreaks of alleged communist-inspired terrorist campaigns, especially in Bali and East Java. In mid-November there were even reports—subsequently denied by Army spokesmen—that a number of high-ranking Army officers had been arrested for plotting to kidnap Suharto and so create a crisis for the benefit of the communists.[26] To what extent these rumors were designed to spread an atmosphere favorable to the elimination of the Army's enemies is difficult to say, but there seems little doubt that Sukarno supporters, including remnants of the radical Left, were principal targets of the continuing post-*Gestapu* pogrom. On September 20, Attorney General Soegih Arto announced in Djakarta that the number of civilian prisoners detained "because of their involvement in the *Gestapu*/PKI attempted coup," was 120,000.

Toward the close of August and through the first week of September, Sukarno's prestige sank still further as a result of testimony at the trial of former Minister Jusuf Muda Dalam, who, it was revealed, had earlier switched his political allegiance from the PKI to the PNI. Jusuf was charged principally with unlawful use and manipulation of public funds, assisting "subversion" (i.e., importing firearms without a license), and immoral conduct, but during his trial it became apparent that President Sukarno had had a hand in Jusuf's financial malversation by approving unlawful payments on certain imports.[27]

To retrieve some of his rapidly falling political stock, Sukarno

[26]*The Straits Times,* November 17 and 18, 1966.

[27]Sukarno appeared also to have introduced Jusuf to at least one of his many girl friends, and the inference that the President was somehow linked to the complex marital problems of his Central Banking Minister hardly added to Sukarno's stature. See, e.g., *The Indonesian Herald* (Djakarta), September 1-6, 1966.

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now began a counterattack, lasting approximately from the end of the Jusuf trial to the end of the trial of former Air Force Chief Omar Dhani in early December. This effort, and the public reaction to it, was to prove sufficiently unsettling as to induce the Army to work for a new, if temporary, rapprochement with the President. As so often in the past when he had been under siege, Sukarno began by raising the specter of a foreign conspiracy. There was a plot by "CIA snipers" to kill him, the President claimed on September 6. Mindful that he was still the MPRS' "mandatory" (i.e., chief executive of the state), he returned again and again in the following weeks to the theme of his *Nawaksara* speech: his ideological concepts and policy directives were the official guides of the nation and should be obeyed. On September 13 he once more avowed that "Inside my chest I am a Marxist" and challenged his critics to prove that "Sukarno is not loyal to the cause of the revolution." A week earlier he had publicly derided the MPRS decision to ban Marxism-Leninism, declaring that "You cannot abolish any isms," and in effect challenged anti-communists to deny him the right to be a Marxist. At about the same time he charged that students had slandered one of his wives, Madame Hartini Sukarno, by claiming that she gave twenty million rupiahs to the communists in Central Java.

Predictably, the President's counteroffensive produced a new round of criticism, including a demand by the influential Academicians' Action Command, closely allied with KAMI, that he resign immediately and stand trial for "betraying the nation." One influential Muslim paper in Djakarta which had been running a series of articles on the manner in which Sukarno had allegedly helped the PKI to increase its power, concluded its exposé by declaring in banner headlines that Sukarno had in fact been the leader of the *Gestapu* coup.[28] Undaunted, Sukarno kept issuing broad appeals to "all revolutionary fighters who have fought with me." At the close of September he was reported to be getting ready to fly to an undisclosed destination in Central Java in order to "organize a new political party." The cabinet, particularly Suharto, foiled this scheme.

Meanwhile, the new vehemence of the anti-Sukarnoists had begun to alarm Army commanders. On October 1, the first anniversary of the *Gestapu* affair, some 10,000 students led by KAMI converged on the Presidential palace shouting that Sukarno be

[28] *Karya Bhakti*, September 27, 1966.

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tried for leading the coup. Troops beat off the mob as it attempted to storm the palace grounds, and several score among the demonstrators suffered bayonet cuts and other wounds. The alleged brutality of the palace guard inflamed anti-Sukarno sentiment in the capital even more. In subsequent days student demonstrations in other Indonesian cities, notably in Medan, North Sumatra, lent additional vigor to the anti-Sukarno campaign. The Indonesian Parliament, as well as local and provincial legislative councils in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes), passed resolutions urging that the President explain his "involvement" in the September 30 affair.

But Suharto and the Army plainly were not to be pushed ahead of their own political timetable. Through much of October and November, as the slogan *Mahmilubkan Sukarno* (i.e., try Sukarno by a special court) found a widening area of support, Army commanders once again seemed preoccupied with cautioning student hotheads not to act "unconstitutionally" and not to "drive a wedge" between Army and people. There is little doubt that Suharto and his associates also put pressure on Sukarno to change tactics at this time, possibly advising him that more was to be gained by an occasional conciliatory gesture. The President, perceiving that his counteroffensive had made the Army somewhat more amenable, chose to comply. On October 5, at a parade in Djakarta in celebration of Indonesian Armed Forces Day, Sukarno condemned as treasonous the *Gestapu* coup (the first time he had done so) and also paid his respects at the graves of the six Army generals slain by *Gestapu* terrorists. A few weeks later, within hours after Suharto had said that many were still dissatisfied with Sukarno's attitude and his failure to condemn the PKI, Sukarno also for the first time praised the armed forces for having crushed the *Gestapu* affair.[29]

There were still occasional indications that the President retained a sizable following. In the middle of October, for example, the PNI newspaper *Suluh Marhaen* reported that tens of thousands of pro-Sukarno students in East Java stood ready to march on Djakarta if necessary. On November 21, a number of prominent military leaders, among them the chief of the national police forces, publicly affirmed their support for Sukarno, while Colonel Kadirin, the East Kalimantan (Borneo) command staff chief, declared that the "armed forces have no intention of

[29] *The Djakarta Times*, November 14, 1966; *The Straits Times*, November 11, 1966.

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overthrowing the President and he remains the supreme commander."[30]

On October 17, moreover, Sukarno, with the apparently reluctant approval of Suharto, declared "rehabilitated" the small but not uninfluential Murba (Proletarian) Party which he had originally banned in early 1965 when he had been removing the last vestiges of opposition to the PKI. Despite its antagonism toward the PKI, Murba's position toward communism has been an ambivalent one. (The party was founded on the theories of Tan Malaka, one of the most important early PKI leaders who later, on tactical grounds, broke with Stalin.) Its general position is perhaps best described as "Indonesian Titoist." Sukarno had had little use for the "revisionist" Murba in the days when he, along with the PKI, had been directing Indonesia ever closer to Peking's orbit. But now, after *Gestapu,* Murba seemed to provide a new tactical opportunity to bolster the radical Left. After its rehabilitation Murba moved cautiously, though undoubtedly it provided something of a new rallying point for a number of Sukarno supporters.

Thus Sukarno's counteroffensive, combined with small conciliatory gestures from the Army as it became alarmed, seemed at first to have improved his position. But while Army and President found the accommodation expedient it is doubtful whether either believed that their rapprochement would last, or that principal Army commanders had necessarily abandoned their gradualist tactic of forcing Sukarno out of office. For the moment, the Army seemed prepared to wait until anti-Sukarno sentiment rose to a new level before taking further action. This new pressure soon became discernible. Questions about Sukarno's conduct during the September 30 coup continued to come from all parts of the country. On November 11 the popular old revolutionary leader, Sutomo (Bung Tomo) even accused the President publicly of having accepted a $150 million bribe from the U.S. government and then of having denounced Washington for trying to influence him. The real erosion of the President's prestige came less from such spectacular charges, however, and more from testimony in the trials of Sukarno's close associates, Subandrio and Dhani.

[30]*The Straits Times,* November 22, 1966. In this period dispatches from foreign reporters in Indonesia often appeared with headlines such as "Sukarno's Star is Rising Again," or "Military Reformers Learning to Live in an Uneasy Truce with President." See, e.g., the dispatches from Djakarta by Alfred Friendly, Jr., in *New York Times,* November 25, 1966, and by T. Jeff Williams of Associated Press, November 19, 1966.

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Subandrio went on trial on October 1 for alleged complicity in the *Gestapu* plot. During the proceedings the prosecution read a letter purportedly written by then fugitive PKI Chairman Aidit a few days after the coup, in which the communist leader urged Sukarno to prohibit condemnation of coup leaders and suggested that he follow a policy of quieting public indignation. Aidit also urged that Sukarno take the solution of post-coup problems entirely in his own hands, and suggested that the responsibility for internal security be turned over to the regular police forces. Among Sukarno's enemies this letter went far to explain his protective attitude toward the PKI immediately after the coup. Indeed, according to KAMI, Sukarno had in fact replied to the letter, promising to "deviate the attention" of the Army so that they would not become preoccupied with the *Gestapu* affair. Still, the authenticity of the Aidit letter itself was by no means established in court. The court also received a sworn written statement from Sukarno in which he declared that the coup had caught him completely by surprise and that he had had no reports from Subandrio (head of the Central Intelligence Bureau) about increased PKI activities or training of communist terror squads. The daily *Operasi,* reflecting the incredulity of much of the Indonesian public, commented on the Sukarno statement: "If Doctor Engineer Sukarno, Bung Karno, was taken completely by surprise, then is Bung Karno a great liar, a deceiver of the people, or the greatest blockhead in Indonesia?"[31]

Even so, the trial of Subandrio (who was sentenced to death, and whose appeal has recently been denied) left Sukarno relatively unscathed compared to the damning testimony in the Dhani trial which began on December 5. Dhani was also charged with treasonous complicity in the *Gestapu* coup, but evidence of his direct involvement was much more convincing than in the Subandrio case. As for Sukarno, testimony was presented that the President had approved the training of PKI terrorist squads, had concurred in the covert supply of small arms from Communist China, and had consulted with Dhani prior to the latter's secret mission to Peking; that he had congratulated one of the principal *Gestapu* plotters, Army Brigadier Supardjo, upon hearing of the murder of six Army generals by the PKI terrorists; that he had concurred in Dhani's first order of the day upon the outbreak of the coup, an order which in effect supported the coup; and that he had later

[31]Cited, *Far Eastern Economic Review,* October 20, 1966, p. 118.

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sheltered Dhani in his palace, even though he knew of his complicity in the plot.[32] Even before the trial ended with Dhani's death sentence, student demonstrations against Sukarno had resumed, and demands that the President be dismissed and tried for his own role in *Gestapu* reached a new intensity. Meanwhile, sensational revelations about the President's private life underscored Sukarno's falling prestige.

For their long-term purposes this new outcry against Sukarno no doubt suited Army leaders. For the moment, however, the Army felt compelled once again to place itself in the path of the mounting popular pressure for the President's removal. At the same time it seemed to be attempting to bend Sukarno to make further conciliatory gestures. Suharto's fear of an unconstitutional removal, which might trigger revolt and eventually redound to the Army's disadvantage, was clearly in the background of this maneuver. At a meeting on December 21, presided over by Suharto and attended by all principal armed forces commanders, a joint statement was released declaring that "after attentively studying the recent internal political developments" the Indonesian armed forces would "consistently" defend the Constitution and the decisions of the MPRS, and would oppose "any group" violating the Constitution or obstructing the work of the cabinet. In further discussions with Sukarno, armed forces commanders persuaded the reluctant President to issue a "supplement" to his *Nawaksara* address to the MPRS, in conformity with the MPRS resolution the previous July that he give an accounting of the *Gestapu* affair and of the country's "economic and moral deterioration." To lend weight to the Army's December 21 statement, eleven battalions from various units of the armed forces staged what was billed as a "show of force" parade in Djakarta on December 28. An uneasy quiet settled over the political scene during the first week of 1967 as the nation waited for Sukarno's self-accounting. Even at this late date an emotional *mea culpa,* in which he could link himself—as he had so often done successfully in the past—to Indonesia's national history and aspirations, might have allowed the President to salvage his constitutional position.

III

But this was not to be. With his *Nawaksara* "supplement" issued on the evening of January 10, 1967, and read in an angry

[32] *The Djakarta Times,* December 6-10, 12, 1966.

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voice to reporters shortly after a copy had been sent to the MPRS executive, Sukarno sealed his political doom.[33] In the statement Sukarno declared that according to the Constitution the MPRS had no authority to demand from him an account of specific political decisions except insofar as they touched on "broad lines of policy." (He was technically correct. Under the Constitution the MPRS is to be concerned only with laying down "broad lines of policy," leaving their implementation to President and Parliament. But he chose to ignore the question of what specific political decision could really be considered wholly apart from the policy lines of the MPRS.) He went on to say that he had already condemned the coup, the occurrence of which had been a "complete surprise to me." The coup itself had three main causes: the blundering of PKI leaders, the cunning of the *nekolim,* and the existence of persons who were "crazy." If he was to be held solely responsible for the *Gestapu* coup, then he would ask that "truth and justice" be served and that it also be determined who was responsible "for the series of attempts on my life" in the past. As for the deterioration of the Indonesian economy, it was not the responsibility of one person, but was the result of "objective factors" and of decisions taken by the government and society as a whole; the same principle of collective responsibility and the "process of consciousness" in the whole nation underlay any moral deterioration. Defiantly Sukarno demanded why only he was asked for an accounting in connection with the *Gestapu* coup: "Is not, for instance, the then Coordinating Minister for Defense and Security (i.e., Nasution) responsible too?"

Except for a mildly worded endorsement by the central executive of the PNI (which brought it a prompt rebuke by the Djakarta military garrison commander), nothing but calumny and demands for his resignation greeted Sukarno's "supplement." Virtually all political parties, many trade unions, and professional groups such as the national journalists association and the Muslim artists league, expressed sharp disapproval or disappointment. Youth groups, including *Ansor* (affiliated with NU), declared that the President's latest statement "strengthened belief" that he was implicated in the *Gestapu* plot. From various quarters—e.g., dissident PNI branches in South Sulawesi, a number of influential NU leaders, and municipal councils in Javanese and Sumatran cities—demands were heard that Suharto

[33] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* January 16, 1967.

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now formally replace Sukarno as President. Others, in more circumspect language, urged the same objective, asserting that the "dualism in the national leadership must be ended." Suharto himself said little, hewing to his line that constitutional procedure had to be preserved, though he also warned that the patience of the Army was running out with those who wished to stand "outside the path fixed by the Provisional People's Congress."[34]

On January 20, MPRS leaders announced that their Congress would meet in March or April to discuss Sukarno's further tenure. MPRS Chairman Nasution, on January 27, said that most people now held the view that Sukarno had been involved in the *Gestapu* affair; that there was virtual unanimity in political and mass organizational circles that the *Nawaksara* "supplement" was unacceptable, and that the President had in effect neglected his constitutional duties. Repeatedly, in this period, Foreign Minister Malik stated that he had counseled Sukarno ("my old comrade in arms") to step down voluntarily, but that the President still remained "stubborn."

After the *Badan Pekerdja* (Executive Standing Committee) of the MPRS resolved on February 9, despite initial PNI resistance, to demand the ouster of Sukarno and the establishment of a court to try him, and on February 16 formally rejected Sukarno's supplementary statement as not complying with the MPRS resolution of July 1966 demanding a full Presidential accounting, Suharto, according to Malik, also began to urge Sukarno to resign voluntarily. "Now everything is dependent on Bung Karno himself," Malik said on February 20. "There are two ways open to him: either resign voluntarily or be dismissed by Congress, that is, the MPRS." Malik also thought it "illogical" that Sukarno's resignation would result in civil war.[35]

It is still unclear whether Sukarno, now faced with an imminent MPRS decision to revoke his authority altogether, might already have reached a compromise with Suharto and the Army, or whether he precipitately initiated such a compromise himself, after entreaties that he step down voluntarily had failed. As late as February 10 he was reported to have spent a lonely night under a banyan tree in his Merdeka Palace garden trying to decide what to do, and subsequently—as he wept—to have told unnamed Army and police emissaries that he would not resign. In any case, on February 22 Information Minister Diah announced to the press,

[34]Antara dispatches, Djakarta, January 24 and February 10, 1967.
[35]*Ibid.*, February 21, 1967.

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after a plenary cabinet meeting, that as of February 20 Sukarno had surrendered all his governing authority to General Suharto in accordance with "the spirit of the MPRS Decision No. 15/MPRS/1966." The latter decision, it may be recalled, had been promulgated the previous July and had provided that while no Vice-President would be appointed at that time, Suharto, in the event of President Sukarno's incapacity, would become "Acting President." This transfer of governing authority was still to leave Sukarno the title of President. In the statement read by Diah it was stipulated that Suharto "regularly" was to report to the President "on the implementation of the task transferred to him."[36] The Diah statement further stressed that the transfer of authority had occurred "without diminishing the aim and spirit" of the Constitution, under which Sukarno remained the official "mandatory" (i.e., chief executive) of the MPRS.

Thus, almost a year after he had granted Suharto the power "to take all steps" to guarantee domestic tranquillity, Sukarno relinquished the remainder of his *de facto* constitutional authority. There is no doubt that by this time his most diehard supporters, such as the left wing of the PNI, the rank and file of the KKO, and the Sukarnoist student fronts, had been cowed into silence. All during January, thousands of anti-Sukarno students had kept up the pressure, demanding the President's ouster in front of Parliament in Djakarta or staging "new order" rallies in other cities in Java and Sumatra. Among the principal political parties, too, a momentum was developing to settle the issue of what was euphemistically referred to as the "dualism in the state leadership." The antagonism between Suharto and Sukarno at the executive apex of the government could not last indefinitely, it was argued. If Sukarno was not removed from power, and soon, the political pendulum might eventually swing back toward him. Domestic problems of economic stabilization remained pressing, and different power factions and organizations would begin looking for protection and an enduring political rallying point.

The Army, meanwhile, despite protestations that constitutional procedures needed to be observed, continued to press its own anti-Sukarno informational and propaganda campaign. On January 23, for example, the Armed Forces Information Center in Djakarta inspired a widely circulated press report that Sukarno, contrary to his repeated claims that the coup had been a complete surprise to

[36] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* February 24, 1967.

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him, had in fact been briefed by some of the *Gestapu* conspirators on their plan the day before it was put into effect. Little or no evidence was advanced for this allegation. A few days later a team of Ministry of Information officials left Djakarta for Central and East Java, the areas of Sukarno's greatest lingering strength, to arrange for improved distribution of newspapers known to be hostile to the President. In addition, the cabinet approved funds to subsidize distribution of at least three Djakarta papers in Central and East Java provinces at low prices.[37] Army commanders in the interim kept up a drumfire of accusations and warnings. Agriculture Minister Major General Sutjipto charged on January 20 that shortly after the *Gestapu* coup Sukarno, in a conversation with him, had said that the murder of six generals by communist terrorists had not been "brutal" but rather a judgment rendered by "a kind of people's court." On January 24 Suharto, in an address to regional military commanders, warned that Sukarno would have to "explain" his past policies or face military action, while virtually at the same time the Djakarta military commander in a radio broadcast announced that he was ready to arrest Sukarno if given the order.

On February 13, in a lengthy broadcast, Nasution laid sole responsibility for the *Gestapu* coup on Sukarno. The MPRS chairman was replying to Sukarno's demand, made in his *Nawaksara* supplementary statement, that Nasution explain his own conduct in relation to the *Gestapu* affair. Nasution added that Sukarno had disliked him because he, Nasution, was anti-communist. Three days later Nasution presented a document to the MPRS executive committee purporting to show Sukarno's full support of the coup. According to this document, Sukarno allegedly threatened to strike an officer who refused to join the *Gestapu* plot after telling the officer that "in a revolution a father may devour his own children."[38] The veracity of these and similar charges is hard to substantiate. It may be noted that in his full report of March 7, 1967 to the MPRS on Sukarno's involvement in the *Gestapu* coup, Suharto made little or no explicit reference to these allegations.

One can speculate that Sukarno, under these circumstances, might have preferred to retain nothing but his titular authority;

[37] *New York Times*, January 28, 1967.

[38] *Armed Forces Daily Mail*, February 16, 1967, and *The Straits Times*, January 25, February 15 and 17, 1967; see also Nicholas Turner, "Damning Dossier," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 9, 1967, p. 428.

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perhaps he had concluded that Suharto would soon fall victim to the jockeying for power among the parties as they prepared for the 1968 general elections. By February 1967 he might also have become convinced that surrender of his remaining powers would be the minimum price for escape from an ignominious trial similar to the ones endured by his friends Subandrio and Dhani. But for the KAMI intransigents even retention of titular authority was still too much. Well into early March, and even as the MPRS went into session again, demonstrators demanded that Sukarno be "dismissed" and tried for treason. New revelations that he had allegedly provided one of the chief *Gestapu* plotters, the recently captured Brigadier General Supardjo, with a "letter of protection" added to the tension. On March 7, however, while describing Sukarno's policy failures and the President's questionable conduct in the *Gestapu* affair, Suharto appealed to the MPRS not to formally dismiss Sukarno. As rumor had it, permitting Sukarno to retain the Presidential title had been Suharto's end of the bargain making the February 20 transfer of authority possible. Meanwhile reports "leaked" from Merdeka Palace that Sukarno still considered Suharto's new authority to be only "temporary."

Caught between Suharto and the more strident anti-Sukarnoists, the MPRS in its Decision No. 33 of March 12 reached a "typical" Indonesian compromise. The February 20 transfer of power to Suharto was legitimized by declaring Suharto "Acting President." The "MPRS mandate" given to Sukarno (which had made him constitutionally the chief executive) was revoked and he was "replaced." But the MPRS also refused to declare the President "dismissed" and preferred the ambiguity of leaving him, in the words of Suharto (note 3 *supra*), as "a president without powers." Additional decrees at this time revoked Sukarno's title of "Great Leader of the Revolution" and emphasized the necessity of reorienting the country away from Sukarnoist ideology.

In the immediate aftermath of the decrees a cloud of rumors about Sukarno, some said to have originated from Suharto himself, seem to have confused the fallen President's friends and foes alike and so helped to forestall further precipitate action for or against him. Variously Sukarno was said to be gravely ill—even mentally ill—in his Bogor Palace; to have secretly left the country for Japan to join his wife Dewi, or be preparing to do so; to be living in "seclusion and atonement" in an East Javanese hamlet; to be getting ready to go on another pilgrimage to Mecca. The question of

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whether he would be tried for his alleged complicity in the *Gestapu* affair having been wholly left to the "discretion" of Suharto, who seemed to have no desire to initiate judicial proceedings at this juncture, Sukarno's friends may have felt that any demonstration or resistance to the MPRS orders would only harm him further and eventually thrust him into the vortex of a humiliating public trial which he had thus far been able to avoid.

IV

In the story of Sukarno's fall from power both the conduct of the President and that of his Army opponents exhibit a dialectic of their own. Sukarno's was calculated defiance followed by reluctant retreat, almost as if he were trying to provoke his enemies to extreme measures against him. His February 21, 1966 cabinet reshuffle, made in the face of growing restiveness of student mobs in Djakarta, may have been as much miscalculation as defiance: he seriously underestimated the degree to which Nasution, Suharto and other anti-Sukarno Army commanders had stabilized their position in the armed forces and covertly had been able to make common cause with student radicals. But the *Nawaksara* speech of June 22 was simple provocation considering the mood of the MPRS and the momentum building up behind Suharto. The retaliatory MPRS decisions of July 5 and the forced cabinet change of July 25 were unmistakable warning signs that he was losing control, yet Sukarno ignored them. Then, never having cultivated a well-organized power base of his own, and always having relied on his charisma with the masses, he found that his counteroffensive against his critics (from September through mid-December), mixed with occasional placating gestures toward them, was not enough to overcome the steady erosion of his prestige, the result of the Subandrio and Dhani trials.

His position seemed to have reached its nadir in the aftermath of the Dhani trial revelations. But despite indications that armed forces leaders were prepared to keep him on as a figurehead, at least for the time being (e.g., in the December 21 armed forces' joint statement), Sukarno declined to follow the path of conciliation. His answer to the ever louder cry "*Mahmilubkan Sukarno!*" was his *Nawaksara* "supplement" of January 10, 1967, which provoked new outbursts of fury. Even after the February 20 transfer of power to Suharto he remained defiant. Only the MPRS' formal revocation of his mandate a few weeks later, and

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the prohibition of further political activity on his part until after the general elections in 1968, at last silenced him.

Along with Sukarno's sense of grandeur and invulnerability and his conviction that he could appeal for support, if necessary, over the heads of the Army leadership to a mass following, we can cite several other factors motivating his tactics in the post-*Gestapu* period. First, his has always been an extremely personalized conception of government, a curious mixture of impulsive intransigence and messianic ardor. His political style—despite his frequent astuteness in patiently playing off various domestic power factions against each other—does not allow for a less theatrical, legalistic, carefully circumscribed type of leadership. Not for him is the inconspicuous manipulation of the levers of bureaucratic power—which, particularly after the debacle of the cabinet reshuffle, might yet have saved him. The official adulation of Sukarnoism as ideology and national policy in the years of "Guided Democracy" had increasingly habituated him to an atmosphere of the Rousseauist *levée en masse,* in which gestures of Olympian boldness, bringing a surge of mass support, presumably carry the day. Notwithstanding the fact that the crisis following his abrupt cabinet reshuffle of February 1966 had demonstrated the further futility of such a tactic, at the end of 1966 Sukarno was still making such gestures. Instead of rallying his adherents, they were merely caricatured in the press.

Second, and in consequence of the preceding, Sukarno not only functions best in a condition of perpetual crisis but prefers to be the center and the provoker of that crisis. Provocation of this kind, used to break through power deadlocks and to keep political alignments fluid, has always been his forte: it accords with the mystique of "permanent revolution" by means of which the nation progresses toward its historic destiny while Sukarno's own position as visionary and balancer is rendered more secure.[39] The Army dealt with this Presidential tactic effectively by declining to be provoked into rash action, while giving the appearance of meeting the demands of impatient supporters by gradually making measured responses to Sukarno's defiance. The power deadlock held firm and in the end it overwhelmed Sukarno.

Finally, being shrewd enough to realize that the Army was succeeding in politically—if not physically—quarantining him, Sukarno by the beginning of 1967 may have wished to accentuate

[39]See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: The Mystique of 'Permanent Revolution,'" *The South Atlantic Quarterly,* Winter 1965, pp. 1-14.

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the differences between himself and his opponents. He may have calculated that such provocations as his *Nawaksara* supplementary statement of January would make the breach irreparable. Even if his provocation tactic did not create the desired political fluidity, Sukarno, by polarizing his supporters and his Army enemies as much as possible, could still have the satisfaction of knowing that he was laying the groundwork for a possible return to power in the near future. For few observers of the mercurial world of Indonesian politics—remembering the PKI's phoenix-like rise to unprecedented power within a decade after its disastrous coup attempt in 1948—are ready to predict that Sukarno, if he lives, can now be safely disregarded.

With the coming of the promised general elections in 1968 intense partisan infighting has already started. Party leaders are attacking the proposition that the armed forces can enter their own candidates. The alternative of reserving a bloc of seats in the new Parliament for the military also has evoked sharp controversy.[40] Despite all disclaimers that he is running a militarist government or has aspirations in that direction, Suharto has found it increasingly difficult to blur the image of extensive Army control.[41] Complaints about corrupt Army officers administering the state's public services keep mounting, along with protests that troops are illegally commandeering property, and are extorting and intimidating civilians. While many PNI branches are reportedly dissolving themselves, others are now forming alliances with the *Partindo,* a small, strongly pro-Sukarno party which, prior to the *Gestapu* coup, was in fact an informal PKI front. The *Partindo* leadership recently purged itself in order to escape being banned by the Army, and the party has become a major, if covert, organizational haven for the political opposition to the Suharto regime. Developing PNI-NU tensions; the outcry in anti-Sukarno Muslim quarters over the Army's recent outlawing "in the interests of public order and security" of a fanatical Muslim youth group, the *Komando Djihad* (Holy War Command), in Djakarta; ongoing clashes between KAMI leaders and the Army, which now frowns on demonstrations and on the students' new campaign to

[40] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* March 30, April 4, 6 and 8, 1967.

[41] In one of Suharto's first press conferences since becoming Acting President reporters pointedly asked him why he was still wearing his green field uniform now that he had become chief executive. Suharto replied that "the question of uniforms is not important. Neither should one have fears of the military." More important, he declared, was the implementation of the government's program. Antara dispatch, Djakarta, April 8, 1967.

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expose "corruption" in the government—all these suggest that the Indonesian political scene continues to produce dynamics that Sukarno and his cohorts may try to exploit.

The Army's dialectic in its confrontation of Sukarno was to allow and even to encourage an accelerating public reaction to the President's tactic of provocation, while at the same time seeming to control and occasionally to repress that reaction. In the first few months following the abortive coup Army leaders shared in organized denunciations of the *Gestapu* affair, but did not attack the President personally. In fact, the Army took good care not to be maneuvered by Sukarno into the position of being "rightist" and reactionary—hence, Nasution's affirmation that the revolution remained "leftist" and the Army's initial endorsement of the anti-Malaysia campaign. Doubtlessly, Suharto, Nasution and other anti-Sukarno commanders required time to consolidate their position among uncommitted armed forces units and to establish a *de facto* alliance with KAMI and other student radicals, who realized that they could never move effectively without a minimum of Army concurrence. Army self-restraint thus simultaneously encouraged Sukarno to make the rash error of his cabinet reshuffle, and the intransigent youth groups to intensify their campaign against Sukarno. From the resulting collision, the Army reaped the principal benefit—Sukarno's transfer of security authority to Suharto.

In subsequent months the Army persisted in the same tactic, alternately (and sometimes simultaneously) encouraging and holding in check rising popular sentiment against the President. After the MPRS decisions of July 1966, when Sukarno began his political counteroffensive, Army leaders in effect beat a tactical retreat, striking a temporary rapprochement with him and warning students not to "divide" the Army from the people. Yet, all the while Suharto added fuel to the anti-Sukarno flames by approving the Subandrio and Dhani trials and Army announcements of allegedly continuing *Gestapu*/PKI "subversion" in the country. In December the wave of agitation following the revelations of the Dhani trial was again undercut by the joint statement of armed forces leaders pledging support for constitutional procedures. Even after Sukarno's surrender of governing authority to Suharto (February 20, 1967), the latter resisted strong demands for a definitive "dismissal" of the President. To KAMI firebrands, dedicated to the overthrow of Sukarno, Suharto and the Army

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must have seemed dubious allies. Yet, there were compelling reasons for the Army's strategy.

One of these reasons stemmed from an insight into the purpose of the President's provocative conduct. The instability and fluidity of power relations resulting from prematurely rash action by the Army would have given Sukarno a new leverage which the continuing deadlock of "dualism" in leadership was denying him. For the Army, therefore, not to be provoked—not to move at all, except when seemingly pushed from behind by a wave of popular indignation—was the essential tactic. There was, moreover, the concern of Suharto, Nasution and many of their followers for the preservation of at least a semblance of constitutional procedures as the erosion of Sukarno's powers progressed. Each transfer of authority by the President to Suharto, whether in March 1966 or in February 1967, was retroactively legitimized by the only body constitutionally able to tamper with the chief executive authority, namely, the MPRS. Even so, Suharto could hardly hope to escape the accusations of critics that such ex post facto legitimizations, following the pressures of street mobs which the Army itself had helped to arouse, had only spurious constitutional value. Sensitivity on this point may account for his description of Sukarno as "temporarily" a "president without powers," thus deliberately obscuring his own present constitutional position. Given all these considerations, the Army could not avoid periodically appearing as the President's defender, even against its allies.

Above all, the Army's anxiety to prevent civil war should be stressed. As late as March 1967, when the MPRS revoked Sukarno's Presidential powers, Suharto feared that domestic security might not be maintained if the President were in fact "dismissed." Deposing Sukarno thus had to occur gradually, if it was to occur at all, and Suharto's "Fabianism" probably outraged his friends as often as it puzzled his enemies.

Whether Suharto, Nasution, and their more uncompromisingly anti-Sukarno associates in the armed forces, the student movement and such parties as NU, were adhering from the start to a plan (the so-called Operation Golden Spear) for the erosion of Sukarno's power and his eventual deposition cannot now be verified. But the finesse with which Army leaders alternately tolerated and repressed student agitation against Sukarno in tandem with their own tactical interests; the manner in which they hid behind a façade of constitutionalism for the supposed protection of the President while simultaneously using extra-con-

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stitutional procedures to weaken him; their technique of seeming to strike a political accord with Sukarno only to encourage other steps that nullified the accord and further undermined his position—all these suggest a degree of insight and coordination that makes the existence of such a plan likely. One receives the impression time and again that the Army reluctantly permitted anti-Sukarno sentiment to rise to a certain level and then acted against the President, demanding and securing a measured diminution in his authority, while leaving him as much as possible with the outward manifestations of power. Sukarno did not fall; he was hollowed out by a skillful political guerrilla war.

V

What of the future? The campaign against Sukarno introduced a new force in Indonesian political life, while underscoring the intractable persistence of older problems and practices. The new force is the student—indeed, the school children's—political movement. Political youth groups have existed in Indonesia since colonial times. But this was the first time their ceaseless agitation and demonstrations played a major—if not decisive—role in bringing down a regime. For the moment KAMI is obedient to the new controls on public demonstrations imposed by the Suharto government, but it has promised it will continue to agitate against "corruption," and with its representation in Parliament it is likely to become even more politically active as general elections approach. How the Suharto government will act if KAMI, having found new political friends and targets, seeks to resume its agitational campaign is one of the major unanswered questions clouding the political scene. The spectacular rise of KAMI in the first few weeks after *Gestapu,* the extent of its coordination with the Army, and the structure of its organization which extends beyond Djakarta, all await a thorough analysis.[42]

By June 1967 various voices, including those of KAMI's leaders and Foreign Minister Malik, were heard urging postponement of the 1968 elections, and by the end of the following month Information Minister Diah declared that the government believed "technical difficulties," including the failure to pass a new elections bill in time, probably would prevent holding the elections as scheduled. Diah's announcement reflected the deadlock in

[42]For a sympathetic account by a well-known Indonesian journalist, see Rosihan Anwar, "Birth of the KAMI," *Quest,* March-April 1967, pp. 54-60.

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political and parliamentary circles over the implementation of a government decree of May 24, 1967, restoring voting rights for members of the banned Masjumi and Socialist parties. Since the ban on these parties was not lifted, this restoration of voting rights can occur only through parties in existence, and many Masjumi and Socialist party members have little use for these. To the disquiet of many military commanders, voting rights have also been restored to those who had led regional rebellions against the central government in the late 1950's. Thus, sharp opposition to the May 24 decree comes from many circles, not only from covert sympathizers of the PKI; under these conditions the Indonesian Parliament typically declined to consider final elections procedures in a new elections bill.

There is also the question of mounting opposition to the armed forces' demand that 25 per cent of all seats in Parliament be reserved for members of the military. No party or prominent politician has cared to support the military's position. In June, when former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta requested legal recognition for his newly formed Indonesian Muslim Party (*Partai Muslim Indonesia* - PMI), Suharto was clearly embarrassed. His hesitation was occasioned by the consideration that prominent Masjumi leaders would attempt to make a comeback through the PMI (to the dismay of other Islamic parties jockeying for power), and also by the military's policy of *penghidjauan* (literally "greenization," i.e., extending the sphere of influence of the green uniformed military) which calls for a careful check of new avenues of civilian power, especially when the civilians are former rebels against the government—even if they are anti-communist Masjumi leaders. By the end of July Suharto had not closed the door on the PMI's future recognition, but the unresolved question of the Army's future political role is likely to postpone a decision indefinitely. Meanwhile, efforts by Army spokesmen to justify the military's continuing close involvement in the nation's political affairs on historic grounds (e.g., by appealing to the Army's role in the Indonesian Revolution of 1945-1949) are meeting with growing civilian opposition and even ridicule.

The problem of Sukarno's ambiguous status also confronts the leaders of the "new order." There are militant demands by prominent judges and KAMI that Sukarno be put on trial for his complicity in the *Gestapu* coup, new promises by the Suharto cabinet to wipe out "lingering Sukarnoist influences," numerous

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clashes in Jogjakarta and other cities between pro- and anti-Sukarno student groups, and pro-Sukarno rallies in East and Central Java. Tension was heightened by the early June "Jogjakarta Declaration" of principal Army commanders, who pledged loyalty to the government and determination to crush all "old order" elements seeking to restore Sukarno. Within two weeks the Army began to arrest leading military and civilian officials, and by the end of July some twenty officers, including a brigadier general, had been apprehended. On August 1 Attorney General Sugiharto linked the arrests to an armed conspiracy supplied with arms from Communist China, and asserted that attempts had been made to restore Sukarno to power "under cover of a general elections campaign and with the support of Indonesian Communists still at large." But little evidence for these and similar allegations has been made available, and it is difficult to suppress the suspicion that the Army's continuing anti-*Gestapu* and anti-Sukarno campaign is an integral part of the *penghidjauan* process. The combination of postponed elections and *penghidjauan* may leave the country as far from democratic norms and the rule of law as it was in the later years of the Sukarno era.

Despite criticism from some thirty members of Indonesia's Parliament that he is perpetuating "dualism" in the state's leadership by permitting Sukarno to wear his official Chief of State uniform, Suharto has steadfastly refused to order Sukarno divested of his trappings of office, including adjutants, secretaries and his Bogor Palace.[43] Indeed, by appointing one of Sukarno's faithful mouthpieces, Ruslan Abdulgani, as Indonesia's Ambassador to the United Nations, Suharto showed late in July that he was well aware of the "lingering Sukarnoist influences" in his own *orba* (from the Indonesian *orde baru*—new order) establishment and was, in the interests of maintaining the precarious stability, prepared still to accommodate them. It may well be one of the ironies of the post-Sukarno era that the persistent residual power of the fallen President is a principal factor in preventing the country from sliding into a military dictatorship.

[43]On May 6, 1967 Suharto issued a Presidential Decision, based on No. 33/MPRS/1967, which provided that Sukarno might no longer use the titles of Head of State or President of Indonesia or "Great Leader of the Revolution," nor employ the Presidential Standard. The same decision designated Sukarno's palace in Bogor, West Java, as his residence.

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AMERICAN-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS: SUBSTANCE AND SHADOWS*

by René Peritz

ON October 30, 1966, at a state function in his honor, President Johnson proposed a toast to the Malaysian Chief of State, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, in which he outlined the nature of current American approaches to Malaysia. He noted, *inter alia,* that:

> The ties that link the Malaysian and American peoples can only become stronger as we pursue our common goals:
> —as we build democracy and protect freedom;
> —as we resist aggression and subversion;
> —as we seek to end world tensions; and
> —as we strive to eliminate ignorance and illiteracy, disease and poverty.[1]

These comments by the President sum up the essence of the developing relationships between two countries that are unequally dependent upon each other. The prevalent U.S. view of the Federation of Malaysia sees it as a prime and inspiring example of a nation that has defeated a communist insurgent force after an extended period of conflict, and has accomplished this with the assistance of a Western country. The Federation today, in official American eyes, bears many of the accoutrements and marks of a functioning democracy. Moreover, within this context of broad American interpretation, there is no conflict of essential interests between the two peoples.

Since the establishment of United States-Malaysian diplomatic relations a number of serious economic—subsequently translated into political—problems have arisen between the states. These problems are attributable to certain of the two governments' commercial and fiscal arrangements; their solution depends in nearly all instances on unilateral American policy decisions. The

*The author wishes to acknowledge receipt of a research grant from the American Philosophical Society which enabled him to gather material for this and other reports and permitted him to spend the summer of 1966 in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

[1]*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* November 7, 1966, p. 1579. The quotation is taken from the advance text of the President's remarks at the State Dinner in Parliament House (Kuala Lumpur).

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outstanding issues focus on the sale of tin and rubber to the United States and the Federation's considerable need for private and public capital funds to pay for its comprehensive First Five-Year Plan. Nevertheless, these issues in the current U.S. Ambassador's evaluation amount to "islands" of disagreement in a sea of common interest.[2] Certainly the Federation's economic difficulties, while of immense importance to the welfare of the Malaysian region, are of marginal importance to the United States in terms of the overall U.S. list of priorities and commitments in the Far East.

Defense Considerations

The United States never disguised the fact that its attitude toward Malaysia was largely determined by the traditional role of the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, especially in the area east of Aden—which until recently included the vast sea regions from the Red Sea to Singapore. A long-held American strategic principle has been that its sphere of responsibility in Asia was defined by a partial circle extending from the Aleutians to the Philippines. The established presence of British troops and bases in Malaya, Singapore and Labuan constituted for the United States a useful division of international labor: the United Kingdom was sharing in a joint, yet independent, unformalized Anglo-American arrangement for policing Southeast Asia until such time as the independent nations on the periphery of the Chinese mainland can establish their own system of national security.

It has been a tenet of America's Far Eastern policy, in the aftermath of the famous 1950 Acheson declaration on the defense of Formosa, that the stability of the noncommunist Pacific nations should not be endangered by external Chinese communist pressures. A corollary of this view has been the notion that the containment of Communist China and *de facto* independence of the separate Asian nations must be firmly established before there can be an unqualified withdrawal of Anglo-American bases and troops from Asia. In pursuit of these goals Washington has favored a regional security system anchored in a network of multilateral and bilateral political and military compacts or, alternatively, if necessary, the development of some form of unity in Southeast Asia under the unofficial aegis of the United States.

[2]"Ambassador Bell Discusses Malaysian-American Relations," official text issued by the United States Information Service; document KL/2/65/65, February 23, 1965.

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Thus when London, in late 1964, decided as a matter of economic necessity to restudy and cut its total fiscal—that is, primarily military—commitments in Malaya-Borneo, Washington was distressed that a vacuum created by a British pull-out of forces might need to be filled by some form of American presence. If the British were to pull out, the United States might have to remain in the Pacific as the last of the "European" powers; such a move could become a severe handicap in American dealings with Asia. The United States desired "not to be left alone."[3] A British withdrawal, coupled with the full-scale U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, could have irreparable consequences for Western positions in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea.

The United Kingdom had noted on many occasions that it could not hold the existing line in Asia while at the same time it was obligated under NATO to maintain military garrisons in Germany. A White Paper on Defense Estimates, issued in 1966, minced few words about Britain's contemporary and future military capabilities in light of its current technical abilities and deployments of nonconscripted troops. The Wilson Government unequivocally came to the conclusion that "to maintain all our current military tasks . . . outside Europe would impose an unacceptable strain on our overstretched forces and bear too heavily both on our domestic economy and on our reserves of foreign exchange."[4] For these reasons Whitehall seriously considered reducing its forces in the Indian Ocean area and curtailing its far-flung activities by eventually closing down its Singapore air force and naval bases.

By June 1966, however, discussions between London and Washington had partially re-established the status quo: the Johnson Administration had persuaded Whitehall that the United Kingdom ought to contribute, despite the high costs, toward the maintenance of a "forward strategy . . . in the Pacific."[5] Thus, there would be no need for direct American replacement of British troops and military networks, and in the case of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur's first line of established defense links would continue to remain the responsibility of the United Kingdom. The British defense umbrella, however, would be augmented by contributions from New Zealand and Australia.

[3] *New York Times,* July 29, 1966.

[4] *Statement on the Defense Estimates 1966, Part I: The Defense Review* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), Cmnd. 2901, p. 7.

[5] *New York Times,* June 29, 1966.

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These countries would likewise guarantee the military and territorial security of Malaysia.

Yet, in the summer of 1967, scarcely a year after publication of the White Paper on Defense Estimates, the United Kingdom announced that it had made definite plans to withdraw completely from Southeast Asia and to close down all bases in Singapore and Malaysia. A time schedule was developed for the withdrawal of all military forces by the middle of the 1970's. Once again, the reason cited for this development was the British government's contention that the country's parlous economy required a reduction in overseas expenditures. Whitehall's great concern with easing its total defense costs during the 1970's was not lost on Malaysian governmental leaders. They had become acutely aware by 1966 that British determination to play a "constructive role in keeping the peace in Asia" would be limited by the actual scale of Britain's military efforts. Given the modest size of its own armed forces—consisting essentially of a small territorial army, a few frigates, gunboats, assorted minesweepers and a number of miscellaneous aircraft—Kuala Lumpur has begun to assess the future importance of maintaining Commonwealth and British forces on its soil. The Federation has noted that foreign troops are welcome, especially until the time when Malaysia can increase its limited defense capabilities. For the present the terms of the Anglo-Malayan Agreement of 1957 are still in force, although parts of the agreement will have to be renegotiated as a result of Singapore's exclusion from Malaysia.

In view of Britain's long-standing fiscal difficulties and Malaysia's fears of dismemberment during the Indonesian *Konfrontasi*,[6] Kuala Lumpur hesitatingly but openly approached Washington for military help. In November 1964 the United States was asked by the Malaysian Prime Minister to supply his country with helicopters large enough to ferry troops to exposed Borneo areas, as well as a number of jet trainers and landing craft. The Malaysians hoped the transaction could be underwritten by a standard defense loan. President Johnson agreed to submit the list of military equipment desired by Malaysia to the Defense Department and offered the beleaguered government, which accepted immediately, free military training in the United States for a select number of Malaysians. A U.S. military mission was

[6]René Peritz, "The Changing World of Malaysia," *Current History*, January 1967, pp. 29-35.

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sent to Kuala Lumpur to investigate the Federation's defense needs.

The mission had expected the Malaysians to ask for specific military hardware and to be ready for discussions about financing and procuring the desired materials. The Malaysians, in turn, had assumed that the U.S. team would make open-ended proposals and suggestions about the availability of defense grants and loans. Each of the negotiating groups was disappointed in the performance of the other and suggested, in private, that the other party was inadequately prepared to make a serious commitment.[7] The difficulties and lack of understanding of these early discussions were to have disappointing consequences.

The initial U.S. response to the Malaysian request for aid was equivocal and hesitant. Washington was uncertain about the international political merits of aiding a country whose destiny seemed to be tied closer to the Commonwealth than to the United States, and hence offered Kuala Lumpur a loan on a standard commercial basis. Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tun Abdul Razak, speaking in Parliament, rejected the loan as being commercially prohibitive—$15 million to be repaid within five to seven years at 5 per cent interest—and chided the United States, declaring that "since we are defending not only ourselves but democracy in this part of the world our friends ought to look after us with more sympathy and give us more aid."[8] Malaysia attributed American reluctance to help her both to the State Department's desire not to antagonize more powerful Indonesia, against which the weapons Malaysia sought might be used, and to a general American "indifference and ignorance" about Malaysia's quest for survival in the face of Indonesia's challenge. Malaysian officials were not slow in pointing out to the American embassy staff in Kuala Lumpur that Indonesia's size, geographic location, untapped natural resources and huge population seemingly meant more to the United States than the emerging Federation which had not yet proven that it "had the steel and stamina to survive as a stable force in Southeast Asia."

Nevertheless, the partly aborted 1964 Malaysian-American discussions led to the first consequential military links between the

[7]Interview with Malaysian and American officials in Kuala Lumpur, August 4, 1966.

[8]*Washington Post*, December 2, 1964, as cited in "Malaysia." *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, p. 21.

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two countries. Only once before had they engaged in minor military collaboration—in the era of Malaya's period of the "Emergency," when communist guerrillas fought against the colonial and then the national government. The liaison then involved chiefly an exchange of security information and the training of a few U.S. soldiers in counterinsurgency. In March 1965, Malaysia's disappointment at American reluctance to come to her aid was somewhat eased. Another military aid package, this time involving a U.S. defense loan of $4 million repayable in ten years at 3 per cent interest, was accepted by Kuala Lumpur. But this more generous offer came after U.S.-Indonesian relations had nearly reached the breaking point; when Washington had been forced to close its Information Services in Java and American rubber estates had been seized by the Indonesian government.

Confrontation and "Counter-Indo"

In a careful assessment of pending political changes in the Pacific, a Congressional study group back from Southeast Asia noted, in 1963, that the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute along the Borneo frontiers could but should not precipitate American engagement in regional complications.[9] But the group's *Report* did not take cognizance of the possible eddying effect of increased pressure from Indonesia, especially if British troops were attacked along the 970-mile-long Sabah and Sarawak borders. The United Kingdom could call for New Zealand and Australian assistance, and the nations involved in turn could be expected to activate the formal ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) agreement, drawing the United States into the conflict. Even though the ANZUS Accords, signed in 1951, had been drawn up with the objective of limiting future Japanese incursions into the strategic areas of Southeast Asia, provision was made for joint undertakings by the signatories, subject to national legal reservations, should any one of them come under armed attack. It was strange that the *Report* should have failed to touch on all aspects of possible U.S. involvement in the Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation.

Australian and New Zealand troops had been sent to the

[9]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Viet Nam and Southeast Asia—Report of Senator Mike Mansfield, Senator J. Caleb Boggs, Senator Claiborne Pell, Senator B. A. Smith,* Committee Print, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 17.

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Borneo jungles in the early part of 1964, and the United Kingdom had come under severe political attack by Indonesia for sponsoring the establishment of the Federation. Both the United Kingdom and the Malaysian Federation remonstrated to the United States to cut off all Indonesian aid programs, those in pipeline included, in a show of solidarity for the embattled Malaysian states. Kuala Lumpur underscored its apprehensions by asking Washington to do more for its survival than give unsatisfying "moral backing," expressions of sympathy, and token offers of military aid. But the United States, having lost much influence in Indonesia during President Sukarno's long era of "living dangerously," was unwilling to terminate all aid programs—especially those which permitted Washington to maintain contacts and collaboration with known anti-communist elements in the Indonesian Army. During the period of greatest hostility toward Malaysia, the Administration continued to supply Djakarta with limited quantities of food, minor shipments of small arms, specialized radio and electronic gear—for use by the army in the outer islands—and was favorably considering helping Indonesia to build a commercial nuclear reactor.

Malaysian newspapers took exception to the U.S. policy of maintaining contacts in Indonesia, however tenuous and limited they seemed to be, and became particularly critical of the U.S. decision to sell strategic electronic equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. One of the more influential Malay dailies, *Utusan Melayu,* called on the central government to review its general friendliness toward the United States "in view of the present enigmatic attitude shown by America concerning Malaysia's struggle to defend her independence."[10] The Sabah English language *Daily Express* harshly and bitterly attributed base motives to the United States for holding on in Indonesia in order to "create a better climate . . . among the Indonesians [so as] to get a welcome reception for their new ambassador."[11] The United Malay National Organization, a major partner of the ruling Malaysian Alliance Party, suggested that the United States was following a "two-faced approach" despite its professions of aiding and strengthening the security of Malaysia.[12]

Almost immediately after the formation of Malaysia Djakarta

[10]*Suara Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur), July 30, 1965.
[11]*Ibid.*
[12]The *Times* (London), November 21, 1963. For other comments about this issue which was threatening to exacerbate U.S. relations with the United Kingdom and Malaysia, see *ibid.,* November 18, 1963 and August 6, 1965.

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had made it clear that it wanted both the breakup of the Federation and the closing down of foreign bases in Malaya. Indonesia withheld recognition of the new state on the broad and general ground that the modern principle of self-determination had not been followed in the Borneo components of the Federation. The solution, as Indonesians saw it, required a plebiscite in Sarawak and Sabah to determine the degree of popular support for the Malaysia concept, and elimination of the British military installations from the area. In an effort to assuage Indonesian sensibilities about not having been consulted about the disposition of the Borneo territories at the time of the Anglo-Malaysian negotiations, and to dampen the possibility of a direct clash, Kuala Lumpur, at a conference of the Heads of Government of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia (MAPHILINDO), acceded to a request that the United Nations send survey teams to Sabah and Sarawak. These were to ascertain local sentiment so as to enable Indonesia and the Philippines to recognize gracefully the *de jure* existence of Malaysia. The United States, having welcomed the Federation to the family of nations, agreed to this move and supported Indonesian requests that the UN teams be accompanied by a number of Indonesian observers. The United Kingdom, however, for its own policy reasons, did not take kindly to Washington's desire to mollify Indonesian suspicions about the United Nations' fact-finding procedures and refused to permit more than a token Indonesian group to enter the Borneo states. On September 13, 1963 a report of the UN Secretary-General concluded that the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak had approved in principle and practice the formation of the Federation.

Subsequent American diplomatic support for Malaysia was an underlying irritant to Indonesia, but far more nettling to Djakarta was London's large military buildup in Singapore, Labuan and various Borneo towns. Djakarta was inclined to see Washington and London as major obstructions to its regional ambitions. The existence of Malaysia, in this line of thinking, constituted an obvious "imperialist plot" to continue British hegemony in Asia and, by inference, a "neo-colonial" scheme to encircle Indonesia. Indonesian newspapers pointed to American naval and air force installations in the Philippines as an additional step in this direction.

In the process of developing his own concept of a permanent revolution, President Sukarno cultivated concord with the Peo-

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ple's Republic of China as a strong anchor for the "newly emerging forces." The United States' objective of containing Communist China was therefore directly challenged during the same period in which a close ally of the United Kingdom was being subjected to a series of border incursions. Sukarno had grown deeply suspicious of the Anglo-Malaysian alliance, and in January 1965 Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations in protest against Malaysia's admission.

Washington had previously made an effort to ease accelerating tensions by sending Robert F. Kennedy, then Attorney General, to Indonesia to appraise Djakarta of the American position in the regional dispute and to warn Sukarno of the consequences to his country should the guerrilla fighting in Borneo escalate into a war in which the United States would be forced to assist Indonesia's opponents. Kennedy had been chosen for his delicate mission for personal as well as political reasons. Once before the United States had been instrumental in helping to settle an international problem of prime interest to Indonesia. By aiding Djakarta to acquire West Irian (New Guinea) from the Netherlands, Washington had earned a large reservoir of goodwill within Indonesia; since this effort had been undertaken during the Kennedy Administration, President Johnson hoped a useful dialogue on ending the Malaysia conflict could be initiated through a visit to Indonesia by a prominent emissary of the former Administration.

Kennedy met with President Sukarno and subsequently with President Macapagal of the Philippines and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, yet the mission was not particularly successful. According to the *New York Times* of January 17, 1964, he brought to Indonesia

> a warning, a proposal and a promise. . . . The warning [was] that the United States [would] be unable to continue economic aid if guerrilla operations continue. The proposal [was] that Indonesia seek a peaceful settlement through a tripartite conference with Malaysia and the Philippines [the latter having laid territorial claims to Sabah]. The promise was . . . United States . . . help to speed [Indonesian] economic development if peace is restored.

In addition, Kennedy suggested that Washington would look with favor on the formation of a MAPHILINDO association of nations in Southeast Asia. In his words, "the role of the United States [was] complete" in the quarrel. His initiative left the Indonesian government in no doubt that it was clashing head-on

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with American interests in preserving the peace. Kennedy declared that the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which many Indonesians have traditionally seen as a source of protection against a strong China, "is also an integral part of America's alliance and friendship with Britain."[13]

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, reiterated American support both for the Federation and for British efforts to stiffen Malaysian resistance against Indonesian infiltration; he indicated that if Djakarta were to continue to subvert the local authorities in Borneo, it would be guilty of "aggression." The Johnson Administration stressed its determination to resist Indonesian attempts to endanger Western security in Southeast Asia by curtailing $2.5 million in annual military grants to the Indonesian government, and all but abandoned membership in an international "Aid to Indonesia" consortium that was considering drafting a stabilization loan. These moves, over a period of many weeks, were met by Sukarno's classic retort, "To hell with your aid. We can do without aid. We will never collapse." The hardening of the American position against confrontation had also been emphasized by a Congressional amendment to the 1965 foreign aid bill including the proviso that the President could deny aid to any country which was commencing aggressive military action against another country receiving American assistance.

Although diplomatically Washington and Djakarta weathered their worst storm since 1956-1957—when the United States was accused of financing the Sumatran revolt against the Indonesian government—little mutual confidence remained. Nevertheless, in order to promote a swift and bloodless settlement, the United States made it clear to Indonesians and Malaysians alike that it would favor a conclusion to the dispute on terms drawn up and implemented by Asians. Washington was too concerned with the task of containing Communist China and protecting South Viet Nam from North Viet Nam to wish to intervene in yet another Asian dispute that was not identified primarily with Chinese foreign policy. In a sense the American posture of exerting pressure without engaging in specific anti-Indonesian commitments proved to be successful. By October 1965 a radical upheaval in Indonesia led to the ouster of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) from positions of power and the isolation of President Sukarno from positions of authority.

[13] *The Observer* (London), January 1, 1964.

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Even though Sukarno continued to symbolize a mystique of national unity, his ideas of "Malaysian neo-colonialism" lost acceptance in the Indonesian government after the PKI's abortive coup d'état of September 30, 1965. The new ruling junta of army and civilian personnel was more concerned with restoring normal relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, and redressing the severe economic imbalances that obtained in the country, than with continuing a struggle in which Indonesian national interests were only vaguely involved. The Minister of Economics, Finance and Development, Hamengku Buwono, Sultan of Jogjakarta, approached American diplomats after the *Gestapu* (September 30 movement) coup had destroyed the PKI, and requested the United States and other members of the "Aid to Indonesia" consortium to help Indonesia control its runaway inflation and general drift toward economic disaster. He was privately informed that the United States would be amenable to a renewal of assistance only if Sukarno could be induced to temper his violent anti-American criticisms, and if Indonesia would end its undeclared war against Malaysia. In the post-*Gestapu* era convictions grew among the ruling triumvirate, General Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik and Sultan Hamengku Buwono, that Indonesia would have to be reinstated in the United Nations and needed to restore cordial ties with the United States if any major progress was to be made toward securing international assistance to revive the shattered Indonesian economy.

The Bangkok Accords of July-August 1966 formally concluded the confrontation issue. These afforded the peoples of East Malaysia—Sabah and Sarawak—the opportunity to reaffirm peaceably and "through general elections their previous decision about their status in Malaysia."[14] For Indonesia and Malaysia the peace agreement strengthened the doctrine espoused by both countries and the United States that "Asian problems must be solved by Asians themselves."[15] For the United States the Accords

[14] *Suara Malaysia,* August 18, 1966.

[15] *The Mirror* (Singapore), August 22, 1966. That Malaysia's rapprochement with Indonesia could be expected to lead to future Asian and American initiatives in the region was noted in Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's evaluation of regional politics shortly after the Bangkok agreements had been ratified. After endorsing U.S. action in Viet Nam and noting that "wherever the Chinese Communists have their agents at work—in Laos, Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines . . . troubles have occurred," he obliquely concluded that the West has a continuing role to play in Southeast Asia: "Indonesia has shaken off the shackles of Communism and it is now the duty of the Free World to do all it can to help her to recover her bearings so that she can embark on honest planning for the reconstruction of the country." *The Straits Times,* September 16, 1966.

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meant that a policy of limited and judicious participation in the complications arising out of the creation of the Malaysian Federation had yielded more than satisfactory results.

Economic and Commercial Directions

A notable feature of American involvement in Malaysia is to be found in Washington's modest pattern of economic assistance to the Federation. Total disbursements for technical aid, loans and grants are minor when compared to U.S. undertakings in Thailand, Viet Nam, the Philippines or even Laos. The United States has no AID (Agency for International Development) mission either in Malaya or Borneo, hence funds that have been channeled into Malaysia have come through a combination of bilateral and multilateral sources. While it is impossible to give complete American expenditures for 1957 to 1965, since a host of export-import citations, investment figures and invisible earnings must be calculated into a grand total, some relevant data are available for the eight-year period. Malaysia has received a number of nongovernmental contributions, including outright grants amounting to US $7,083,000. Assistance from government sources totals $18,290,000 and has been used for community services and educational programs as well as training of specialized staff for various Malaysian institutions. In addition, American defense and development loans came to $24,000,000. In 1966 alone, U.S. bilateral assistance from nongovernmental and official sources amounted to $11,400,000.[16] This last total does not include precise figures of loans and grants from nongovernmental American contributors. Aid involvement and economic cooperation have often been in support of domestic "self-help" projects to which a host of miscellaneous individual private organizations have given financial assistance.

While Malaysia has been particularly eager for American guidance in educational and social development plans, the most effective and direct U.S. contributions have been the provision of capital for specific economic diversification plans and the training of indigenous personnel in various fields by American experts and professional people.

[16]These figures are based on conversations with officials of the United States Embassy in Malaysia, the Federation's Ministry of Commerce and Industry, various private foundations, the Department of Commerce (Washington), the Peace Corps (Washington) and the U.S. Defense Department, July-August 1966. In 1966-1967 the U.S. government loaned Malaysia approximately $19 million for the purchase of military equipment and defense items of various kinds. *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 13, 1967, p. 102.

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In July 1958 an initial $10,000,000 was loaned to help build a seaport, a network of roads, and bridges in East Malaya. This loan was issued on terms requiring repayment in thirty years at a rate of 3½ per cent interest. The disbursing agency, the Development Loan Fund, in the same year made an additional $10,000,000 available on similar terms for an ambitious wharf-building scheme in West Malaya. In post-independent Malaya, the United States has liberally funded an extensive Peace Corps program which has operated in all sections of the country. The main objective of this scheme has been, and is, to help the central government operate its many community and rural development projects. To November 1966 no fewer than 1,016 volunteers had arrived in the fourteen Malaysian states, Penang and Malacca to undertake a variety of tasks, chiefly educational and medical-clinical; of this number 700 were teachers, about 125 were health specialists—nurses, medical technicians, and the like—and about 200 were rural community workers.[17] Thirteen Peace Corps contingents have been dispersed throughout the Malaysian region at an estimated cost of $9,240,000 to the United States. The program has been extraordinarily successful and, even though beset at times by administrative difficulties in the field, has been uniquely free of negative political repercussions.

In another educational venture the United States Information Service office—usually in conjunction with, but at times separately from, the Malaysian-American Commission on Educational Exchange (the Fulbright program)—has paid for the costs of sending, and maintaining, 500 persons to the United States on study and observation missions. Of this figure, however, fewer than 160 grants had been issued to Malaysians for degree studies in American institutions of higher learning. The reasons for the limited number of students coming to the United States can be traced to an uncertain administrative legacy bequeathed to the Federation by preceding colonial governments.[18].

[17]Communication to the author from the Peace Corps (Washington), November 30, 1966. In addition to the figures given, about 90 teachers were to have arrived in Malaysia by December 1966. Currently training were 50 industrial arts teachers, 26 village community development workers, and 30 tuberculosis control workers, in preparation for a January-February 1967 arrival. A spring 1967 training program was planned for 43 community development volunteers. The Peace Corps continues to receive requests from the Malaysian government for more volunteers than it is able to supply.

[18]The Malaysian Ministry of Education had been restrictive about accepting American university and college degrees on a par with those granted by British and Australian-New Zealand institutions. The latter institutions were considered to be superior in many respects to their American equivalents. The holder of an

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Malaysia has also been the recipient of outright gifts of surplus food from the United States under the "Food for Peace" program and has received miscellaneous equipment and books from the United States Information Agency, the American Public Health Service, and the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Other assistance, amounting in value to somewhat under $2,000,000, has included equipment and specialized technical help for the Malaysian Institute of Medical Research. Perhaps the greatest sustained generosity can be found in grants from private American sources for programs in the fields of agriculture, education and economic planning, pilot research projects, and a number of humanitarian and economic enterprises.[19]

The First Malaysian Five-Year Plan (1966-1970), a comprehensive national scheme designed to spur the development of all parts of the country, calls for an outlay of $3.5 billion in both private and public sectors and stresses the raising of more revenue from internal and external sources. Whereas previously the Federation in its First and Second Malaya Plans had been able to finance its development almost exclusively from local funds, the Malaysia Five-Year Plan depends to a considerable extent on attracting foreign capital. The emphasis on foreign funding can be attributed to large allocations for the Federation's defense establishment. As a result of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation and the requirements of internal security along the long land frontiers of Sabah and Sarawak, approximately 25 per cent

American university degree was not "recognized" as possessing bona fide university credentials and therefore could not expect the same access to government employment as Oxford and Cambridge graduates. Before 1965, Malaysia accepted a few select American degrees primarily earned in such specialized fields as mining, chemistry, engineering and fisheries, thereby casting doubt on the value of any other type of degree earned in the United States—irrespective of the status of the accredited institution. It was only after the Fulbright-Hays program had been inaugurated, and the American Ambassador had made personal representations on the subject, that the Malaysian cabinet, as a matter of national policy, reversed its position on restricting the graduates of higher American educational institutions from entering government service.

[19]American diplomatic officials have occasionally pointed out that the flow of international capital into Malaysia through multilateral institutions includes an American component since the United States is the major contributor to the international agencies furnishing the aid. Thus contributions by the United Nations Technical Assistance Program (U.S. contribution of $4,300,000 for 1950-1965), World Health Organization and International Labor Organization ($2,000,000 for 1960-1965), United Nations Special Fund ($1,800,000 for 1961-1965), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund ($600,000 for 1963-1965), and six different loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and two by its affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IBRD: $177,500,000 for 1958-1966; IFC: $3,033,000 for 1963-1966), have helped to alleviate Malaysia's acute need for developmental and capital assistance.

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of the total public expenditure for 1965-1966 was reserved for defense. The goals of the Malaysia Plan, per se, would

> promote integration of the peoples and states of Malaysia, provide a steady increase in income and consumption per head, generate employment opportunities for new entrants to the labor force, stimulate new kinds of economic activity, both agricultural and industrial, to reduce the nation's dependence on rubber and tin, open new land for development and reduce the number of landless requiring plots for agricultural purposes.[20]

In order to achieve these objectives Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin went to Washington in October 1965 to attend a conference of twelve industrialized countries which, under the auspices of the World Bank, met to consider ways to help Malaysia meet its foreign resources gap. Arrangements were made for the further meeting of an "Aid to Malaysia Club" composed of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the World Bank. After it had convened, this group agreed that the Federation's long-range plans "accorded with justifiable needs . . . and would require a significant increase in the volume of external assistance."[21] These sympathetic considerations were to result in a number of firm pledges totaling $633,000,000 in foreign funds available to Malaysia.

The United States was hesitant, however, to offer large amounts of dollar aid. Washington pointed out to Kuala Lumpur that Malaysia had extensive financial reserves, was well-endowed in natural resources, and therefore required only limited bilateral assistance. The Federation, in pleading its case, suggested that its high rate of population growth was likely to cut deeply into contemplated plans for raising national living standards. The American reply was that U.S. reservations about making outright and large commitments were tied to budgetary demands, expenditures in Viet Nam, and an adverse balance of payments. This view was reluctantly accepted by Tan Siew Sin, who sensed that U.S. Administration officials "feel they have done enough in this field [of stimulating economic improvement] . . . and . . . this [Malaysia] is really a British field of responsibility."[22] Neverthe-

[20]Malaysian Information Service of the Embassy of Malaysia (Washington), *Malaysian Bulletin,* January 1966, No. NB 26, p. 1.
[21]*Special Appendix to the Royal Address by His Majesty the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong at the Opening of Parliament on Tuesday, 14th June 1966* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 4.
[22]*The Sunday Times* (Kuala Lumpur), January 23, 1966.

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less he pointed out that Malaysian budgetary surpluses had dwindled from a peak of $237 million (Malaysian dollars) in 1960 almost to zero five years later. The United States agreed that as a member of the "Aid to Malaysia" group it would try to help the Federation meet its financial schedules, despite its own curtailed foreign aid budgets, by letting Malaysia borrow the needed funds from the Export-Import Bank. The American people have helped in another way to finance Malaysian economic expansion: in 1965 the Federation was able to offer $25 million in external serial bonds on the New York market and raised the entire amount by public subscription in a matter of days.

Apart from the specialized funds it has secured for programs of development, the central government has sought to create an atmosphere conducive to capital investment in the manufacturing and industrial sectors. Legal measures aimed at promoting balanced economic development were taken with the passage of laws governing the establishment of tax-exempt pioneer industries—mainly those which produce consumer goods for the home market and thus reduce Malaysian imports of similar products. The pioneer industries program was launched for the purpose of attracting foreign capital by offering the investor tax relief for a flexible period of two to five years, tariff protection from competing foreign units, protection against dumping by foreign exporters, loan facilities through the Malayan Industrial Development Finance Limited, and favorable sites in government-supported parks. By the terms of the Investment Guarantee Agreement accepted by the United States and Malaysia, the American investor is protected and insured against loss of his capital from most risks, including revolution, war and insurrection. The Federation has stipulated that a foreign concern should, whenever possible, reserve at least 49 per cent of the share capital for subscription by Malaysian nationals. By the end of 1965 American companies had called up capital in excess of M $38,700,000, out of an overall total of M $146,000,000,[23] thereby making the United States the biggest single investor in pioneer industries and giving it a commanding lead among some forty nations that have contributed to the country's progress in industrial development.[24]

[23]Communication from the Industrial Development Division of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Kuala Lumpur), August 9, 1966.

[24]Pan-Malaysian-U.S. trade balances have been running heavily in Kuala Lumpur's favor for a number of years. In 1966 Malaysia imported from the United States sundry goods totaling US $69 million, but exported to it the equivalent of

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As the world's largest producer of natural rubber, Malaysia furnished in 1965 about one-third of the world supply. In total figures natural rubber cultivation takes up 60 per cent of the available land in the various Malayan states. In 1965 latex accounted for 40 per cent of the total export earnings of the country and yielded approximately a third of its budgetary revenues.[25] The Federation's considerable dependence on U.S. imports of natural rubber date to the period of the Korean War, when the United States began to stockpile rubber and bought it at very high prices. Rubber has become one of the two greatest foreign exchange earners for the Federation (tin is the other one) and has raised Malaysian per capita income to one of the highest levels among the underdeveloped nations.

The gentleman's agreement between the United States and the world's leading natural rubber producing countries stipulates that if the price of rubber goes above 96 Malaysian cents ($.32) a pound, the United States (through its General Services Administration which manages American stockpiles) may sell unlimited amounts of rubber on the international market. If, however, the world price falls below 84 cents ($.28) the U.S. government may sell only "deteriorated" rubber up to a maximum of 6,000 tons a month or 72,000 tons a year. The Federation has insisted that this unofficial consensus has had a reassuring effect on the market in stabilizing natural rubber prices and in controlling the available and disposable U.S. stockpile of 600,000 tons.[26] Washington has taken the position that the 84-96 cent price formula was merely a general working arrangement and has consistently refused to acknowledge that it is bound by any agreement to a specific official disposal program. On the contrary, the United States Treasury Department has favored continuous reduction of available rubber on grounds that the stockpiled natural material tends to deteriorate, while local storage charges increase, and should therefore be sold at favorable prices. Malaysia has maintained that indiscriminate international sales would seriously cripple its economy and introduce market uncertainties which could easily result in local repercussions with strong anti-American overtones.

The concern with which the Federation views U.S. rubber

US $161 million, mainly in tin, rubber, canned pineapples and timber, thereby demonstrating that the United States is a major customer for Malaysian produce and goods. *The Far Eastern Economic Review,* July 13, 1967, p. 102.

[25] *Natural Rubber News,* January 1966, p. 3.

[26] *Financial Times* (London), May 3, 1966.

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purchases and sales is often expressed in the Malaysian press and public forum. At times, U.S. actions are interpreted as deliberate efforts to undermine the Federation. In the midst of the confrontation issue the United States was severely criticized for buying large quantities of rubber from Indonesia. The Chinese newspaper *Nanyang Siang Pau* interpreted this as being "tantamount to helping Indonesia to crush Malaysia."[27] Often accompanying these criticisms are notes of moderation and appeal to the effect that "Malaysia is the strongest proponent of the democratic, free enterprise system in Southeast Asia. [It] . . . believes in and practices the tenets of these two institutions."[28] The American answer to Malaysian critics has usually been that United States-Malaysian relations should always be evaluated from a global context, and that U.S. decisions to allow unrestricted sales of stockpiled rubber have not been responsible in the final analysis for driving down the price of rubber.

A similar quandary with concomitant political overtones exists with regard to the U.S. program for disposal of excess stockpiled tin. The United States has accumulated vast reserves of tin since 1951 and is capable of influencing the international market at moments of price weaknesses or unforeseen market disruptions. The General Services Administration, Malaysians hold, has almost complete freedom to dispose of and to sell quantities of the metal during any specified period, but has regularly held or sought consultations with the major producing countries and the International Tin Council representing tin-producing countries. The nature of the consultations has never been firmly spelled out and Kuala Lumpur has, as in the case of rubber, consistently believed that U.S. reserves can determine the market price of tin and consequently Malaysia's revenues from its own tin sales. On this point the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Dr. Lim Swee Aun, has often cited the lack of a firm understanding between the United States and Malaysia on one hand, or between the United States and major producers on the other. Again, as in the rubber question, Washington has held that it would continue to dispose of tin which it judged to be surplus and unnecessary for strategic requirements.

Conclusions

President Johnson's brief stopover in Malaysia in October

[27] *Suara Malaysia*, July 23, 1966.
[28] *Natural Rubber News*, April 1966, p. 1.

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1966 may have marked the beginning of a new period in American-Malaysian relations. Before that visit, the two countries had had mostly friendly but limited political ties and they shared a common ideological commitment. On the question of the Malaysian-Indonesian estrangement, Washington adopted a cautious position consonant with its well-established policies of containing communist expansion. Since the confrontation issue was all-important to Malaysia, America's recognition of Malaysia and its concern for the survival of this new state were welcomed in Kuala Lumpur. Other Malaysian causes, such as regional integration and association, have been broadly, if only occasionally, supported in Washington. The facts for the United States, of course, were that cordial political ties with Malaysia were considered normal and official U.S. attention was more concerned with the problems of Viet Nam than with the difficulties confronting Malaysia in her relations with Indonesia. In the early 1960's the regional balance of power among the states of Southeast Asia, except for the situation in Viet Nam, was operating satisfactorily and the United States hoped that no large-scale intervention in the area would be necessary. However, the danger of political shifts in the Malay world and the rest of Southeast Asia during the *Konfrontasi* era was very real, especially since the United Kingdom was assuming a lesser role on the Malaysian scene. The influence of the United States in the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute probably played a key role in bringing that imbroglio to an end.

Malaysia's economic dependence on the United States is another factor complicating relationships between the countries. For America that is a minor problem, but to the Malaysians U.S. complacency about GSA purchases and sales of natural products has immediate consequences for the local economy and the Malaysian level of foreign exchange earnings. The U.S. impact in this regard can be at different times detrimental or beneficial.

Moreover, despite Washington's often-repeated assertion that Malaysian interests are closely linked with those of the United Kingdom, the prevalent mood in Kuala Lumpur is that the United States is the world power able to give needed direction to regional cooperation and development in Southeast Asia. While there is considerable harmony between the United States and Malaysia on many questions, Malaysian officials at times find it difficult to reconcile broad U.S. political initiatives in Asia with specific U.S. economic programs involving stockpile policies that directly affect the Federation's economy.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1934-1945

by Warren I. Cohen

TOWARD the end of 1933, the Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek launched its fifth and greatest "pacification" campaign in a determined effort to bring about a final solution to the problem posed to it by Chinese communism. By October 1934, the Kiangsi Soviet had ceased to exist and the remaining communist armies were fortunate in breaking through the Nationalist encirclement to begin the grim retreat that was to be romanticized as the Long March. After a year in which they covered approximately 6,000 miles on foot, more often than not under attack, the communists reached the relative safety of Shensi Province, in the northwestern part of China proper. They carried with them a heritage of anti-Americanism.

To a large extent this anti-Americanism was rhetorical, based on doctrinaire disapproval of the United States as a capitalist and an imperialist power. The historical experience of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provided little substance for hatred of the sort that the party could generate against Japan or England, and there was evidence of occasional prompting from Moscow to stiffen the line the Chinese comrades took against America. But there was also the matter of the ease with which the United States came to terms with Chiang Kai-shek after he purged his revolutionary forces of communist influence, of the amicable relations between the United States and the hated Kuomintang (KMT) regime. If, in the early 1930's Chiang's quarrels with Japan and differences with England precluded labeling him a puppet of either of these countries, Sino-American friendship and especially American loans to Chiang's government allowed the CCP to charge Chiang with being the servant of American imperialism. For substance, there was an awareness that American loans enabled Chiang to free other funds for his campaigns against the communists.[1]

[1]For an extended discussion of the legacy of anti-Americanism which the CCP carried to Shensi, see my "The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1922-1933," in ORBIS, Spring 1967, pp. 219-237.

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However, by the time the Long March reached its triumphant conclusion, the international situation had led to a new Comintern line that left no room for overt expressions of antagonism toward the United States. The failure of the League of Nations to contain Japanese aggression, combined with the rising threat of national socialism in rearmed Germany, prompted a Soviet call in July 1935 at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International for the formation of a united front, not against reactionary domestic forces, but against foreign aggression.

For several years before this the CCP had been calling for a united front of all the Chinese people, nominally directed against Japan, but in fact directed against the Kuomintang. In April 1934, for example, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a long manifesto calling upon the people to "firmly oppose the Kuomintang policy of surrender and betrayal and to abandon any illusions about the League of Nations and the United States."[2] But in 1934 the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations and the demands of the Seventh Congress required a *de facto* reversal of CCP policy: a shift from talk about a united front that was meaningless without the participation of the KMT to an attempt to establish a genuine united front with the KMT against Japan. Perhaps more significantly with regard to foreign policy, it *required* the CCP for the first time to make distinctions among the various noncommunist countries, with a view toward the possibility of allying with some of them against others.

Thus the guidelines were established for a friendlier CCP line on the United States and a policy inviting the United States to demonstrate by its actions that it deserved to be considered apart from Germany and Japan and as a friend of China. This new foreign policy position was spelled out in the last half of 1935 and advanced by the CCP until the summer of 1939, when the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact required still another shift in communist strategy, in which the CCP, like the American Communist Party, followed the Soviet lead.

In August 1935, after the Soviet Union signed alliances with France and Czechoslovakia, the CCP issued a call for the establishment of friendly relations with all peoples and nations that showed goodwill toward the Chinese effort against Japan. In December, the Central Committee announced that the com-

[2]Quoted in Wang Chien-min, *Chung-Kuo Kung Ch'ang Tang Shih-kao,* III (Taipei, 1965), pp. 32-33.

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munists would cooperate with anyone who would oppose Japanese imperialism—that all who helped would be considered friends.[3]

In the summer of 1936, a sympathetic young American journalist, Edgar Snow, courageously penetrated the Nationalist blockade of the communist-controlled Shen-Kan-Ning border region and learned a great deal about the Chinese communists that he passed on to the outside world in his famous *Red Star Over China,* published in 1938. According to communist sources, on July 15, 1936 Mao Tse-tung permitted Snow to interview him on questions of foreign policy. The results of the interview appeared not only in Snow's book, but in slightly different form in a pamphlet printed by the CCP for distribution in China. For the CCP, the interview proved to be an excellent means of promulgating its new line.

Snow asked for a general statement of policy toward capitalist countries and, as in response to most of the subsequent questions, Mao chose not to reply directly, but to issue a broad propaganda statement. He contended that the main issue was the struggle against Japan and that Japan was not only the enemy of China, but the enemy of all who desired peace, especially the people of countries like England, the United States, France and the USSR. The Chinese communists sought to be united with all these countries and hoped for active assistance from them. For the United States, juxtaposition with the Soviet Union in a CCP statement was clearly an increase in status.

Some countries, Mao declared, were unwilling to countenance a Japanese occupation of China. Among these he included the United States. Such countries, like weaker colonies and semi-colonies threatened by aggression, "we consider . . . friendly states and ask for their cooperation." And so the United States, though not viewed as warmly as the Soviet Union, had been elevated to the position of "friendly state."

In outlining the kind of aid he hoped for, Mao noted that in the past aid from the United States and a number of other countries had gone to the Nanking government, which had used most of this material and financial support in the civil war—"that kind of 'help', in our opinion, is definitely of no value to the Chinese people." If the United States would oppose Japanese

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 45; "Chung-Kuo Kung Ch'ang Tang kuan-yü mu-ch'ien cheng-shih hsing-shih yü tang te jen-wu chueh-i" in *Kuo-Kung Ho-tso k'ang-jih wen-hsien* (Hankow, 1938), p. 23.

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aggression, go so far as to blockade Japan, *then* relations between the Chinese and American people would be closer.

Asked by Snow to explain what he hoped for from the American government and the people of the United States, Mao replied that he believed both the American government and people shared a "vast vision" toward China and that the future would draw the United States into a more active role in Chinese and Japanese affairs. The communists, he said, believed Americans would preserve this "vast vision," but they also hoped the Americans would join in a united front with the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism and the forces Japan represented. He was concerned, however, with "short-sighted politicians and mistaken isolationists" who seemed to pose an obstacle to the fulfillment of the role he hoped to see the United States play.[4]

In the months that followed, the Chinese communists, with an assist from General Chang Hsueh-liang in the Sian Incident,[5] succeeded in their efforts toward rapprochement with the KMT. A year later came the full-scale Japanese invasion of China proper. From this point until the Nazi-Soviet pact, the CCP chose to view the United States as a country divided between those who, like FDR, favored assistance to China and showed a growing inclination to oppose the Axis powers, and the reactionary isolationists. In January 1938, a writer in *Ch'-ün-chung* (*The Masses*) declared: "We are not, of course, satisfied with American actions in the last half year, but we certainly cannot deny that they have given China some convenient assistance in the war against Japan. . . ." While viewing England in much the same terms as the United States, he suggested that France and the Soviet Union were doing a bit more for China. Later in the month, another writer contended that the isolationists and reactionaries in the United States were growing weaker and wrote optimistically of the day soon to come when there would be an alliance of the democratic countries.[6]

Throughout 1938 and 1939, communist analysts took hope from the speeches of Roosevelt and Cordell Hull and from American military preparations, but they nevertheless compared the United States unfavorably with the Soviet Union: "We dare to say that the world does not have one nation that, like the Soviet Union, is able to bravely and strongly announce its opposition

[4] *Mao Tse-tung K'ang-chan yen-lun chi* (1938).
[5] The General kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in December 1936 to force him to declare war on Japan.
[6] *Ch'ün-chung (The Masses)*, I, No. 7 (January 15 and 22, 1938). Hereafter cited as *Masses*.

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to aggression." In particular, the CCP was unhappy with the Neutrality Legislation of the United States, and demanded its repeal.[7] The 1939 revisions that permitted "cash and carry" sales to belligerents satisfied them not at all. They could draw no solace from the fact that England could benefit from the change while China could not. When, in June 1939, the communists welcomed the American Ambassador, Nelson Johnson, on his arrival in Chungking, to which the Chinese government had retreated, they also complained about the limited U.S. assistance to China and contended that 54 per cent of Japanese arms came from the United States: Why didn't the American government stop its capitalists from selling to Japan?[8]

II

July 1939 brought some new hostile notes into the air. The CCP leadership seemed uncertain how China would be affected by the onrush of the Second World War. Mao himself wrote of the defeatism he sensed in China and in the West and foresaw a new "Munich" in the Far East. The Kuomintang Bureau of Investigation reported evidence of growing communist distrust of the United States. According to the Bureau's secret monthly report for July, the CCP analysis of the international scene concluded that England, France and the United States were sitting over the exhausted Chinese and Japanese, planning to mediate and partition China—a tune muted since the early days of Japanese operations in Manchuria.[9]

With August came the Nazi-Soviet pact, but in China it evoked none of the shock it occasioned in the West. If Chiang Kai-shek could view the pact and the threat of war in Europe as beneficial to China, it was hardly reasonable to expect Mao to attack Stalin's policy. The CCP line, to no one's surprise, was a defense of the pact as a triumph of Soviet peace efforts: Stalin had split the united front of the capitalist countries and defeated Chamber-

[7]The Neutrality Act of 1937, enlarging upon earlier statutes, stated that whenever the President proclaimed the existence of a state of war outside the Western Hemisphere, the export of arms and munitions to belligerents was to be prohibited. Certain types of exports to combatants had to be paid for before leaving U.S. Ports and had to be carried in foreign ships. All other trade was subject to the "cash," but not to the "carry," provision. It also barred loans to warring powers.

[8]*Masses,* I, No. 15 (March 26, 1938), No. 19 (April 23, 1938); II, No. 20 (April 1, 1939); III, No. 4 (June 11, 1939), No. 5 (June 18, 1939).

[9]*Masses,* III, No. 8-9 (combined, July 16, 1939); *Tiao Ch'a Chuan Pao (Bureau of Investigation Report),* No. 12 (July 1939).

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lain's plot to bring about a Soviet-German war. When war came to Europe, the CCP could and did shrug it off as a war between the fascists and imperialist England and France.[10]

Moreover, in August there was other news to which the Chinese communists could react with satisfaction: the United States announced the abrogation of its commercial treaty with Japan. Initial comments were joyous and high in their praise for Roosevelt, who was presumed to be outmaneuvering the isolationists in Congress. There was no doubt that the American people were pro-Chinese, and now they would be able to deny arms to the Japanese. Nonetheless, communist writers warned that this step would not be sufficient to stop Japan. Soon a demand was voiced that the United States boycott Japanese goods and embargo exports to Japan.[11]

The major events of the summer of 1939 had included the Nazi-Soviet pact, abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty and the outbreak of war in Europe. If the CCP reactions to these events were markedly similar to the positions taken in Moscow, it should also be noted that they were identical with the line coming out of Chungking. The change in the world situation was not followed by any noticeable shift in Chinese communist attitudes toward the United States, but the wedge that the united front tactic provided for separating capitalist countries into various categories placed the United States in a unique position. From 1935 to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, a power which opposed fascism could be considered a "friendly state," especially if it helped China. But when the CCP followed Moscow's lead and chose to view the war in Europe as a war between fascism and nonfascist imperialism, to view England and France as no better than Germany, Italy and Japan, the United States was left as the only major capitalist power toward which the CCP could look kindly. Traditional distrust of the United States persisted, as evidenced in July 1939 and again in 1940 and 1941—until the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it was clear that of all the capitalist powers only the United States could supply the kind of aid the CCP—and China—demanded.

In February 1940 the KMT's Bureau of Investigation made

[10] *Masses,* III, No. 14 (August 23, September 3, 1939); see also Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 132 ff.

[11] *Masses,* III, No. 11 (articles dated August 13 and 30, 1939).

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another secret report on Chinese communist views of American policy. Here again was the traditional view of the United States standing by during the Sino-Japanese war, waiting for the fisherman's share, or *tso shan kuan hu t'o* (sitting on the mountain observing the struggle between the tigers). The Americans were accused of wanting the Chinese to submit under protest, of being willing to mediate a settlement that would recognize Japanese hegemony in China. According to this report, the CCP insisted that China's only friends in the United States could be found in the American Communist Party. Other KMT intelligence materials in this period, such as the weekly analyses of important CCP speeches, were similar in content, alleging that the CCP was not satisfied with American efforts to stop the shipment of war supplies to Japan. The KMT Central Intelligence and Statistics Bureau reported that the CCP line stressed the desire of the American *people* to help China, but indicated that aid would only come from the Soviet Union, not from the *government* of the United States.[12]

Clearly, the KMT reports suggest a harsher CCP line on the United States than evidenced in CCP publications. It is possible that these reports are false, part of a deliberate effort by the Nationalists to create an impression that the Communist Party was implacably hostile to the United States. But the statements were secret, prepared for party consumption only, and there is no evidence that they were ever made available to the American government. In addition, a number of them contradicted the image of a Moscow-controlled CCP which the KMT was trying desperately to purvey to the United States. Indeed, there is much in CCP publications—often supported by secret CCP statements—which is consistent with the conclusions of KMT intelligence. In sum, it would seem feasible to view these reports as genuine efforts by the KMT to analyze developments within the CCP.

An example of discrepancies between published communist statements and secret inner-party directives discussing the United States can be seen in the period from October 1940 to May 1941. In October 1940, in a discussion of wartime industrial policy, a communist writer called for increased foreign assistance: ". . . under a pro-Soviet, pro-American foreign policy, advance Sino-Soviet, Sino-American friendly relations, get Soviet and American material and technical assistance." But the writer then went on

[12] *Tang p'ai Tiao Ch'a Chuo Pao (Report of KMT Bureau of Investigation)*, No. 3, February 24, 1940; No. 4 (weekly report for February 22-28, 1940).

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to oppose dependence on the United States. The implication was, quite simply, that American friendship and aid was possible and should be sought, but that the Americans could not be considered as reliable as the Soviets. In May 1941, in a secret inner-party directive, Mao warned: "Japan, the United States, and Chiang Kai-shek are plotting a new Munich in the Far East against Communism and the Soviet Union by bringing about a Japanese-American reconciliation at China's expense. . . ."[13] These were strange words coming only a month after the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact to which the CCP had given its unqualified endorsement. But the juxtaposition of two such statements about the United States indicated that despite changes in CCP leadership since the 1920's, despite the united front, suspicion of the United States remained strong. There could be and was hope, but where Soviet actions could be assumed to stem from the best of motives, the United States had yet to transcend twenty years of distrust. Although differences in the two statements might be explained by the passage of seven months and the intervening events, the six years from the communists' arrival in Yenan to the German invasion of the Soviet Union can be seen *in toto* as a period in which the CCP attitude toward the United States was one of faint hope, manacled by mistrust.

III

When Hitler turned eastward, Mao issued a new directive: "In foreign affairs, unite against the common foe with all the people in Britain, the United States and other countries who are opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan." As other communists writers explained, the German attack on the Soviet Union created a new situation: the war was no longer a struggle for dominion, colonies or markets, but a war of Soviet "righteousness and self-defense against German perfidy and counter-revolution."[14] This shift in the communist line affected the United States but little; rather it was France and England that had been transformed. American unwillingness to intervene had been equated with the Soviet quest for peace. Now the Americans, too, would be expected to meet the fascist threat. With the intensification of calls for a united front came demands that the United

[13] *Masses*, V, No. 9-10 (combined, October 30, 1940); Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), p. 21.

[14] Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, p. 23 (dated June 23, 1941); *Masses*, VI, No. 7 (June 30, 1941).

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States do more not only for China, but also for the Soviet Union. Chou En-lai wrote in praise of Churchill for recognizing that the Soviet effort was also England's and America's. Chou saw the United States moving closer and closer to intervention and asked only that the Americans should not compromise with Japan again. He understood that the United States was reluctant to fight a two-ocean war and that Germany had to be defeated first, but hoped for more aid to China.[15]

Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, until December 7, the communists chose to view the United States as a friendly state that was not helping China enough. American aid was contrasted unfavorably with Soviet aid, which had in fact been substantial prior to the German attack:

> The Chinese people have not forgotten that in the hour of their greatest danger, when democratic governments offered sympathy to the victims and arms to the authors of aggression, a socialist government acted differently. In the years when Britain and America sent finely worded tributes to China's defenders, Soviet Russia sent planes and guns. This is something the whole world should remember, now that Russia herself is receiving the full shock of the fascist attack. . . .[16]

The CCP line on the United States during these months can probably best be characterized as hopefully critical.

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chinese communists became increasingly pro-American. Not only were communist publications for the next few years fulsome in their praise of the United States, but there were revisions in the educational programs in communist-controlled areas which guaranteed that this new appreciation of America's role would permeate all levels of Chinese society. Not until the spring of 1945, after the death of Franklin Roosevelt, was any significant criticism directed against the United States.

Immediately after the United States entered the war, the com munists urged that the education of China's youth should stress the indivisibility of the Chinese, Soviet, English and American opposition to fascism. Young people were to be encouraged to establish friendship with the youth of these countries. The people were to be told that the war of England and the United States against Japan was a war for independence and freedom for all

[15] *Masses,* VI, No. 7 (June 30, 1941).

[16] *China Defense League Newsletter,* No. 36 (October-November 1941), p. 2. This newsletter was published in Hong Kong by the China Defense League under the chairmanship of Madame Sun Yat-sen. It followed the communist line. See also *Masses,* VI, No. 8-9 (combined, August 30, 1941).

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peoples—that their victory would be a victory of all the peoples of the world.[17] In the initial statements of December 1941 there were no invidious comparisons with the Soviet Union. In fact, with the stress on the "Pacific War" there was a growing tendency to omit all mention of the Soviet Union. The new emphasis on the united front against Japan seemed to require ignoring the Soviets and their nonaggression pact with the Japanese. Instead, constant emphasis was placed upon CCP cooperation with England and especially the United States.[18]

And so, at the close of 1941, as Americans pulled themselves together to recover from the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the Chinese Communist Party issued a warm welcome to its new comrades in war. The united front within China had long since degenerated into a sham and the KMT blockade of CCP-controlled areas was about a year old. But Mao's forces could no longer be dismissed as a paper organization or bandit-remnants. Now, for the first time in the history of the CCP, Mao controlled a sizeable portion of Chinese territory and had the support of almost 100 million people.[19] Now, for the first time, it became eminently reasonable to consider the CCP line not as the doctrine of a few alienated intellectuals or armed conspirators, but as ideas which would influence China's foreign policy; to recognize the Chinese communists as a force that could not be denied a say in China's future.

In February 1942, the CCP indicated some concern over the war effort in the United States and England. There were suggestions that these countries might learn from China's experience and take measures to unite all classes, all people in the fight against fascism. A contrast was offered between the "unanimous effort of the Soviet people against Germany" and the "fifth column" in the United States. Something appeared to be lacking in the United States and the implication was that the United States was less democratic than the Soviet Union, where the people were fighting to preserve their freedom.[20] But far more impressive was the constant praise which the party bestowed upon its new allies, the constant expressions of gratitude toward the United

[17]"T'ai-p'ing Chan-cheng fa-tung i-hou, 'Chung-kung' chih yen-lun" (*A Discussion of the "Chinese Communists" after the Outbreak of the Pacific War*), by the Honan Province Investigative and Statistical Office.

[18]Report of the KMT Bureau of Investigation, No. 12 (December 24, 1941).

[19]See Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[20]*Masses,* VII, No. 2 (February 10, 1942).

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States for its aid and assistance. One editorial in the *Chieh-fang jih-pao,* the CCP daily published in Yenan, indicated the degree of warmth the communists could generate when looking toward the United States. The writer examined the record of American fliers in China and praised them as "excellent sons of the American people." Of the Americans, he wrote: "For many years they have given the Chinese people continuous spiritual and material support." There was considerable discussion of the Sino-American alliance and its value to China, passing mention of the British contribution, but no mention of the Soviet Union. The Americans were described as a people who loved democracy and freedom and the editorial concluded with a call for greater Sino-American harmony in the struggle for the common victory over fascism. When Wendell Wilkie visited China in the fall of 1942, the communists issued a call for a rousing welcome for the man they called Roosevelt's special emissary, and urged that he be received with a great show of support and affection.[21] Even more significant, the party attempted to make clear that the enemy was fascism, not capitalism. An article in *Masses* praised the cooperation of the British, Americans and Russians, stressing the point that this cooperation was possible despite differences in ideology. Capitalist countries remained capitalist, the Soviet Union remained socialist, but the three countries did not allow these differences to interfere in their common effort.[22]

IV

After the Quebec Conference during the summer of 1943, there was some mild criticism of the United States in CCP publications. Roosevelt and other Americans had made much of their efforts to treat China as a great power, but the communists were quick to note the dichotomy between words and actions. As a gesture toward China's great-power status, a Chinese representative had been permitted to join the conference just prior to its conclusion. The CCP recognized that this was obviously an improvement over past practices among the Allies, but contended nevertheless that this token representation was not enough when the conference had covered issues which were relevant to China.[23]

[21] *Ibid.,* No. 4 (February 28, 1942); *Chieh-fang jih-pao,* April 12, August 9, and October 2, 1942. There is no indication in KMT intelligence reports of any less friendly statements by any member or organ of the CCP during this period.

[22] *Masses,* VIII, No. 6-7 (combined, April 10, 1943).

[23] *Chieh-fang jih-pao,* November 29, 1943. Mao acknowledged authorship of this statement in his *Selected Works,* IV, 131 ff.

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On the other hand this comment prompted by nationalistic pride was more than balanced by a defense of the American refusal to adopt an Asia-first policy—which was in effect a rebuttal of a KMT criticism of the United States. Mao contended that the KMT's criticism of American policy was based on Chiang's desire to see the Soviet Union crushed. It had apparently not occurred to Chairman Mao that the KMT position might be the logical argument of Chinese nationalists.

After the summer of 1943, KMT-CCP relations again grew tense and the specter of civil war reappeared. Thereafter, the CCP tended to ignore the existence of the Chungking government, and treated the war against Japan as if only the Americans and the Chinese communists were fighting—unless, of course, Nationalist forces suffered a disastrous defeat. In the disagreements that followed between the United States and the KMT government, the CCP press consistently supported the United States.

Though the CCP seemed happy with its American allies, the men who wrote for *Pravda* showed concern for the state of Soviet-American relations, and this was reflected in the CCP press in early 1944. The Soviets were annoyed by American criticism of their actions in Eastern Europe, particularly by some published remarks of Wendell Wilkie. Several *Pravda* articles were reprinted in the *Chieh-fang jih-pao,* but without comment. Not until May did a Chinese communist writer voice concern about American policy. This was expressed in a warning about recent activities of American "isolationists" and their attitudes toward the Soviet Union which could conceivably create problems when the war was over.[24] But the communists were not as worried as were some members of the KMT.

On May 1, 1944 the KMT put together a top secret report on recent CCP activities which left no doubt that the Nationalists were greatly concerned about the success with which the communists had wooed American opinion. After analyzing the content of CCP propaganda and the methods used to disseminate it, the men who compiled the report examined the international reaction with their focus on the American response. They were aware of a sharp decline in American faith in the Chungking government and contended that there was great sympathy in the United States for the Chinese communists. This was attributed

[24]*Chieh-fang jih-pao,* January 13, February 1, May 12, 1944.

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to the work of Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong, and other Americans who had visited China and provided propaganda materials for "leftist" publications.[25] Although the report accurately analyzed CCP tactics and the shifts in American reporting of Chinese affairs, the KMT did nothing in the next year to counteract this undesirable situation. On the contrary, friction between the Nationalist regime and the United States increased throughout 1944, and on all issues the CCP supported the American position.

The CCP continued its warm praise of the United States, defended America against Japanese charges of American imperialism, and celebrated the Fourth of July. When Vice President Henry Wallace persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to allow an American military mission to go to Yenan, Mao interpreted the mission as a reciprocal expression of American sympathy with the communist cause. Apparently elated, he told an American Foreign Service Officer that "any contact you Americans may have with us is gold" and that the primary virtue of the mission was the effect upon the KMT.[26] In handling the KMT-U.S. conflict, especially as it developed over the role of General Stilwell, the preferred CCP means was to reprint items hostile to Chiang from the American press, including a front-page story in the *New York Times* by Brooks Atkinson which referred to the KMT as a "moribund anti-democratic regime." Whenever possible, American articles suggesting direct cooperation between the United States and the Chinese communists were juxtaposed.[27]

One communist writer, discussing the Hurley-Nelson mission to China in September 1944, offered special praise for General Hurley—who was shortly to become the American least likely to find a friend in Yenan. The main purpose of the article, however, was to contend that the KMT-U.S. quarrel over aid was not due to insufficient assistance from the United States, but was caused by Chiang's mismanagement.[28] Thus the CCP found itself in a delightful situation: in attacking the hated KMT it could further ingratiate itself with the Americans. Despite its excellent intelligence reports, the KMT leadership had played into Mao's hands.

[25]"Pan-nien lai Chung-Kung yao-chung tai" *(Important Conditions among the Chinese Communists in the last six months).*

[26]John S. Service, "Interview with Mao Tze Tung, August 27, 1944," quoted in Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 162.

[27]*Chieh-fang jih-pao,* June 23, July 4 and 5, September 9, November 9 and 11, and December 14, 1944, January 22, 1945; *Masses,* IX, No. 10 (May 30, 1944).

[28]*Masses,* IX, No. 18 (September 30, 1944).

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Enmeshed in the praise the CCP was lavishing upon the United States was another thread that proved to be of vital importance in following years. It could be seen perhaps most clearly in a primary school reader that was published in July 1944 for use in the communist-controlled areas. Lesson 28 of the reader described the Soviet Union as a socialist country which, since the October Revolution, had become the world's most progressive nation. Lesson 29 described both the United States and England as capitalist countries but also as democratic countries threatened by fascism:

> Thus they are united with the Soviet Union and China in the war against fascism. Within these two countries there are progressive democratic factions *and also anti-democratic reactionary factions.* The English and American *democratic factions advocate continuous cooperation* with the Soviet Union and the Chinese people, to make a democratic world together.[29]

The italicized words were most significant. If in the United States there were two factions, and only one of these supported cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Chinese people (as distinct from the KMT), then, conceivably, the day might arrive when the other faction would come to power. The subsequent dangers were obvious.

The communists had, at least since 1937, chosen to view the American political scene in terms of a struggle between Roosevelt and reactionary isolationists. Wartime cooperation led to increasingly effusive praise for Roosevelt and his followers. When the CCP press celebrated the Fourth of July in 1944, editorial writers hailed the team of Roosevelt and Wallace—not only for supporting steps like the second front, but for extending the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the whole world and for their domestic policies on behalf of the working class. All of Roosevelt's policies were lauded as expressions of the great tradition of freedom and democracy in America.[30] The Chinese communists were not at all reticent about stating their preference in the American election of 1944. The re-election of Roosevelt would be a victory for peace, prosperity and democracy for the postwar world. The election results appeared to cheer CCP leaders, who contended that Chinese reactionaries were among those who sought Roosevelt's defeat. Mao sent a cable of congratulation, and his press referred to Roosevelt as the outstanding American advocate of inter-

[29] *Chu-chi hsin-k'e pen,* VI (Yenan, 1944), pp. 57-58.
[30] *Chieh-fang jih-pao,* July 4 and 5, 1944.

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national cooperation.[31] The "reactionaries" had been pushed back again, and the CCP evidently rested its hopes for the future on the continuation of Roosevelt's leadership.

V

The communists' friendly attitude persisted until Roosevelt's death in the spring of 1945. Earlier indications of dissatisfaction with or concern over Allied policy applied mainly to Great Britain. The CCP appeared to be confident about postwar cooperation with the United States, while fearing British opposition to communism after the defeat of the Axis powers. In December 1944, a Chinese communist writer criticized the British attitude toward the Greek communists, but he saw reason to hope that British policy would be opposed by the United States, in particular by Secretary of State Stettinius and various members of the United States Senate. Just before Roosevelt's death, *Masses* published an analysis of the prospects for peace in the postwar world in which optimism about future cooperation between the "democracies" and the Soviet Union was tempered by concern over a possible Anglo-American trade rivalry.[32]

Then, in April 1945, three events of transcendent importance occasioned a radical shift in the CCP attitude toward the United States. First General Hurley, American Ambassador to China, declared that the American government would support only the KMT government and would not recognize or supply any other government or forces. Second, Roosevelt died and was succeeded by a man about whom the communists knew nothing. Finally, Stalin signaled a new direction in communist relations with the West, which marked the beginning of the end of wartime cooperation.

Hurley's statement appears to have come as a shock to the CCP. KMT intelligence reports indicated that the communists had hoped to get direct aid from the United States in the form of lend-lease supplies. Mao and Chou were well aware of American dissatisfaction with the Nationalist war effort, and CCP propaganda had long attempted to exploit this. The arrival in Yenan of the American Observer Group in the summer of 1944 had been viewed as a prelude to broader cooperation. Obviously, the CCP leaders were alert to the friction between Chiang and

[31] *Ibid.*, July 27, October 27, November 10, 1944.
[32] *Ibid.*, December 9, 1944; *Masses*, X, No. 5-6 (combined, April 5, 1945).

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the U.S. government that had led to Stilwell's recall and the resignation of Ambassador Gauss, and sensed the relative favor with which their cause was viewed by most American officials and reporters in China. Now Hurley's statement abruptly ended their dream. KMT intelligence reported the CCP's initial anger, and in the next few months Mao became increasingly open in his condemnation of Hurley and the new tack in American policy. First, he warned both the United States and Great Britain against thwarting the wishes of the majority of the Chinese people by supporting Chinese reactionaries against democratic forces within China. On May 8 Hurley's statement was criticized in the CCP press. In June, at the Seventh National Congress of the CCP, Mao gave clear indication of his response:

> Yesterday in a talk with two Americans who were leaving for the United States, I said that the U.S. Government was attempting to undermine us —a thing which will not be tolerated. We object to the U.S. Government's policy of opposing Communism and supporting Chiang Kai-shek. . . . I told the two Americans: "Tell the policy-makers in your government that we forbid you Americans to enter the liberated areas because your policy is to support Chiang Kai-shek in the struggle against the Communist Party and this cannot but put us on our guard. You can come to the liberated areas, if your errand has to do with the anti-Japanese war, but there must be an agreement about this. If you want to prowl about, that won't be allowed. Since Patrick J. Hurley has openly declared that there will be no more cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party, why should you still want to prowl about in our liberated areas?"[33]

To Mao, the American policy as stated by Hurley was evidence of the "rampancy of the American reactionaries." When Roosevelt died, the CCP press had mourned his loss and expressed hope that Truman would carry on his policies. Events of the spring and summer, however, were interpreted to mean that U.S. policy had entered a new, anti-communist phase. One Chinese communist writer bemoaned American opposition to the Polish Provisional Government's participation in the San Francisco Conference and also expressed concern about Anglo-American opposition to the interests of the Soviet Union. When the details of the *Amerasia* case were announced, the CCP condemned the arrest of the *Amerasia* staff as the work of American reactionaries. This was viewed not as an isolated case, but rather as indicative of a growing dichotomy in American policy due to a

[33]Report of KMT Bureau of Investigation, No. 184 (April 28, 1945); *Chieh-fang jih-pao,* May 2 and 8, 1945; Mao, *Selected Works,* IV, pp. 317-318.

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resurgence of "reactionaries, isolationists, and appeasers." The new trend, which had grown in opposition to Roosevelt's policy, was personified by Hurley.

Mao personally kept up the attack on Hurley, demanding a return to Roosevelt's policy. He contended that Hurley was encouraging Chiang to be less willing to compromise, to be more dictatorial, to press on to civil war. He maintained that FDR had been concerned with peacetime reconstruction and had refrained from assisting the KMT's attack on the Chinese communists. Mao claimed that when Hurley came to Yenan in November 1945, as Roosevelt's personal representative, he had agreed to CCP plans for the "abolition of Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic coalition government. But later he changed his tune and went back on what he said at Yenan."[34]

The CCP's shift in attitude toward the United States was clear and easily understandable within the Chinese context alone. But the fact that it took place at precisely the same time as a worldwide shift in the communist line toward the West cannot be ignored. Most sources point to an article by a French communist, Jacques Duclos, published in April 1945, as the signal for the shift.[35] Duclos attacked Earl Browder, leader of the American Communist Party, for his wartime policies of collaboration with the U.S. government. This condemnation enabled William Z. Foster to oust Browder and take over the leadership of the ACP, but not until four weeks after Hurley's statement did the ACP begin to attack American policy in China. On July 2 Mao sent a cable to Foster congratulating him on his victory over revisionist-capitulationism.[36] There can be no question that the ACP had responded to an external stimulus, but what of the CCP? Was it Hurley's declaration or Stalin's prodding that led to the shift in the CCP line?

Although the policy shift reflected in the new CCP criticism of the United States accorded with the worldwide shift in communist tactics heralded by the Duclos article—and there can be no doubt that Mao, dependent as he was on Stalin's support, would follow Moscow's lead on such an issue—nonetheless Hurley's statement and subsequent actions gave Mao genuine

[34]*Chieh-fang jih-pao,* June 17 and 25, July 11, 13 and 20, 1945; Mao, *Selected Works,* IV, 328-329.

[35]See, for example, Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 442, and McLane, *op. cit.,* pp. 186 ff.

[36]Mao, *Selected Works,* IV, 330.

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cause for an independent shift. Moreover, with FDR's death and Truman's growing resistance to Soviet moves, Mao had reason to fear that Hurley's line would prevail and that no support would be forthcoming from the United States. Under these circumstances, the CCP had no choice but to dance to Stalin's tune and hope for the best.

There remained one last chance for minimizing hostility between the CCP and the United States. At Yalta, Roosevelt had created a time-bomb that exploded within a week after the Japanese surrender: the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. In this treaty the Soviets pledged not to interfere in China's internal affairs, and in an accompanying exchange of notes Molotov stated that aid and support to China would be given exclusively to the central (i.e., KMT) government. The signing of such a pledge made it apparent that Stalin's proclivity for giving primacy to the interests of the Soviet Union had led to the sacrifice of CCP interests.

Despite the brave front of the CCP press, the party leadership was badly shaken by the Soviet betrayal. Communist cadres were told that they must continue to tell the people that Soviet policy would work to the party's long-term advantage, but the leadership confessed that "Soviet policy cannot be understood." Without direct aid from Moscow, the Chinese communists were not ready for civil war, and the cadres were assured that the United States as well as the Soviet Union did not want civil war in China. Party strategy, however, was revised, and it was decided that for the time being it would avoid confrontation in the larger cities, concentrating on middle-size and smaller cities. Uncertain as to what Stalin's game was, the CCP would "proceed from hope."[37]

VI

At the close of the Second World War, the state of relations between the United States and the Chinese communists resembled what Marxists like to call an "open historical situation." The CCP leadership, anxious for outside aid in their struggle against the KMT, had counted on their ideological brethren in the Soviet Union. But just as Hurley's stand in April 1945 had dispelled hopes of American support, so the Sino-Soviet treaty had shattered Mao's hopes for Soviet assistance. Bravely the CCP

[37]Hu Hsi-k'uei, *Shih-chü pien-hua ho wo-te fang-chen* (Transcript of lecture to cadres dated August 30, 1945, entitled *Changes in the Present Situation and Our Plan*).

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contended that the "democratic movement" in China had depended on its own strength in the past and it would not be hurt by the Sino-Soviet treaty. Nonetheless, as the summer closed, the CCP faced an unhappy situation.

In a sense, the subsequent shape of CCP-U.S. relations was determined in the year following the end of World War II. Conceivably, the United States could have moved into the vacuum created by Stalin's betrayal of the communists. But it seems clear that the legacy of over twenty years of CCP mistrust would have required the United States to outbid the Soviet Union—to be prepared to repudiate the Nationalist government to a degree which even Stalin could not yet countenance. When Hurley took his stand against the CCP, his actions were construed to be consistent with reactionary traditions in the United States, reinforcing the thread of mistrust that had existed even during years of wartime cooperation. When Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet pact with the KMT, the CCP may have been bewildered, but Mao could still "proceed from hope"; he could still believe that in the end the Russian communist would come to the aid of the Chinese communist. In the months that followed, as the Americans continued to give at least nominal support to the KMT, it was clear that they had decided not to bid. Thus Mao had no choice but to take whatever terms he could get from Stalin. We may never know what those terms were, or when they were agreed upon, but by the summer of 1946 the Chinese communists had launched an anti-American campaign that has only increased in virulence from that day to our own.

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THE SED-SPD DIALOGUE: COMMUNIST POLITICAL STRATEGY IN GERMANY

by Gerhard Wettig

THE most striking recent event of the East-West contest in Germany was the effort during the first half of 1966 to set up an official dialogue between the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Previously, on more than a dozen occasions, the SED had suggested that the two parties establish contacts and move toward a "unity of action of the German working class," but those proposals had been ignored for the SPD, highly suspicious of communist intentions, wanted to avoid creating the impression of collaborating with the communists. This time, however, despite their distrust of the SED, SPD leaders decided to respond affirmatively, in order to test those intentions. The credit for this decision goes largely to Herbert Wehner, a vice-chairman of the SPD, who in the meantime has become Minister for All-German Affairs in the coalition CDU (Christian Democratic Union)/SPD cabinet. The outcome of the Social Democratic attempt to engage in a dialogue with the SED sheds light on the policy pursued by the German communists and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The interpretations that follow are based on a systematic analysis of statements issued by SED and Soviet authorities.

Decision-Making on the Communist Side: East Berlin or Moscow?

The ideological basis of the 1966 communist move can be found in the doctrine of the "state-monopolistic" phase of "capitalism" as formulated in the CPSU Party Program of 1961. Following this line, Moscow and East Berlin set forth a new evaluation of the political situation in West European countries. In September 1964, when the centennial of the First International was celebrated in Moscow, one of the chief ideologists of the Soviet Union, Anushavan Arsumanyan, reinterpreted the role played by the social democratic parties of Western Europe.[1] SED party boss Walter Ulbricht, who had taken part in the Moscow centennial, adopted the new Soviet line at once. Immediately after his return from Moscow on September 25, he issued a statement on political tendencies and forces in West Germany in which he applied Arzumanyan's reappraisal to the Federal Republic and the SPD.

More than a year elapsed, however, before the SED leaders decided

[1] A. Arzumanyan, "Itogi razvitiya za 100 let i aktual'nyye problemy mezhdunarodnogo revolyutsionnogo osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya," in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 11, pp. 64-90; No. 12, pp. 74-97.

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that the time had come to put the new guideline into operation. On December 15, 1965, Erich Honecker, the most powerful man in the SED after Ulbricht, proclaimed the principle of the "unity of the German working class" before the Central Committee of the party. Again, there is no doubt that the SED leadership took its cue from Moscow. Honecker's speech was an account of an immediately preceding visit in the Soviet capital, and its contents were in strict conformity with Soviet statements issued a few days earlier. The next step was the open letter of February 7, 1966 from the SED leadership to all SPD party members in which the dialogue was proposed.

The SPD Presidium's answer on March 19, 1966 confronted East Berlin with an unexpected situation. The SPD sent an official reply, which it had refused to do on earlier occasions, and set certain conditions not mentioned by the SED. There is ample evidence that the SED leadership did not know for some time how to respond. Contrary to their normal habit, SED functionaries refused comment during the following week, and the press of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) avoided any reference to the matter. According to Otto Frei, the well-informed Berlin correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* the answer of the Central Committee, released on March 26, was given only after extensive consultations with Soviet officials. During the subsequent two months, Soviet press and Radio Moscow commentaries were in complete accord with East Berlin statements. Articles by Walter Ulbricht and Hermann Matern, treating the theme of the SED-SPD dialogue, were published in *Pravda,* thus receiving official Soviet endorsement. An interview given by the East Berlin State Secretary for All-German Affairs, Joachim Hermann, was printed in the Soviet weekly *Novoye vremya* (*New Times*), which is published in several Slavic and Western languages and functions as a transmitter of official Soviet views to an international audience. It can be inferred, therefore, that the course followed by the SED in relationship to the SPD corresponded fully to the wishes of the Soviet leadership throughout the entire period.

During the SPD's Party Congress in Dortmund from June 1 to 5, 1966, the theme of the SED-SPD dialogue in Germany suddenly disappeared from public statements in both the USSR and East Germany. On June 7, however, *Pravda* printed a routine statement condemning West German "revanchism" and implicitly hinting that the hopes which had been pinned on the dialogue with the SPD had failed. Neither the leaders of the SPD nor the working masses in the Federal Republic, according to *Pravda,* showed a positive attitude toward the Soviet Union, nor were they willing to act according to their class interests. Three days later, similar explanations in a more general form were repeated in a *Pravda* article dealing with the Tenth Congress of the Socialist International in Stockholm. The attentive and knowledgeable reader could make out the purpose of the article: to condemn remarks made by Willy Brandt, the chairman of the SPD, who up to then had been treated rather favorably

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by communist propaganda. The first criticism from East Berlin was made by television commentator Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler on June 9. His explanations closely followed the line in *Pravda*. Subsequent pronouncements by Walter Ulbricht contained similar criticism.

We can see again in this instance that the SED's refusal to continue its previous policy of seeking contact with the SPD had its origin in a hint from Moscow. It is even probable that this hint was simply the *Pravda* article. In the communist world, communication between the parties of different countries often is carried on through veiled statements in the central party press.[2] The two days between the appearance of the first Soviet article and Schnitzler's commentary amount to the time span which, in a number of other cases, has been needed by the SED leadership to transform a Soviet suggestion into a party directive.

The SED-SPD dialogue provides a test case of how closely SED leaders feel themselves bound by Soviet wishes in questions bearing importantly on the German problem. If no serious practical consequences are involved, East German officials and commentators may take a position differing from the Soviet line, as occurred in December 1966 when GDR statements with regard to the formation of the Bonn CDU/CSU-SPD government (CSU, Christian Social Union of Bavaria) were much more hostile than those of the USSR.[3] But as soon as it is a question of verbal guidelines and matters of practical policy that may have far-reaching effects on the German issue—especially the status of Berlin—the SED leadership is expected to hew to the line emanating from Moscow. It is highly significant that, while SED leaders in 1966 verbally attacked the links of West Berlin to the Federal Republic, they have done nothing about them—for Soviet statements at that time did not show an interest in playing up the matter. The inference drawn here was confirmed by the testimony which a prominent Polish defector, Wladyslaw Tykocinsky, until May 1965 the chief of the Polish military mission in West Berlin, gave in his interviews with Radio Free Europe in July 1966. The dependence of East Berlin on Moscow in all matters relating to the coexistence of the two German territories disproves the Soviet thesis that inter-German relations are a responsibility exclusively of the "two German states."

The GDR-USSR relationship contrasts sharply with the relationship between other communist countries and the Soviet Union. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia have followed political lines differing markedly from the Soviet position. While Moscow was fully supporting the contact between the "two German workers' parties," Polish press statements and radio broadcasts voiced the opinion that the SED took a serious risk in

[2]See Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 28-29, and John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), pp. 200-202.

[3]East Berlin made it clear that it condemned any West German government which did not move toward fraternization with the SED, while Moscow at first nourished some hope that Gaullist tendencies might appear in Bonn and change the attitude of the Federal Republic toward NATO.

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entering into a dialogue with the westernized Social Democrats of the Federal Republic. The Polish leadership was apprehensive that the dialogue might lead to undesirable results, perhaps distracting East Berlin from close cooperation with Warsaw and Prague.

On the other hand, Czechoslovakian comments welcomed the inter-German dialogue without the slightest reservation. In contrast to what can be inferred from GDR and USSR statements up to the end of May 1966, Czechoslovakian commentators did not expect the Social Democrats to cooperate with the SED; they predicted that any dialogue that might emerge would inevitably degenerate into a harsh polemical exchange. For East Berlin and Moscow, such a verbal confrontation was the very thing to be avoided, but to Prague it seemed necessary and useful. Czechoslovakian leaders agreed with Herbert Wehner of the SPD as to the manner in which the inter-German contest should be conducted, for they believed the communist side was in a strong position to wage a political struggle in Germany. Top functionaries in Prague, from the outset much more realistic with regard to SPD attitudes and reactions than were the leaders in Moscow and East Berlin, were more optimistic regarding the appeal of communism to the West Germans. News of the termination of the SED-SPD dialogue, therefore, was received with regret in Prague.

Communist Intentions and Strategy

According to the Soviet doctrine of the "state-monopolistic" phase of "capitalism," the present socio-political structure of the advanced Western countries is characterized by growing state intervention into the economic process. As pointed out in detail in Arzumanyan's statement of September 1965, this development provides many opportunities for communist activities, for allegedly the working class in the West now has to fight not only private entrepreneurs but also the authority of the state in order to improve its material condition. Supposedly forced to transform the economic struggle into a political one, workers in the Western countries are expected naturally to develop interests parallel to the political objectives of the communist movement, which thus hopes to gain increasing influence over the working masses.

In the initial phase, the objective of the common struggle is to push through a "democratic program" which will lay the foundation for the final goal—a total "revolutionary" change in the communist sense. In contrast to earlier times, the communists are to promote their objectives not by struggling against the social democratic parties which influence large sections of the working masses, but in limited cooperation with them. Although the West German Social Democrats are now viewed more favorably, they are not to be immune to criticism. Social Democratic leaders are reproached for "approximating the ideology and the policies of the bourgeoisie" and, in so doing, "discarding not only Marxism, but also many of the traditional Socialist slogans." As

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"defenders of the monopoly-bourgeoisie," they are threatened with merciless "unmasking." Wherever the Social Democrats are not willing to follow the line drawn by the communists, they are to be attacked. Those SPD forces which are unwilling to follow the communist program of action must be isolated. The "unity of action" implies solidarity only insofar as the Social Democrats accept the conditions dictated by the communists. The communists may not enter into strategic compromises with their partners, but must push them forward on the communist path.

Thus the purpose of the "unity of action between the forces of the working class" is a means to use the Social Democrats. Only if they allow themselves to be used does the new political strategy make sense to the Soviet communists. Arzumanyan has stated explicitly that the degree of Social Democratic cooperativeness alone will determine the "further evolution of the various Socialist parties to the unity of action of the working class under the slogans of peace, democracy, and Socialism."[4] The objectives have been fixed by the communists, and it is up to the partners to accept them. The Soviet communists have chosen the partnership approach because of the great influence exerted by the social democratic parties and the communist wish to avoid an open confrontation with them.

This strategic concept was applied by the SED on September 25, 1965, when Walter Ulbricht called upon the SPD to cooperate with the SED. By reserving the "right to criticize the revisionism and the opportunism" displayed by the West German Social Democrats, he indicated that the SED would not refrain from stirring up the rank and file of the SPD against their leadership, should the latter resist the course outlined by the SED. The objectives of the partnership were to be the "taming of German militarism" and the "transition to a democratic development in West Germany," i.e., fundamental changes in the socio-political structure of the Federal Republic. Since there was not the slightest chance of winning over the leaders or the followers of CDU/CSU and FDP (Free Democratic Party) for such an "anti-bourgeois" program, SED-SPD cooperation necessarily involved a total break between the West German Social Democrats and the other democratic parties of the Federal Republic. Moreover, the SPD was to be refused the right "to apply its present views to the GDR," i.e., to question the policies and institutions of the SED.[5] The strategic concept spelled out by Ulbricht was designed to break the SPD's ties with "bourgeois" forces, link it to the SED, and thus open the Federal Republic to communist influence. At the same time the GDR was to be shielded against all Western—including Social Democratic—influences.

For some time, no practical measures were taken to implement Ulbricht's pronouncement. But the concept was not laid aside. Otto

[4]Arzumanyan, *op. cit.*, No. 12, pp. 81-82.
[5]*Dokumentation der Zeit (Ddz.)* (the semi-monthly publication of the Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte in East Berlin), No. 321, pp. 34-35.

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Reinhold, the Director of the Institute for Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, was in charge of elaborating it. By the end of 1965 SED leaders felt the time was ripe for action. On December 15, in a speech before the Central Committee, Erich Honecker stressed the necessity of an "alliance of the working class" in Germany. The SED and SPD were to form a common front against "reactionary" forces which held power in the Federal Republic.[6] On February 7, 1966, the Central Committee sent an open letter "to the delegates of the Dortmund Party Congress of the SPD and to all the members and friends of social democracy in West Germany" proposing the establishment of contacts between the two parties. To that end, representatives of both sides were to convene and create a deliberative body.[7]

Subsequent statements by East German and USSR officials were based on the estimate that the relationship of forces in Europe and Germany had changed decisively in favor of the communists and that this trend would continue. The increasing economic power of the GDR, the growing difficulties of Bonn's German policy, and the advanced isolation of the Federal Republic within the Western Alliance were some of the main factors contributing to GDR self-confidence. Another factor of first importance was the existence of the Berlin Wall. In the eyes of the leaders in Moscow and East Berlin, the Wall had restored the GDR economy, had rendered meaningless the reunification policy of West Germany, and had greatly exacerbated relations between the Federal Republic as an unsatisfied country and the Western status-quo powers.

Moscow and East Berlin interpreted the frustrating situation in which the Federal Republic found itself as a sign that West Germany would be swept by strong waves of popular discontent against the CDU/CSU government and the Western allies, both in general and with special regard to the issues of Bonn's Eastern policy. The ardent debates in the Federal Republic on the issues of a détente toward Eastern Europe, nuclear armaments, special legislation to enable the government to cope with crises and states of emergency, and industrial co-determination were looked upon as symptoms of broadly based discontent. Soviet and GDR leaders expected that the position of the "ruling circles" would soon be seriously endangered and that a "democratic movement" in the Soviet sense would be formed and gain more and more strength.

In accordance with the doctrine of historical materialism, the communists believed that it was the working class that occupied the decisive position in the Federal Republic. The Christian Democrats came to power and held power only because the "right-wing SPD leadership" had handed over the Social Democrats and their followers to the "bourgeoisie" and had supported the policy of the "reactionary" CDU/CSU. For the communists, the key to the Federal Republic was the SPD: a change in Social Democratic attitudes could produce a change in

[6] *Ddz*, No. 349, pp. 1-16.
[7] *Ddz*, No. 353, pp. 20-23.

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West German politics and policies. Hence, the communist demand that the "two German workers' parties" should open a common struggle against the CDU/CSU. It was stressed repeatedly that the SPD had to offer West Germans an alternative program to the course pursued by the Bonn government. Although it was not fully spelled out, the implication was clear that the SPD had to take over the communist program; the East German communists asserted that a third position between the SED and the CDU/CSU was impossible. Moreover, the Social Democrats were expected to conduct their struggle against the CDU/CSU as a full-scale political battle aiming at the total political destruction of enemy forces. Even the application of armed force in the struggle for West Germany was not entirely excluded. As stated by Honecker on December 15, 1965, the application of armed force could be avoided only if the opposition in the Federal Republic was strong enough to remove "reactionary circles" without help from outside. The Federal Republic was to undergo a revolutionary upheaval following the model of the GDR. Only then would the reunification of Germany become possible.

CPSU and SED leaders knew that such a revolutionary program could hardly be accepted by SPD leaders. Therefore, they expressed their intentions in ideological terms whose significance would not be fully understood by the uninitiated. Communist propaganda sought to convince the Social Democratic masses that it was in the SPD's own interest to follow the course proposed by East Germany. It cited the crisis of confidence experienced by Chancellor Erhard and the CDU/CSU as a prime reason for the Social Democrats to make a full break with the decaying regime lest the SPD be dragged into the impending ruin of the CDU/CSU. SPD leaders were advised that a "democratic movement" was growing outside the parties and warned that they had the choice of adapting themselves to this trend or of watching it grow irresistibly outside their party. If they chose the latter course, they would gradually lose all influence on the further political development of the Federal Republic. Communist propaganda argued that the deadlock of Bonn's German policy allowed but one way out: a complete break with the views held hitherto by SPD leaders. The communists believed that the West German situation was ripe for an initiative in the winter of 1965-1966. Soviet and East German leaders expected an unprecedented crisis in the Federal Republic which could be exploited in order to detach it from the "capitalist camp" and woo it over to the Soviet bloc.

Communist strategy aimed at strengthening a presumed latent dissatisfaction within the SPD against the party leadership. The open letter of February 7 was directed not to the leading party organs, but to the "members and friends" of the party. Communist propaganda criticized SPD leaders on major issues and depicted them as an obstacle to future cooperation. It was implied that any partnership with the ruling SPD circles was impossible. Only one party organization in the Federal

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Republic found communist approval: the small German Peace Union (DFU) which was largely under communist influence. The SED did not spare any effort to discredit the leaders of the SPD in the eyes of their followers. In several statements the East Germans tried to create the impression that the popular chairman of the party, Willy Brandt, had joined those who opposed the official leadership; meanwhile, Helmut Schmidt and the late Fritz Erler, and especially Herbert Wehner, were depicted as the bosses of the party and became the targets of violent attacks. The immediate objective of the communist campaign was to spur factionalism within the SPD prior to the Dortmund Party Congress of early June so that massive pressures from below might be generated and be used to force the SPD into a fundamental change of its policies.

Although it was not the real addressee of the open letter, the SPD Presidium answered it on March 19. Contrary to the expectations of the communist side, the leaders of the SPD seized the initiative. The communists had miscalculated in believing that the SED would be able to conduct its campaign within the SPD without serious hindrance from a supposedly passive party leadership. Moreover, the contents of the Social Democratic reply embarrassed the SED. The SPD Presidium called for revisions in the SED's imprecise proposal for preparatory talks and subsequent discussions so that throughout Germany "representatives of the parties in the German Bundestag and in the People's Chamber can openly explain, advocate, and confront their views on the German problem."[8] Instead of accepting the communist offer to enter into an "agreement with the German working class," SPD leaders proposed to allow freedom of opinion in the whole of Germany. This recommendation struck at the most vulnerable point of the GDR's political system. Such a serious concession was out of the question for Moscow and the East Germans.

Nevertheless, the communists wanted to avoid making a negative reply. The SPD counterproposal was unnerving, but the East Germans could claim some success for their policy in the very fact that the SPD had not refused to reply. In their opinion, the SPD Presidium would never have replied if it had not been compelled to by increasing pressures from below. Consequently, the SPD reply was interpreted as proof that the movement which Moscow and East Berlin had hoped to foster through the open letter was making some headway. Seen in this light, a negative answer to the SPD reply would have benefited the Social Democratic leadership by disappointing the opposition forces and providing the SPD Presidium with convincing arguments against moving closer to the SED.

Therefore, the SED Central Committee declared in its answer of March 26 that it was satisfied "that, in spite of many differences of opinion in questions of principle, the dialogue of the German working class has started." It proposed that in the beginning two meetings should be held at which SED and SPD orators would speak—one in the GDR and

[8] *Ddz*, No. 356, pp. 5-6.

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one in the Federal Republic. Succeeding steps would depend on the "experiences of this first attempt."[9] SED leaders also declared themselves willing to publish SPD letters in their party press if their letters were printed in West German newspapers. The communist proposal restricted the free exchange of opinion demanded by the SPD to two meetings for the time being and to the participation of only two parties, SED and SPD. Communist leaders wished to determine whether the debates would fulfill their expectations before committing themselves to further engagements. Though sure of achieving political success in the Federal Republic, they were not so certain that this would amount to a real breakthrough in the near future. During April and May communist hopes dimmed; additional preconditions were inserted into SED statements in order to provide a platform of retreat if Moscow and East Germany should decide to withdraw from the exchange of orators. SED leaders refused a Social Democratic proposal to hold the two meetings in May and sought appointments for July instead. The reason they gave was a thinly veiled pretext: the real motive was a desire to wait for the results of the Dortmund Party Congress before finally deciding whether it would be advantageous to hold the two meetings. Thus, the debate which the SED Central Committee had proposed on March 26 was made dependent on whether political developments in the Federal Republic pleased communist leaders.

After the Dortmund Party Congress, communist propaganda changed from intensive efforts to gain Social Democratic sympathies, coupled with a relatively moderate polemic against parts of the SPD leadership, to an uninhibited display of hostility toward all who adhered to the official line of the West German Social Democrats. The communists accused the SPD of supporting the claim of the Bonn government that the Federal Republic was the only legitimate German state, as implied in the "law on safe conduct," which was then under consideration in the Bundestag. This bill was designed to protect those communist functionaries who would take part in the orators' exchange from legal prosecution during their stay in the Federal Republic.[10] Completely misrepresenting this legal measure, the communists called it the "law of the manacles" and claimed that it endangered the personal security of GDR citizens in West Germany and violated GDR sovereignty. The leaders of the SED formulated a new precondition for the exchange of orators, namely, that the Federal Republic drop its claim to represent the whole of Germany. The communists knew, of course, that this condition would not be met. In addition, the SED demanded that the SPD join in communist accusations against "American war criminals" in Viet Nam—a matter which clearly had nothing to do with the German situation. At the same time, the SPD Presidium was pressed to take a number of steps which

[9] *Ddz*, No. 356, pp. 1-4.
[10] Legal prosecution of some SED leaders was a possibility, for some of them, in pursuance of their policies, had violated the West German penal code.

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would imply full acknowledgment of the GDR as the legitimate second state in Germany. When the "law on safe conduct" was enacted by the Bundestag on June 23, the East German authorities expressly refused to participate in an exchange of orators.

The communist polemic against this law was only a pretext which masked other motivations for avoiding an official dialogue with the SPD. The polemic against the Bonn measure was begun in the SED statements of May, but the argument that its implementation would constitute a serious obstacle to the orators' exchange was missing then—a clear indication that the attitude of SED leaders was dependent on other matters. In the first Moscow and East German statements after Dortmund there was not the slightest mention of the law. Soviet statesmen and commentators have never taken up the East German argument that Bonn's claim to represent all of Germany was a political obstacle to further talks, and Walter Ulbricht himself indicated in his speech of September 16, 1966 that the real reasons were of a different nature.

In all important communist statements, the SPD was accused of being hostile toward the SED, the GDR and/or the Soviet Union, and of being tied to the "reactionary forces" in West Germany, i.e., the CDU/CSU. The kind of behavior that had been expected from the SPD was described in a *Pravda* article which condemned SPD support of the "law on safe conduct." It asserted that the Social Democratic government of the federal state of Lower Saxony—where the West German part of the orators' exchange was to take place—would have been obliged to use its police to protect its SED guests against the federal government. Thus the SPD's guilt lay in helping to pass a law which destroyed communist hopes that the issue of the legal status of the SED orators might result in a break between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. Communist propaganda tried to convince the German people that there was no sense in talking with Social Democrats who had passed over to the "reactionary" class enemy and had become "reactionaries" themselves. In doing this, the SED tried to create the impression that the fault lay only with the "right-wing SPD leadership" which tried to suppress the opposition forces within the party. This picture was calculated to bolster morale in the GDR and to foster a greater sense of alienation among the nonconformists in the Federal Republic.

In contrast to those assertions, Soviet statements clearly indicated that it was not so much the anti-communist attitude of the Social Democratic leadership (regarding which the Soviets had not had many illusions anyhow), but rather the strong support they were receiving from the West German masses including the workers, that disappointed the communists and made them feel that their efforts had been futile. The political strategy outlined by Anushavan Arzumanyan and Walter Ulbricht in 1964 provided for the possibility that the leaders of the Social Democrats would be difficult, but they were not prepared for the fact

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that the communist program of action would fail to appeal to the working masses.

It was only logical, therefore, that the CPSU and SED statements should make it plain that the broken SED-SPD contacts could be renewed only if the West German Social Democrats some day revised their negative attitude toward the communists. Until then, the strategy of an "alliance from below"—between the SED and any willing West German leftists who opposed the Federal Republic's social democracy—was proclaimed under the slogan: "The dialogue is continuing!" Instead of allowing a confrontation of opinions and views, SED leaders decided to resort to unilateral propaganda. By this means they hoped it would be possible at last to effect a decisive change in the Federal Republic. Communist leaders did not expect success in the immediate future. *Pravda* warned its readers that the "progressive forces" in West Germany still had to overcome a great number of difficulties, and SED cadres were told that the SPD leadership's attitudes were hindering the progressive political development of the Federal Republic.

Summary

Under the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," the leaders of Soviet bloc countries deal with other countries on two different levels: normal interstate relations and irregular efforts to influence internal developments through manipulation of local forces. By initiating a dialogue between the SED and the SPD, Soviet leaders pursued their German policy on the second level. Their political strategy aimed at splitting the democratic forces in the Federal Republic: the East German communists would attempt to force the West German Social Democrats into an alliance in order to separate SPD followers from their leaders and bring them under communist control. But it was the SED which had to be afraid of unchanneled contacts between the two parts of Germany, for public opinion in the GDR—more so than in the Federal Republic—was susceptible to appeals from the opposite side. Communist leaders, therefore, tried to devise a plan of action which would give them every opportunity to influence West German opinion, while at the same time denying to their Western opponents comparable opportunities with regard to the GDR.

The fact that SPD leaders were willing to participate in the dialogue which the communist side desired to conduct with the Social Democratic Party rank and file alone greatly embarrassed Moscow and East Berlin. But in order not to lose anticipated advantages communist leaders gave their consent to a dialogue with the SPD on an official level. However, they introduced several restrictions designed to minimize their risks, and then sought a postponement while trying to ascertain whether political developments in West Germany were taking the direction they desired. When it became clear that the Social Democratic Party followers were not listening to the appeals of the communists but rallied round their leaders, Moscow and East Berlin concluded that an official dialogue

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would not serve their purposes in the Federal Republic and would be too risky for the GDR. They revoked the offer of an official dialogue and tried again to further their objectives by one-sided propaganda.

In the meantime, the "alliance" between the SPD and the "reactionary" CDU/CSU—which was the real reason for the communist refusal to live up to the agreement on an exchange of orators—has been strengthened through the formation of the coalition government late in November 1966. This event confirmed to the communists that at present there is no hope of securing political access to the Federal Republic through the SPD. If communist policy toward Germany does not change fundamentally, SED leaders will make no further attempt to establish political contacts with West Germany—at least as long as there is no clear crisis which, in the eyes of the communists, would offer decisive new opportunities for political penetration.

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JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS AND ASIAN DIPLOMACY*

by Yung-Hwan Jo

OF all the former members of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, probably no other nation has resented Japanese colonialism more than Korea. Postwar relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have been hostile. Nevertheless, today's geopolitical and economic realities dictate that it is to their mutual advantage to develop closer ties and the habit of cooperation.

The formal establishment in December 1965 of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea marked an historic act of reconciliation. After fourteen years of often-suspended negotiations, and more than twenty years after Japan's ouster from Korea, normalization was accomplished. Why were the negotiations so difficult and protracted? And, more importantly, what finally motivated the two governments to reach a series of settlements during February-April of 1965? What were the terms of these settlements? Why was normalization hailed by the governments but opposed by a large segment of the people in both countries? In this article we will examine these questions and suggest some possible implications of these developments for the international politics of the Far East.

I

The legacy of Korean-Japanese relations has produced in each people distorted perceptions of the other. The Japanese rightly take credit for having modernized Korea—building railroads, port facilities, industries, schools and hospitals, all of which the "primitive" Koreans could not have done for themselves. Koreans expect from Japan a show of regret for the latter's "atrocious" past as a colonial power and for the division of Korea which they allege resulted partly from Japanese colonization. Koreans would like to remind the Japanese of the role Korea played in the ancient past as a transmitter of culture and more recently as a bulwark against communist aggression during the Korean War, which greatly stimulated Japan's economic growth.

It is tragic that the postwar generations in both countries share a common prejudice against each other. Ironically, recent survey findings indicate that the attitude of the postwar generation is more hostile than

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that of the prewar generations who had been at each other's throats. According to a study conducted in Osaka, young Japanese students rated Koreans as the worst people among the twelve nationality groups with whom they were familiar,[1] while the adult respondents of *The Shukan Jiji* surveys conducted in 1964 and 1965 rated Korea as the third most disliked nation.[2] By the same token, an opinion poll in Korea bears out the resentment of the Korean youth: 37.8 per cent would not deal with Japanese if the latter lived in the neighborhood, while only 24.1 per cent of their parents would react in the same way.[3]

This phenomenon can be explained in terms of either or both of the following factors: (1) young people tend to feel emotional extremes more intensely, while older people may have a more realistic understanding of the complex relations between the two nations;[4] (2) older people have "overtold," instead of alleviating, the mutual resentment. Nevertheless, the attitude of the adult Japanese toward Koreans is one of contempt: Koreans are third-class people unable to rule themselves or to modernize their own economy. The attitude of adult Koreans toward the Japanese is one of deep-seated suspicion and fear: the Japanese are a crafty race bent on reasserting economic domination of Korea. These socio-psychological tensions underlying Japanese-Korean relations account for the difficult and lengthy course of Japanese-South Korean negotiations which began in 1951, for the deep-seated prejudices were shared by the leaders themselves. The talks were punctuated with claims and counterclaims, all heavily charged with emotion.

During the first nine years of negotiations, 1951-1960, the ROK government was headed by Syngman Rhee, who was dogmatically hostile to Japan; hence, despite four rounds of talks, there was no progress. Korea's unilateral establishment in 1952 of the so-called Peace (or Rhee) Line (denying Japanese fishermen access to waters within fifty miles of the Korean coast) and subsequent seizure of Japanese fishing boats; Japan's "Kubota statement" asserting that Japan's rule over Korea was not without merits; and Japan's repatriation in 1959 of nearly 80,000 Koreans resident in Japan to North Korea, were three events which served to stymie negotiations.

A turning point in the negotiations was the change in leadership of the ROK government. Premier John M. Chang and General Park Chung Hee deliberately sought to improve the state of Japan-Korea relations. In September 1960 the Chang government invited Japanese

[1]Tatsuo Haratani, and others, "Minzokuteki Stereotype to Koaku Kanjo ni tsuite no Ichi Kosatsu," *Kyoiku Shinrigaku Kenkyu*, VIII, No. 1 (1960), p. 6. See also E. Seidensticker, "The Image," in H. Passin, editor, *The U.S. and Japan* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 22.

[2]More than 40 per cent of the *Jiji* samples in June 1965 cited Russia as the most disliked foreign country; 32 per cent named China; and 21 per cent named Korea. Cited from Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Japan Reviews Her American Alliance," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1966, p. 4.

[3]Interim reports, Nos. 16-18 (1964), by Kyoyuk Sahoe Yongkushil of the Korean Ministry of Education; quoted in *Sasangge*, July 1965, p. 168.

[4]For the results of surveys on this point, see J. M. Mobius, "The Korean Press and Public Opinion about Japan," *Journalism Quarterly*, Autumn 1965, p. 629.

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Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka to Seoul, and, despite the fact that one car of his party was mobbed by angry Koreans, the visit was a step toward better understanding.[5]

One of the major points in dispute was that of Korean property claims. In October 1962, General J. P. Kim, General Park's right-hand man, secretly agreed with Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira to a settlement of $300 million in grants, $200 million in government loans, and more than $100 million in commercial credits. The so-called Ohira-Kim memorandum on the claims problem laid the groundwork for major progress later.[6] The figure of slightly over $600 million was far under Chang's claim of $800 to $1800 million and Rhee's claim of between $2 and $3.6 billion. Japan, in turn, backed down on its insistence that Korea's territorial sea should be limited to the three-mile offshore limit. Instead, it proposed a twelve-mile sea belt off the ebbtide line as the "ROK exclusive fishing zone."[7]

Compared to first generation revolutionaries like Rhee and the students who received most of their education during his reign, the military statesmen of South Korea appear to have lower quotients of revolutionary ardor and emotional extremism, and have been more eager to negotiate and more willing to adjust differences. This may be related to the fact that in the prewar period many of them were officers of the Japanese Imperial Army rather than anti-Japanese revolutionaries.

II

Early in 1964 Japan and Korea seemed to be on the verge of normalizing relations, but student riots in Korea prevented progress at that time. Serious negotiations were resumed on December 3 with the opening of the seventh round of talks.[8] Rapid progress was made in the spring of 1965. The diplomats engaged in marathon all-night sessions preceding the initialing of the Basic Relations Treaty in February and the final signing of the normalization treaties and related agreements on June 22 at Tokyo. Ratification of these documents was exchanged at Seoul on December 18, 1965.

This seventh round was described by some observers in both countries as a tripartite negotiation among Japan, Korea and the United States.[9] Whatever the truth of these accounts, the process of Japan-Korean negotiation cannot be explained without mentioning the role the United States has played. The U.S. government realized that the security of Korea has an important bearing on that of Japan and the Free World, and that an alignment between Korea and Japan would strengthen

[5] A Japanese observer has referred to this Korean mob action as the "second Hagerty incident." See Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Korea: The Bitter Legacy," in *Dimensions of Japan* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1963), p. 354.
[6] *Toitsu Chosen Nenkan: 1964* (Tokyo: Toitsu Chosen Shimbunsha, 1964), p. 305.
[7] *Japan Times* (Tokyo), June 23, 1965, p. 2.
[8] For the first time the delegates of both sides used the Japanese language in negotiations. *Loc. cit.*
[9] *Hankuk Ilbo* (Seoul), June 22, 1965, p. 5 and *Nippon*, May 1965, pp. 246 ff. Also see *Sekai*, April 1965, especially pp. 52-57, 117-131.

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Korea politically and economically. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, appearing before the Research Institute of Japan in September 1964, asserted that "As a great power Japan bears special responsibilities to settle outstanding problems with its smaller and heavily burdened neighbor, which stands as a barrier against the forces of aggression that threaten peace in the Far East."[10] U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Winthrop Brown and Korean Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee, through their joint communiqué in August 1964, made it clear that the United States "will assist in appropriate ways in bringing about the earliest possible settlement between the Republic of Korea and Japan."[11]

The United States had been prodding the normalization talks from the sidelines. But in early 1965, when the gravity of the Viet Nam conflict increased, the tempo of the talks gradually accelerated.[12] The U.S. containment policy had been fashioned by NATO in Western Europe, by CENTO in the Middle East, and by SEATO (though ineffectually) in Southeast Asia. The major gap in the regional defense system was in Northeast Asia, where Japanese-Korean normalization was a prerequisite to the formation of a regional grouping.[13] From the viewpoint of anti-communist nations there has never been a more urgent need for cooperation in Asia, particularly in face of the intensification of the Viet Nam war, the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power, and the rapid economic growth of North Korea. President Johnson, in his meeting with Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato in January 1965, had reportedly urged an early Japanese-Korean settlement. Even McNamara's annual report to the Armed Services Committee of the House for the period July 1963 through June 1964 refers to Japanese-Korean negotiations, indicating the degree of preoccupation of the Johnson Administration with this normalization process. The official and behind-the-scene statements and the visits by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary Bundy to Korea and Japan—during which they called on the members of the Korean opposition party to drop the anti-normalization struggle and to agree to the dispatching of ROK troops to South Viet Nam[14]—illustrate the degree of American involvement.

Despite widespread criticism and student demonstrations, the South Korean government pressed on to achieve normalization. The Park government was concerned about the instability of the "abnormal" situation it was facing both externally and internally. The officially explained objectives of normalization were to contribute to the solidarity of the Free World, and "to make friends wherever we can to fight the

[10]Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, "U.S.-Japanese Cooperation in Asia," *Foreign Affairs Outline*, November 1964, p. 4.
[11]*Korean Report*, July-September 1964, p. 4.
[12]For details see Saburo Kugai, "Nikkan mondai to Vietnam senso o renketsu suru mono," *Nippon*, May 1965, p. 246.
[13]Taesup Chung, "Hyonsi jum esu bon Han-il Munje," *Sasangge*, March 1965, p. 52; see also *Sasangge*, April 1965, pp. 50-59.
[14]Kaoru Murakami, "Taberu monoka, Democracy Ka," *Nippon*, June 1965, p. 240. For the American influence in 1964, see *Maeil Shinmun* (Seoul), February 7, 1964 and *Taehan Ilbo* (Seoul), May 8, 1964.

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Communists."[15] ROK leaders, watching the development of Communist China's nuclear arsenal and the gradual escalation of the war in Viet Nam, became increasingly worried over the possibility of another confrontation with North Korea. Hence, the normalization was viewed as strengthening South Korea's political and economic ties with Japan and thus improving ROK security.[16]

The urgent task of rebuilding Korea's deteriorating economy was another factor. The steady decline in U.S. aid to South Korea has not been compensated by an increase of credits or loans from the international financial community. Korean leaders, saddled with a huge army and growing population, looked to Japan as a major source of capital for economic development. More than 30 per cent of the ROK budget is siphoned into defense spendings, and trade deficits are barely offset by foreign aid funds.

The Sato Government of Japan was likewise eager to make a success of the normalization talks. Normalization with her closest neighbor—however difficult—was viewed as Japan's first step in the promotion of a new Pan-Asia foreign policy and the enhancement of her international prestige.[17] The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party took up the theme of Japan's traditional geostrategic interest in Korea: "Korea is next door to Japan." The monthly magazine of the Japan-South Korea Friendship Society questioned the wisdom of excluding Japan from the outset from Korean-American planning, since Japan is in a better position than the United States to help train Koreans to rebuild their country.[18]

In terms of raw materials and foodstuffs, Korea has little that Japan needs aside from some tungsten, a little coal and a few agricultural products. However, business circles in Japan relish the prospect of utilizing abundant and cheap labor forces in Korea and opening new markets for trade.

III

The Basic Relations Treaty, under which the two countries formally exchanged diplomatic envoys, contains two articles on which there is a divergence of interpretation between the policymakers and their critics in both countries. Article 2 provides that all agreements and treaties concluded between Korea and Japan "on or before August 22, 1910," when Japan annexed Korea, are "already null and void." The Korean interpretation is that the old treaty of annexation has never been valid because it was accepted "under duress." Korean Foreign Minister Lee maintained that the treaty was "null and void" from the beginning; he referred to *Black's Law Dictionary* for a definition of the phrase.[19] This

[15]See Foreign Minister Lee's statement quoted in *Korean Report*, December 1965, p. 5, and President Park's statement quoted in *Korea Times* (Seoul), June 24, 1965, p. 1.
[16]"Trends and Topics" (editorial), *Japan Quarterly*, July-September 1965, p. 286.
[17]See Zengo Ohira, *Azia Gaiko to Nikkan Kankei* (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1965), p. ii.
[18]*Shinwa*, No. 83, September 15, 1960, quoted in Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 357.
[19]According to the fourth edition, "The words 'null' and 'void,' when used in a contract or statute, are often construed as meaning 'voidable,' and 'voidable' is that which may be avoided, or declared void; not absolutely void, or void in itself." (p. 1216.)

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interpretation implies that Japan is liable for the "invalid" annexation and for the subsequent "exploitation." Japanese officials argue that the old treaties were nullified only at the Republic of Korea's independence in 1948, but were valid prior to that date.[20] On the basis of this Japanese interpretation, the annexation was not illegally imposed upon Korea and Japan is, therefore, not legally bound to compensate Korea for acts under her legitimate colonial administration.

In Article 3 of the Basic Relations Treaty, Japan, using the terminology of a UN resolution adopted in 1948, confirmed that the Republic of Korea government is the "only lawful government in Korea."[21] The Foreign Minister of Korea claimed that Japan, by signing the treaty, recognized his government's jurisdiction over the entire Korean peninsula and that it would therefore be illegal for Japan to establish any relations, including diplomatic ties, with North Korea.[22] According to Etsusaburo Shiina, Japanese Foreign Minister, the UN resolution defined the area under ROK jurisdiction as the part of Korea where effective control and jurisdiction was then exerted by the Seoul government. The fact that the treaty provisions relating to South Korea's claims against Japan restricted the claims to areas under South Korea's rule was cited by Shiina as proof that ROK jurisdiction was not recognized north of the truce line.[23] The Japanese fear that to recognize the ROK government as the only rightful government of all Korea might make them liable to South Korea for property claims on behalf of both Koreas, force Koreans in Japan to identify only with the South, and antagonize even further the Japanese Left which objects to Japan's rapprochement with one part of Korea.[24]

Settlement of Japan's claims for reimbursement for Japanese private property in Korea and the ROK demand for compensation for property and other damage sustained during Japanese annexation posed a major problem. The settlement took the form of an agreement entitled "The Settlement of Problems in regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation," by which Japan undertook to provide Korea with $300 million in outright grants, $200 million in government loans, and $300 million in private commercial credits. Payment will be made in Japanese products and services, not in cash.[25]

The ROK government insists that the agreement dealt primarily with Korea's property claims and secondarily with economic cooperation,

[20]See "Kankoku Kokkai Gijirok," *Chuokoron*, December 1965, pp. 163-164; Ei-ichi Nagasue, "Nikkan Kosho to Shorai heno Kakon." *Chuokoron*, June 1965, pp. 254-255.
[21]The resolution passed by the UN General Assembly declared that "there has been established a lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of people of all Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea." General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), December 12, 1948; *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949*, p. 290.
[22]*Chuokoron*, December 1965, p. 161, and June 1965, p. 252.
[23]*Japan Times*, October 3, 1965, p. 1.
[24]See J. W. Morley, *Japan and Korea* (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), pp. 58-59.
[25]For the agreement texts on property claims, see *Japan Times*, June 23, 1965, p. 3. Also, the highlights of agreements appear in *Korea Times*, June 23, 1965, p. 3.

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and that Japan's payment of $300 million in property claims should be considered in effect as a reparation payment for her past exploitation of Korea. Against this position was Japan's view that the $300 million grant and $200 million loan bore no relation to reparations and were offered as "economic cooperation" funds on the assumption that Korea's property claims would then "lapse away."[26]

The Koreans who demand "reparations" from the Japanese should realize that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not give to a non-belligerent such as Korea the right to any form of reparation. On the other hand the Japanese should also be aware that the treaty did recognize Korean property claims. It is, of course, difficult to ascertain the accuracy of each other's property claims in view of the lapse of time since Korea's independence and the disruption resulting from the Korean War.

No less controversial than the Korean property claims was the issue of Japan's fishing rights within what the Koreans call the "Peace Line." The maritime zone, demarcated in 1952 and called by the Japanese the "Rhee Line," extends on the average over fifty miles out from the Korean coast and covers some 136,000 square miles. Within the line is a very rich fishing grounds which the Koreans want to reserve for themselves, especially since their fishing industry is too weak to compete against that of Japan. Japan claims that the Rhee Line is preposterous when compared to the usual three-mile limit of territorial waters and that the arbitrary line adversely affects the welfare of more than 40,000 Japanese fishermen.[27]

In the Fishery Agreement, Korea has agreed to an exclusive fishing zone, extending in most cases twelve miles from the coast, into which Japanese vessels are not to enter. Outside this belt is a joint fishing control zone where the size of catch and number of vessels employed will be regulated. Finally, Japan is to provide $90 million out of the $300 million commercial credits to improve Korea's underdeveloped fishing industry.[28]

According to Article IV of the Fishery Agreement, "the authority for policing and exercising court jurisdiction in waters outside the exclusive fishing zones shall be exercised by the nation to which the fishing boat belongs." Foreign Minister Shiina was of the opinion that since any area outside the twelve-mile exclusive zone, including the area under joint control, is on the high sea and subject to the "flag state principle," the Rhee Line—the point of sorest contention—was in effect abolished together with the ROK government's rights to seize Japanese fishing boats within the line. But Korean Foreign Minister Lee announced that the Rhee Line would continue to be enforced under the domestic law of Korea

[26] *Toitsu Chosen Nenkan, 1965-1966* (Tokyo: Toitsu Chosen Shimbunsha, 1966), p. 694. For different official interpretations between the two governments, see *Chuokoron*, December 1965, pp. 168-169.

[27] Chong-do Hah, "Bitter Diplomacy: Postwar Japan-Korea Relations," *Studies on Asia: 1964*, pp. 68-71. The Koreans also rely on the Rhee Line to defend their coastline against communist smuggling and infiltration.

[28] *Japan Times*, June 23, 1965, p. 9.

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with regard to two of its three functions: "necessity of national defense" and "protection of Korea's continental shelf resources."[29]

Although the Rhee Line is not mentioned in the agreement, the fact that the line of Korea's exclusive fishing zone has been pulled back from more than fifty miles to twelve miles offshore makes it impossible for South Korea to prevent the Japanese from fishing within the Rhee Line.

Agreements were reached also on the legal status of some 570,000 Korean residents in Japan and on the return of some 1,430 Korean cultural objects taken to Japan during the period of colonial rule. Japan agreed to give Koreans resident in Japan and their first and second generation descendants the right of permanent residence and educational and social security benefits equal to those enjoyed by the Japanese themselves—except for the right to vote.[30]

The only major issue that was not touched by the normalization treaties and remains unsolved is that of jurisdiction over a tiny, desolate and uninhabited islet, lying in the Japan Sea within the Rhee Line, called Takeshima in Japanese and Dokto in Korean. Along with the aforementioned agreements were "Notes on the Peaceful Disposition of Disputes Between the Two Countries," in which both governments agreed to settle their disputes through diplomatic channels, "provided they are specified . . . in the agreements between the two countries."[31] Korean officials contend that since Dokto was not mentioned in any part of the agreements, the islet issue is not subject to the agreement on peaceful settlement of disputes and that the Japanese government understood this at the time. Japanese counterparts insist, however, that the agreement was understood as referring to the Takeshima islet dispute because the notes did not specify "disputes other than the islet" and there remains scarcely any unsettled dispute other than the islet.[32]

Lee declared that the "island is so indisputably a part of our territory that there is no room whatever for arguing about its ownership."[33] Japanese Premier Sato replied that "it is hardly necessary to point out that Takeshima has been a part of our territory from ancient time."[34] The ROK position is that the islet is an extension of Korea's Ulyongdo Island, possessed by the Shilla Kingdom of Korea in 512 and so recorded in many historical records of Korea, and that Japanese maps of 1785, including their navy map, listed it as part of Korea. Japan points out that her people were engaged in fishing in the area in 1618 and it was incorporated into her territory in 1905 (in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War) by a public notice of Shimane prefecture.[35]

[29] *Chuokoron*, December 1965, pp. 170-174.
[30] *Korea Times*, June 23, 1965, p. 3; *International Legal Material*, January 1966, pp. 118-120.
[31] *Japan Times*, June 23, 1965, p. 3.
[32] *Chuokoron*, December 1965, pp. 164-168.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 165.
[34] *Japan Times*, October 13, 1965, p. 12.
[35] *Shinhan Mimbo*, October 8, 1965, pp. 1-2. See also an interview with Yoshisaburo Damura, Chief, Office of Historical Studies, Shimane Prefecture, in *Asai Janaru*, November 28, 1965, p. 21. According to Damura, there is no evidence that Koreans were aware of the existence of the island or ever utilized it before the Meiji era (1868).

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IV

These controversies reveal that Korean and Japanese statesmen did not and could not settle the underlying issue separating the two countries, namely, the legacy of mutual hostility. Both governments hailed the ratification of the normalization treaty, but the opposition to it from nongovernment sources has been substantial and vociferous in both countries.[36] When Lee returned from Tokyo after signing the normalization treaty, President Park lauded him as a "patriot" while the opposition branded him as a *maeguk-no* (traitor).

Before the signing of the normalization treaty, the anti-government campaign was directed at the way negotiations were being carried on and demanded a tough position in bargaining with Japan. But after the signing, opposition elements attacked the contents of the treaty and demanded its abrogation or revision on the grounds that it was tantamount to "selling out" the nation and giving it back to Japan. The contents of the agreements were at such variance with general expectations in South Korea that they prompted in July 1965 a rapid series of denunciatory statements from student organizations, congressmen of the opposition parties, Christian leaders, men of letters, associations of historic studies, university professors, and a group of well-known reserve generals.[37]

The opposition movement gained strength from a widespread Korean feeling of distrust of General Park's government and of Japan. Yet it can be safely estimated that a majority of well-informed Koreans were in favor of normalized relations with Japan, and even a greater proportion of them considered it inevitable that the two countries should eventually become friendly neighbors.[38]

Opposition in Japan, smaller than in Korea, arose mainly from the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo), and the leftist students. They feared that normalization of relations with South Korea and recognition of the ROK as the only "lawful government in Korea" would obstruct unification of Korea and adversely affect Japan's relations with North Korea and the People's Republic of China. They looked upon normalization as part of a plan to increase anti-communist forces in Asia, leading to Japan's *de facto* involvement in the Viet Nam war and establishment of a U.S.-backed "NEATO" (North East Asia Treaty Organization).[39] The Japanese

[36]According to a Korean national survey of 1,200 respondents conducted by *Tonga Ilbo* in December 1964, 46 per cent were opposed to and only 19 per cent supported the government's policy, whereas the proportions were 11.9 per cent and 47.1 per cent according to another national survey of 2,000 respondents conducted in March 1965 by the Research Bureau of the Korean Ministry of Public Information. (*Sasangge*, July 1965, pp. 169-170.) The gross discrepancy between the two sets of statistics stems from the fact that the government agency and the anti-government newspaper publisher were using differently worded questions and opinion samples so that the results would favor their side of the dispute.

[37]For details, see *Toitsu Chosen Nenkan: 1965-1966, op. cit.*, pp. 699-726.

[38]Mobius, *op. cit.*, p. 625.

[39]For a collection of articles authored by the Japanese opposition see *Nikkan Mondai* (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1965).

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leftists demanded that normalization be extended to both Koreas or be postponed until Korea was unified. Korean opposition to the normalization treaty did not stem from any of these reasons.

Among noncommunist circles in Japan, the normalization treaty was criticized for its contents, but normalization itself was welcomed. According to the editorials of the *Asai Shimbun* and the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* on June 23, 1965, the Japanese felt that their government made too many concessions. The Komei Party and the Democratic Socialist Party criticized the government for failing to solve the issue of Takeshima Island, to settle the technicalities of agreements on fishing and property claims, and to abrogate the Rhee Line.

There were reportedly more than forty anti-normalization organizations in Japan, including the aforementioned leftist parties.[40] According to a survey prepared on Japanese radio and television programs by a Japanese government research organization, there were 120 programs between June 18 and October 7, 1965 that dealt with the Japan-ROK reconciliation. Of these, 59 programs indicated approval of the policy while 61 indicated disapproval.[41] This rather negative attitude of the Japanese mass media may be contrasted with the positive attitude of the *Jiji* respondents. According to the monthly *Jiji* surveys conducted throughout 1964, only 10 per cent opposed their government's reconciliation policy.[42] In other words, the Japanese oppositionists, while enjoying considerable support of the leftists and the radio-television programmers, had less general popular backing than their Korean counterparts.

North Korean reaction to the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan took the form of outright denunciations. Pyongyang's reasons were similar to those of the Japanese Left except that they were calculated to exploit the traditional anti-Japanese national feeling in South Korea.[43]

The Chinese communists, too, attacked the treaty, portraying it as the work of U.S. "imperialists" and their "followers" in the Japanese and Korean governments and asserting that "NEATO" was a *fait accompli* to be used some day against North Korea and China. Peking sought to play on the most sensitive emotion of the Japanese people, fear of war, but without any evidence of success.[44] It appears that China wants to prevent Japan from playing an active role in noncommunist Asia as much as the United States wants to encourage the Japanese.

V

Whatever validity there may be in the arguments of the normalization opponents in Korea and Japan, the rapprochement between the two

[40]Naokichi Tanaka, *Nihon o Ugokasu Nikkan Kankei* (Tokyo: Bunkyo shoten, 1963), p. 196.
[41]Hiroshi Watanabe, "Shijo Kuzen no Nikkan Senden Gassen," *Nippon*, December 1965, pp. 98-99.
[42]Mendel, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
[43]*Toitsu Chosen Nenkan: 1965-1966, op. cit.*, p. 684.
[44]Arthur J. Dommen, "In Northeast Asia: Dragon and the Dove," *Current Scene*, January 1, 1966.

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countries will certainly benefit each, and the United States as well. Japan cannot afford to remain a mere onlooker with regard to her closest neighbor, for her national interest compels her to help keep South Korea a noncommunist safety zone. South Korea also provides Japan with markets and a source of low-cost labor. Even were closer ties with Seoul to have an adverse effect on Japan's existing relations with North Korea, which are largely commercial, Japan's loss would be less significant in view of the gain she can expect to make from increased trade with the South. In recent years South Korea, with its population of 27 million compared to North Korea's 11 million, has been carrying on a volume of trade with Japan seven times larger than that between North Korea and Japan. Furthermore, normalized relations with the ROK could also serve as a modest test case, if not a model, for Japan's good neighbor policy for the rest of Asia. In the long run Japan will have great influence on South Korea, perhaps as much as the United States.

For Korea, normalization means closer economic cooperation with a wealthy Japan. Japanese economic activities will be more complementary than competitive, and thereby should contribute to economic improvement in less-developed Korea. In the diplomatic sphere, rapprochement with Japan may serve as a preventive measure against a future Japanese attempt to establish closer relations with North Korea. South Korea stands to gain more than Japan from normalization.

For the United States, the improvement in Korean-Japanese relations represents a major step toward strengthening the defenses of East Asia. Economically, in the long run it will bring some relief from the Korean aid burden, a larger share of which Japan can now assume. These "advantages" will not automatically result from the Japan-Korea normalization treaty, but it could be a major step toward true rapprochement.

Future prospects depend not so much on the well-intentioned agreements per se but rather on how the agreements will be carried out and how remaining problems will be handled. Could the two parties take the case of the disputed island to an international court? What will happen to Japan's current stand of not recognizing the USSR's twelve-mile fishing zone in view of her acceptance of a similar zone in the treaties concluded with South Korea? What will be Seoul's reaction to an effort by Japan to improve relations with North Korea? To what extent and how soon can public opinion in both countries be enlightened so that mutual antagonisms can be replaced by understanding?

By far the most sensitive and controversial question surrounding the Japan-Korea treaty concerns its military implications. South Korea has been agitating for the creation of a permanent foreign ministers organization for the collective defense of the Asian rimland and offshore nations. In early 1966 Seoul proposed formation of either a tripartite alliance among Japan, Nationalist China and South Korea, or a foreign

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ministers' conference of the free countries in Asia. But Tokyo appeared to have no desire to participate in such ventures because "Japan's interests as a trading nation and stabilizing influence in Asia lie in developing friendly relations with a broad spectrum of Asian nations including neutrals and Communists."[45] Nevertheless, the Korean-proposed conference of foreign ministers was held in Seoul on June 14-16, 1966. The eight other "free" countries in Asia (Nationalist China, South Viet Nam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) were invited; all of them, including Japan, participated in the parley. Laos was represented by an observer.[46] In view of Japan's cautious objection to reported pressures for a military alliance, the Seoul meeting shunned military topics and established a nine-member Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), with an ambassadorial committee to maintain regular consultation. To the Japanese delegate, ASPAC did not constitute an organization and it was "not anti-Communist—just non-Communist."[47]

Yet at the 1967 ASPAC meeting held at Bangkok on June 13, the Japanese delegate spoke of the desirability of establishing an organization called the "Asian and Pacific Sphere" with Japan building a bridge between the shattered rimland of Asia (East and Southeast Asia) on the one hand and the Pacific powers (the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) on the other.[48] Today, there are signs of an increasing awareness on the part of noncommunist Asian leaders that they can best meet their national needs through regional cooperation.

If a regional defense system were to result from ASPAC, it would strengthen the contention of Japanese leftists who warned that Japan-Korea normalization was linked to an anti-communist defense pact; it might also cost the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party its majority in the Diet, irrespective of the geostrategic advantages of such a defense system. Japanese leaders hope that ASPAC members will take measures to strengthen mutual cooperation in economic reconstruction and cultural exchanges, and that any security arrangements will come later since, in their view, regional cooperation efforts are usually more successful if they avoid political and security problems. This would give Japanese leaders more time to persuade their people to think of Japan's security in terms of a regional defense system. In the long run this may be feasible: a recent nationwide survey of some 6,000 Japanese voters showed that 60 per cent of them, while opposing any revision of the Constitution's nonbelligerency clause and preferring "neutralism" to alignment, nevertheless approved Japan's self-defense force as necessary."[49]

[45] *Japan Times*, June 23, 1965, p. 2.
[46] *Korean Herald*, March 26, 1966, editorial; *Asian Student*, April 9, 1966; *Denver Post*, May 29, 1966, p. 6; *New York Times*, June 15, 1966, p. 1.
[47] *New York Times*, June 19, 1966, p. 4.
[48] See *Asai Janaru*, July 9, 1967, p. 22, and July 16, 1967, p. 9.
[49] Toshitaka Ushiomi, "Jinken Ishiki to Boei Ishiki," *Sekai*, June 1966, pp. 91-94. The survey cited here appears to be quite reliable as it was conducted by a group of twenty scholars. Their findings indicate that there are serious differences of opinion among Japanese voters regarding defense and related matters, even though a majority support the self-defense forces.

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Reviews

Technology, Security and the Test Ban Treaty*

by Edward Teller

If the United States had joined the League of Nations, World War II probably never would have occurred. If France and England had opposed with a show of strength Hitler's military occupation of the Rhineland in 1935, twenty million lives would have been saved. These and numerous other shortsighted policies and repeated failures to take a stand against aggression, epitomized by the incredible performance at Munich in 1938, paved the road to the greatest catastrophe of our times.

Are historians of the future likely to find a parallel to the 1930's in the acts of the United States during the 1960's? Will present U.S. policies lead to another general war? These are worrisome questions for American statesmen anxious to avoid repeating mistakes of the past, and they form the framework for the book, *The Test Ban Treaty,* by James H. McBride.

"It is generally agreed that the Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, is one of the most important treaties of the twentieth century." The first sentence in McBride's book is not an exaggeration. President Kennedy, in arguing for the Test Ban Treaty, called it a "first step." McBride asks: In what direction does this first step lead us? His answer is given in detail and is supported by thorough documentation.

Enough time has passed to permit an objective and thorough analysis of the discussions that led to the ratification of the treaty in 1963. That many of the relevant facts remain classified impedes the review. The argument is made only implicitly, but in my opinion with considerable force, that our policy of secrecy has interfered in this instance with the proper and enlightened functioning of the democratic process. Yet even on the basis of what is actually available, a great deal can be said.

The first and perhaps most powerful point raised in the book is that the two committees of the United States Senate which undertook the investigation of the proposed Test Ban Treaty—the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee — arrived at opposite conclusions. This fact was expressed in the votes of committee members when the treaty came to the Senate floor for confirmation.

The Foreign Relations Committee heard more witnesses, conducted all its hearings in open sessions, and gave considerable publicity to these hearings. It came to the conclusion that the treaty must be ratified. On the floor of the Senate this conclusion prevailed.

The Armed Services Committee heard a small number of highly

**The Test Ban Treaty.* By James H. McBride. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967. 197 pp. $5.75.

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selected witnesses, questioned each witness in considerable detail, and conducted most of its hearings in executive session. In this way its members had ample opportunity to get a complete picture of the technical background and the likely consequences of the treaty for the defense of our country. The detailed arguments which led to its conclusion are even today available only in part. At the time of the vote in the Senate, these arguments had been given little circulation and had a strong influence only on the voting of the Armed Services Committee members, most of whom voted against ratification. Those Committee members who supported the treaty were responsible for proposing and putting into effect safeguards designed to minimize possible harmful consequences of the partial test ban.

The strength of McBride's book lies in the voluminous documentation taken from the testimony given both for and against the proposed treaty. The two opposing positions are clearly described in full detail and with considerable and justified repetition so that the reader obtains a complete and reliable account of the discussion.

The arguments opposing the Test Ban Treaty derive from the fact that the ban is advantageous to the Soviet Union and correspondingly dangerous for the United States. In fact, this advantage may well become a decisive factor in Soviet-American relations. There are three reasons for the Soviet advantage.

During the nuclear test moratorium (1957 to 1961), the Soviets thoroughly and clandestinely prepared for testing and then violated the moratorium in a surprise move. In the following two years the Soviets conducted numerous tests of various kinds and sizes of nuclear weapons and gathered extremely valuable data. Some time after the Soviet action, the United States resumed testing, but due to lack of preparation the U.S. series was carried out with considerably less effect. While the detailed results of these tests remain classified, the unclassified portions of the testimony before the Armed Services Committee reveals virtual unanimity on the part of the informed witnesses regarding the dangers posed by the Soviet tests in 1961-1962. This point was not refuted by Administration witnesses who, of course, supported the proposed treaty. They in turn maintained that in the natural course of developments it is unavoidable that the two sides should approach parity, and the more rapid progress of the Soviets during their last atmospheric tests should give no cause for alarm.

The second reason for a Soviet advantage is closely related to the first, but is more concrete and therefore more impressive. The opponents of the Test Ban Treaty maintained that the USSR may well have acquired sufficient knowledge to develop a defense against incoming missiles, while the United States will be hampered in a similar effort by lack of information obtainable only through nuclear tests now forbidden by the treaty. This argument was strongly and clearly contradicted by Administra-

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tion witnesses who asserted that the United States would retain ample superiority for the time being. The question of missile defense is particularly crucial because it bears on the question whether the development of nuclear weapons has reached a saturation point at which no new developments are apt to be significant, or whether we are dealing with a continuously vigorous field of technology in which new points of view and sustained effort can lead to unexpected and fateful future breakthroughs.

In the years that have passed since the partial test ban treaty was signed, missile defense has become a hotly contested issue. The Secretary of Defense, some civilians working under his immediate direction, and a considerable number of scientists who occupy positions as consultants to the government continue to insist that the creation of an effective missile defense is virtually impossible. They do not appear to be shaken in their opinion by evidence that the USSR has deployed a missile defense. On the other hand, responsible military authorities as well as the majority of scientists who work on the hardware of nuclear explosives argue that U.S. deployment of an ABM defense is overdue, even in face of the fact that such a defense will be handicapped in terms of reliability and effectiveness due to existing restrictions on atmospheric testing.

The third reason for a Soviet advantage is the demonstrated willingness of the USSR to change the rules of the game at a moment's notice. This happened during the test moratorium and may happen again whenever secret Soviet developments produce a number of important military devices whose functioning they will want to check and whose consequences they will desire to exploit. While Administration witnesses claimed that test restrictions will affect the USSR and the United States equally, the fact remains that the Soviet closed society and tight security system permit a high degree of secrecy which an open society cannot duplicate. In relation to this point, some of the Senators, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a positive contribution to the debate by proposing a number of "safeguards." These safeguards are designed to keep the United States in a state of readiness so that, in case of Soviet violation or abrogation of the treaty, the United States will be in a good position to resume its own testing program within three to six months. This program has been put into effect and one can claim for it a measure of success.

McBride examines many other issues of somewhat less importance. One of these concerns the fact that the Test Ban Treaty rules out many potential benefits of the Plowshare Project, the peaceful application of nuclear explosives. Administration circles expressed the hope in the summer of 1963 that restrictions on earth-moving projects, e.g., building harbors and canals, could and would be removed at a later time. Obviously, this has not been done, and, as a consequence, the much needed sea-

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level canal across the American isthmus has been delayed.

McBride also probes the one issue charged with the greatest emotional content, namely, radioactive fallout. As far as the public was concerned, this danger was the most important argument for a nuclear test ban treaty. On this point the author quotes Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, who supported the treaty in many respects and who is always restrained in his public pronouncements: "I regret that fallout from atmospheric testing has been so played up rather recently in public statements. I think this is an exaggerated situation far beyond the needs of the actual situation. . . . I infer that some of the words which the President has used may arise to haunt us if we return to atmospheric testings, not because they are true, but because they have been said." (p. 131.)

On issues like disarmament or the banning of nuclear tests, most people have made up their minds; reading a book such as McBride's is not likely to change fixed positions that have been maintained through the years. Nevertheless, the book can be read with profit by both proponents and opponents of the Test Ban Treaty. The proponents of the treaty will be reminded of the arguments they must be prepared to answer to uphold their position. It would be especially instructive today, at a time when many of these proponents are trying to take a second step in the same direction by advocating a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Those of us who have opposed the partial test ban treaty will be keenly reminded of the difficulties that arise when one tries to defend an unpopular position. Repetition of unpleasant facts does not suffice. To state the obvious is not enough when one is faced by massive popular opinion rooted in the wish for peace and fixed in the public mind by the enormous weight of the mass media. I cannot say that McBride or those who agree with him have yet found an effective way to set forth the case for strength in the cause of peace. But his book provides a wealth of material and an additional stimulus to those who feel that with each passing year it becomes more urgent to explain the unpleasant truths of our uneasy "cold armistice."

Yugoslavia, March 1941: Revolution or Coup d'Etat?*

by Vladimir Petrov

In the early hours of March 27, 1941, as Churchill put it at the time, Yugoslavia "found her soul." In a successful coup d'état, a band of Serb officers arrested government leaders, deposed the Regent, and in the name of the boy-King, Peter II, proclaimed a new regime headed by General Dusan Simovic. This bloodless coup was plotted and carried out in the best tradition of Balkan conspiracy, and was welcomed by most of the Serbs of the kingdom, as well as by all the op-

**Yugoslavia's Revolution of 1941*. By Dragisa N. Ristic. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966. 175 pp. $7.50.

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ponents of the Axis. The Serbs did not like the old government. It was soft on the Croats, the country's second largest nationality. And it kept drifting toward the Axis, a movement which had culminated on March 25 with Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. The Serbs, who had preserved their loyalties and animosities from the First World War, deeply resented the pact, while the Croats and the Slovenes accepted it with satisfaction since it guaranteed Yugoslavia against possible encroachments from Mussolini's Italy.

The decision to join the Axis did not come easily to Prince Regent Paul, who had neither sympathy nor liking for Hitler or Mussolini. But he was determined to keep his weak and divided country out of the European war, and in face of the virtually complete encirclement of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers and their satellites this was the way to do it. Thus he turned down the British and American demands that Yugoslavia take a stand against Hitler, and, after securing for his country the terms which promised it a status of relative independence and neutrality, cast his lot with the wrong side. Prince Paul could obtain favorable terms only because Hitler, then in the midst of preparations for an attack on Greece and the Soviet Union, desperately wanted to avoid an additional involvement in a struggle with Yugoslavia. The coup d'état upset all this.

The March 27 event was not a "revolution"—as the title of Dragisa N. Ristic's book, *Yugoslavia's Revolution of 1941,* claims—since the public outburst followed rather than preceded it. Nevertheless, for two days after the proclamation of the Simovic government enthusiastic Serbs wildly cheered the Allies and denounced the Germans. Then they began to worry, as everybody realized that Hitler would not take this challenge kindly and that the British, then in the process of landing their troops in Greece, could not possibly rescue Yugoslavia.

The reckoning came on April 6. Belgrade was heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe, while German motorized divisions entered the country from three directions. Within ten days, it was all over. Yugoslavia was occupied, divided and plunged into a regional, national and political strife in which, in the following months and years, one out of every ten Yugoslavs perished.

Ristic does one creditable job, that of reconstructing political and diplomatic developments which had led to the "revolution." Even here, however, he talks more as the Serb he is than as a dispassionate observer. But his narrative of the "revolution," in which he personally participated as an aide to its presumed leader, General Simovic, is singularly disappointing. Since he evidently chose to "protect the record" instead of contributing to history, we are compelled to wait for someone else, with less personal commitment and more candor, to write the definitive account.

Ristic presents the coup d'état as a spontaneous action on the part of the passionately patriotic Serb officers devoted to the cause of democracy. This is preposterous. The officers' plot had much deeper

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roots, and it had taken form at least six months before the coup d'état. Their real leader was not Simovic but General Mirkovic, perhaps the only officer in the group who knew approximately what he was doing. Their patriotism is beyond doubt, but it is equally beyond doubt that they were moved less by their devotion to the democratic cause than by the fear that Prince Paul, bent on bringing the Croats into Yugoslavia's political life, would end the Serb monopoly in the Yugoslav Army.

Ristic is likewise silent about the role played in the "revolution" by the British and, to a lesser extent, by the Americans. This is disappointing because it has been a matter of record, albeit incomplete, for some time, and because it was an interesting and instructive development. Both Churchill and Roosevelt wished to see Yugoslavia drawn into the war against the Axis; they were joined in this wish even by Stalin, who, on April 6, 1941, concluded with the Yugoslav mission in Moscow a pact of friendship for the sole purpose of stiffening the Yugoslavs' backs. The British Legation in Belgrade, especially its undercover SOE (Special Operations Executive) agents, had been in on the plot from its inception, providing the participants with advice, guidance and cash. After the future chief of the OSS, Colonel William J. Donovan, had visited Belgrade in January 1941, the American Legation had lavishly supplied the plotters with moral encouragement.

There was nothing particularly shameful in this link between Serb patriots and the Anglo-Saxons. It was perfectly understandable within the context of the time, and fully in the Balkan tradition dating back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Although Yugoslavia paid an awesome price for the "revolution," the country was but a pawn on the European chessboard in the spring of 1941 for all the Great Powers. Had the Allied leaders realized that Yugoslav resistance would be crushed so swiftly, they might have left the country alone. But they were just as ignorant as the Belgrade conspirators: the whole British undertaking of a "Balkan front," including their landing in Greece, was a mixture of hope, ignorance, ineptitude and noble intentions, which ended in disaster.

But a quarter of a century later, we are entitled to hear the full story, where both heroes and villains are brought closer to their original size, and where all pertinent factors are revealed and evaluated regardless of how the record of one or another group of Yugoslav emigrés would be affected by such revelation. This story, unfortunately, has yet to be told.

Policy Formulation and the British Political System*

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

The process of policy formulation in Britain has been the topic of extensive investigation by students

**British Politics in the Collectivist Age.* By Samuel H. Beer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965. 390 pp. $5.95.
Personalities and Politics: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. By D. C. Watt. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. 276 pp. $6.00.

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of the British political system. Two recent books, Samuel H. Beer's *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* and D. C. Watt's *Personalities and Politics: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century,* provide new and important insights into the nature of decision-making in Britain. Professor Beer has addressed himself to the evolution, or "modernization," of the British political system and has examined the nature of political representation in Britain, contemporary and past. Professor Watt has assessed the role of elites in decision-making in the formulation of British foreign policy.

According to Professor Beer, political culture furnishes one of the "main variables of a political system and a major factor in explaining the political behavior of individuals, groups, and parties." (p. x.) In order to test this hypothesis, the author examines five different types of British politics in their historical context: Old Tory, Old Whig, Liberal, Radical, and, finally, what he terms Collectivist. This classification, the author asserts, characterizes the principal stages in the "modernization of British politics." In each of the five stages are to be found distinctive theories of political representation which define "a more or less coherent system of roles for political formations and their members." (p. xi.) Beer effectively marshals a vast amount of data in support of his hypothesis. In each of the five historical stages he examines the relationship between the prevalent political culture and political behavior, including representation.

Beer holds that there is not an exact one-to-one correlation between political culture and behavior. Instead, he asserts: "Political culture, its values, beliefs, and emotional symbols, while a major variable, is only one of the variables determining behavior." (p. xi.) Yet a reading of this work reveals political culture and behavior to be closely related. In almost a dialectical relationship, political culture influences behavior; yet political behavior is the important conditioner of culture. In fact, the "modernization" of British politics which Beer describes is essentially the history of interaction between the two key variables, culture and behavior.

The major portion of the study is devoted to an examination of the Collectivist theory of representation, characterized by a party government and the functional representation of important interests. As the author suggests, the Collectivist theory of representation was "facilitated by attitudes favorable to pluralism and functional representation that had survived from a much earlier time," (p. x.) for example from Liberal and Radical stages. Yet the Collectivist stage of British politics accords a greater role to group and party than did previous stages in British political modernization.

This book is notable for its detailed and analytical treatment of the development of the contemporary British political system, especially the evolution of the Conservative and Labour parties. But

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Professor Beer has contributed impressively as well to the growing literature on interest group behavior in Britain. His principal contribution, in this reviewer's estimation, lies in the relationship he has drawn between historic and contemporary British thought and practice on the role of interest groups. In both parties there has been a general growth in the recognition of a need to associate representatives of interest groups with government administration. In fact, as Beer points out, functional representation, together with parliamentary representation, forms a key element in the Collectivist stage of British political development. Producers influence policy through direct contact with the executive; consumers exercise their power through a system of parliamentary representation in which party government is a dominant feature. Competing parties develop programs designed to appeal to as diverse and large a following as possible. By such action, parties provide representation for most, if not all, important groups in Britain, and, in the process, have moved toward each other "on issues of substantial, even fundamental, importance."

Several of the theories of representation examined by Beer are elitest in nature. In his study, Professor Watt argues a familiar thesis, namely, that "Britain is essentially an oligarchic society." (p. 1.) This thesis is perhaps nowhere more clearly substantiated than in the formulation of British foreign policy. According to Watt, "The group interested in the formulation and execution of British foreign policy has been defined as an elite, that is, as a social group defined by and performing a political function." (p. 2.)

The author tests his hypothesis in several essays in which he examines such historical topics as the pattern of interaction between U.S. and British policymakers between 1895 and 1956, German influence upon British elite opinion in the 1930's, Anglo-American policy and Japanese naval rearmament in the 1930's, Sir Warren Fisher and British policy toward rearmament against Germany in the interwar period, Imperial defense and foreign policy between 1911 and 1939, and the influence of the Commonwealth upon British foreign policy during the Munich crisis.

In each of these essays, Watt presents findings, some of which are unique, concerning the historical problems he is investigating and the role played by policymaking elites. For example, he cites the record of an opponent of Britain's appeasement of Germany, Sir Warren Fisher, a Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury, as an "outstanding illustration of how influence can be used within the foreign policymaking elite to lead in the formulation of policy, where those formally responsible are, as so often, divided and ineffective." (p. 116.) According to the author, Fisher played a major role in pressing for British rearmament in the 1930's.

In another essay, Watt reports that the Dominions, which were essentially isolationist, exerted considerable influence on Britain at the

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time of the Munich crisis. Had the British chosen to oppose Hitler in 1938, they could not have expected support from the Dominions. The British government had concluded that "There would be no sense in fighting a war which would break the British Empire while trying to secure the safety of the United Kingdom." (p. 169.)

Both authors, Beer the political scientist and Watt the historian, have shown considerable ability to utilize history in testing hypotheses important to the student of politics. Beer's work provides an indication of the fund of historical data available to the political scientist in testing hypotheses about the development of political systems. Watt's study, although it will be read primarily by historians, gives evidence of the contribution history makes to the study of the actions of foreign policy decision-makers.

Mussolini and the Corfu Dispute*

by Harry J. Psomiades

The Corfu Incident of 1923 confronted the League of Nations with one of its first major tests. When one of its most powerful members refused to carry out its treaty obligations under the Covenant and succeeded in doing so with impunity—some might even say with an increase in prestige—the fundamental principles of the League were brought into question. The decision of Britain and France to support Italy and bypass the League further undermined its authority and led many of the smaller states to believe that they could expect no more than moral support from the international organization in the event of aggression.

We are reminded by Professor James Barros' thorough study of the Corfu dispute, *The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations,* that the only framework of law and order which sovereign states recognize is a conventional one. And this is recognized only so long as their interests are not impinged upon, so long as they are convinced that, in practice, their sovereignty will not be affected in ways they do not like. When states are forced into unfavorable agreements, it is under the threat of a greater power than their own.

Having scrutinized previously inaccessible archival materials, Barros describes in lively detail the reaction of the interested parties to the Corfu dispute and the aggressiveness which marked a major turning point in Italian foreign policy. Under Mussolini the restless discontent characteristic of Italian policy since the turn of the century "became more ambitious, more self-assertive, more calculating in its determination to turn the needs and embarrassments of other Powers to Italy's advantage."

The Corfu incident took place in August 1923. General Enrico Tellini, the Italian representative on the commission set up by the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris to delineate the Albanian-Greek frontier, was shot, together with four of his assistants—all

**The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations.* By James Barros. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 339 pp. $7.50.

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Italians—by unknown assassins on Greek territory near the Albanian frontier. Mussolini immediately addressed an ultimatum to Greece. The refusal of the Athens government to acquiesce to all of the Italian demands within a brief time limit resulted in the bombardment and occupation of the Greek island of Corfu on August 31. Defenseless and politically isolated, Greece frantically asked for the intervention of the League of Nations and the Ambassadors' Conference. Mussolini declared that he would not recognize the jurisdiction of the League, claiming that the murdered Italians were technically employed by the Conference of Ambassadors and that it was the exclusive responsibility of this body to handle the dispute.

Lord Curzon at first decided to support the Greek position that the League was competent to handle the issue, but Poincaré prevailed upon him to support the Italian contention, so as to allay the susceptibilities of Mussolini. France was willing to condone Italy's aggressive behavior in order to enlist Mussolini's support on the German question and to prevent the establishment of a precedent that might possibly be used against her occupation of the Ruhr which had taken place a short time before. In yielding to French diplomatic pressure, Britain had in mind the decline of her naval power in the Mediterranean. She concluded that coercive action through the League was impossible and that she was not prepared to take the initiative on her own.

The tragedy of the Corfu crisis was not that the dispute was solved outside the League machinery, but that it in no way denied Mussolini the fruits of his aggression. His success in introducing a new style of diplomacy strengthened his commitment to an expansionist foreign policy and undermined the moderating influences of the regular officials of the Italian Foreign Office "who believed that the intricate and delicate task of negotiation and compromise was preferable to the assumption of impossible positions which could only lead to situations where compromise proved impossible and resort to force became a necessity." (p. 298.)

In retrospect, as Barros clearly indicates, the difficulty presenting itself during the Corfu crisis and repeated in Manchuria in 1931, in Ethiopia four years later, and in Munich in 1938, was that the League's two principal supporters, France and Britain, approached the problems facing the international organization within the context of their own conflicting interests and desires. Their differing interpretations regarding the implementation of the League machinery and the maintenance of the League system caused them to work at cross-purposes and, in so doing, weakened and ultimately helped to destroy the very system they were pledged to defend.

Although not precisely within the scope of this work, it should be noted that the one major attempt of the quarreling Balkan states to achieve intraregional cooperation was, in fact, not caused by the

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withdrawal of the Great Powers but rather their return to the area. While the story of the Balkan Entente belongs to the decade of the 1930's, the basis of the Entente—the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1930—developed largely as a result of the penetration of fascist Italy into the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean in the 1920's.

Professor Barros should be congratulated for this scholarly and thoughtful study. It is recommended as a case study in diplomacy and the efforts of international organizations to achieve the peaceful settlement of basic disputes.

Strategy and Power Politics in Ancient Greece*

by Bernard F. Donahue, O.S.F.S.

In *Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity*, Peter J. Fliess, Professor of Government at Louisiana State University, has set himself the task of analyzing the bipolar system of international relations which existed in the Greek world of the fifth century B.C. and was recorded by Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Since one's judgment of his achievement will be colored by the perspective from which the study is viewed, whether that of the specialist in international relations or that of the historian, it should be made clear that the former is the one adopted in this review.

Fliess ascribes a timely value to his study because of the similarity between the Greek system of 2400 years ago and the bipolar world of today. The simplicity of this proposition, however, skirts an issue which could have brought more clarity to his work if he had faced up to it and allowed it to guide him in his analysis: the issue of the validity of historical analogy.

As a point of fact, specialists in international relations receive variously the warning of George Santayana: "Those who refuse to learn from history are condemned to repeat it." For some, the application of historical analogies to contemporary events constitutes a restriction upon minds seeking a creative understanding of the facts as they are, a mental crutch which imposes unwarranted restraints upon the scientific investigation of reality. For others, to use the words of Morton A. Kaplan, "history is the great laboratory within which international action occurs." It is the reservoir of insights into the constants of human nature which operate in events irrespective of time and place; it is the priceless teacher which adds a third dimension, perspective, to the here and now.

If the truth lies in the middle ground, the effort of the student of historical international relations to reach it will benefit by his resolving the arguments of both protagonists. Nor is the value of doing so a purely speculative one. One hears today that the United States has a choice between seeing the war in Viet Nam through to a successful conclusion or else consummating a "Munich" in Southeast Asia. "Munich," of course, is an historical

**Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity.* By Peter J. Fliess. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966. 194 pp. $6.00.

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metaphor denominating an act of appeasement, a granting of undue concessions to an expansionist power which has the effect of encouraging further demands. Having learned the lesson of the 1938 Munich, U.S. foreign policymakers are unwilling to repeat it in Asia, especially when it would supply proof for the Maoist doctrine that wars of national liberation need not fear "the paper tiger." Thus it happens that Viet Nam is linked to Munich by historical analogy, and our present policy is supported by a lesson from the past.

What is critical in this case is whether or not Munich and Viet Nam are really analogous. Is the essence of an act of appeasement factually present in Southeast Asia today as it was in Europe in 1938? If it is, then historical analogy has performed a valuable service for the practitioners of statecraft; if it is not, then it has placed an unacceptable burden on policymaking. The obvious need in this issue is for an accurate historical analysis which will provide a solid theoretical foundation for analogical predication. By the same token, what is demanded in this example is also demanded in any historical study that purports to furnish insights into current events. Has Fliess written such a study in his treatment of Thucydides' *History*?

There are, in fact, two ways in which Thucydides' material can be approached. One can approach it as a historian, systematizing the data into relevant categories and letting the facts speak for themselves; or one can treat it from an analytical perspective, viewing the *History* as a vehicle for Thucydides' own insights into the events which he recorded. On the one hand, the result will be a reconstituted history; on the other hand, it will be a creative exposition of Thucydides' theoretical understanding of the events of his time. Fliess' work belongs to the former category.

As reconstituted history, *Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity* sifts Thucydides' *History* through categories which have a familiar ring in modern ears: "bipolarity and third powers," "cold war," "domestic politics and foreign affairs." As such, it is a generally successful attempt at reconstructing the events for which Thucydides is our major source of information. However, Fliess falls short of communicating to his reader the experience of insightful knowledge into international politics which Thucydides himself provides the careful reader of his *History*. Fliess sets forth the facts and reasons about them from a political perspective, but he provides no theoretical hypotheses. In fact, the result appears to be more an insight into the mind of Fliess than into the mind of Thucydides. It is this shortcoming that prevents this study from serving as a reliable source for analogical reasoning about today's bipolar international system.

This deficiency can be attributed not only to Fliess' failure to probe more deeply into Thucydides' materials but also at times to his misreading of them. For example, he writes off the initial Spartan strategy for waging the war as "evi-

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dence of the Spartan capacity for self-delusion," whereas Thucydides presents it as a shrewd plan based on the principle that war's hardships can demoralize a people. Thus, while Fliess speaks of the "fatuous hope" of Archidamus, the Spartan leader, in implementing the strategy, Thucydides sees in his advice the cunning of a skilled strategist.

Thucydides portrays Archidamus as reckoning that the devastation of Athens' territory outside its city walls, although contributing very little toward the destruction of Athens' material resources, might provoke the Athenians to commit a fatal error in judgment (*History:* II.11.7). As Thucydides tells it, Archidamus thought that at the very sight of the Spartan army "the Athenians would shrink from letting their land be wasted and would make their submission while it was still uninjured" (*History:* II.18.5). This failing, he then "hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency of their service to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation of their lands" (*History:* II.20.2). In that event the Athenians would expose themselves to defeat by the Spartan army in the very element of warfare in which it excelled. If, on the other hand, the Athenians did not come out to fight, Archidamus reasoned that he "could then fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions and extend his advance up to the very walls of Athens" and by doing this finally provoke "a division in the Athenian counsels" which would topple Athens from within (*History:* II.20.4).

The reason for the failure of this strategy is another story, but this interpretation of Archidamus' counsel indicates that Thucydides, when he is read with some depth of analysis, can provide productive insights. The distance between Athens and Saigon is a few thousand miles and over two thousand years, but with his analysis of the strategy of demoralization Thucydides closed the gap between them. Unfortunately, it is this type of analysis, supportive of analogy, which Fliess has failed to extract from the *History.*

Even granting that Fliess has restricted his study to the phenomenon of bipolarity and should be judged only in respect to this topic, his analysis of Thucydides' treatment of bipolarity falls short of the mark. His lack of theoretical depth here also has him at one time citing facts in support of one conclusion and immediately thereafter citing facts to support the opposite conclusion. While this type of presentation has the merit of impressing upon the reader the author's profound respect for the complexity of human affairs, it does little to furnish an insight into the handling of that complexity. For example, Fliess explains Athenian imperialism in terms of "the rationale of bipolarism," but he does not adequately explain Thucydides' own analysis of it in terms of the exigencies of sea power, the character of the Athenians, the growth of their interests, and the existence

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of an opportunity to indulge their expansionist ambitions. One can readily understand why Fliess wisely refrained from drawing any analogies from his material for application to current events; he would have been walking on very thin ice had he attempted to do so.

In brief, Fliess has provided a well-reconstructed history of an ancient bipolar system, but he has neither done justice to the theoretical analysis of the forces which Thucydides discerned in the events he recorded, nor given us a reliable guide to analogical reasoning.

System-Building in International Relations*

by Young W. Kihl

In his *International Relations: A General Theory,* John Burton makes a plea for a fresh look at familiar subjects: power, policy, war, peace, security, international organization. With "a slight shift in emphasis or the slightly altered perspective of new terms," (p. 141) it is expected that a whole new scheme for explaining the worldly phenomena will emerge. This is not altogether impossible since history is full of successful incidences of innovative enterprise: the Copernican revolution in natural science and the Keynesian revolution in economics may be cited as two outstanding examples.

Dr. Burton urges "rethinking" about and "restatement" of the traditional assumptions and theories in the study of international relations. Those acquainted with his earlier works, including *Peace Theory,* will recall that his idea is based on the concept of controlling conflict or change as the therapeutic device for the condition of peace. A similar vein of thought reappears in this work, which may be considered a more systematic exposition of Burton's thinking. In this sense the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the systematic theory of international relations. Its charm is that it is full of new and provocative interpretations of the topics with which many of us are already familiar.

The book is divided into six main parts. Following a somewhat cursory discussion of the general state of the international relations discipline, the author develops a set of five main arguments. First, he holds that the power approach to international relations is a failure since it is based on several false assumptions regarding the nature of man, the state and the causes of war. The consequences of this "orthodoxy" have led to policy conclusions that are both "self-perpetuating and self-defeating in terms of peace and security." (p. 2.) Second, owing to the nuclear threat and the spread of nationalism, the world environment has changed: the employment of force is restrained, "states are being obliged to break from reliance on alliances and forms of collective security," (p. 273) and we see trends toward increasing independence of political units.

**International Relations: A General Theory.* By John W. Burton. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1965. 288 pp. $7.50.

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Third, Burton maintains that a new conceptual model is needed to explain the altered world environment and the changing pattern of relations between states. This may take the form of a cybernetic model, with an emphasis on steering and decision-making rather than on power. Fourth, he argues that peace is dependent upon the condition of nonalignment. This national policy pursued by the new states, based on principles of independence and noncommitment in the Cold War, is a working model and "a relevant response" to the changing world environment. Nonalignment is not only emerging but must be made workable as an alternative to the power model. Finally, the author is convinced that a new system is evolving, marked by the principles of nonalignment, independence, nondiscrimination, nonintervention, and noninvolvement in the conflicts of others.

Of these six parts, the less controversial introductory and concluding sections are justifiable in light of the main argumentation. The description of the changing world environment in Part Three is also convincing. For example, when he recognizes the trends toward political independence, the author writes as if he had anticipated de Gaulle's retreat from NATO and the recent turmoils in the new African states and Indonesia. The sections on the new models and nonalignment are more provocative and require careful scrutiny. Also, Burton's criticism of the "orthodox" theory of the power model needs further consideration.

The suggestion to consider international organization as a system of communication and a model of decision-making seems basically sound and tenable. While proliferation of international bodies since World War II has been an important trend in world politics, the prevailing approach to the study of this subject has been largely legalistic and institutional. There is a need for systematic analysis of the dynamic forces and processes of international organization in world politics, and the communication model in this regard promises to yield a positive contribution.

What is more controversial is the concept of nonalignment. Burton rightly recognizes the trend toward policies of nonalignment as significant in interstate relations, but he fails to regard the emergence of new states and their nonalignment policies as a transitory phenomenon in world politics seen from the vantage of human history. In emphasizing the element of nonalignment, he may have exaggerated the point and idealized the situation, overlooking the fact that the present revolutionary environment may be replaced by a more stable and viable system. When he discusses the condition and possibilities of nonalignment, he depicts a utopia, thus making a theoretical leap from the realm of fact to that of prescription. Despite his attempt to qualify nonalignment "as an academic model" rather than as a "model in the exemplary sense" (p. 163), this confusion in the level of reasoning is not wholly dispelled.

Finally, Burton's basic stand re-

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garding power in international relations may be subject to criticism. It is debatable, for example, that the altered condition of the world environment has made the power approach to international relations less applicable and that "power in the form of force or the threat of force now plays a less important role than it did before 1945. . . ." (p. 1.) There are evidences that the actual condition of the world is more power-stricken and power-motivated than the author is prepared to admit.

The confusion, it seems to this reviewer, arises from the fact that in Burton's statement power is equated with nuclear weapons. Obviously nuclear weapons, although admittedly important, are only *one* element of power: the advent of the nuclear threat does not guarantee the abolition of power politics, per se. For generations power politics has been the prevailing pattern, the essence and form of international relations. Technological breakthroughs — nuclear weapons included — are not likely to do away with or minimize the importance of power in interstate relations. Even among the specialists the question of the proper role of nuclear deterrence is still unresolved. The continued drift toward multipolarity in the international system—as the independent moves of China and de Gaulle's France indicate—promises the revival of power politics and the continuous application of the balance-of-power model among the major actors on the world stage.

A further criticism can be made about Burton's method of presentation. The central theme of the book is simply and clearly stated, but it is repeated over and over, thus reducing the forcefulness of the presentation, at least for this reader. Further elaboration and substantiation of the theme with some fresh facts and evidence seems required in order to make the argument more effective.

Despite this procedural flaw, Burton demonstrates that he is not only a master of synthesizing the complex ideas of various individuals but also an original interpreter of a familiar subject and a source of new concepts. Sometimes innovation occurs in science as in other scholarship from creative synthesis as much as from an act of system-building. A careful reading of this book will yield abundant ideas, and serious students will find it challenging and stimulating.

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Books Received

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I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Development. Edited by Bertram M. Gross. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 314 pp. $12.00. An approach to national planning for economic and social progress that deals with the realities of implementation as they are affected by institutional, cultural, environmental, political and managerial as well as economic factors. The eight authors —English, French, Polish and American experts on national planning—evolve a practical international planning terminology and specific concepts of the general planning process, national planning in particular, and national planning institutions.

After Victory: Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace. By William L. Neumann. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 212 pp. $5.95. An examination of Big Power diplomacy during and immediately after World War II by a member of the History Department of Goucher College. His emphasis is on the roles of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, whom he describes as "fallible men, working to achieve their best . . . within the framework of their particular national values and interests."

Contemporary Political Analysis. Edited by James C. Charlesworth. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 380 pp. $8.50 ($3.95, paper). In this important contribution to an understanding of the latest and most important thinking on research methods in political science, 19 authorities discuss behavioralism, functional analysis, quantitative methods, systems theory, decision-making theory, game theory, communications theory, and political development.

Doctrines of Imperialism. By A. P. Thornton. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. 246 pp. $5.95 ($2.95, paper). In this reappraisal of imperialism, Professor Thornton, a historian at the University of Toronto, analyzes the doctrines of power, profit and civilization that have animated the instinctive human activity known as imperialism. He treats the subject from Roman times to the present, argues against the purely economic interpretation, allots as much space to the ideas and habits of empire-builders as he does to those of their critics, and insists that imperialism is not merely a phase in the history of international relations but an integral factor in all eras.

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 340 pp. $7.50. Drawing upon the conceptual and empirical insights of sociology and psychology as well as political science, ten specialists examine the impact of domestic institutions, individual personality and behavior, voting, the mass media, interest groups, and other social and political variables on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

The Evolution of International Organizations. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: Praeger, 1966. 342 pp. $9.00. An assessment of the causes, instruments and types

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of change, and the obstacles to change, within international organizations, presented as a series of case studies. Considered are the League of Nations, the United Nations' General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, Administrative Committee on Coordination, Peace Forces and Economic Organs, the International Labour Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Economic Community.

Issues of Political Development. By Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 248 pp. n.p. (paper). An exploration of three critical issues of political development: integrating the "nation" in the face of centrifugal subnational loyalties; establishing and maintaining order and stability in the midst of civic disruption and violence; and fashioning a workable ideology that will describe what the "nation" wants to achieve in the way of material well-being and a desirable social order. The book includes case studies of violence in Burma, Congo and Colombia.

The Making of Foreign Policy: East and West. By Kurt London. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1965. 358 pp. n.p. (paper). An examination of the foreign policy machinery of the United States, Great Britain, France, the USSR and Communist China. In introductory chapters the author, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, treats subjects such as international law, ideology, nuclear stalemate, and war and peace in a divided world; the elements of national power; and the influence on policymaking of domestic politics, economic factors, and national security policy. Remaining chapters are concerned with intelligence ("the crux of foreign policy making"), propaganda, the conduct of diplomacy, foreign ministries and the formulation of policy, and the relationship of foreign ministries to international organization.

Peace or Peaceful Coexistence? By Richard V. Allen. Chicago: American Bar Association (Standing Committee on Education Against Communism), 1966. 233 pp. n.p. The communists define peaceful coexistence as "the strategic line designed for the whole period of the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale." To Westerners unschooled in Soviet semantics it means simply "live and let live." With the object of unmasking this intentionally deceptive slogan as an obstacle to genuine peace the American Bar Association asked Mr. Allen, who is affiliated with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University as a Senior Staff Member, to undertake an analysis of Soviet statements on the subject. The result was *Peaceful Coexistence: A Communist Blueprint for Victory*, published in 1964. The present work, analyzing more than 3,000 articles, books and other documents of communist origin, expands that first study.

Progress and Revolution: A Study of the Issues of Our Age. By Robert Waelder. New York: International Universities Press, 1967. 372 pp. $7.00. Dr. Waelder, an eminent psychologist, outlines the basic plot of modern history. He traces the evolutionary and revolutionary developments in scientific-technological progress and moral progress; shows how the advocates of one kind of progress were usually advocates of the other; and examines the relationship of these two forms of progress and their effect on mankind. He analyzes the concept of power, structures of governments, role of violence, influence of ideas, conditions for revolution, predicaments of developed societies (both democracies and communist systems), and the awesome problems confronting developing societies.

Rural Planning in Developing Countries: Report on the Second Rehovoth Conference, Israel, August 1963. Edited by Raanan Weitz. Cleveland: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1966. 443 pp. $9.50. Representatives of 38 countries and a number of international organizations discuss agricultural plan-

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ning and rural development, the human factor in agricultural development, and agricultural research, extension and education. The views of participants from underdeveloped areas are emphasized, and each topic is illuminated by editorial comment.

Theory and the International System. By Charles A. McClelland. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 138 pp. $1.50 (paper). A survey and explanation of the major trends in the study of international relations, including the traditional historical approach, political theory, behavioralism, systems analysis, decision-making analysis, and communications theory. In analyzing and comparing the strengths, weaknesses and achievements of the traditional and new methods, Professor McClelland provides a balanced and detached perspective of the field of international relations.

The United Nations in the Balance: Accomplishments and Prospects. Edited by Norman J. Padelford and Leland M. Goodrich. New York: Praeger, 1965. 482 pp. $2.95 (paper). Twenty-seven essays, from the special Summer 1965 issue of *International Organization,* provide a carefully measured estimate of the United Nations' first twenty years. Each is a study-in-depth of one aspect of UN activity. Together they appraise the evolving institution, its balance sheet of cooperation and conflict, its relations with member-nations, and its prospects for becoming more useful in the future.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

Arms Control for the Late Sixties. Edited by James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967. 265 pp. $8.50. Twenty-seven distinguished diplomats, scientists, strategists, policymakers, political scientists and analysts of arms control and disarmament problems discuss the anti-proliferation issue and its implications for NATO; ballistic missile defense; détente and Viet Nam; and the control of conflict through international machinery. The papers presented here are an outgrowth of the Third International Arms Control Symposium. Contributors include Richard J. Barnet, William R. Kintner, Thomas W. Wolfe, Edward Teller, Hedley Bull, Klaus Knorr, Robert Strausz-Hupé, Kenneth E. Boulding, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Herman Kahn.

Maritime Strategy. By Sir Peter Gretton. New York: Praeger, 1965. 210 pp. $6.75. A study of the role of seapower in an era of nuclear strategy. Vice Admiral Gretton's major premise is that the threat to the West takes the form primarily of limited wars, pressures, harassments and subversion. He believes that the use of conventional seapower may offer a more practical means for the display of force or the application of power than dependence on the land or air arm, and argues that NATO naval strategy should pay more attention to its conventional forces than to its nuclear strike forces.

The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy. Edited by John Erickson. New York: Praeger, for the Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1966. 284 pp. $7.50. Seventeen European and American specialists, including Ferdinand O. Miksche, Thomas W. Wolfe, Nikolai Galay, Raymond Garthoff, Malcolm Mackintosh and Herbert Dinerstein, discuss such topics as the dilemma of nuclear strategy, the Soviet approach to the modern military revolution, the McNamara Doctrine, neutralism and the West, NATO's organizational crisis, the cohesion of the Soviet bloc, Soviet naval strategy, the future of manned aircraft and anti-missile systems, and implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95. How to maintain peace in an era of strategic confronta-

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tions, rapid technological progress, arms races, and revolutions is the subject of this book. Professor Kintner argues that "the strategic nuclear superiority of the United States has been, and can continue to be, the major contribution to whatever tenuous stability the world enjoys." However, he expresses concern that Defense Department measures and programs "are no longer adequate, particularly in light of the sustained Soviet drive to reverse the strategic balance of power." He examines the post-World War II history of nuclear weapons and strategy, the technological revolution, the strategic assets and liabilities of both sides, Soviet strategic dilemmas, the efficacy of arms control, NATO and the defense of Europe; and recommends measures to sustain U.S. strategic superiority.

Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs. By Sir Solly Zuckerman. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 177 pp. $4.95. A collection of essays and lectures dealing with the grave responsibilities of science and scientists for the military and political decisions of our time. Among the author's themes are the political consequences of international scientific cooperation; the U.S.-USSR technological-military stalemate; the problem of secrecy in scientific research; and the rising economic costs of scientific, technological and engineering research.

III. United States and Canada

Among the Anti-Americans. By Thomas B. Morgan. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. 211 pp. $5.95. A former editor of *Esquire,* senior editor of *Look,* and press secretary to Adlai Stevenson, probes the causes for growing anti-Americanism abroad by seeking out the views of peasants, clerks, labor leaders, intellectuals, priests, newspaper editors, and statesmen toward America —her wealth, power, policies, image. His account of the anti-American syndrome is based on interviews with Brazilians, Japanese, Indonesians, Egyptians, Kenyans and Frenchmen.

The Bombs of Palomares. By Tad Szulc. New York: The Viking Press, 1967. 274 pp. $6.50. A chronicle of the land and sea search for the missing H-bomb off Palomares, Spain. Although the book suffers from a number of technical errors, it is well-written and points up the international ramifications of the incident.

Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance. By John B. McLin. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 251 pp. $8.50. A study of several controversial issues that have been central to Canadian defense policy formulation between 1957 and 1963, including Canada's participation in NORAD, the purchase or development of several advanced weapons systems, and the decision to arm these systems with nuclear warheads. These problems are analyzed in the context of Canada's domestic security problems, foreign policy and NATO commitments.

A Nation on Trial: America and the War of 1812. By Patrick C. T. White. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. 177 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper). In this treatment of U.S. foreign policy from 1803 to 1815, Dr. White, Associate Professor of History at the University of Toronto, examines the issues that drove the United States and Britain apart; the attempts made to resolve these differences; and the factors, including the military stalemate, which shaped the compromise peace settlement.

The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad. By Charles Frankel. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965. 156 pp. $5.00. A study of the principles that should guide U.S. educational and cultural relations with other countries, especially those of an official nature. Dr. Frankel, a Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University when he wrote

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this book, and currently Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, reviews the problems and responsibilities of the U.S. representative in the field, the Cultural Affairs Officer; suggests reforms to carry out the principles he outlines; and restates the purposes of educational and cultural relations.

One of Our H-Bombs is Missing. By Flora Lewis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 270 pp. $5.95. The author, a *Washington Post* correspondent, reports on the search for and reaction to the missing U.S. H-bomb off Palomares, Spain. An interesting account of the underwater search for the weapon highlights her narrative.

United States Higher Education and World Affairs: A Partially Annotated Bibliography. By Richrad F. Crabbs and Frank W. Holmquist. New York: Praeger, 1967. 207 pp. $12.50. Begun in 1964 as a service to members of the Indiana University Committee on International Affairs, this is a bibliographic survey of the international role of American colleges and universities. Topical sections cover international educational activity in general, the international content of curricula, area studies, training for international service, exchange programs, U.S. nationals abroad, foreign nationals in the United States, institutional relationships and resource materials.

The United States in World Affairs 1966. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 487 pp. $6.95.

Documents on American Foreign Relations 1966. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 530 pp. $9.50. Continuing the annual series published for the Council on Foreign Relations, these companion volumes present the international experience of the United States and the principal documentary texts relating to American foreign policy during 1966. In the narrative account of the year's developments the war in Viet Nam has prominence, followed by chapters on East-West and intra-West relations, Near Eastern and South Asian conflicts, Africa, the East and China, Latin America, the expanding United Nations, and the divided American mind with respect to foreign policy issues. The annotated documents include President Johnson's speeches in favor of détente, the diplomatic exchanges occasioned by French disengagement from the NATO defense structure, the many proposals looking toward a Viet Nam settlement, and cover, among other broad topics, the search for disarmament and accomplishments in international cooperation.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

The Alliance of Necessity: Britain's Crisis, the New Europe and American Interests. By Lionel Gelber. New York: Stein and Day, 1966. 192 pp. $5.95. The author assesses the potential implications of British Common Market membership for the Anglo-American "special relationship". According to Gelber, Britain's position as an ally of the United States would be diminished by British EEC entry.

Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966. 208 pp. $5.95 ($2.95, paper). An examination of the nature of domestic changes in East European countries as well as changing relationships between the Soviet Union and its client states. The author presents his framework for a U.S. policy of "peaceful engagement" in Eastern Europe and devotes considerable attention to the problem of German reunification.

The Atlantic Community: A Study in Unity and Diversity. By Drew Middleton. New York: David McKay, 1965. 303 pp. $5.95. After reviewing recent trends

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within NATO and the European unification movement, the author assesses the policies of major West European powers and the Soviet Union, and presents a framework for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance.

Atlantic Economic Cooperation: The Case of the OECD. By Henry G. Aubrey. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967. 214 pp. $6.00. The author assesses the performance of OECD in the light of the major economic problems which the industrialized countries of the West and Japan can solve only in collaboration with each other. Included is an appraisal of prospects for broadening the activities of OECD and resolving problems already within its purview in the fields of agriculture, trade, science, education and economic growth.

Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization. By Gianfranco Poggi. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 280 pp. $8.00. A case study of Azione Cattolica Italiana (Italian Catholic Action), an organization dedicated to promoting the Church's influence in all areas of Italian life. Dealing with the period from 1944 to 1958, the author assesses the relationship between the ACI, the Church and the general social environment. He concludes that the ACI's difficulties reflect the more basic question of whether the Catholic Church can meet the challenges posed by the secularization of Italian life.

Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955. By Gerhard Wettig. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967. 863 pp. n.p. Gerhard Wettig, specialist in the foreign policy of the Soviet bloc at the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies (Cologne), presents a detailed account of the motives behind the Allied Powers' decision to disarm Germany and the measures taken to accomplish this objective. He then discusses the reasons for, and early stages of, rearmament in West Germany and in the Eastern zone.

France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. By Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis V. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis and Richard L. Merritt. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. 324 pp. $2.95 (paper). This volume is the product of a survey of French and German elite attitudes on U.S. military strategy, the MLF, a national European nuclear force, a multilateral European nuclear capability, and other issues related to European integration and world politics.

The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present. By Gerhard Ritter. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, for the Mershon Center, 1965. 233 pp. $6.00. This brief interpretive study of German history and political institutions is an effort to counteract the tendency—noticeable especially among the younger generation of German intellectuals—"to turn away from the idea of the nation as a historically bound and binding community. . . . this antinationalism exemplifies the innate—or perhaps historically conditioned—German inclination toward radical, unqualified shifts in the development of their ideas. . . ." The author believes German scholars must seek to keep alive the German people's interest in their national past, for otherwise how can a sound German state, resting on the confidence of the entire people, be built if historic identity atrophies and organic continuity with the past is severed?

The Politics of the Common Market. By W. Hartley Clark. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 180 pp. $4.95. Drawing upon official and secondary materials, the author examines the structure and operation of the European Community. Included are chapters on the Council and Commission, as well as the European Parliament and Court. The volume provides a concise survey and introduction to the study of the European Community.

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The Superparliaments: Interparliamentary Consultation and Atlantic Cooperation. By J. Allen Hovey, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1966. 202 pp. $10.00. In the first comprehensive examination of international parliamentary bodies in the North Atlantic area, the author describes the operation of the North Atlantic Assembly and the European regional assemblies, and assesses their contribution to collaboration among Atlantic countries.

West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response. By Wolfram F. Hanrieder. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 275 pp. $7.50. By employing systems analysis, the author attempts to bridge the gap left by authors who study only the international or the domestic aspects of foreign policy formulation and implementation. Concerned with three sets of relationships---one between foreign policy goals and the conditions of the external operational environment, a second between foreign policy goals and the internal motivational environment, and a third consisting of the correlation of the first two sets—the author examines the degree of overlap between external patterns of feasibility and internal patterns of consensus. He believes that in the middle 1950's fundamental attributes of the international system were changing, thus providing new opportunities to German foreign policymakers to accomplish their foreign policy objectives.

V. Communist Bloc

Chinese Communism. By Robert C. North. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 254 pp. $4.95. This brief history of China in the 19th and 20th centuries is a volume in the World University Library. The Library seeks to provide authoritative introductory books for universtiy students which will be of interest also to the general reader.

Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919-1930. By George D. Jackson, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 339 pp. $8.50. Dr. Jackson, Professor of Russian and Modern European History at Hofstra University, traces the development of Comintern policy toward the peasantry in the early years of competition between communists and agrarians for peasant allegiance in Eastern Europe—and the pattern thus provided for later communist strategy in backward countries. He describes the social and economic problems of Eastern Europe and the solutions offered by communism and agrarianism; the struggle coordinated on the international level by the Red Peasant International and the populist International Agrarian Bureau at Prague; and the national conflicts in Bulgaria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, where the Comintern peasant policy was applied.

Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. By William Hinton. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. 637 pp. $12.50. A glowing report on land reform and other "progressive" policies in Long Bow village in South Shansi following its "liberation" by Chinese communist forces. Mr. Hinton, a Pennsylvania farmer, was working as a tractor technician for UNRRA in 1947-1948 when he went to the village as an observer, and he remained in China until 1953.

A Geography of China. By T. R. Tregear. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965. 342 pp. $7.95. A former Lecturer in Geography at the University of Hong Kong describes the physical, historical, economic and social geography of China, and then explores the many geographic regions and the factors making for disunity and unity in China. The more than 100 plates, maps and diagrams, and the bibliography, glossary and conversion tables make this a basic reference book and teaching aid.

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Khrushchev: A Career. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: The Viking Press, 1966. 311 pp. $7.50. A readable and insightful account of Khrushchev's career by a foremost authority on the Soviet Union, this is also a graphic history of post-revolutionary Russia illumined by the author's on-the-scene perceptions acquired in service with the British Military Mission and as correspondent for the London *Observer*. The tragedy of deluded masses being manipulated by a ruthless clique—seen as more concerned with power than ideology—is always part of the scene as Khrushchev contrives his rise from humble peasant origins to become master of 200 million Russians and a determining force in world affairs. He is described as "the consummate career politician, the opportunist, the actor . . . the natural bully," who still remembered what it was to be a human being and cherish Russia above the Communist Party, so that the drama of his supreme years was the conflict between this expressive humanity and the corruption that marked his rise to the top.

Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World—Its Appeals and Paradoxes. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. New York: Praeger, for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966. 192 pp. $6.50. The seven essays in this symposium are based on papers presented at the Hoover Institution's conference on One Hundred Years of Revolutionary Internationals held in October 1964 at Stanford University. Five discuss the varying ideological appeals of Marxism in Western, communist and "third world" countries—as a tool of social critique for the alienated intellectual; Leninized, as a unifying social cement identified with power and "historic mission"; as a guide to modernization and promise of Utopia—and the remaining two analyze Marxist economics and the competitive concepts of communist planning and capitalism as models for economic development. All point out the ambiguities of Marxism as the doctrinal basis of contemporary communism.

Poland's Politics. By Adam Bromke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 316 pp. $9.95. Dr. Bromke's thesis is that Poland's preoccupation with foreign policy in its struggle for identity between Germany and Russia has given rise to a conflict between political idealism and political realism which is the most pervasive phenomenon in modern Polish political life. Yet the aim of the moderate versions of both programs is the same: to make Poland more secure by advancing its interest vis-à-vis its powerful neighbors. The positivist accommodation with the communist power structure has swerved to a middle course, seeking to lessen dependence on the Soviet Union without leaning toward the West so that the old Prussian provinces might have to be relinquished to German territorial claims, and because of it Poland is stronger than at any time in the last century. A revival of political idealism would hinge on Western—including German—approval of Poland's present boundaries.

Soviet Ideology Today. By Gustav A. Wetter. New York: Praeger, 1966. 334 pp. $7.50. Father Wetter provides both a condensation and a critique of the official post-Stalin version of communist doctrine as interpreted in the contemporary Soviet textbooks, *Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy* (1958) and *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (1959). He defines the major changes in the philosophy since de-Stalinization, reviews Soviet economic theory and its implications, and criticizes, point by point, what he considers the inherent fallacies of the doctrine. Today's communism, he contends, is trapped by its rigid dependence on dialectical and historical materialism and would sooner use force to alter the course of history in accordance with Marxist theory than accommodate that theory to historical realities.

Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition. Edited by Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton. New York: Praeger, 1967. 274 pp. $6.50. A

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panel of distinguished Sovietologists analyzes the new forces at work in Soviet decision-making since "government by fiat" has become "government by reconciliation of conflicting interests." Professor Morton discusses the Soviet political process as it compares with those of the Western industrialized nations. The essays that follow explore the Liberman plan for introducing the profit motive into agriculture and industry; the move to make the Academy of Sciences once again a sanctuary for theoretical, as opposed to applied, science; the shifts in policy on literature and cultural contacts with the outside world; the effort to reform adoption and divorce laws; the mitigation of anti-parasite penal decrees; and the factors behind the fluctuations in Soviet foreign policy.

VI. Middle East and Africa

African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy. Edited by Vernon McKay. New York: Praeger, for the School of Advanced International Studies, 1966. 210 pp. $6.00 ($1.95, paper). In this comparative study of the foreign relations and politics of African states, seven American scholars from various disciplines—anthropology, economics, geography, history and political science—examine such topics as national interest and ideology, economic determinants, military influences, cultural and psychological factors, political determinants and external political pressures. The editor contributes two essays on international conflict patterns and research needs.

The Anatomy of Uhuru: Dynamics and Problems of African Independence in an Age of Conflict. By N. S. Carey Jones. New York: Praeger, 1967. 231 pp. $6.50. An historical interpretation of the events that led to Kenya's independence, by a man who, as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, was in charge of buying European-owned farms for resettlement by Africans. His reference point, in describing the momentum given to *uhuru* by social and economic geography, the immigrant races, the Africans themselves and world influences, and arriving at a post-independence balance sheet, is the effect of the changed national status on the "ordinary" African—"in his millions . . . his hunger . . . his attempt to live."

Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics. Edited by Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno. New York: Praeger, 1967. 342 pp. $15.00. Of these 12 papers from a faculty seminar at Boston University's African Studies Center (1963-1965), five deal with political parties and political theory, mainly in East African countries. Other subjects treated are legal and constitutional developments (in Ghana and the Bechuanaland Protectorate); corruption and machine politics (in Ibadan); the relationship between religion and politics, and the role of trade unions and trade unionism.

Communism in Africa. By Fritz Schatten. New York: Praeger, 1966. 352 pp. $7.95. Fritz Schatten, who fled the Eastern zone of Germany in 1949 and is now head of the Foreign Department of a West German broadcast network and a foreign affairs specialist for German and Swiss newspapers, reports on the efforts of international communism to penetrate, subvert and influence African nations. He traces the history of communist policy toward Africa, analyzes the differences between Soviet and Chinese strategies and interests, concludes that communism does not appear to present an immediate danger to the continent thanks to the strong force of nationalism, and offers a critique of and guidelines for Western policy.

French North Africa: The Maghrib Between Two World Wars. By Jacques Berque. New York: Praeger, 1967. 422 pp. $12.50. A political, social, cultural and economic history of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia under French colonial rule during the 1920's and 1930's, written by a Frenchman, born and educated in

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Algeria, who has taught at universities in many Arab lands, and who is now Professor of the Social History of Contemporary Islam at the Collège de France in Paris. A generally unfavorable portrayal of the French colonial system emerges.

Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic. By Dwight L. Ling. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. 273 pp. $7.50. The author, Professor of History and Assistant Dean of De Pauw University, describes the land, climate and people of Tunisia, the impact of French culture during the 75-year protectorate, the rise of nationalism, the bitter struggle for independence led by the Neo-Destour Party and Habib Bourguiba, who became President of the free republic in 1959, and the subsequent record of the newborn nation. He finds the story of Tunisia's prudent reaction to her problems of political immaturity and economic development an edifying chapter in the contemporary history of young governments.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Cambodia's Foreign Policy. By Roger M. Smith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. 273 pp. $5.75. Although this book is two years old, it remains a valuable guide to the puzzling foreign policies and attitudes of Cambodia. Separate chapters treat of the 1954 Geneva accords and their effect on Cambodia; her relations with the major powers; the long-standing hostility between Cambodia and two of her neighbors, Viet Nam and Thailand; and her reactions to the fighting in Laos and Viet Nam.

Communism in Vietnam: A Documentary Study. By Rodger Swearingen and Hammond Rolph. Chicago: American Bar Association, 1967. 195 pp. $1.00 (paper). This documentary study of the goals, methods and interests of Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and the Viet Cong as they relate to the conflict in Viet Nam is based on such primary sources as official communist journals and radio broadcasts, statements and books by communist leaders, and formal resolutions adopted at communist conferences.

India, China and Pakistan. By Latif Ahmed Sherwani. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1967. 140 pp. Rs. 9.00 or $2.75. This is a critical analysis, by a leading Pakistani student of international affairs, of the foreign policy of India, "with special reference to its motivations and the roles of Pakistan and China in its formulation." The author obviously feels that India is largely responsible for its difficulties with both Pakistan and China. He is particularly critical of India's policy on Kashmir and he argues that India sought a conflict with Pakistan in 1965. He begins by noting that India has had conflicting concepts of its national interests and he concludes by suggesting that it should take a fresh look at its true interests before they are damaged "beyond repair."

The Security of Southern Asia. By D. E. Kennedy. New York: Praeger, 1965. 308 pp. $7.50. Dr. Kennedy, Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Melbourne, Australia, examines the security problems of the countries from the Philippines to Pakistan; the defense policies and national potential of these nations; Soviet and Chinese strategy and interests; the techniques of communist subversion, especially those of the Viet Cong; the counterinsurgency efforts of the various countries; the role of SEATO; and the prospects for working out a more effective Asian security system with U.S. support.

Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. By Donald E. Nuechterlein. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. 279 pp. $5.95. A U.S. government official who served in Thailand from 1961 to 1963 reports on Thailand's foreign policy since World War II, with an introduction to the historical setting of the preceding century. The author provides a valuable account of the 1961-1962 Laotian crisis when Thailand's faith in SEATO and her American ally was

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weakened. Although Washington tried to reassure Bangkok of its determination to fight communist aggression, the Thai government remained skeptical of U.S. intentions as late as the U.S. Presidential election of 1964.

Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience. By Robert McAfee Brown, Abraham J. Heschel and Michael Novak. New York: Association Press, 1967. 127 pp. $.95. Three clergymen from America's major faiths call upon Protestants, Jews and Catholics to bring pressure on the U.S. government to halt the war in Viet Nam which they say is "impossible to justify."

Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. By Chester A. Bain. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 184 pp. $4.95. A former professor of East Asian studies who is currently a Foreign Service Officer with the United States Information Agency traces the 2300-year history of Viet Nam through alternating eras of Chinese conquest, autonomy, French conquest, and the present period of independence, partition and upheaval. He shows how a complicated cultural heritage—Confucianism, Buddhism, Catholicism, native lore and animism, and Chinese and Western social and political institutions and concepts—conditions the present turmoil.

Viet-Nam Witness, 1953-1966. By Bernard B. Fall. New York: Praeger, 1966. 363 pp. $6.95. In this selection of his writings on Viet Nam from 1953 to 1966, the late Bernard Fall emerges as a consistent critic of French, South Vietnamese and U.S. policies. He treats such matters as the French debacle at Dien Bien Phu, the rise and fall of the Diem regime and family, the violation of the Geneva accords, and the gradual and finally large-scale intervention of U.S. forces.

VIII. Latin America

Foreign Investment in Latin America: Cases and Attitudes. Edited with an Introduction by Marvin D. Bernstein. New York: Knopf, 1966. 305 pp. $2.50 (paper). The vast outpouring of European and American capital into Latin America, while it has undoubtedly aided economic growth, has in many cases raised problems for the debtor countries. The subject is here considered from both angles. Among the case studies, Rómulo Betancourt writes on "Venezuela: Politics and Petroleum," Robert F. Smith on "The United States and Cuba," and John F. Gallagher on "The Sears, Roebuck Venture in Latin America." The points of view range from the brief for private enterprise presented by H. W. Balgooyen, Vice President of the American & Foreign Power Company, to the Marxian outlook of the Mexican economist, Pablo González Casanova.

Latin America: Problems and Perspectives of Economic Development, 1963-1964. Prepared in the Department of Economic Affairs of the Pan American Union. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the Organization of American States, 1966. 242 pp. $6.50. This survey of Latin American economic development examines the current status and prospects for growth; the necessity for an increase in foreign trade, especially in exports; efforts toward regional integration; the need for more external financing and the decline in foreign investments; the failure of the public sectors in most Latin American countries to generate sufficient levels of savings; and the prevalence of low agricultural productivity and poor marketing facilities.

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Monographs and Reports Received

Africa, 1967. By Pierre Etienne Dostert. Washington: Stryker-Post Publications, The World Today Series, January 1967. 89 pp. $1.75.

Africa: Problems and Prospects, A Bibliographic Survey. Prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U.S. Army. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet No. 550-5, April 28, 1967. 226 pp. n.p.

Central American Regional Integration. By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation*, March 1967, No. 562. 66 pp. 50 cents.

The Changing Strategic Military Balance: USA vs. USSR. A Study prepared for the House Armed Services Committee by the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council. Chicago: American Security Council, June 1967. 103 pp. $1.50.

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